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OF THE  
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

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*Containing the Papers read before the Society during the  
Thirty-Eighth Session, 1916–1917.*

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
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# PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY.

1916-1917.

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## I.—THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNITION.

*By* H. WILDON CARR.

THE study of the problem of Recognition which I now offer to the Aristotelian Society on this second occasion on which I am honoured with the duty of delivering a Presidential Address, I was led to undertake by the Symposium on "The Implications of Recognition" in our last Session.\* Philosophical problems have a way of beginning with something apparently simple and easy and leading one on until one is lost in the general problem of metaphysical reality. That at least is a common experience with me, and I find this no exception to the rule. It has led me further than I expected when I contributed to the Symposium, and further than I expected when I went on thinking about it.

In this address I wish to deal with two questions. In the first place I wish to inquire into the nature of the modification of a cognition which constitutes it a recognition. This is the problem of recognition, so far as its source is within the individual's experience. In the second place I wish to inquire

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\* "The Implications of Recognition," a Symposium, by Miss Beatrice Edgell, Mr. F. E. Bartlett, Mr. G. E. Moore and Mr. H. W. Carr (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1915-16, p. 179).

how there can be recognition, as there appears to be, where there can be no conscious memory of the prior cognition. This is the problem of recognition so far as its source is beyond the individual's experience and in his ancestral experience. More briefly I may describe my problem as that of the nature of intelligent recognition and of instinctive recognition and of their relation.

As the subject is a very large one and the temptations to turn off the track of the inquiry will be manifold, it may be well to state clearly certain very closely connected problems which I wish to avoid discussing. I do not propose to discuss the nature of instinct and intelligence and their relation to one another. I wish only to discuss the nature of recognition, intelligent or instinctive. I do not propose to discuss any of the well-known theories as to the nature of the relation of mind and body, though the dependence of recognition on physiological process on the one hand and on conscious process on the other will lead me to deal with the problem of mind and body. I wish only to discuss in this connection in what sense instinctive recognition is a mental fact.

In recognition there is, as distinctive of the experience, an element we may describe as "againness." It is the experience "had before," "seen already." Under the first question I wish to discuss the nature and genesis of the experience of "againness." Under the second question, I wish to inquire how there can be, as there certainly appears to be, recognition in the first performance by an animal of an instinctive action.

These two questions may appear to be quite distinct and to have nothing whatever in common, and some may object that while the first is a question which can only be resolved by subjective or introspective analysis and is therefore in the full sense a question of philosophy, the second is merely a question of descriptive natural history, and any theory founded on the description can only be of quite secondary philosophical

importance. It must rest, they will say, almost entirely on analogy and if treated philosophically cannot avoid the taint of anthropomorphism. I shall try to show that this is not so. The two questions are in my view very closely associated and are indeed part of one and the same metaphysical problem. At the same time I propose to keep them distinct.

1. *What is the Nature of the Modification of Cognition which makes it Recognition?*

There may be no cognition which is cognition only and not recognition. Every cognition may be a recognition, and a pure cognition may be a limiting concept. In a developed consciousness such as our own, were there only cognition and no recognition, there would be no acquirement of meaning and therefore no experience in the ordinary sense of the word. The recognitions in present experience may be the cognitions on which future recognitions depend, and so likewise the cognitions on which present recognitions depend may themselves have been recognitions. Pure cognition, however, is theoretically conceivable, and as an abstract possibility it forms part of the concept of experience as a concrete reality. Logically and etymologically cognition is presupposed in recognition. Cognition is the ground or condition of recognition.

If the second apprehension of an identical object or of an identical event were a repetition of the first apprehension and only numerically different from it, recognition would simply be the addition of memory and judgment to the mental act of apprehension. But plainly this is not the fact, for there are cases of recognition in which there is no repetition of any experience at all, and in most cases of recognition, if not in all, even though there may seem to be a similarity between a present experience and a past experience on which a judgment of identity could be based, there is no similarity in fact. If this be disputed it is at least certain that there may be

recognition where there is no similarity even between the present recognised object and any previous experience of that object whatever.

The term recognition, as distinct from the term cognition, connotes that the meaning, or content, or implication of a sense presentation is in some way already known: it is the direct immediate apprehension of familiarity with the object presented to us. The nature of this apprehension of a mark of our own past experience in an object present to sense or to thought is the problem of recognition. That the problem is a difficult one will be evident to anyone who will refer to the article on "Recognition" in Baldwin's *Dictionary*. Three main groups of theories are there specified and these are again subdivided into twelve sub-groups, and a list of psychological writers, by no means exhaustive, is added, each of whom seems to have propounded a distinct theory or to have adopted some characteristic doctrine of recognition.

The task I am going to set myself is not that of comparing and criticising these different theories: I wish to inquire how far we can directly observe the process of recognition at work—the process by which cognition acquires the modification which makes it recognition. It will lead me to a metaphysical theory. I do not see how this can be avoided, and therefore it is well to give warning. The problem of recognition cannot be decided by observation of empirical fact, for that depends on the pre-suppositions which psychology, like every special science, adopts. This was made clear, I think, if nothing else was, in the symposium to which I have referred. The real difference which divided us was metaphysical—so at least it appeared to me—a different theory of the nature of the continuity of experience.

Let me begin by taking some definite instances of what everyone would accept as cases of recognition. This appears an easy matter because recognition is a perfectly familiar experience. It is in fact, however, peculiarly difficult, and the difficulty is

of a quite paradoxical nature, due to a veritable *embarras de richesse*. I can find nothing else in my cognitive experience but recognitions, and I cannot therefore establish by a clear example what is a recognition in distinction from what is only a cognition. Nevertheless for practical purposes we make a clear and well-marked distinction between what we term recognitions and the cognitions on which they depend. It is only when we analyse these cognitions that we find that they in their turn are also recognitions. When we push our analysis to the point of imagining the simplest conditions of cognition and the absolutely unanalysable character of a first cognition we are driven to hypostasise some theoretical being like Condillac's statue and endow it with sense organs one at a time, and follow out the gradual complications of sense experience from its hypothetically simple origin. It is logic or epistemology which spurs us to the attempt, not psychology.

(1) The young chick, we are told by Professor Lloyd Morgan, at first pecks instinctively at all small objects. But experience very rapidly teaches it that it is pleasant to peck at some things, such as yolk of egg, or cabbage-moth caterpillars, and very unpleasant to peck at others, such as cinnabar caterpillars or bits of orange peel. The young chick profits by experience and thereby comes to recognise objects. The latter experience we should call recognition of objects in distinction from the earlier experience, and this earlier experience we should call cognition in contrast to the later experience.

(2) I arrive at a town I have not visited before and take a first stroll through its streets. All that I notice is new to me and I set to work to find my way about. After a time or on a second stroll I am familiar with my surroundings, and I recognise what I see. The later cognitions I call recognitions, as distinguished from the earlier ones on which they depend, and which I then think of as cognitions merely.

(3) Two friends are walking in the country for the enjoyment

of the exercise. Each is experiencing the same exhilaration from the crisp air, the bright sunshine and the beauty of the surroundings. One is an engineer, the other a naturalist. Their recognitions are entirely distinct. The one recognises gradients, strains, actual or possible constructions, and the details of locomotive devices, which to his companion are merely roads, banks, valleys, hills, engines, etc. The other recognises the character of the vegetation, the nature of the soil and subsoil, the various species of animals, which to his companion are merely green grass, hedgerows, woods, and singing birds, etc. Here then we have a practical difference between recognition and general awareness. It is only part of experience which we distinguish as recognition, and one man's recognitions are different from another's, even when the sense stimuli of each are, so far as they are external influences, identical.

(4) A favourite book of mine is Fielding's *Tom Jones*, but the enjoyment it never fails to give me is due to something literary and perhaps to something sympathetic in the author, not to an interest in the plot. Yet I distinctly remember the delightful surprise I experienced on the first reading as the plot unfolded itself. This enjoyment can never recur, and in this respect recognition, in giving me "againness," leaves me poorer. It illustrates, however, and this is why I cite it, how recognition may depend upon an experience, the repetition of which the recognition itself renders impossible.

With these illustrations of the use of the term recognition, let me try to define it. Recognition is the whole content, meaning, or significance of a sense presentation in so far as we have learnt that content, meaning, or significance by experience. What is recognised, or what we call objectively the recognition, is what we have learnt by experience, and learning by experience is a subjective process, by which I mean an activity of the mind. I think we always mean this by recognition. We perceive in what is present to sense what we have learnt to



know is this, that, or the other, and the perception gives to the sense presentation the mark of "already seen," "had before," "againness." Against this definition it may be objected that we also use the term recognition in describing purely instinctive behaviour, behaviour which we characterise as action which is perfect at its very first performance and therefore excludes the notion of learning by experience. We say for example that animals recognise their prey, or recognise their kin, or recognise a menace to their life or to that of their offspring, and we apply the term even to creatures who, like most of the insects, begin their individual life without having known their parents and whose knowledge cannot possibly have been acquired by individual experience at all. Undoubtedly the use of the term recognition in cases of pure instinct is derived from its use in cases of rational knowledge, and many no doubt will deny that there is any identity of fact underlying the use of the term in the case of instinct. I think it is a right term to use, although its primary meaning only is that the creature acts as one acts who has learnt by experience and therefore already knows. The difference between instinctive recognition and intelligent recognition is that the mark of the past in instinctive experience cannot be explained by individual but only by racial experience; it is innate or congenital. Recognition always implies that there has been past experience and that the individual has learnt by it, though the past experience is not in cases of instinct the individual's individual experience.

A more fundamental objection, however, will be raised. To explain recognition as learning by experience is to explain what is difficult to understand by something more difficult to understand. Even if it be granted that recognition always depends on our having learnt by experience, this will bring no solution of the problem. It simply overwhelms the difficulty of accounting for a modification of a present datum of experience by a mark of past experience with the far greater difficulty of conceiving a process by which the past can modify the present.

I admit this difficulty and the main purpose of the present study is to make it explicit. Recognition implies that we learn by experience and learning by experience implies mental process modifying the data of knowledge. It implies also that there are no unmodified data as ultimate constituents of the reality we know, for if there were they would be unrecognisable.

Many philosophers will also, I know, reject my order of implication *ab initio*. Learning by experience, they will say, implies recognition, and wholly depends upon it, whereas recognition does not imply learning by experience, for it is theoretically possible in minds whose knowledge is purely contemplative. Indeed, such must necessarily be the order of implication for those who hold that knowledge is essentially contemplation. Recognition will be for them a perception or a judgment of a relation between two terms—one a present sense-datum, the other a memory. Take, for example, Dr. Moore's answer to the question: "What kind of event are we asserting to be happening when we say, with regard to a present sense-datum, 'I know that I have sensed something like this before?'" in our Symposium last session. "This kind of recognition," he says, "consists in our knowing, with regard to the present sense-datum, and with regard to the relation 'likeness,' just this,—that there was a sense-datum, of which it is true, both that it was sensed by me before, and that it had the relation of likeness to this sense-datum."\*

I consider this account of recognition and the order of implication which would follow from it, quite wrong, and I will try to show why. Let me first, however, freely admit that Dr. Moore is concerned only with intelligent, and not at all with instinctive, recognition. The process he describes represents, quite truly, as it seems to me, a very common experience. A vague recognition may cause us to make an effort to

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\* *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1915-16, p. 213.

give it sharper definition, and then we reflect and deliberately compare present with past experience. Also, as all mental process is in my view a process of recognising, and as conscious deliberation is a mental process, conscious deliberation is a process of recognising. What I deny is that recognition is this. Recognition is immediate experience. The process which has made it recognition is already past, and not to come. The sense-datum, if we use that term to denote the actual object present to the mind, has not to wait for the judgment or perception of a relation, in order that it may become, what as yet it is not, recognition. Take, then, any one of my four cases and attempt to reduce it to the perception or judgment of likeness between a present sense-datum and remembered sense-data, and you will soon discover the failure is absolute. Not only is there no identity (this is obvious—we might, perhaps, posit an identity of unperceived substances, if that would help us at all, but there can be no identity of sense-data), there is not even similarity. Take the chick which first pecks the cinnabar caterpillar, then afterwards rejects it, while it continues to peck the cabbage caterpillar. The sense-data are entirely different the second time, for the chick has learnt to distinguish the objects, which as physical objects are unaltered; *i.e.*, the resemblance between the caterpillars, so far as the resemblance is objective, has not disappeared on the second occasion. The important thing is, that whatever the chick knows about the caterpillar when, meeting it a second time, it rejects it, is something it has learnt the first time. If it has learnt nothing the first time it will learn nothing by repetition. Only if it has learnt something the first time will it modify its action the second time. I have chosen this particular illustration for its simplicity, as an instance of intelligent, not of instinctive, recognition. No one supposes that logical processes take place in the mind of the newly-hatched chick. It is possible they do, but it is a possibility most people would ignore. Now, we may suppose that recognition is the

condition of learning by experience, or we may suppose that it is the conditionate. If it be the condition, we must suppose that there is a mental process, involving a memory-image, an act of comparison, and a judgment or perception of a relation, as well as the present perceptual matter. It seems to me highly improbable; but even if I suppose there is, learning by experience does not necessarily follow; whereas, if I suppose the animal learns by experience, recognition is a necessary consequence. Take the other illustrations. Unless I am learning by experience in my first stroll in the strange town, my second stroll will be equally strange, there will be no recognition. The sense-data will yield nothing on which a judgment of identity can be based, for they are not the same nor similar. So with the third and fourth illustrations, the recognition is not the observation of a relation of likeness between sense-data. I shall search for ever and in vain for any likeness. Recognition is due to a progressive work of the mind exercised at and from the beginning of experience, and continually throughout experience. It is not an external act of comparison of the experience of one moment with that of another and earlier moment, possible only at the later moment, and dependent simply on the power of the mind to retain and revive a memory-image of the earlier moment. I recognise in the later moment only what I have *learnt* in the first moment, but to be able to recognise I must have been learning by experience. Learning by experience is not something which happens only on the repetition of a particular experience. It is a primary process taking place on the first occasion. I may mention, on this point, Mr. Stout's admirable argument in the chapter on "Instinct" in the *Manual*. It is because this process has been working in the initial instance that the repetition of the exactly similar conditions (exactly similar as judged by an indifferent observer) presents the peculiar modification of cognition we call recognition. Professor Lloyd Morgan, from whom my first illustration is taken, considers the chick's action in

rejecting the cinabar moth caterpillars an instance of "profit-  
ing by experience," not of "learning by experience." I fail to  
see, however, that this distinction affects the conclusion that,  
whatever activity of the mind be supposed, it is an activity  
at work in the first instance and not called forth by the  
repetition.

Learning by experience presupposes a distinction between  
the mind and its objects. The expression itself implies that  
there is something obstinately objective in the reality opposed  
to thought, stubborn fact which the mind may turn to practical  
advantage by understanding it and adapting conduct to it. It  
also supposes that what is past can still, though past, modify  
present action. This seems to be effected by the blending of  
memory with sensation in perception. Learning by experience,  
further, positively excludes the notion of pure repetition.  
Every fresh instance comes before the mind modified by  
previous experience.

The problem as it affects the theory of knowledge may be  
presented then as an inquiry into the *a priori* conditions of recog-  
nition. What are the conditions of an experience in which there  
is no repetition, but a continual modification of the present by  
the past? What is the meaning in such an experience of  
"againness"? What mental factors are necessarily supposed  
and how do they bring about the result? And what do they  
imply as to the ultimate nature of mind and reality? The  
factors seem to me to be these:—(1) Retention. (2) Revival.  
(3) Discrimination. (4) Selection. (5) Habit-memory. (6) Pure  
Memory or Recollection.

I will briefly indicate what I mean by each:—

(1) Retention is presence together in consciousness of what  
is before with what is after in experience. It is the holding  
together in a present duration-span of an experience itself  
successive. This duration-span of consciousness I endeavoured  
to analyse in my Address to the Society last Session on "The  
Moment of Experience." The retention implied in that

phrase is the essential character of the mind which makes connected experience or consciousness of duration possible. Without it experience is inconceivable. Were there no retention in this primary meaning, sense impressions, did they exist, would be fleeting and perishing as the stimuli which occasion them. Retention appears to me the most direct and the most obvious instance of the reality we name mind and the clearest manifestation of its essential character.

(2) Revival is the recall of an experience after it has ceased to be retained in present consciousness. It also is named retention, because it implies that experience which has passed out of consciousness is still retained. It is different, however, from what I have called retention, for the revived experience comes to consciousness without the peculiar character of being present to sense and with the ghostly character of a memory-image. It is revival which makes the past appear to us as a continuous objective reality, on to any part of which we can turn our attention, in the same way in which we turn our attention on to any part of the objective reality we call spatial.

(3) By discrimination I mean that experience can be dissociated or disintegrated on any principle and the elements so dissociated can be associated and reintegrated in any order and on any principle. I include under discrimination both disintegration and reintegration, for they seem to me to form one mental activity. This and the following seem to me the most active factors in the process of learning by experience on which recognition depends. Each of our individual minds seems distinguished from every other mind, not by its objective experience, but by its own special centre of interest and the standpoint from which it orders and arranges its experience.

(4) By selection I mean the suppression or the exclusion from consciousness, or the neglect by consciousness, of some aspects of experience, or of some influences, which if admitted

not neglected, would tend to make experience an undifferentiated whole instead of a discrete reality. The discreteness of the objective world for our knowledge is due to the mental work of selection. The selection is exercised automatically in the first instance by the sense organs, and by many of the neural mechanisms of the brain, but also directly by the mind itself.

(5) Habit-memory fixes past experience in the form of habits. It is the preservation of the past in motor dispositions to repeat experience as distinguished from memory images which contemplate it.

(6) Pure Memory or Recollection preserves the past as a pure record. It enables us to date our experience. It is more than schematisation in a time order and space order. It enables us to apprehend an absolute or integral time order, every part of which is in an indissoluble relation of time and circumstance with every other part.

These seem to me the essential factors of recognition. They are not theoretical. I have tried to state only what seem to me the facts in our experience which everyone would agree to call mental facts, but they enable me to form concepts of mind and of the modes of its activity. These are theoretical. I do not conceive the factors I have distinguished as separate activities assembled in the mind or in the organism nor as separate characters or attributes of the mind sometimes present in, sometimes absent from, its activity. Nor do I conceive mind as merely a general term to denote these specific activities. I think they imply a real substance and a real life. All the activities I have distinguished, but especially the last, pure memory or recollection, imply that the past is recorded, that a register of it exists. Recollection is inconceivable as a fact and must be pure illusion unless there exists a register of the past. The register seems to be integral and independent of actual recollection. The ground for this is mainly based on would modify experience, or of some data which, if attended to and

the evidence derived from abnormal experience. I do not propose to enter on this subject. There can be no doubt, I think, that there exists a register; the only doubt is whether this register is the mind or the brain. In my view this register or record is the substance of mind, if I may be allowed that useful though much abused term. I use the term because I want to distinguish between mental stuff and mental life. Memory is the stuff, but mind is not mere receptivity, a growing record of external material. It is an active process.

The life of the mind is a continuous organisation of experience. The mind is not passive, waiting on experience and passing judgment on it reflectively as it flows past. The mind advances to meet experience, its attitude is not contemplative but expectant. It is forward-looking, ready prepared, ready organised to receive the external influences, reaction to which is the primal necessity of life. This attitude has been named attention to life. It characterises mind wherever in the animal world we meet it. It determines in advance the form the coming experience will assume. Nothing is less like the mind than the old-time image of the wax tablet on which the objects of the external world make imprints. The mind, as I conceive it, is an active power of organising experience, which lives by assimilating the experience it organises.

A good illustration of this work of the mind is afforded us by the physiology of the organism. The digestive organs, the stomach and intestines in particular, were, before the days of scientific physiology, regarded as more or less mechanical receptacles for food, supplied with the necessary acids and ferments for reducing it, and fitted with a kind of filter apparatus for letting the nutriment pass into the blood stream. And all these contrivances had nothing else to do but passively wait for supplies which, when they came, were mechanically and automatically reduced and utilised. Modern physiology gives us an entirely different notion of the vital activities at



work in the digestive process. A vast system of co-ordinated activities, each with its distinct function, is ready prepared to receive and deal with the food. The supply of the food is not in its control, neither the quantity nor the quality. But, though dependent on the external supply, the result of the process is not determined by the external supply. It is regulated and delicately adjusted by the pre-adaptation of the digestive processes themselves, which exercise selection and discrimination. The result is the maintenance of the living body in a state of efficiency and equilibrium as one organic unity. The mind appears to me to be a spiritual organism, which maintains itself in the same way. Experience is, as it were, fed to it, but the mind is not a passive receptor. It does not contemplate the reality which flows past it. It incorporates it. It meets experience with a ready-prepared organisation to deal with it. Its various activities are those I have named—retention, memory, selection, and the rest. The result is the maintenance of an individual soul, the unity of a personal character.

Let me now return to the direct problem of recognition. The problem is to account for the experience of "againness," to account for the feeling of "seen before," "this again," "had already," directly attached to the object of cognition. This feeling requires explaining, because, in fact, there is no repetition, and can be no repetition, for experience is a continuous change.

What happens, then, when a totally new sense-presentation arises? How can it bring with it an "againness" for the mind to experience? It sounds a paradox. My theory of the mind gives me the explanation. Recognition is the form which prior cognition gives to new experience. The mind receives the new presentation into a ready prepared organisation of past knowledge and incorporates it. Recognition is the expectancy with which the mind grasps the novel, the unknown, the unforeseen. By this I mean not only that recognition has

prospective value—the whole attitude of life is forward-looking and all value seems to be prospective. I mean more than this. The past, as from being present it becomes past, gives form and substance to the present activity and is carried along in it. It is this incorporation of past experience in present activity, and not repetition, and also not resemblance of present experience to past experience, which constitutes recognition. And this explains why and in what way all cognition is of necessity recognition. The life of the mind, the mental process, consists in, and is sustained by, the continual reception of the yet unknown into the frame or organisation of the already known. We modify reality by impressing on it a mark of the past in the present act by which we grasp it, and, with every new addition, there goes a correspondent modification of the frame or organisation which is the mind. Thus it is that all new experience comes to us bearing, as it were, already on it the mark of the past. The mind stamps reality with this mark in the very act of apprehension, not because the mind receives the manifold of sense into stereotyped frames or categories, as Kant supposed, for the frames also are being subtly and continuously modified by the mutual adaptation of the mind to reality and of reality to the mind. There is no absolute repetition of anything, either of mental act or of physical object, there is continual new invention. This, then, in my view is the modification of experience which makes all cognition recognition.

This process, with the various activities I have distinguished in it (not presented as exhausting it but as characterising it), is the *a priori* condition of the possibility of recognition. It is not a condition of recognition that a memory-image, general or distinct, should be present to the mind, challenging comparison with, or provoking a judgment on, the present sense-datum.

2. *Can there be Recognition without Conscious Memory of Prior Cognition ?*

Let me now turn to the second part of my problem. So far we have been considering rational or intelligent recognition only, and not instinctive recognition ; or, rather, we have been considering only the recognition which appears to be explicable by the experience of the individual. If my theory be true, recognition is an effect of the continuity of mental process. Nothing in the phenomena of ordinary recognition suggests that the explanation is in bodily structure rather than in mental activity. We have, in fact, no need to raise the question of the relation of mind and body, because, whatever be the nature of this relation, recognition is concerned only with mental facts. But when we come to study instinctive recognition, there seems to be no mental continuity such as we conceive to constitute an individual mind, and we seem to be left with one kind of continuity only—the material continuity which links, by the living protoplasm in the germ, one generation of conscious individuals with another. It will not be disputed that instinctive behaviour, however we account for it, presents the appearance of recognition as one of its essential traits. The creature acts as one who already knows ; and is, therefore, familiar with the conditions and circumstances under which it is acting. This is true, even of the first performance of an instinctive action, and whether or not repeated instinctive performances show any advance on, or essential difference from, the first performance, the familiarity with the conditions we are describing as recognition is not dependent upon repetition. In intelligent behaviour there is no repetition. In instinctive behaviour, however, there is practically perfect repetition ; or, rather, a specific character of invariability in the repetitions. Yet this repetition in instinctive actions marks something negative so far as mentality is concerned. It is the negation of learning by experience. If, then, one peculiar mark of instinctive

behaviour is invariability in repetition, and, consequently, an absence of "learning," must not recognition as a description of such behaviour be unmeaning? We seem to be driven for an explanation of instinctive knowledge to the bodily organisation rather than to the mental organisation. Instinct suggests something structural in the nervous system. Now clearly, as it seems to me, if we can explain instinctive knowledge as a phenomenon of physiological process without mind, we raise a strong presumption that intelligent knowledge is explicable in the same way. I think we cannot explain instinctive knowledge without supposing the continuous activity of mind independently of physiological process. I will try to give reasons for this view.

An example of instinctive behaviour is hardly required for the purpose of my argument, but it may be useful to refer to a definite case. I cannot do better than take Professor Lloyd Morgan's classical experiment with the incubated moorhen. The advantage of referring to a case like this is that we have an observation under what are practically laboratory conditions. I need not go into the details. The little creature, after many failures of the experimenter to induce the characteristic diving action, performed it at once in response to the stimulus, absolutely novel in its individual experience, of a romping puppy. In this behaviour everyone will, I suppose, admit that there was conscious awareness, though many will deny that there was anything whatever in it which can rightly be called recognition. Yet the familiarity with surroundings, the evident feeling at home in the environment, the absence of strangeness and embarrassment which was exhibited in its action, is, so far as its nature is concerned, indistinguishable from what I call recognition in my own experience. It is immediate knowledge, but so in my view is intelligent recognition. If then there be no difference of nature between intelligent and instinctive recognition, is the difference in the genesis? Is the view I have put forward of the genesis of intelligent recognition

inapplicable to instinctive recognition? We know that the creature's ancestors have behaved in this characteristic way throughout a long series of past generations, and that the immediacy of the response is due to a congenital disposition to act in this way. But the individual moorhen does not know this, unless we suppose that its memory goes back to those previous performances of its ancestors and that it has, as part of its congenital disposition, the power to revive memory-images of them. This seems improbable to such a high degree that we may as well reject it outright.

Here then we have a creature manifesting all the signs of mentality and of mentality in a highly developed form. It acts as if it remembered what it is impossible that it can remember, for there is no continuity of consciousness between its action and the source of that action in past experience. The only unity and continuity manifest to us is the physiological process which has carried it from the fertilised germ, through the stage of unconscious life in the egg, to separate individual activity. Does the creature's mind somehow bridge this gulf which separates its individual brain from the brains of its progenitors? To answer this question we must form some concept of the creature's mind and its relation to the creature's body.

As I indicated at the beginning, I do not propose to enter into the controversy between correlationists and interactionists as to the nature of the relation of mind and body. I want to look at mind and body from a different point of view than that at which this question is raised, and one which I think gives rise to no dissent. A certain unity of life characterises the complex and infinite variety of physiological processes which constitute the individual organism. Let us understand that this is meant when we refer to the body. There is also a certain unity of conscious processes which makes awareness of every kind part of a personal experience. Let us understand that this unity of conscious personal experience is meant by the mind. This

is what we ordinarily mean when we contrast body and mind, that is to say, we mean the living body, not the dead material body, and the thinking mind. It is different from the contrast between body and mind where what is meant by body is a certain disposition of molecules or atoms or electrons. The distinction is rather between life and mind, living and conscious processes.

This distinction of mind and body is, I think, practically the same as that of Descartes. The mind thinks, the body lives. The body, being an extension, is automatic and mechanical and determined; the mind, being unextended, is independent of the body which it guides and controls, and is free in the sense that it is without and not within the series of mechanical actions and reactions which modern physics has formulated in the principle of the conservation of energy.

I am not arguing that body and mind are two substances as Descartes supposed, but that from the standpoint of a living creature endowed with conscious awareness, body and mind, *i.e.*, living body and thinking mind, are, as Descartes conceived them, two completely distinct realities, each with a quality which excludes the other, each a unity, and an individual unity. But the two unities do not coincide. From this point of view, namely, that of a distinction between living and thinking, it is possible to regard the living body as a self-regulated automaton distinct from the thinking mind or the soul—a view which I think Descartes held, and which in any case seems to accord with many recent physiological discoveries. Let me try and illustrate what I may call the mutual convergence and divergence of these two systematic unities, living body and thinking mind. An illustration, suggested to me by the interesting work of Professor Sherrington on the subject of sentience, may make the meaning clear.

The first part of the digestive process is the mastication of food; it is followed by deglutition, then by the many varied processes which are carried out by stomach and bowels.

The divisions between these various stages or processes of digestion are merely convenient,—all form part of one complex but co-ordinated systematic process. Parts of this process are accompanied by consciousness in the form of sentience. Mastication is accompanied by the special forms of sentience, taste and smell; and all the muscular actions of the tongue and palate and the closing of the glottis during deglutition are also accompanied by awareness; but from that stage in the digestive process sentience ceases, and most, nearly all, of the succeeding stages, peristaltic action and the like, are devoid of any sentient accompaniment whatsoever. Now, we may say that sentience where it occurs in mastication and deglutition is useful to the creature; it serves the purpose of incentive to obtain food and of discrimination in the food procured, and insentience where sentience does not occur is equally useful. And this is no doubt true. So far, however, as the efficiency of the process is concerned, there seems to be no need for the presence of sentience. It may serve a purpose, but that purpose is no part of the actual process which it accompanies. Yet, though from the point of view of the digestive process the sentient accompaniment is fragmentary and sporadic, sentience itself is not fragmentary and sporadic. It is one and continuous with the conscious awareness exercised by the unity we call a man's mind or soul. So when we describe a man's taste as refined, or cultivated, or debased, using the word taste in its original meaning to indicate his pleasure in what he eats, the fact, so far as the man's body is in question, concerns only a small part of a complex physiological process, which process is indifferent to it; so far as the man's mind is in question, it concerns the whole of that unity we call personal; it is continuous with a man's character.

From the physiologist's point of view, therefore, sentience is an epiphenomenon accompanying a certain specific living process, and exercising no efficiency; from the psychologist's point of view, sentience is an inseparable element of another

and altogether different order of reality and kind of unity. These two continuous processes meet for a brief moment in the functioning of a taste bulb. The true image of them is that of two spheres which if they meet can touch only at a point, which by moving on one another may bring successive points into contact, but the points which meet belong to divergent curves.

This standpoint of the relation of mind and body is especially important in regard to the science and practice of psychiatry. Functional disorder appears to be due to some disturbance or disruption of the mental unity, as physiological disorder is due to some disturbance or disruption of the vital unity. Could we localise the point of union in some *conarium*, as Descartes thought he could, could we find some central neurone whose special function was to preside over the various activities and direct and control them, our task might be simpler. We should at least have some point on which to concentrate our experimental study. But correlating conscious awareness with neural physiological process in the higher cortical centres, undoubtedly important as it is, does not bring us within sight of the principle of vital unity or of the principle of mental unity which we are seeking to determine and relate. If we follow the integrative function of the nervous system from its lowest and simplest mode in the quasi-independent reflex arc, the integration of reflexes in complex physiological processes and co-ordinations and in instinctive reactions, to the final integration effected in the higher centres of the cerebral cortex and accompanied by intelligence, we reach at last, not a chief neurone, nor a chief monad, but a countless mass of constituent neurones on the one hand, and an infinite variety of functions accompanied by sentience, or other forms of mind, on the other, each of which may be in its turn *primus inter pares*.

These two self-centred unities, thinking mind and living body, if from our individual standpoint they appear as two



complete systems, are from another standpoint not self-centred, but each continuous with a larger system of reality. We know that we directly continue in our body the life of countless generations of ancestors, and that we shall hand on this heritage to succeeding generations. We also know, though it is not so easy to envisage, that our mind is not formed within our individual lifetime and anew for our individuality. It is continuous with the experience of past generations and has been formed out of it. Each individual living centre bears along in the focus of its activity the impulsion as well as the construction of an illimitable past. Now, although we suppose that this past was always like the present, that each individual of a former generation united in his action, as we do, a thinking mind and living body, yet when we think of these two systems transcending the individual life, it seems to us impossible to think of the original source as twofold. What makes the original impulsion seem single is that mind and body appear to have evolved *pari passu*, every increase in mental range being co-ordinated with a complexity of brain structure, while what makes the dualism in the individual seem pronounced is the complete disparity between the two orders. From the standpoint of evolution we are naturally, I think, attracted to Spinoza's idea of mind and body as two modes of one substance. Whether with Spinoza we name this substance God, or with Bergson *Élan vital*, we have to recognise that, though the source may be single, the manifestation is always twofold—the living body and the thinking mind.

This brings us at once to the main problem—how is this twofold continuity carried over from one generation to the next? Let me first notice one question, which may for many people have a decisive bearing on the solution. Is the difference between the individual mind of an animal, whose behaviour is predominantly instinctive, and the mind of a man, whose behaviour is predominantly intelligent, a quantitative difference only, or is it a qualitative difference also? It seems

to me, relying wholly on analogy, direct proof being obviously impossible, that the mind of the lower animal is in every respect like the human mind, differing only in its range. There seems to me every reason to suppose that the moorhen's mind differs from mine in the ratio that its brain differs in complexity from mine. Its brain registers, so to speak, its range of action, as my brain registers mine, and it is not likely, again judging by analogy, that its mind is inadequate, or more than adequate, to its range of action. If this be so, then the mind of the lower animal is, like mine, a continuity of personal experience, and must stand to the continuity of physiological process, the living body, in the relation I have schematised by imagining two spheres in contact. There is in that case no difference in kind between human behaviour and the behaviour of the lower animals. There is only a difference, which may be very deceptive, in the proportion of their behaviour which we describe as instinctive and that which we describe as intelligent.

But is it necessary to suppose that an animal has a mind? Can we not class instinctive actions under vital actions? We associate with mind the creation of aesthetic, logical, and ethical values, and we find it very difficult to suppose that there is anything even corresponding to these in the mind of the animal. It seems to me that in instinctive action we can distinguish elements which are certainly mental and not merely vital. These are (*a*) sentient enjoyment, or simply sentience, indicating conscious awareness of action in progress; (*b*) familiarity, indicated by the absence of strangeness in the behaviour (this is what I call recognition); and (*c*) pre-awareness, a certain readiness of attention or alertness, indicated by a forward-looking attitude towards an action. All of these, if they be present, and to the extent to which they are present, are mental characters in the full sense of the term mental. What this connotes for me is that all these characters are continuous with, and derive meaning from, the fact that they

enter as constituent elements into a mental organisation, the unity of an experience.

It is a two-fold continuity, then, which has to be carried from one generation to the next. The link which joins the generations is neither living body nor thinking mind, neither brain nor soul, but a germ. The germ neither acts nor thinks, at least not in any ordinary meaning of those terms; it undergoes development, and it holds within it the potentiality of developing a living body and a thinking mind. We are led, therefore, it seems to me by logical necessity to the concept of life—life which is not the mere abstract idea of an attribute common to processes we class as living, but life which is the concrete idea of a reality of which living body and thinking mind, organic activity and personality, are modes.

I will not here enlarge on this concept but be content with indicating that in it, in my view, lies the solution of the problem of recognition. It will be recognised as the doctrine of Bergson in *Creative Evolution* which I have tried elsewhere to expound.

I will now draw together the main lines of my argument, and try to show the thesis I have endeavoured to establish.

1. Recognition is knowing what in some manner we already know. It is the mark of our past experience which a present and entirely novel sense-presentation bears, and this mark is immediately apprehended as part of the presentation, and is not inferred from it.

2. Recognition implies prior cognition. It does not imply that a memory-image of the prior cognition is present in consciousness together with the recognition; and *a fortiori* it does not imply a mental process of comparison with a prior cognition or the perception or judgment of a relation of similarity.

3. Recognition is the resultant of learning by experience,—the conditionate, not the condition, of learning by experience. It is not by recognising that we learn by experience, but having learnt by experience we recognise.

4. Learning by experience is not dependent on repetition, and in experience there is, in fact, no repetition. Learning is the mental process by which the mind incorporates and assimilates experience. It is an activity which begins with, and continues throughout, experience.

5. Recognition may be intelligent or instinctive. Both are of the same nature. Each is the immediate apprehension of entirely novel sense-presentations with the mark of prior cognition.

6. In intelligent recognition we can by reflection bring to the mind the factors of the process; and so, in a manner and within a limited range, reconstitute the process. We can bring to mind memory-images of the prior cognition so far as the prior cognition falls within the memory range of the individual experience. This gives rise to the illusion that recognition is dependent on such reflective thought. We think we recognise after reflecting, whereas in reality we reflect after recognising. In instinctive recognition, on the other hand, we cannot reconstitute by reflection the prior cognition, because it does not fall within the individual's experience. It lies in the ancestral experience.

7. The problem of recognition is the same for intelligent as for instinctive recognition—how can new sense-presentation be known as what is already known?

8. The solution suggested rests on a distinction between life and mind, or living body and thinking mind, and a comparison between the activity of each. They are distinct self-centred organic continuities; sentient experience enters each system, but the systems are tangential to one another. The mind is an organisation of experience. All past experience has not only contributed to it but is incorporated within it, giving it character and individuality. New sentient experience can only enter by receiving the mould or mark of this organisation. This constitutes recognition.

9. Instinctive recognition raises a larger problem. How is

mental continuity established and maintained between one generation and another, since generations are separated by a state in which there is neither living body nor thinking mind? The living germ has neither brain nor soul, but is the potentiality of the development of both. The solution suggested is the concept of life, not an abstraction from living process, but a pure, universal, concrete concept.

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## II.—THE FUNCTION OF THE STATE IN PROMOTING THE UNITY OF MANKIND.\*

By BERNARD BOSANQUET.

I WISH to present a brief positive account of the theory of the state as I understand it, more particularly with reference to the state in its external relations, and the conditions essential to federations or a world-state. It seems to me that much misconception is prevalent as to the views which in fact great philosophers have held upon this problem. But I do not wish to raise mere questions in the history of philosophy, but to meet the issue as it seems to me to stand to-day. The ideas which I express are therefore my own, in the sense that no one else is responsible for the form I give them. But, to the best of my judgment, they represent the Greek tradition as renewed by Hegel and by English thought.

In considering any problem affecting the state I take the primary question to be how self-government is possible. For anything which interferes with the possibility of self-government destroys altogether the conditions of true government. The answer is drawn, I take it, from the conception of the general will, which involves the existence of an actual community, of such a nature as to share an identical mind and

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\* Cf. the lectures by Professor A. C. Bradley on "International Morality: the United States of Europe," and Mr. B. Bosanquet on "Patriotism in the Perfect State," in *The International Crisis*, Oxford University Press, 1915, and Lord Haldane's Montreal address, "Higher Nationality." In speaking of the critics, I have had in mind, besides the writers in last year's *Aristotelian Proceedings*, Mr. A. D. Lindsay's lecture in the Bedford College volume, *Theory of the State*, and some remarks of Professor Jacks in *From the Human End*, together with the general reaction against what is supposed to be the "German" theory of the State.

feeling. There is no other way of explaining how a free man can put up with compulsion and even welcome it. Here then we have the universal condition of legitimate outward authority. City-state, Nation-state, Commonwealth, Federation, World-state, it makes no difference. Behind all force there must be a general will, and the general will must represent a communal mind.\* All other contrivances for government are external and tyrannical.

1. This is the reason of the unique relation between the state and the individual which is caricatured by critics as state absolutism. Of course the state is not the ultimate end of life. The ultimate end, if we avoid religious phraseology, which would probably furnish the truest expression of it, is surely the best life. I understand by the state the power which, as the organ of a community, has the function of maintaining the external conditions necessary to the best life. These conditions are called rights. They are the claims recognised by the will of a community as the *sine qua non* of the highest obtainable fulfilment of the capacities for the best life possessed by its members.

Now the relation between the state and the individual is the external equivalent of that between the community and the individual. And it is a unique relation, because there is no other body that bears the same relation to the individual's will as that community which is represented by a state in the external world.

This can be said with as much precision as human affairs admit, because there is reason to expect that the community which organises itself as a state will be for every group the largest body which possesses the unity of experience necessary for constituting a general will. There is, as we shall see, no other body at all comparable with it in intensity of unity. "A national purpose is the most unconquerable and victorious of

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\* See Lord Haldane's address referred to above.

all things on earth.”\* And the individual’s private will, we must bear in mind, is certainly and literally a part of the communal will. There is no other material of which his will can be made. If he rejects the communal will in part, he rejects it on the basis of what it is in him, not from any will of his own which has a different source. This is the ground of the duty of rebellion.

This unique relation between the individual and the community which the state represents—it may be a nation or any other community—is what seems to me to dominate the whole problem. It is further determined when we add the consideration that the state is an organ of action in the external world. In this sphere, which is its special sphere as an organ exercising force, it may really be called absolute,—that is, if power extending to life and death and complete disposal of property can be called absolute. This does not mean that it is the whole end of life,† nor that it is the only object of loyalty.‡ It means, as I understand it, that, being the special organ of arrangement in the external world corresponding to that particular community whose will is our own will when most highly organised, it has the distinctive function of dictating the final adjustment in matters of external action. This is the only sense in which I have called it absolute,§ and the ground is obvious and simple. It lies in the tendency of the world of action to bring into collision factors which, apart from action, might never conflict. However purely non-political two associations may be, and however cosmopolitan,

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\* A. E., *Imaginations, etc.*, p. 107.

† Hegel, in one place, calls the state an end-in-itself, when he is contrasting his view of it with the reduction of its purpose to the protection of property or the right of the stronger. He regards it as having in it some of the end of life, viz., the embodiment of liberty; of course, not the whole end. It is for him the basis of the further, more specialised, achievements (art, philosophy, and the like).—*Rechtsphilosophie*, Sect. 258.

‡ See below, pp. 40 and 41.

§ *Philosophy of the State*, Ch. VIII, 3, and Introduction to 2nd edition.



if they claim the same funds or the same building they must come before a power which can adjust the difference without appeal. And if such a power were not single in respect of them, obviously there could be no certainty of adjustment without a conflict between the two or more powers which might claim jurisdiction. Cases like that supposed are frequent, of course, with churches.

Thus there are two connected points, which, I think, the critics confuse under the name of absolutism. One is the power of the state as sustainer of all adjustments in the world of external action, on the ground which has just been explained. The other is the unique relation to the individual of such a community as is at present exemplified by his nation-state, because it represents, as nothing else in the world does, that special system of rights and sentiments, the complement of his own being, which the general will of his group has formed a state to maintain.

It is the result, I take it, of these two grounds of unity co-operating, that in times of stress the state, as the organ of the community, will suspend or subject to conditions any form of intercourse between its members and persons or associations within or without its territory, and will require any service that it thinks fit from any of its members. It does, in Mr. Bradley's words, "with the moral approval of all what the explicit theory of scarcely one will morally justify."\* That it does not exercise such powers to anything like the same degree in ordinary times, and that it recognises the rights of conscience even in times of stress, flows from the fact that its primary end is the maintenance of rights; and it will override no right by force where an adjustment is possible compatibly with the good life of the whole. And of this possibility it is the sole judge. What it permits, it permits by reason of its end, and no theory can stand which will not justify in principle its habitual action in time of stress.

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\* *Ethical Studies*, p. 166.

It is unmeaning to call our analysis introspective.\* When the term introspection is withdrawn from its natural application to the individual looking into his own mind, its meaning as a criticism is gone. The method here employed, which originated with Plato's *Republic*, was renewed in modern times precisely as a revolution against what is rightly called introspection, by substituting for it the valuation and analysis of objective achievement. The state is a creation of mind as actual and external as a poem or a work of plastic art, or the systems of commerce and industry, and its relations to what is within it and to what is outside it are equally external objects, objects observed by extrospection.

2. "The state," as I understand the words, is a phrase framed in the normal way, to express that one is dealing with the members of a class strictly according to the connotation of the class-name. If a plural noun is used, there can be no certainty whether we are speaking of characteristics which belong to the class-members as such or of circumstances which may occur in each of them for independent reasons. "The state," in a word, is a brief expression for "states *qua* states." I confess that I am a good deal surprised that nearly all recent critics have stumbled, as it seems to me, in this simple matter of interpretation.† Would they find the same difficulty in the title of a book on "the heart" or "the steam engine"? It would be urged, perhaps, that a heart does not imply other hearts, but that a state does imply other states; but if the thing implies other things its name implies the reference to them.

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\* Mr. Cole, *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1915, p. 311.

† Hegel pointed out this ambiguity, *Ph. des Rechts*, Sect. 258; cf. also A. C. Bradley, *International Crisis*, p. 47. With the phrase, "philosophy of men," which is offered as a counter-example (Mr. Cole, *ib.*, p. 311), we may compare the two expressions, "knowledge of man" and "knowledge of men." The former means something like philosophy; the latter means the knowledge of individual peculiarities and defects, gathered by the experience of a worldling. The former belongs to Plato or Shakespeare, the latter to Major Pendennis.

And, indeed, the whole *raison d'être* of our theory is to show why, and in what sense, there must be states wherever there are groups of human beings, and to explain for what reasons men are distinguished into separate adjacent political bodies instead of forming a single system over the whole earth's surface.

Our theory has told us, for example, that states represent differentiations of the single human spirit (Hegel), whose extent and intensity determine and are determined by territorial limits. They are members, we are told by Plato and Hegel, of an ethical family of nations, so far, at least, as the European world is concerned; they are characterised—it is Mazzini's well known doctrine—by individual missions\* or functions which furnish for every state its distinctive contribution to human life. They have a similar task to achieve, each within its territory allotted by history, so Green argues, and the more perfectly each of them attains its proper object of giving free scope to the capacities of all persons living on a certain range of territory, the easier it is for others to do so.† Obviously, they are co-operating units. This is throughout the essence of the theory.

Now it is not, I think, unfair to point out that my critics, dealing unguardedly with "states" and not with "the state" or with "states *qua* states," have on the whole founded their account of states not upon what they are, so far as states, but just upon what, *qua* states, they are not; upon defects which appear unequally in the several communities, consisting in those evils which the organisation of the state exists in order to remove, and does progressively remove in so far as true self-government is attained. Such evils are war, exploitation within or without, class privilege, arbitrary authority, discontent directing ambitions to foreign conquest and to jealousy

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\* The term I have myself selected to describe the ethical unity of a nation-state. *Phil. of State*, p. 321.

† Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 170.

of other states, the doctrine that one state's gain is *ipso facto* another's loss.

3. Space and time do not permit me to discuss, what I should be interested in discussing at some length, the continuous relations which extend beyond the frontiers of individual states, their importance compared with that of other continuities which are co-extensive with the area of the states and constituent of them, and why it is necessary to recognise, in spite of the former, separate sovereign political units which undoubtedly, while imperfect, tend to break down at the frontier, in a regrettable way, the continuities which pass beyond it.\* Broadly speaking, the reason lies, I take it, in the exceptionally intense unity and concreteness of certain group-minds,† in which innumerable continuities coincide, while other continuities, which extend beyond the group, nevertheless do not coincide with any marked rival unity.

4. It follows from our theory, as we saw, that the normal relation of states is co-operative.‡ Their influence on each other's structure and culture is mainly a question of wants and materials. The characteristic dealing with them depends after all upon the national mind, as we see in the contrast of Athens and Sparta, the two leading states of one and the same civilisation. It is a curious fallacy in the disparagement of the state that the recognition of a debt to foreign culture has been pushed so far as to suggest that nothing great

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\* This problem is suggested by the opening sentences of Curtius' *History of Greece*, with reference to the unity of continental Greece and Ionia, or by the natural unity of the basin of the North Sea (in the Hanseatic League). The case of England and Scotland, compared with that of England and Ireland, repays study.

† † See above, p. 30. I do not say "national" minds, because I observe that the phrase is used with various unduly restricted meanings, *cp.* Lord Acton, who considers nationality a mere physical kinship. Plato shows the right line, surely. The group must have the same myth, *i.e.*, the same consciousness of unity. It does not matter how they got it.

‡ Hobbes, it must be remembered, with kindred theorists, is far removed from the philosophy of which we are speaking.

originates in any state because everything is imported from some other.\*

Further, it follows that the maintenance of this normal relation, or its attainment where unattained, depends on the right discharge by states of their internal function—the maintenance of rights as the conditions of good life. War, as Plato showed,† is not of the essence of states, but has its causes in their internal disease and distraction, leading to policies of “expansion.” Therefore, in this sense, to begin with, we want more of the state and not less. In order to reinforce the organisation of rights by other states, the main thing it has to do is to complete its own. This fundamental truth none of the critics seem to have observed, and to have emphasised it appears to me a very great merit in our philosophy.‡ The fundamental principle is that states *qua* states are—“the state” is—the human mind doing the same work in different localities with different materials. Obviously, in as far as it succeeds, its efforts assist each other.

\* Compare the malevolent gossips in *Middlemarch*, who referred the husband's book to the wife's special knowledge, and *vice versa*, so that they did not need to give credit to either for the books they wrote.

† I note one or two points with reference to Mr. Delisle Burns' assertion, that the *Republic* “attaches no importance to foreign contacts.” A full treatment is impossible here. Plato's state is affected by commercial relations from the beginning, and manufactures for export (*Rep.*, 371 A). The genesis of war is in internal corruption of communities, which produces a reciprocal policy of expansion (373 D). A healthy state gives no excuse to its neighbour for war—limits of healthy expansion (422). Civilised laws of war, implying an ethical family of states and persistent good will (469–70). Religious institutions to be prescribed by an external authority that speaks to all mankind (427). The references to Hegel and Aristotle are equally misleading.

‡ Cf. especially Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*, Sect. 167 ff. The root of venom in the present conflict lies surely in two things: (a) In the mediæval condition of the Prussian franchise, which the Monistic League of several hundred thousand members, with Ostwald at its head, was pledged to see reformed; and (β) the false political economy of “your gain is my loss,” which such an internal situation promotes.

5. Thus every state as such—that is, “the state”—is “the guardian of a moral world,”\* maintaining the peculiar contribution of its community to the total of human life and of human mind. We shall see why this double expression is necessary. And it is very important to observe that this moral world includes a whole distinctive attitude to life and humanity. It is an attitude *of* the community, but *to* the world. Thus you cannot get away from it. All individuals share it, more or less, and every relation of the group, external or internal, is brought to a meeting point within their consciousness, and elicits a response from it.

It is easy to discern how such guardianship on the part of bodies so highly individualised, so deeply conscious of a function and as yet so imperfectly organised, may lead, from time to time, to differences which can only be resolved by force. It is a profound mistake, I am convinced, to direct the moral of the present calamity against the communal sense of a function and a mission; against, in a word, the belief that a community has a conscience. Yet this belief is the root of the doctrine caricatured under the name of state absolutism. It seems to me foolish to take a hostile attitude to a general truth because it displays the root of serious evils. For, indeed, what displays their root is the only indication of the remedy. The true moral is, surely, not that a community should have no overmastering purpose, no consciousness of a mission and no conscience, but simply that its conscience should as far as possible be enlightened. Enlightened consciences, I venture to assume, cannot bring actions into conflict. But, being internally ill organised, and correspondingly biassed and unenlightened, communities enter into conflicts from time to time with their whole heart and soul, just because they *have* consciences and *have* moral worlds to guard. It happens naturally to them as to private

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\* Mr. Delisle Burns in quoting this phrase of mine omits the word “moral.” *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1915, p. 293.

persons that they throw their whole sense of right into what is wrong. In order to produce a disastrous collision, we must bear in mind, the aspirations of two communities need not be in conflict at every point. It is like two trains running side by side, where an encroachment of an inch is enough to produce a calamity. Aspirations may be irreconcilable in practice which have a very large factor of agreement. This factor is the ground for hope, which consists in their being, after all, aspirations of communities which possess reason and conscience. Reconciliation of them by harmonious adjustment, though impracticable at certain moments, is never inconceivable.

Now it is surely plain that no power on earth can deal with such a cause of conflict, except something that enables the biassed and erroneous factors of the conflicting claims to be eliminated. And this can never be done by external force, but must mainly depend on a better organisation of rights by every state at home, with a consequent correction of its ambitions and outlook on the world. A healthy state is not militant.

But the mischief is, that the popular mind, observing that the present trouble has arisen through aspirations in others which we pronounce perverse, is inclined to attribute to a false philosophy the whole conception of national aspirations as representing the conscience of a people and its over-mastering sense of duty. Men do not reflect that precisely such aspirations are determining their own group-action at every step. They say, as our critics are saying, that the theory of the unity of a people in the moral consciousness of a pre-eminent duty, and the principle of its expression through an organ supreme in practical life, are absolutism, and ought to be weakened or abandoned. The unique obligation of the private person to the community as incomparably the fullest representative of himself is to be put on a level with isolated abstract obligations arising in the course of this or that special relation, although it is on the communal mind that the task

of harmonising them must ultimately fall. In short, the whole moral status and moral being of the community is to be indefinitely but considerably lowered.

All this seems to me to point exactly the wrong way. We all know, in modern society more especially, that we pay for the existence of great organising agencies by the possibility of their conflicting. But that does not make us desire to weaken them; it makes us desire to amplify their members' faith in them, and to get them to do their work more completely. The remedy for disorganisation is not less organisation, but more. All organisation, of course, brings a concurrent risk of conflict. You bring claims together, and you find points which for the moment cannot be adjusted. It is a flat contradiction to maintain that the state is morally responsible, and also that it must not face an actual conflict where its conscience is concerned. Even within the community, where obligations to the common will are so high and so determinate, the conscientious objector will follow his conscience to the end, and if we believe him to be sincere we all respect him for it. Why should the community, an individual in a far deeper sense than the citizen, being the nearest approach to a true individual that exists upon the earth, be expected not to follow its conscience? The clause on which I have just insisted, in opposition to one of my critics,\* is, as Rousseau pointed out, the fundamental issue. The point to be remembered is that the individual only has his individuality through the social consciousness. The nearer he approaches to being himself the more he approaches identification with the communal mind.† This mind can only be expressed as what the individual would be if he possessed in completeness all that his actual consciousness implies regarding the group-life. If he sees reason to rebel,

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\* Mr. Cole, p. 315 ; *cf.* Rousseau, *C.S.*, I, vii.

† *Cf.* Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, Essays II and V.



it is still as a social duty. It cannot be in virtue of some right of his own, as he would be, *per impossibile*, apart.

No doubt, when there is strife between communities, a wrong is being committed somewhere. But the way to right it is not for the conscientious group to make a rule of yielding on points which it holds fundamental to its function. Now I think that the critics of our theory speak uncertainly here. Is our fault in saying that the community which asserts itself through the state is a moral being, and *has* a conscience, or is not a moral being and has not a conscience? They seem to me in effect to say both at once.\* Yet only one can be true.

It is clear, I think, that we are accused of denying the moral responsibility of the community which has the state for its organ. But it can hardly be doubted that we are also accused of putting this moral responsibility much too high. If the first of the three papers makes the former imputation, the whole argument of the two latter points to the second. It is directed to denying any supreme value in the community, any unique relation, such as we assert, between the community's conscience and that of the private person. Thus the critics find themselves driven to treat the community which is a state as a mere association of individuals, which cannot possess an organic moral conscience nor general will. Though in one passage disclaiming individualism,† the argument

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\* *Cp.* Mr. Delisle Burns, pp. 293 and 295; Mr. Russell, *passim*; Mr. Cole, p. 315.

† In Mr. Cole's paper. Mr. Russell, I think, does not disclaim it, seeing, if I understand him, no common mind in men, capable of a common will. I am prepared to receive what comes from him with great respect, and I agree with his disbelief in the likelihood of an international authority being established after this war; and I take it that he agrees with me that *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, is self-contradictory. But his view of the state and its aim seems to me just introspective in the bad sense. It represents the conscious reflections of minds unappreciative of the actual work done in legislation and administration. It is quite extraordinarily akin to Horace Walpole's attitude, *e.g.*, letter to Sir H. Mann, November 2nd, 1765.

breathes its spirit. If you call the state an association, you speak the language of individualism, and still more so, if you speak of individual rights which can be asserted against it, and of the individual judgment as ultimate. To call it an "association" is contrary, I think, both to usage and to truth. The word is, I presume, employed intentionally as paradoxical and aggressive.

It is really, then, the moral being and moral responsibility of the state which we affirm, and which the main attack desires to undermine, although the method partly consists in setting up against it possibilities of conflict between its discharge of function and other more sporadic goods, not recognising the focus of all these demands in the social consciousness. In this way the method obtains an apparent harmony on moral grounds with its attack directed *against* the unique moral position of the state. The opposite suggestion, that we do not recognise the moral responsibility of the members of a group for its action, is, as we shall see, a mere misconception, derived from the fact that we observe the moral action of a community not to be capable of being criticised by the method of comparison with that of an individual.

The unique position of the state springs, as I said at starting, from the fact that it is moulded, as no mere association is, by and for the special task of maintaining in a certain territory the external conditions of good life as a whole. Its territorial area adjusts itself to that unity of communal experience which is most favourable to the maintenance of an organised will, so that it tends to cover the largest area within which, for a certain group, the conditions of such an experience exist.

It is an error, I think, resting on a confusion regarding the sphere of the state, to suggest that obedience to it can conflict with the existence of loyalty to associations—I refuse to say *other* associations—at home or abroad. The state's peculiar function is in the world of external action, and it does not

inquire into the sentiments of men and women further than to establish the *bonâ fide* intention which the law includes in the meaning of an act. But whatever loyalties may exist in the mind, the state will undoubtedly, when need arises, of which it through constitutional methods is the sole judge, prohibit and prevent the expression, in external acts, of any loyalty but that to the community which it represents. Absoluteness in this sense is inherent in the state, for the reason which we have noted.\*

But even for loyalties which we inwardly cherish, and which appear to us irreconcilable with the concrete communal will, we pay a severe penalty in a felt contradiction which is a constant sore in our mind. It forms a continual demand for reconciliation by adjustment, and so for a new response and an enlarged and not restricted operation of the social consciousness, which if it passes into action will reflect itself in a new and ampler initiative on the part of the state. Every conflict as a matter of course is a stimulus to fresh reaction.

6. So much for the *rationale* of the so-called absolutism of the state, which is in the main a caricature of its position as sole organiser of rights and as guardian of moral values.

I believe that the principal difficulty which is felt about the view which I am trying to explain arises from its denial that the moral obligations of a state can be deduced from the consideration of those which attach to a private person under what are taken to be analogous circumstances.† This difficulty seems to depend on the crude belief that morality consists in the observance of abstract absolute rules, unmodified by relations and situations, such that you can paint the world of outward actions, as it were, with two colours only, right and wrong, which will stand fast for all moral beings under all

\* Pp. 30-31, above. Even the duty of rebellion is not in principle a limit upon this power; for it does not rest on a non-social right, but on a recognition that the state is divided against itself.

† See Professor A. C. Bradley's lecture, above referred to, pp. 62 ff.

conditions. I do not think it could possibly be felt by any mind which had once grasped the point that duty is a systematic structure, such as to bring home its universal demand in a particular and appropriate form to every moral being according to its conditions, and that the best brief summary of it is "to be equal to the situation."

When this is grasped, I think that the moral criticism of our view is easily seen to rest on mere misunderstanding. We assume *ab initio* that the state has a mission or a function, a contribution to make to the life of the world such as no other body or person can pretend to. The question is whether comparison with the moral task of a private person can throw light on our judgment of what it does or of what it ought to do.

A word on the case of the private person himself will, perhaps, make the matter plainer. Even his morality is ultimately a very different thing, not from what common sense recognises, but from what popular theory assumes. There is no such thing in ethics as an absolute rule or an absolute obligation, unless it were that of so far as possible realising the best life. In every action the moral agent confronts a conflict of duties, and has in some degree to steer an uncharted course. Every situation is in some degree, however slightly, new; and his moral duty is to be equal to it, to deal with it, to mould it, in accordance with the moral spirit which is in him, into a contribution to the realisation of the best life. There is perhaps no act that we can think of which, if we do not set it down by definition as an act of the bad will, could not conceivably be a duty. The room for immoral casuistry is infinite, and there is no security but to grasp so far as possible the actual obligations, which in accordance with the ethical spirit acquired from social discipline and applying itself anew in a similar sense, are plainly incumbent upon the particular moral agent. With all the aids of moral convention, of a life organised in extreme detail within a framework of social and legal obligations, of the communal sentiment engrained and

embodied in his habitual will, the private individual has still in principle a new morality constantly to create, though in practice, assuming *bona fides*, he has in general little difficulty in discerning his duty at the moment. A strictly moral judgment of others is scarcely open to him at all.

Now turn to the community organised as a state. In quiet times, and over a great part of its conduct, its course, like that of the individual, may be considered as plainly marked.\* But at any moment some huge new problem may crop up, involving, one might say, a whole philosophy or prophecy of the future history of the world.† Suppose the British Empire confronted by an opponent or by an international Peace League or Tribunal with some proposed regulation which it (the Empire) judged fatal to sea power.‡ Is it not plain what we mean by saying that there is no organised moral world within which a course of duty under such conditions is prescribed to the state? Even assuming a disinterested tribunal—which at present would be quite impossible—who could determine with authority the effect on the world's future of any such regulation? Of course such a question is not justiciable. Yet when you get beyond justiciable questions you are in the ocean of speculation as to elements of future welfare. As to the really effective type of world-wide authority, I will say more below.

But at present the point is this. In the case supposed, the unit in question has one great certainty. It has the moral world of which so far it has been the guardian, which is the source of the mission or function which its conscience

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\* I am quite aware of the immense amount of international co-operation, for desirable ends, which goes on in normal times.

† Conflicting philosophies of history are ultimately, one might say, the root of bitterness between the Germans and ourselves. They sincerely think one course of things best for the world, and we sincerely think another. We are fighting for our faiths.

‡ The hypothesis is taken from *The War and Democracy*, p. 376.

and general will recognise as its own, and of the view of humanity and the world at large which it holds to be the highest. If it believes itself to see clearly that the proposed regulation must destroy or gravely endanger that form of good life and that attitude to humanity with which it has so far identified itself, it will possess in this conviction the only definite element in this moral problem. I do not mean that it must be so in the case of every innovation; but it very well may be so. In as far as it is so, the consideration of this certainty would probably present itself as an overwhelming ground of action.\* There is nothing here analogous to the tissue of obligation within which the individual lives. It is not the mere absence of a sanction that makes the difference; an external sanction cannot affect your own moral obligation. It is partly, no doubt, the absence of an external order on the maintenance of which you can rely; but it is still more, and more intimately, the absence of a recognised moral order such as to guide the conscience itself.

In the case suggested it is proposed to reshape the world; and it may well happen that in dealing with the proposal the unit has no guide but to defend the best thing it knows. This is what we mean by saying that it is the guardian of a whole moral world, but does not itself act within a moral world. Say, if you like, that it is within the society of states. But the life of this society, as a whole, has up to the present no moral tradition, imposing adapted and appropriate obligations on all units, comparable with the social consciousness which constitutes the whole basis and material of the normal individual will. In any case analogous to that just supposed, it is not likely to afford any help whatever. There is no middle term, so to speak, between the unit which has to act and the general obligation of realising what is best—none, that is, except the form of good life with which the unit is already

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\* See Professor Bradley, *loc. cit.*, comparing the right of a state and of an individual to sacrifice themselves or risk their own suppression.

identified. And we have seen that its special form of good life, being a moral consciousness, is not merely a self-contained habit of conduct in the members of a group, but is an attitude and moral outlook which, though existing in them, has for its object the whole world, and is determined by the view and spirit which the group has evolved for itself, implying its conception of the best thing for the world. Devotion to humanity as a best, as a supreme quality, is, unless and until the organism of mankind becomes actual, better represented by the moral world of the highest communities than by anything common to the whole multitude of mankind.\*

7. After these explanations, I hope it may be hardly necessary to refute the charge of immorality† brought against the thesis that a state simply cannot do all immoral acts which a single human being can. We have seen that morality is relative to the special obligation of the particular moral being, and it is obviously also relative to his capacity for action. Now a community simply cannot express its will directly, as a man or woman can, in a bodily act. To act is to make a will pass into fact, and how a community can do this is an old question and not an easy one. Rousseau held that nothing but a law, a decision dealing with something of general interest, could be an act of the sovereign power, and, in the main, I believe he was right. It is plain surely that even a mere aggregate of men cannot commit a single bodily act as one man can. It may be answered, "they may be accomplices before or after the fact." But we should consider what would have to be proved to bring in a nation as accomplices in a breach of the Decalogue. An act of attainder is, I should think, the nearest thing to murder by a state, and such an act, like all privilegia, is, I believe, now considered abhorrent to the spirit of law.‡ Surely

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\* See pp. 47-48, below.

† Mr. Delisle Burns, p. 293.

‡ Cf. the decision of the Athenian assembly to put the Mityleneans to death, and its recall.

it is better and even more impressive to recognise obvious distinctions and call things by their right names. The fundamental point is in the defective individuality of human beings. If a man could be inspired by the whole living system of the communal mind, then the community as active—the state—might be fully responsible for what he does. And in practice we make a great distinction, which nothing else can account for, between the degrees of its responsibility for the sayings and doings of its different agents. A Cabinet minister acts for the state in a different degree from a police constable. For, as any man or woman's mind is always but a fragment of the general mind and will, it is plain that the community which acts through them can only answer for as much of their act as represents the degree of its will which it can fairly be said to have succeeded in communicating to them; that is, in practice, for their appointment and dismissal, their instructions, and the general system under which they work. And the recognition of this is enough, and more effective in practice than an attempt to impute something more, which would always fail. "Power can be delegated, but not will." You may order special acts to be done by another, but you cannot transfer to him the general exercise of your will.

I admit that recent events have done something to show that the responsibility of a community for single wicked actions of men may be more intimate than I had thought possible. But I still think that all this will look very different when the conditions of such action come to be criticised in cold blood. And in any case I have rightly stated the hypothetical conditions of such responsibility.\*

If agents thought of their duty more in terms of a community's obligations and less in terms of private conscience much evil would be avoided. It has been the private conscience that has been responsible, very largely at least, for religious persecution and active intolerance of all kinds, which have been

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\* *Phil. Theory of State*, p. 324.



not an advantage, but a distinct obstruction to the community in its function.

8. I will pass on to the question of a wider loyalty, or a larger political unit than those which centre in the nation-state.

It is natural to infer from the social organism to an organism of humanity, and to look for the supreme authority or object of devotion in this as the inclusive unit. But here, again, is a difficulty in the facts—a double difficulty, which our theory is framed to meet, and which its critics seem not to have heeded.

The first thing that strikes us is that, in fact, at present there is no organism of humanity. For such an organism, consciousness of connection is necessary. Mere causal connection exists in the mere physical world. And putting aside the question of past and future human beings, will anyone say that the existing multitude of humanity possesses any connected communal consciousness whatever? But if not, there is at present no community, outside those which speak through the state, which can at all pretend to be a moral purpose or to be endowed with a conscience.

And secondly, considering as an aggregate all the human beings on the earth's surface, we can find in them no common character in which the values to which we are devoted as the qualitative essence of humanity are adequately represented. I do not say that something of humanity in the highest sense is not present wherever there are human beings. But it is plain that neither the main values which govern our aspirations to the best life, nor the valuation of them, are possessions common to mankind. It is not to the multitudes of all mankind that we go for "love and beauty and delight." At their best they are possessions of particular communities, and form elements in the diverse moral worlds which states exist to guard. Thus, to put it bluntly, a duty to realise the best life cannot be shown to coincide with a duty to the

multitude of mankind. Our primary loyalty is to a quality, not to a crowd. If you see the two as one, it is by faith only, and at any given moment they may conflict. This makes the moral alternative between, say, the self-defence of a highly civilised state and submission in the interests of the whole world's peace, a really tragic crisis, and entitles us to say that there is nothing in the interstate world to guide its units in moral choices.

It is not unnecessary to guard ourselves, as we are doing, against the assumption that humanity is a real corporate being, an object of devotion and a guide to moral duty. This formed the central doctrine of Comtism, and seeming to correspond to a natural expansion of our interest tends to make us fancy that we apprehend an ultimate visible community to which our devotion is due, and with which we can have a will in common. It is conceivable, of course, that such a community may one day come into being. But there are suggestions which point elsewhere. M. Romain Rolland has spoken of our only dwelling-places being our earthly fatherland and the City of God.\* I do not know whether by the second phrase he understands a visible community. The antithesis seems to suggest a different idea, and the truly complete community, which religion, for instance, assumes as ultimate, cannot possibly be that with which the Comtist confused it, the multitude of human beings either alive at any given moment, or including all that have been and that will be.

However this may be, whatever may prove to be the extent of the effective unity which at any time may be realised among mankind, the condition of its realisation, if our theory is sound, admits of no dispute. The body which is to be in sole or supreme command of force for the common good must possess a true general will, and for that reason must be a genuine community sharing a common sentiment and animated by a common tradition. With less than this

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\* See *The War and Democracy*, p. 13.

the supreme authority must become an administration of general rules, external to the needs and consciences of the communities which it is meant to unite, and incapable therefore of appreciating the more serious problems which will confront them, or those needs of their lives which demand a certain social structure. This is why I view with apprehension the tendency to minimise the function of the state which is current to-day, owing, as I believe, to a too special explanation of causes which led to the present conflict. The first thing needed is the better adjustment and maintenance of rights within the communities which form states at the present moment. That is to say, the more complete discharge of their functions by existing states, and, if need be, the formation of new ones, adapted to similar tasks. More of the state, that is, and not less, is required within communities. And so, too, without. If larger units are needed and can be realised, they too must fulfil the conditions of states. Here, also, more of the state is needed, and not less. Leagues, alliances, united states, which have not the spirit of true communities, carry the germs of disruption within them, and the probability, as Hegel explained, of antagonism without. External antagonism, and not a deep-seated general will, is, as a rule, their binding force. Here I am thoroughly at one with Mr. Russell as to the improbability of an international authority being created as an outcome of the present war. I confess that I see something of the same danger in the unit which has been spoken of as the commonwealth—say, the British Empire in its present stage of development. For it is its essence, as I understand the doctrine, that its constituent members are to be on an unequal footing, unified only by a reign of external law which leaves their national consciousnesses untouched and unreconciled.\* I cannot believe

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\* Lord Acton, *Freedom and other Essays*, p. 290 ; see *The War and Democracy*, p. 370. Lord Acton does not use the term Commonwealth in the sense referred to by the latter writer. It is discussed, of course, in Mr. Curtis' works.

that this is satisfactory. If the members remain heterogeneous and unequal, there is no general will. If the point is that they are to be trained to freedom and equality, then it seems to me to matter little whether in the end they go their own way in peace, or choose to form an effective unity with the other members, which shall be a true state. But the "commonwealth" as described is neither one thing nor the other, and is justified, I should have said, only by its possible future.

9. Thus it seems clear to me that the organisation of rights can only be complete in a community which satisfies the conditions necessary to the possession of a general will; that is to say, a very high degree of common experience, tradition, and aspiration. Such communities are not now to be found except in the nation-state. The commonwealth of nations alluded to above does not, I believe, fulfil the condition in respect of the dependencies included in it. Yet I do not suggest that larger units than nation-states can never come to fulfil these conditions; only that, if they do, they must have achieved a unity comparable to that which we now experience in nationality alone. I do not say this is impossible to be realised at some remote period even in a world-state. But in so far as it is not realised, any unitary authority which it may be attempted to set up will be superficial, external, arbitrary, and liable to disruption.

And this contemplation of remote possibilities is making people neglect the plain facts and the nearer remedies. Whatever may happen in the future, there is nothing in the world to-day that can compare for a moment in power and intimacy and concreteness with the type of corporate being which we call the nation-state. The organism of humanity, though conceivable, is at present, as we saw, a mere possibility, and the idea of it contains a serious contradiction between quality and totality.

A system of nation-states or of commonwealths (I have

said why I cannot recognise the distinction as one of principle), each internally well organised, would not perhaps give us all that a world-state might give us, but it would place the world in a wholly different ethical position from that which it occupies to-day. It would involve, I assume, universal freedom of trade and intercourse. Interference with this I take to be the result of internal distraction, giving rise to the doctrine of "your gain my loss," which is the principal source of war.

There is no reason that I can see for considering it a defective arrangement that world-wide relations or associations shall pass under the dominion of different sovereign powers in different regions of the earth. It seems to me that a very doubtful assumption is made when we are told that economic relations have outstripped political relations. This is actually to assume that there cannot be friendly and efficient co-operation between different political bodies in respect of world-wide relations. It is a pessimistic view, for which our theory recognises no ground whatever. Each local power, we consider, has expressly evolved itself from the need and demand for an organisation of rights in a certain territory. And it is quite arguable that every world-wide relation or association—say, for example, the Roman Catholic Church—is better protected and developed by unification with such a local power in every region, than it would be by a world-wide political unit. The fear that this will not be so is itself a relic of that barbarous suspicion directed against foreign communities which belongs to the identification of states with agencies for war and exploitation.

The case of relations to units outside a state makes no difference of principle. It is quite plain that if our mind and will are to be at one with themselves, our loyalty and co-operation with, say, an international labour movement or an association in a foreign country, must be reconciled with that system of our mind which is our national\* consciousness and

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\* I take the term "national" as adjective of any sovereign community which has a general will.

conscience. If not, there must be a constant sore in our moral being, and, of course, there are many such sores, and while we live in this world they are not likely altogether to cease.

But there is no reason in principle why a system of states, each doing with fair completeness its local work of organisation, and recognising, with or without active modification, the world-wide relations which pass through them, should not result in a world as peaceful as one under a more unitary system, and much richer in quality.\* Those who think it cannot be so must believe that states are naturally at war, and do not, so far as I can see, understand what the nature of the state is, nor how a group-mind (like every mind) is an attitude to the world at large, nor for what reasons it is that communities are apt to be hostile.

I do not think it necessary that such a system of states should form an explicit federation. Federations are apt to be unsuccessful unless they possess, like the United States of America, an obvious and increasing tendency to assume the national type. Those who think federation necessary for the sake of a central force, obviously believe in force rather than in friendship. But without friendship the force is dangerous, and with it, perhaps, hardly necessary. I am assuming that the experience and tradition of states remain as they are to-day, too highly individual to permit of a thoroughly common mind and of a true general will, but that they remain peaceful neighbours with their full national differences, because they have every reason for friendship and none for enmity, and are united in all sorts of common enterprises.

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\* I cannot see the least relevance in the suggestion that our theory requires relations which pass beyond the frontier to be suppressed. (Lindsay, *Theory of State*, p. 101.) The group-mind, we saw, is a species of world-mind, and has not the group for its sole object. All external relations, therefore, are focussed in it along with the group-relations proper, and constitute, of course, a demand for unification by a response.

It seems to me an advantage of this conception that it leaves room for the widest diversity in the contributions of the several communities to the life of the world, and it confronts the difficulty which arises, as we saw, from the fact that the higher gifts of humanity have hitherto, at any rate, sprung from localised minds, and have not been characteristic of mankind at large nor acceptable to it. It might be that this is the law of life; and that reciprocal good will, with understanding and appreciation, even intensified by the sense of foreignness and mystery, are all that the different types of mankind are ever to have in common; that the great gifts are still to be, as they have been, achievements of diversely intensified life-centres, which seem to leave the rest behind.

The opposite ideal, that of a world-state, is, of course, conceivable. The point of interest is, I think, whether the identification of spirit and experience necessary as the basis of a general will could be achieved without the sacrifice of the valuable individual qualities of national minds.

Is our love of local peculiarities—of local dialects, for example—purely an obscurantist superstition; and how far do local styles and traditions of beauty depend upon conditions like those of local dialects? Certainly it appears as if anything ought to go which keeps people barbarous and makes mutual understanding impossible.

This analogy of language, I think, is helpful.\* We should desire, I suppose, to preserve the languages of the world in all their glory and individuality, but that they should become for mankind a means of entrance into each other's minds and not a bar to it. If we compare this ideal with that of a universal artificial language, we shall see perhaps the true distinction between what we desire and what we should reject.

But the problem still returns upon us. Will the high civilisation of the future be a single thing, fusing into one the

individualities of all regions and of all former nations? Or will national and local genius develop new internal resources, and even diverge into fresh and several types of greatness, instead of emerging in a homogeneous character?

I do not think that the future of political organisation can be treated apart from the consideration of questions like these. And there is a homely remark which occurs to me as very relevant. Many people are very good friends apart who would quarrel if they kept house together. Is not this likely to be true of nations?

And, in conclusion, since after all this is a philosophical society, I wish to draw attention to an assumption of popular philosophy which I suspect of having a serious bearing upon current ideas of the international future. I mean the popular belief in a progress of the species which is to end in a condition of the world that shall compensate for the wrongs and sufferings of the past; in a word, in the evanescence of evil. We have had it explicitly argued by Herbert Spencer; and there is hardly any popular writing about the future which does not assume it. Now I am inclined to think that the notion of a necessary advance towards the inclusion of mankind in a single political body is an offshoot of this naïve form of optimism. The nature of consciousness in retaining the past as a basis for the future, together with its imperative demand for improvement, does make it fairly certain that man must tend on the whole to add to his moral and social achievements. But it is clear, I think, that any progress of future generations towards happiness could not compensate for the wrong and suffering of the past, and therefore this widely operating motive for assuming its likelihood must be dismissed, while in itself the evanescence of evil seems altogether self-contradictory. Therefore, while I believe in a nobler future, I do not believe in any simple advance towards comfort and tranquillity.

Another ancient superstition comes to my mind which



illustrates the same popular tendency. The idea of a Millennium—of the reign of Christ on earth—passed gradually into the more modern conviction that at least the whole world was one day to be brought under the sway of Christianity, or perhaps of Western enlightenment as typified by nineteenth century science.\* All this, I take it, is gone by. The development of opinion has been in the contrary direction. The best Churchmen will admit, I believe, that to a great extent at least the peoples of the world have already the religions that suit them best. And we all see that the gospel of Western science, valuable as it is, has no exclusive claim to be the doctrine even of civilised man. A number of great systems, very profoundly differing in life, mind, and institutions, existing side by side in peace and co-operation, and each contributing to the world an individual best, irreducible to terms of the others,—this might be, I do not say must be, a finer and higher thing† than a single body with a homogeneous civilisation and a single communal will.

And what about war? It is certain, to my mind, that evil and suffering must be permanent in the world, because man is a self-contradictory being, in an environment to which he can never be adapted, seeing that at least his own activity is always transforming it. And in principle there can be no reason for treating war as an exceptional case, as if presided over by a special devil apart from every other form of wrong. Neither the possibility of eradicating war, nor the incidental good that comes of it, can reasonably be discussed, as they commonly are, apart from the general problem of evil in the world. While man has a conscience, and things he values above life, and yet his conscience is liable to err, the root of war exists. Issues may arise between group and group which cannot be compromised.

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\* *E.g.*, of Positivism, as Comte held.

† *Cf.* the sentence from A.E., quoted above, p. 29. I do not mean that the nation-unit is final. But I think any change would be a grave loss which did not, if it had to go, give us something as rich in qualities in its place.

Within the state itself, which is cited as the convincing analogy for a universal reign of law, both civil war and individual rebellion remain possible.

But man is bound, with this evil as with any other, to do what he can for its removal. And I do not doubt that its occasions may be immensely diminished by the reform of states, and their reconstruction in certain cases, and by, what this will promote, a truer economic creed.

For the sake of clearness, and as an aid to discussion, I will express myself definitely under the heads in which Mr. Cole sums up his views.

Firstly: The analysis of the state as the expression of organised will belongs to the philosophical tendency most opposed to introspection. Its recognition of the state's true function as the organisation of rights is the only cure for the exclusive Imperialism which I agree with Mr. Cole in condemning.

Secondly: Mr. Cole has betrayed his real attitude by calling the state a means (p. 321). It really is an embodiment of the end, the best life, up to a certain point, and the foundation of the remainder. The conception is Greek, and depends on a systematic analysis of action which neither Kant nor Rousseau has offered.

Thirdly: To treat the individual, the state, and the world, as concentric circles after Euler's method could only be the device of an individualist. Both relations implied are primarily qualitative; and in any relation the individual can no more divest himself of the communal mind than of his own. In fact, the former is the latter at its fullest.

Fourthly: States differ from associations by being *φύσει*, and so by their total and concrete survey of practical life. All relations of their members, so far as demanding practical recognition, are in their province. States are territorial, only as far as poems are historical. They start from facts, but they deal with the world.

Fifthly: State absolutism is a phrase coined by the critics to discredit the unique nature of the state and the community it represents. The so-called practical limitations to the power of the state are inherent in its function as the organisation of rights. They are therefore not limitations but positive stimuli to its activity.

Sixthly: The enforcement of obligations by the state is limited by the nature of its function and by nothing else. Doubt whether an official is really speaking for the state may make it uncertain what our obligation is. He may be acting *ultra vires*. But it is false that democratic management necessarily implies, *e.g.*, antecedent control by a parliament.

Lastly: The state is a *partial* embodiment of the national consciousness only as being confined to practice. Any conflict of social obligations is absolute proof that they have a meeting-point in the same social consciousness, and form material for a creative response on its part, and, it may be, for a new initiative in organisation on the part of the state as its operative agency.

The critics' confusion of the character of the state with the vices of states has led them into hopeless dilemmas. They argue from these vices that it should be weakened, while admitting a character which implies that it can hardly be too strong. It is quite impossible to unite a demonstration of growing demands on the state for organising activity with a demonstration that its rank and authority already demand diminution. It is quite impossible to unite a demonstration that the state has a conscience and moral responsibility with a demonstration that it shows itself non-moral when it throws itself heart and soul into its individual duty.

Ultimately, it seems to me, the critics' error is just that which they believe themselves to be attacking. Having misconceived the real spring of organisation and enlightenment, they are driven to put their faith in external force.

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others. I am not going to plunge into an analysis of the process of induction. Induction is the machinery and not the product, and it is the product which I want to consider. When we understand the product we shall be in a stronger position to improve the machinery.

First, there is one point which it is necessary to emphasise. There is a tendency, in analysing scientific processes, to assume a given assemblage of concepts applying to nature, and to imagine that the discovery of laws of nature consists in selecting, by means of inductive logic, some one out of a definite set of possible alternative relations which may hold between the things in nature answering to these obvious concepts. In a sense this assumption is fairly correct, especially in regard to the earlier stages of science. Mankind found itself in possession of certain concepts respecting nature—for example, the concept of fairly permanent material bodies—and proceeded to determine laws which related the corresponding percepts in nature. But the formulation of laws changed the concepts,—sometimes gently by an added precision, sometimes violently. At first this process was not much noticed, or at least was felt to be a process curbed within narrow bounds, not touching fundamental ideas. At the stage where we now are, the formulation of the concepts can be seen to be as important as the formulation of the empirical laws connecting the events in the universe as thus conceived by us. For example, the concepts of life, of heredity, of a material body, of a molecule, of an atom, of an electron, of energy, of space, of time, of quantity, and of number. I am not dogmatising about the best way of getting such ideas straight. Certainly it will only be done by those who have devoted themselves to a special study of the facts in question. Success is never absolute, and progress in the right direction is the result of a slow, gradual process of continual comparison of ideas with facts. The criterion of success is that we should be able to formulate empirical laws, that is, statements of relations, connecting the

various parts of the universe as thus conceived,—laws with the property that we can interpret the actual events of our lives as being our fragmentary knowledge of this conceived interrelated whole.

But, for the purposes of science, what is the actual world? Has science to wait for the termination of the metaphysical debate till it can determine its own subject-matter? I suggest that science has a much more homely starting-ground. Its task is the discovery of the relations which exist within that flux of perceptions, sensations, and emotions, which forms our experience of life. The panorama yielded by sight, sound, taste, smell, touch, and by more inchoate sensible feelings, is the sole field of activity. It is in this way that science is the thought organisation of experience. The most obvious aspect of this field of actual experience is its disorderly character. It is for each person a *continuum*, fragmentary, and with elements not clearly differentiated. The comparison of the sensible experiences of diverse people brings its own difficulties. I insist on the radically untidy, ill-adjusted character of the fields of actual experience from which science starts. To grasp this fundamental truth is the first step in wisdom, when constructing a philosophy of science. This fact is concealed by the influence of language, moulded by science, which foists on us exact concepts as though they represented the immediate deliverances of experience. The result is that we imagine that we have immediate experience of a world of perfectly defined objects implicated in perfectly defined events which, as known to us by the direct deliverance of our senses, happen at exact instants of time, in a space formed by exact points, without parts and without magnitude: the neat, trim, tidy, exact world which is the goal of scientific thought.

My contention is that this world is a world of ideas, and that its internal relations are relations between abstract concepts, and that the elucidation of the precise connection between this world and the feelings of actual experience is the

fundamental question of scientific philosophy. The question which I am inviting you to consider is this: How does exact thought apply to the fragmentary, vague *continuum* of experience? I am not saying that it does not apply: quite the contrary. But I want to know how it applies. The solution I am asking for is not a phrase, however brilliant, but a solid branch of science, constructed with slow patience, showing in detail how the correspondence is effected.

The first great steps in the organisation of thought were due exclusively to the practical source of scientific activity, without any admixture of theoretical impulse. Their slow accomplishment was the cause and also the effect of the gradual evolution of moderately rational beings. I mean the formation of the concepts of definite material objects, of the determinate lapse of time, of simultaneity, of recurrence, of definite relative position, and of analogous fundamental ideas, according to which the flux of our experience is mentally arranged for handy reference: in fact, the whole apparatus of common-sense thought. Consider in your mind some definite chair. The concept of that chair is simply the concept of all the interrelated experiences connected with that chair—namely, of the experience of the folk who made it, of the folk who sold it, of the folk who have seen it or used it, of the man who is now experiencing a comfortable sense of support, combined with our expectations of an analogous future, terminated finally by a different set of experiences when the chair collapses and becomes fire-wood. The formation of that type of concept was a tremendous job, and zoologists and geologists tell us that it took many tens of millions of years. I can well believe it.

I now emphasise two points. In the first place, science is rooted in what I have just called the whole apparatus of common-sense thought. That is the *datum* from which it starts, and to which it must recur. We may speculate, if it amuses us, of other beings in other planets who have arranged

analogous experiences according to an entirely different conceptual code—who have directed their chief attention, namely, to different relations between their various experiences. But the task is too complex, too gigantic, to be revised in its main outlines. You may polish up common sense, you may contradict it in detail, you may surprise it. Yet ultimately your whole task is to satisfy it.

In the second place, neither common sense nor science can proceed with their task of thought organisation without departing in some respect from the strict consideration of what is actual in experience. Think again of the chair. Among the experiences upon which its concept is based, I included our expectations of its future history. I should have gone further and included our imagination of all the possible experiences which in ordinary language we should call perceptions of the chair which might have occurred. This is a difficult question, and I do not see my way through it. But, at present, in the construction of a theory of space and of time there seem insuperable difficulties if we refuse to admit ideal experiences. This imaginative perception of experiences, which, if they occurred, would be coherent with our actual experiences, seems fundamental in our lives. It is neither wholly arbitrary, nor yet fully determined. It is a vague background which is only made in part definite by isolated activities of thought. Consider, for example, our thoughts of the unseen flora of Brazil.

Ideal experiences are closely connected with our imaginative reproduction of the actual experiences of other people, and also with our almost inevitable conception of ourselves as receiving our impressions from an external complex reality beyond ourselves. It may be that an adequate analysis of every source and every type of experience yields demonstrative proof of such a reality and of its nature. Indeed, it is hardly to be doubted that this is the case. The precise elucidation of this question is the problem of metaphysics. One of the points which I am

urging in this paper is that the basis of science does not depend on the assumption of any of the conclusions of metaphysics; but that both science and metaphysics start from the same given groundwork of immediate experience, and in the main proceed in opposite directions on their diverse tasks.

For example, metaphysics inquires how our perceptions of the chair relate us to some true reality. Science gathers up these perceptions into a determinate class, adds to them ideal perceptions of analogous sort, which under assignable circumstances would be obtained, and this single concept of that set of perceptions is all that science needs; unless indeed you prefer that thought find its origin in some legend of those great twin brethren, the Cock and Bull.

My immediate problem is to inquire into the nature of the texture of science. Science is essentially logical. The nexus between its concepts is a logical nexus, and the grounds for its detailed assertions are logical grounds. King James said, "No bishops, no king." With greater confidence we can say, "No logic, no science." The reason for the instinctive dislike which most men of science feel towards the recognition of this truth is, I think, the barren failure of logical theory during the past three or four centuries. We may trace this failure back to the worship of authority, which in some respects increased in the learned world at the time of the Renaissance. Mankind then changed its authority, and this fact temporally acted as an emancipation. But the main fact, and we can find complaints\* of it at the very commencement of the modern movement, was the establishment of a reverential attitude towards any statement made by a classical author. Scholars became commentators on truths too fragile to bear translation. A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost. To this hesitation I ascribe the barrenness of logic. Another reason for distrust of logical theory and of mathematics is the belief that deduc-

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\* *E.g.*, in 1551 by Italian schoolmen. Cf. Sarpi's *History of the Council of Trent*, under that date.



tive reasoning can give you nothing new. Your conclusions are contained in your premises, which by hypothesis are known to you.

In the first place, this last condemnation of logic neglects the fragmentary, disconnected character of human knowledge. To know one premise on Monday, and another premise on Tuesday, is useless to you on Wednesday. Science is a permanent record of premises, deductions, and conclusions, verified all along the line by its correspondence with facts. Secondly, it is untrue that when we know the premises we also know the conclusions. In arithmetic, for example, mankind are not calculating boys. Any theory which proves that they are conversant with the consequences of their assumption must be wrong. We can imagine beings who possess such insight. But we are not such creatures. Both these answers are, I think, true and relevant. But they are not satisfactory. They are too much in the nature of bludgeons, too external. We want something more explanatory of the very real difficulty which the question suggests. In fact, the true answer is embedded in the discussion of our main problem of the relation of logic to natural science.

It will be necessary to sketch in broad outline some relevant features of modern logic. In doing so, I shall try to avoid the profound general discussions and the minute technical classifications which occupy the main part of traditional logic. It is characteristic of a science in its earlier stages—and logic has become fossilised in such a stage—to be both ambitiously profound in its aims and trivial in its handling of details.

We can discern four departments of logical theory. By an analogy which is not so very remote I will call these departments or sections the arithmetic section, the algebraic section, the section of general-function theory, the analytical section. I do not mean that arithmetic arises in the first section, algebra in the second section, and so on; but the names are suggestive of certain qualities of thought in each section which are

reminiscent of analogous qualities in arithmetic, in algebra, in the general theory of a mathematical function, and in the mathematical analysis of the properties of particular functions.

The first section—namely, the arithmetic stage—deals with the relations of definite propositions to each other, just as arithmetic deals with definite numbers. Consider any definite proposition; call it " $p$ ." We conceive that there is always another proposition which is the direct contradictory to " $p$ "; call it " $\text{not-}p$ ." When we have got two propositions,  $p$  and  $q$ , we can form derivative propositions from them, and from their contradictories. We can say, "At least one of  $p$  or  $q$  is true, and perhaps both." Let us call this proposition " $p$  or  $q$ ." I may mention, as an aside, that one of the greatest of living philosophers has stated that this use of the word "or"—namely, " $p$  or  $q$ " in the sense that either or both may be true—makes him despair of exact expression. We must brave his wrath, which is unintelligible to me.

We have thus got hold of four new propositions, namely, " $p$  or  $q$ ," and " $\text{not-}p$  or  $q$ ," and " $p$  or  $\text{not-}q$ ," and " $\text{not-}p$  or  $\text{not-}q$ ." Call these the set of disjunctive derivatives. There are, so far, in all eight propositions,  $p$ ,  $\text{not-}p$ ,  $q$ ,  $\text{not-}q$ , and the four disjunctive derivatives. Any pair of these eight propositions can be taken, and substituted for  $p$  and  $q$  in the foregoing treatment. Thus each pair yields eight propositions, some of which may have been obtained before. By proceeding in this way, we arrive at an unending set of propositions of growing complexity, ultimately derived from the two original propositions  $p$  or  $q$ . Of course, only a few are important. Similarly we can start from three propositions,  $p$ ,  $q$ ,  $r$ , or from four propositions,  $p$ ,  $q$ ,  $r$ ,  $s$ , and so on. Any one of the propositions of these aggregates may be true or false. It has no other alternative. Whichever it is, true or false, call it the "truth-value" of the proposition.

The first section of logical inquiry is to settle what we know of the truth-values of these propositions, when we know the

truth-values of some of them. The inquiry, so far as it is worth while carrying it, is not very abstruse, and the best way of expressing its results is a detail which I will not now consider. This inquiry forms the arithmetic stage.

The next section of logic is the algebraic stage. Now, the difference between arithmetic and algebra is that in arithmetic definite numbers are considered, and in algebra symbols—namely, letters—are introduced which stand for any numbers. The idea of a number is also enlarged. These letters, standing for any numbers, are called sometimes variables and sometimes parameters. Their essential characteristic is that they are undetermined, unless, indeed, the algebraic conditions which they satisfy implicitly determine them. Then they are sometimes called unknowns. An algebraic formula with letters is a blank form. It becomes a determinate arithmetic statement when definite numbers are substituted for the letters. The importance of algebra is a tribute to the study of form. Consider now the following proposition :

The specific heat of mercury is 0.033.

This is a definite proposition which, with certain limitations, is true. But the truth-value of the proposition does not immediately concern us. Instead of mercury put a mere letter which is the name of some undetermined thing: we get

The specific heat of  $x$  is 0.033.

This is not a proposition; it has been called by Russell a propositional function. It is the logical analogy of an algebraic expression. Let us write  $f(x)$  for any propositional function. We could also generalise still further, and say

The specific heat of  $x$  is  $y$ .

We thus get another propositional function,  $F(x, y)$ , of two arguments  $x$  and  $y$ , and so on for any number of arguments.

Now, consider  $f(x)$ . There is the range of values of  $x$ , for which  $f(x)$  is a proposition, true or false. For values of  $x$

outside this range,  $f(x)$  is not a proposition at all, and is neither true nor false. It may have vague suggestions for us, but it has no unit meaning of definite assertion. For example,

The specific heat of water is 0.033

is a proposition which is false ; and

The specific heat of virtue is 0.033

is, I should imagine, not a proposition at all ; so that it is neither true nor false, though its component parts raise various associations in our minds. This range of values, for which  $f(x)$  has sense, is called the "type" of the argument  $x$ .

But there is also a range of values of  $x$  for which  $f(x)$  is a true proposition. This is the class of those values of the argument which *satisfy*  $f(x)$ . This class may have no members ; or, in the other extreme, the class may be the whole type of the arguments.

We thus conceive two general propositions respecting the indefinite number of propositions which share in the same logical form,—that is, which are values of the same propositional function. One of these propositions is

$f(x)$  yields a true proposition for each value of  $x$  of the  
proper type ;

the other proposition is,

There is a value of  $x$  for which  $f(x)$  is true.

Given two, or more, propositional functions  $f(x)$  and  $\phi(x)$  with the same argument  $x$ , we form derivative propositional functions, namely,

$f(x)$  or  $\phi(x)$ ,  $f(x)$  or not- $\phi(x)$ ,

and so on with the contradictories, obtaining, as in the arithmetical stage, an unending aggregate of propositional functions. Also each propositional function yields two general propositions. The theory of the interconnection between the truth-values of the general propositions arising from any such aggregate of

propositional functions forms a simple and elegant chapter of mathematical logic.

In this algebraic section of logic the theory of types crops up, as we have already noted. It cannot be neglected without the introduction of error. Its theory has to be settled at least by some safe hypothesis, even if it does not go to the philosophic basis of the question. This part of the subject is obscure and difficult, and has not been finally elucidated, though Russell's brilliant work has opened out the subject.

The final impulse to modern logic comes from the independent discovery of the importance of the logic variable by Frege and Peano. Frege went further than Peano, but by an unfortunate symbolism rendered his work so obscure that no one fully recognised his meaning who had not found it out for himself. But the movement has a large history reaching back to Leibniz and even to Aristotle. Among English contributors are De Morgan, Boole, and Sir Alfred Kempe; their work is of the first rank.

The third logical section is the stage of general-function theory. In logical language, we perform in this stage the transition from intension to extension, and investigate the theory of denotation. Take the propositional function  $f(x)$ . There is the class, or range of values for  $x$ , whose members satisfy  $f(x)$ . But the same range may be the class whose members satisfy another propositional function  $\phi(x)$ . It is necessary to investigate how to indicate the class by a way which is indifferent as between the various propositional functions that are satisfied by any member of it, and of it only. What has to be done is to analyse the nature of propositions about a class—namely, those propositions whose truth-values depend on the class itself and not on the particular meaning by which the class is indicated.

Furthermore, there are propositions about alleged individuals indicated by descriptive phrases: for example, propositions about "the present King of England," who does exist, and

"the present Emperor of Brazil," who does not exist. More complicated, but analogous, questions involving propositional functions of two variables involve the notion of "correlation," just as functions of one argument involve classes. Similarly functions of three arguments yield three-cornered correlations, and so on. This logical section is one which Russell has made peculiarly his own by work which must always remain fundamental. I have called this the section of functional theory, because its ideas are essential to the construction of logical denoting functions which include as a special case ordinary mathematical functions, such as sine, logarithm, etc. In each of these three stages it will be necessary gradually to introduce an appropriate symbolism, if we are to pass on to the fourth stage.

The fourth logical section, the analytic stage, is concerned with the investigation of the properties of special logical constructions, that is, of classes and correlations of special sorts. The whole of mathematics is included here. So the section is a large one. In fact, it is mathematics, neither more nor less. But it includes an analysis of mathematical ideas not hitherto included in the scope of that science, nor, indeed, contemplated at all. The essence of this stage is construction. It is by means of suitable constructions that the great framework of applied mathematics, comprising the theories of number, quantity, time, and space, is elaborated.

It is impossible, even in brief outline, to explain how mathematics is developed from the concepts of class and correlation, including many-cornered correlations, which are established in the third section. I can only allude to the headings of the process, which is fully developed in the work, *Principia Mathematica*, by Mr. Russell and myself. There are in this process of development seven special sorts of correlations which are of peculiar interest. The first sort comprises one-to-many, many-to-one, and one-to-one correlations. The second sort comprises serial relations, that is, correlations by which the

members of some field are arranged in serial order, so that, in the sense defined by the relation, any member of the field is either before or after any other member. The third class comprises inductive relations, that is, correlations on which the theory of mathematical induction depends. The fourth class comprises selective relations, which are required for the general theory of arithmetic operations, and elsewhere. It is in connection with such relations that the famous multiplicative axiom arises for consideration. The fifth class comprises vector relations, from which the theory of quantity arises. The sixth class comprises ratio relations, which interconnect number and quantity. The seventh class comprises three-cornered and four-cornered relations, which occur in geometry.

A bare enumeration of technical names, such as the above, is not very illuminating, though it may help to a comprehension of the demarcations of the subject. Please remember that the names are technical names, meant, no doubt, to be suggestive, but used in strictly defined senses. We have suffered much from critics who consider it sufficient to criticise our procedure on the slender basis of a knowledge of the dictionary meanings of such terms. For example, a one-to-one correlation depends on the notion of a class with only one member, and this notion is defined without appeal to the concept of the number one. The notion of diversity is all that is wanted. Thus the class  $\alpha$  has only one member, if (1) the class of values of  $x$  which satisfies the propositional function,

$$x \text{ is not a member of } \alpha,$$

is not the whole type of relevant values of  $x$ , and if (2) the propositional function,

$$x \text{ and } y \text{ are members of } \alpha, \text{ and } x \text{ is diverse from } y,$$

is false, whatever be the values of  $x$  and  $y$  in the relevant type.

Analogous procedures are obviously possible for higher finite cardinal members. Thus, step by step, the whole cycle of

current mathematical ideas is capable of logical definition. The process is detailed and laborious, and, like all science, knows nothing of a royal road of airy phrases. The essence of the process is, first, to construct the notion in terms of the forms of propositions, that is, in terms of the relevant propositional functions, and secondly, to prove the fundamental truths which hold about the notion by reference to the results obtained in the algebraic section of logic.

It will be seen that in this process the whole apparatus of special indefinable mathematical concepts, and special *a priori* mathematical premises, respecting number, quantity, and space, has vanished. Mathematics is merely an apparatus for analysing the deductions which can be drawn from any particular premises, supplied by common sense, or by more refined scientific observation, so far as these deductions depend on the forms of the propositions. Propositions of certain forms are continually occurring in thought. Our existing mathematics is the analysis of deductions which concern those forms and in some way are important, either from practical utility or theoretical interest. Here I am speaking of the science as it in fact exists. A theoretical definition of mathematics must include in its scope any deductions depending on the mere forms of propositions. But, of course, no one would wish to develop that part of mathematics which in no sense is of importance.

This hasty summary of logical ideas suggests some reflections. The question arises, How many forms of propositions are there? The answer is an unending number. The reason for the supposed sterility of logical science can thus be discerned. Aristotle founded the science by conceiving the idea of the form of a proposition, and by conceiving deduction as taking place in virtue of the forms. But he confined propositions to four forms, now named A, I, E, O. So long as logicians were obsessed by this unfortunate restriction, real progress was impossible. Again, in their theory of form, both Aristotle and



subsequent logicians came very near to the theory of the logical variable. But to come very near to a true theory and to grasp its precise application are two very different things, as the history of science teaches us. Everything of importance has been said before by somebody who did not discover it.

Again, one reason why logical deductions are not obvious is that logical form is not a subject which ordinarily enters into thought. Common-sense deduction probably moves by blind instinct from concrete proposition to concrete proposition, guided by some habitual association of ideas. Thus common sense fails in the presence of a wealth of material.

A more important question is the relation of induction, based on observation, to deductive logic. There is a tradition of opposition between adherents of induction and of deduction. In my view, it would be just as sensible for the two ends of a worm to quarrel. Both observation and deduction are necessary for any knowledge worth having. We cannot get at an inductive law without having recourse to a propositional function. For example, take the statement of observed fact,

This body is mercury, and its specific heat is 0.033.

The propositional function is formed,

Either  $x$  is not mercury, or its specific heat is 0.033.

The inductive law is the assumption of the truth of the general proposition, that the above propositional function is true for every value of  $x$  in the relevant type.

But it is objected that this process and its consequences are so simple that an elaborate science is out of place. In the same way, a British sailor knows the salt sea when he sails over it. What, then, is the use of an elaborate chemical analysis of seawater? There is the general answer, that you cannot know too much of methods which you always employ; and there is the special answer, that logical forms and logical implications are not so very simple, and that the whole of mathematics is evidence to this effect.

One great use of the study of logical method is not in the region of elaborate deduction, but to guide us in the study of the formation of the main concepts of science. Consider Geometry, for example. What are the points which compose space? Euclid tells us that they are without parts and without magnitude. But how is the notion of a point derived from the sense-perceptions from which science starts? Certainly points are not direct deliverances of the senses. Here and there we may see, or unpleasantly feel, something suggestive of a point. Yet this is a rare phenomenon, and certainly does not warrant the conception of space as composed of points. Our knowledge of space properties is not based on any observations of relations between points. It arises from experience of relations between bodies. Now, a fundamental space relation between bodies is that one body may be part of another. We are tempted to define the "whole and part" relation by saying that the points occupied by the part are some of the points occupied by the whole. But "whole and part" being more fundamental than the notion of "point," this definition is really circular and vicious.

We accordingly ask whether any other definition of "spatial whole and part" can be given. I think that it can be done in this way, though, if I be mistaken, it is unessential to my general argument. We have come to the conclusion that an extended body is nothing else than the class of perception of it by all its percipients, actual or ideal. Of course, it is not any class of perceptions, but a certain definite sort of class which I have not defined here, except by the vicious method of saying that they are perceptions of a body. Now, the perceptions of a part of a body are among the perceptions which compose the whole body. Thus two bodies  $a$  and  $b$  are both classes of perceptions; and  $b$  is part of  $a$  when the class which is  $b$  is contained in the class which is  $a$ . It immediately follows from the logical form of this definition that if  $b$  is part of  $a$ , and  $c$  is part of  $b$ , then  $c$  is part of  $a$ . Thus the relation "whole to part" is transitive.

Again, it will be convenient to allow that a body is part of itself. This is a mere question of how you draw the definition. With this understanding, the relation is reflexive. Finally, if  $a$  is part of  $b$ , and  $b$  is part of  $a$ , then  $a$  and  $b$  must be identical. These properties of "whole and part" are not fresh assumptions. They follow from the logical form of our definition. One assumption has to be made if we assume the ideal infinite divisibility of space. We assume, namely, that every class of perceptions which is an extended body contains other classes of perceptions which are extended bodies diverse from itself. This assumption makes rather a large draft on the theory of ideal perceptions. Geometry vanishes unless in some form you make it. The assumption is not peculiar to my exposition. It is then possible to define what we mean by a point. A point is the class of extended objects which, in ordinary language, contain that point. The definition, without presupposing the idea of a point, is rather elaborate, and I have not now time for its statement.

The advantage of introducing points into Geometry is the simplicity of the logical expression of their mutual relations. For science, simplicity of definition is of slight importance, but simplicity of mutual relations is essential. Another example of this law is the way physicists and chemists have dissolved the simple idea of an extended body, say of a chair, which a child understands, into a bewildering notion of a complex dance of molecules and atoms and electrons and waves of light. They have thereby gained notions with simpler logical relations.

Space as thus conceived is the exact formulation of the properties of the apparent space of the common-sense world of experience. It is not necessarily the best mode of conceiving the space of the physicist. The one essential requisite is that the correspondence between the common-sense world in its space and the physicists' world in its space should be definite and reciprocal.

I will now break off the exposition of the function of logic

in connection with the science of natural phenomena. I have endeavoured to exhibit it as the organising principle, analysing the derivation of the concepts from the immediate phenomena, examining the structure of the general propositions which are the assumed laws of nature, establishing their relations to each other in respect to reciprocal implications, deducing the phenomena we may expect under given circumstances.

Logic, properly used, does not shackle thought. It gives freedom, and above all, boldness. Illogical thought hesitates to draw conclusions, because it never knows either what it means, or what it assumes, or how far it trusts its own assumptions, or what will be the effect of any modification of assumptions. Also the mind untrained in that part of constructive logic which is relevant to the subject in hand will be ignorant of the sort of conclusions which follow from various sorts of assumptions, and will be correspondingly dull in divining the inductive laws. The fundamental training in this relevant logic is, undoubtedly, to ponder with an active mind over the known facts of the case, directly observed. But where elaborate deductions are possible, this mental activity requires for its full exercise the direct study of the abstract logical relations. This is applied mathematics.

Neither logic without observation, nor observation without logic, can move one step in the formation of science. We may conceive humanity as engaged in an internecine conflict between youth and age. Youth is not defined by years, but by the creative impulse to make something. The aged are those who, before all things, desire not to make a mistake. Logic is the olive branch from the old to the young, the wand which in the hands of youth has the magic property of creating science.

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#### IV.—HUME'S THEORY OF THE CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES.

By C. D. BROAD.

§1. HUME'S *Essay on Miracles* is, perhaps, the most notorious of his works to the non-philosophic but educated public. Yet its notoriety is mainly due to what has been said about it, and to what it is believed to contain. Probably few people read it who are not making a special study of Hume's philosophy. It has always seemed to me to be an over-rated work, and to fall below the extremely high standard of Hume's other philosophical writings. In the present paper I propose to do three things: (*a*) to state Hume's theory as clearly and fairly as possible; (*b*) to discuss its internal consistency and truth; and (*c*) to see how far it is compatible with Hume's own views about causation and belief.

§2. Hume's argument about the credibility of miraculous stories is closely connected with his theory of causation. It may be put as follows. We believe a great many things on testimony, *i.e.*, because other people tell us that they witnessed the events in question. Why do we believe on testimony? It is because a long experience has taught us that, as a rule, people with no special motive for lying, and with no special cause for self-deception, report accurately in the main what they have observed. We ourselves have verified this conjunction between reports and things reported in a number of cases, *e.g.*, a man tells us that he has seen something (X) at the other side of the town. We go and look, and see it for ourselves. Here we have a conjunction between a fact (X) and the man's testimony to the fact. We find such conjunctions to hold in a great many cases, and it is because we

have found this to be so that we generally attach credit to a story if there be no reason for thinking that our informant is specially given to lying or specially liable to make mistakes.

The point that Hume wants us to notice is that our belief in testimony is of exactly the same kind as our belief in causal laws. I believe that A will always be followed by B because I have so often observed A to be followed by B. I believe what a sensible and truthful man tells me as having been witnessed by himself, because in so many cases where I have been able to make the test I have been able to observe what such men have reported to me. We may compare the observed agreements between such men's accounts and the facts in the past with the observed sequences A and B. And we may compare my general belief that their stories are to be accepted with my belief that A will always be followed by B.

§3. Now, Hume says, it is a general principle that we ought to increase our belief in anything proportionally to the amount of evidence for it and to decrease our belief proportionally to the amount of evidence against it. If in 99 cases out of 100 A has been observed to be followed by B, and in one case B was observed not to follow, we very strongly expect A to be followed by B in the next case. But if this sequence has only happened in 50 per cent. of the observed cases, we ought to have no strong expectation of its happening in the next instance. Let us, then, apply this principle to the credibility of stories believed on the evidence of witnesses.

§4. In the first place, the witnesses may conflict with each other. Then we naturally cannot attach much weight to what either party says, because we have just as much cause to believe that the event did not take place as that it did.

But suppose the witnesses all agree in saying that a certain event took place. Then our belief will depend on two factors: (a) It will be strengthened by the agreement of the witnesses because we know that, in the majority of cases, when honest and independent witnesses agree in saying that something has

happened, that event has happened; (b) It will be strengthened or weakened according as the event reported is one that is in itself likely or unlikely to have happened. If I know that events of the kind which the witnesses report have often happened, I have no reason to doubt what they say. But, if they report something that is quite contrary to what has generally been observed to happen, I ought not to believe at all strongly that they are right. For I shall entertain conflicting states of mind. (a) I know that what they report is at variance with what generally happens. Hence I have so far a tendency to believe the contrary of what they report. (b) I know that what is reported by a number of honest witnesses is oftener true than false. Hence I have so far a tendency to believe what they report. These two tendencies, both founded on the same general principle and therefore equally justifiable, will have to fight in my mind; and my final state of belief will be a compromise between the two. It will be weaker than if I attended solely to the agreement of the witnesses, and it will be stronger than if I attended solely to the rarity of the event which they report.

§ 5. Let us now suppose that the event which is reported is not merely extraordinary but miraculous. What ought we to believe? Hume defines a miracle as follows: It is a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent. *E.g.*, it would be extraordinary if we were to find a lion in the Great Court at Trinity, or an intelligent and honest man in the Anti-German Union. But such events would not be miracles, because it would be possible to explain even the latter in terms of known laws of nature. It would, however, be a miracle if a lion were to come into my rooms through the keyhole, or a member of the Anti-German Union were to turn Mr. Arthur Ponsonby into a pillar of salt by merely looking at him, for such events are contrary to known laws of nature. Now a law of nature is simply a regularity which has, up to the present,

never been known to fail. So Hume says: Any event that is called a miracle either is of a kind that has been observed in other cases or not. If it has been observed in other cases it is not really a miracle, for it cannot contradict a genuine law of nature. If it never has been observed in other cases it is a genuine miracle, but there is an absolutely uniform experience against it. So if any event could justly be called a miracle and not merely an extraordinary occurrence, it must be one which is contrary to the entire course of experience.

Now suppose that a number of honest people agree in asserting that they witnessed a miracle, an event contrary to the whole course of experience. Then, if we consider the reported event by itself, we have the strongest ground for disbelieving in it that we can possibly have. For we have the strongest possible ground for believing in what is incompatible with it, viz. the ground of an absolutely uniform experience. Let us consider the evidence for it. We cannot say that we have the strongest possible ground for believing what honest witnesses agree in telling us, for we know that there are plenty of cases where such witnesses have been mistaken.

So Hume's argument comes to this. Against belief in any alleged miracle we have, by definition of the word miracle, an absolutely uniform experience. For believing in the miracle we have only our experience as to the trustworthiness of testimony. And this is not an absolutely uniform experience, however trustworthy we may suppose the witnesses to be. Therefore we have never the right to believe in any alleged miracle however strong the testimony for it may be.

§ 6. Hume says that he has here put the case for miracles as strongly as he can, and has shown that, *however good* the testimony may be, we ought not to believe them. He now goes on to show that the testimony for a miracle never really is the best possible. (1) The witnesses to any alleged miracle have never been at once so well educated as to ensure that they shall not be deluding themselves and so unquestionably



honest as to ensure that they are not trying to delude other people. And no alleged miracle has been performed so publicly as to make it certain that no fraud has been employed. (2) Many people have strong motives for believing in miracles. Most people have a fondness for what is wonderful and out of the common, and therefore have a natural tendency to believe any miraculous story on very slight evidence. And a religious enthusiast demands very much less proof for the alleged miracles of his own religion than for those of any other religion or for quite ordinary stories about everyday affairs. (I myself have a Scottish friend who believes all the miracles of the New Testament, but cannot be induced to believe, on the repeated evidence of my own eyes, that a small section of the main North British Railway between Dundee and Aberdeen consists of a single line.) (3) It is rather ominous for miracles that they are almost ostentatiously frequent in barbarous times and among backward peoples, but become fewer and fewer as people become more educated. This strongly suggests that the alleged miracles are due to the ease with which barbaric people are duped by others, and to their lack of knowledge of natural laws which makes them think that many perfectly natural events (*e.g.*, the firing of a gun) are miraculous.

(4) Lastly Hume has a very ingenious argument about religious miracles. Any two religious systems, *e.g.*, Christianity and Mahometanism, are incompatible with each other. Any evidence for a Mahometan miracle tends to support Mahometanism, and therefore tends so far to refute Christianity and thus to discredit the evidence for Christian miracles. Similarly any evidence for a Christian miracle tends to discredit the evidence for Mahometan miracles. Thus the fact that miracles are alleged to occur in a number of incompatible religions tends to decrease the probability that miracles happen anywhere.

This argument is somewhat subtle, and it contains a suppressed premise; so it will be well to state it more formally. Let  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  be two incompatible religions. And let it be

supposed that miracles *only* occur in connexion with *true* religion. (This is the suppressed premise.) Then the assertion, "Miracles occur in connexion with  $R_1$ ," implies that  $R_1$  is true; this implies that  $R_2$  is false; and this implies that miracles do not occur in connexion with  $R_2$ . Similarly the assertion "Miracles occur in connexion with  $R_2$ ," implies that miracles do not occur in connexion with  $R_1$ . Now both these assertions are made (though, of course, by different sets of people). The combined proposition implies its own contradictory and therefore *must* be false, and therefore *one* of the separate assertions *must* be false, and *both* may be. This argument, however, as we have seen, needs the premise that miracles only occur in connexion with true religion. Now this might very well be false, and it is certainly not universally held by people who believe in religious miracles. Thus the early Christians accepted the miracles of Pagan religions, but ascribed them to devils.

Hume's final conclusion, then, is that no human testimony, however strong, ought to make us believe a miracle, and that the actual testimony that we are offered for alleged historical miracles is not even the strongest kind of human testimony.

§ 7. I pass to a consideration of these views. Two distinct questions arise: (a) Is Hume right in his arguments and conclusions? (b) Are they consistent with his other views, particularly his theories as to belief and causation?

All Hume's arguments to show that the testimony that is actually offered for any particular alleged miracle is untrustworthy seem to me to be sound and important. Investigations made since Hume's time have only strengthened his arguments. We are perhaps less inclined to lay stress on conscious deception carried out "by Priests and Kings for the enslavement of Peoples" than were our forefathers in the eighteenth century. But the careful investigations of the Society for Psychical Research on the extraordinary discrepancies between what intelligent people, who knew that they were looking at

mere conjuring tricks, saw, and what they thought they saw, have shown that we must allow far more for honest self-deception than could possibly have been imagined in Hume's time. And perhaps we may mention the celebrated story of the 80,000 Russians who passed through England at the beginning of the war in the presence of such a cloud of witnesses, as a case which renders it practically impossible in future to accept a miraculous story *merely* on the evidence of *direct* testimony to its truth.

There is, however, a point which needs mentioning before we leave this part of the subject. Sometimes the best evidence for a miracle is not direct testimony, but indirect testimony. Let me explain. Direct testimony to an event X is a statement by some person or persons that they observed X. Indirect testimony to X is a statement by some person or persons that they observed something other than X (say Y), which is judged to be such that it could not have been observed unless X actually took place. This indirect testimony to an alleged miracle *has* a special weakness, and *seems* to have two special sources of strength. Of the latter one is real and the other illusory. The evidence for X, based on indirect testimony, must have any weakness that the evidence for Y has, and it will have the additional weakness that the hypothesis that X actually happened may not be the only or the best explanation of the fact that Y was observed, even if the latter be true. On the other hand, Y may be quite a commonplace event, whilst X is a very extraordinary one. This does actually strengthen indirect testimony for X through Y, as against direct testimony for X, because the testimony for Y will not be vitiated by such factors as love of the wonderful, religious enthusiasm, etc., which tend to cast suspicion on the direct testimony for X. It also *seems* to strengthen the indirect testimony for X through Y, as against the direct testimony for X, because the intrinsic probability of Y will be much greater than that of X. But, in the

long run, it does not do so. The testimony to Y only supports X in so far as the occurrence of X is the hypothesis that best explains the occurrence of Y. But the credibility of an hypothesis depends not merely on its ability to explain admitted facts, but also on its intrinsic probability. Thus the intrinsic improbability of X is as relevant to attempts to establish X through indirect testimony as to attempts to establish it through direct testimony. Still, on balance, a story of a miraculous event may be rendered much more probable by indirect than by direct testimony.

An example is provided by the story of the Resurrection in the Christian religion. The direct testimony for this event appears to me to be very feeble. It would be absurd, surely, to say that we have as good direct evidence for it as for the false story of the 80,000 Russians. But the indirect evidence is much stronger.\* We have testimony to the effect that the disciples were exceedingly depressed at the time of the Crucifixion; that they had extremely little faith in the future; and that, after a certain time, this depression disappeared, and they believed that they had evidence that their Master had risen from the dead. Now none of these alleged facts is in the least odd or improbable, and we have therefore little ground for not accepting them on the testimony offered us. But having done this, we are faced with the problem of accounting for the facts which we have accepted. What caused the disciples to believe, contrary to their previous conviction, and in spite of their feeling of depression, that Christ had risen from the dead? Clearly one explanation is that he actually had risen. And this explanation accounts for the facts so well that we may at least say that the indirect evidence for the miracle is far and away stronger than the direct evidence.

On the other hand, it does not seem to me that even the indirect evidence is strong in such a case. Such strength as

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\* These points are excellently brought out in Samuel Butler's *Fair Haven*.

it has springs from two roots: (a) The explanation does account for the facts which we have accepted on testimony; (b) No other explanation that has been put forward can be said to account equally well for them. But against this it must be said (a) that the miraculous explanation is intrinsically the least probable that can be put forward; and (b) that, in the present case, the failure of alternative explanations does not just leave the miraculous explanation standing alone; it leaves it with an indefinite number of other explanations which our lack of all detailed knowledge of the events immediately following the Crucifixion prevents us from formulating. We know that our state of ignorance is such that it is compatible with the existence of some quite simple explanation, and with the fact that no one will ever hit on this explanation.\*

With these remarks we may leave Hume's special argument and pass to his general one.

§ 8. Hume's general argument against miracles seems to me to be weak in a number of ways. His definition of a miracle is very peculiar. He refuses to call an event a miracle unless it be the only event of the kind that has ever been known to happen. This is involved in his saying that a genuine miracle must contradict the *whole* course of experience. But surely there may be several events of the same kind which are all miracles, and all miraculous because of a single common

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\* It is understood that the story of the 80,000 Russians originated through some third person reading a private telegram from a Russian to an English egg merchant. The words were, "80,000 Russians are coming"; and they referred to eggs, not to soldiers. A future historian, trying to account for the strange belief current in England in 1914, would hardly think of this explanation; and, if he put it forward as a conjecture, it would appear wild as compared with the hypothesis that the Russians actually did pass through England. There may be some equally simple explanation of the stories about the Resurrection; the true explanation may even have been hit upon by some sceptical biblical critic, and yet have been rejected by himself and others as too absurdly inadequate to account for the facts.

circumstance. If Samuel was raised from the dead by the Witch of Endor, and if Lazarus was raised from the dead by Christ, these were both miracles. And they were both miracles of the same kind, viz., contraventions of the natural law that when once a man dies he remains dead. It seems as if Hume would have to say that, if anybody has ever been raised from the dead, it was a miracle on the first occasion, because it contradicted all previous experience; but that, if it ever happened again, the second case would not be a miracle, because it did not contradict *all* previous experience. And then, I suppose, he would have to go back to the first case and deny that even this was really a miracle, because he would now say that it is not a genuine law of nature that people never come to life again after they are dead. I suppose that Hume's position really is that all miracles are solitary exceptions to some law of nature; but that you can never be sure that a solitary exception to some alleged law of nature is a miracle, because another exception may arise, and this will prove that we were not really concerned with a law of nature at all. This is not a satisfactory definition of a miracle. (a) It is, as we have seen, incompatible with the common view that miracles of the same kind may recur and be none the less miracles. (b) Unless miracles are to be ruled out as contradictions in terms—in which case the rest of Hume's arguments would be pointless—he must admit that a regularity does not cease to be a law of nature through a single alleged exception. But, if so, it seems arbitrary to suppose that two or three exceptions to a regularity necessarily prove that it is not a law of nature, and consequently that none of the exceptions are miraculous. (c) If this be granted, the important part of Hume's definition of a miracle will be that the event is caused by a particular volition of the Deity or by the interposition of some invisible agent; and this part of the definition is ignored in his subsequent argument.

§ 9. If we take Hume's argument seriously we get into

difficulties over cases where no one supposes that there is a miracle. Clearly many propositions have been accounted laws of nature because of an invariable experience in their favour, then exceptions have been observed, and finally these propositions have ceased to be regarded as laws of nature. But the first reported exception was, to anyone who had not himself observed it, in precisely the same position as a story of a miracle, if Hume be right. Those, then, to whom the first exception was reported ought to have rejected it, and gone on believing in the alleged law of nature. Yet, if the report of the first exception makes *no* difference to their belief in the law, their state of belief will be precisely the same when a second exception is reported as it was on the first occasion. Hence, if the first report ought to make no difference to their belief in the law, neither ought the second. So that it would seem on Hume's theory that if, up to a certain time, I and every one else have always observed A to be followed by B, then no amount of testimony from the most trustworthy persons that they have observed A not followed by B ought to have the least effect on my belief in the law.

It might of course be said that I could examine the alleged exceptions for myself or explain them by other natural laws, and that then I ought to believe them. But the point is that if I acted as Hume seems to think I ought to act I should have no motive for doing either. My only motive for investigating alleged exceptions or trying to explain them is that the report of them has made me doubtful of the law. Yet, if the testimony of others does not shake my belief in the law, there is no reason for me to think that there is anything that needs explanation or investigation. If scientists had actually proceeded in this way, some of the most important natural laws would never have been discovered. For the people who discover exceptions to alleged general laws are seldom the same people as explain them. The former are often mere experimentalists and the latter mere mathematicians. Hence, if

Hume were right, the people who could see that these were exceptions could not explain them; and the people who could explain them could not be persuaded that they exist.

Perhaps it will be contended that I am unfair to Hume here. It may be urged that, on his theory, my belief in a law, even when one exception only has been reported, cannot be precisely the same as it was before. It may be said that all that he means is that one reported exception, however well attested, ought never to reduce my belief in the law so far as to change it to doubt or disbelief, though it must reduce my belief to some extent. This does seem to me to be the natural consequence of Hume's theory of belief and probability. But what follows? If one reported exception does reduce my belief in the law to some extent, how can we be sure that it will never reduce it from belief to doubt or disbelief? Hume's reply is that this is because we have only testimony, which, at its best, is not invariably trustworthy, to put against an experience which has *ex hypothesi* been so far uniform. But now suppose that a second exception is reported to me. My own experience in favour of the law is still uniformly favourable; my knowledge that the best human testimony is not invariably trustworthy has undergone no change. Why then should my belief in the law be further reduced by the testimony to the second exception than it was by the testimony to the first? If my own experience in favour of the law and my own experience of the general characteristics of human testimony be, as Hume seems to suggest, the only operative factors, the same startling results follow from the present milder interpretation of Hume's theory as from the earlier and more rigid one. If, on the other hand, concurrent testimony to *two* similar events may reduce my belief in a law to doubt or disbelief, in spite of my uniform experience in its favour, how can I possibly be sure that *no* amount of testimony to *one* such event can possibly reduce my belief so far? And, if I cannot be sure of



this, how can I lay down the principle that *no* amount of testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle in Hume's sense of the word?

§ 10. Hume does not seem to notice that our belief in many natural laws rests mainly on testimony. There are many natural laws in which we all believe, but of which most of us have observed very few instances. *E.g.*, our belief that we shall die rests largely on testimony; most of us have met with very few cases of death in our own experience. So the evidence for and against an alleged miracle is mainly a matter of testimony against testimony. Nobody, *e.g.*, has had enough personal experience of death to make it reasonable for him to judge, simply from the regularity of his own experience, that a dead man never rises again. Our strong belief on this point is almost wholly due to the practically uniform testimony of other people. But we also know that there are a few accounts of men being raised from the dead. The position, therefore, is this. There is an enormous amount of testimony in favour of the view that all men once dead remain dead. There is a very little testimony in favour of the view that some dead men have risen again.

Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that the testimony on one side seems as trustworthy as that on the other, and that the only difference is the amount of it on each side. Then we could interpret the fact in two ways. We might say: (*a*) It is not an absolutely general law of nature that all men once dead remain dead. Or we might say: (*b*) It is a general law of nature that all men once dead remain dead; but, in a few cases, this law has been contravened by a miracle. What would be the precise difference between these two interpretations of the facts?

§ 11. If we examined all the cases where people did come to life again and found that they had something common and peculiar to them we need not suppose a miracle. Let the common quality be *q*. Then we should merely have to modify

our general law and say: All men, except those who have the quality  $q$ , remain dead when they are once dead. This law would have no exceptions. And the resurrection of the persons with the quality  $q$  would not be a miracle, but merely an instance of another general law, viz.: All men who have the quality  $q$  can be raised from the dead.

It must be noticed that some explanation of this kind is always theoretically possible. It is therefore true to say that no testimony, however good, will *necessitate* a belief in a miracle. It is always possible (and nearly always reasonable), even if the alleged exceptional cases be admitted, to hold that they have some common and peculiar characteristic, though this may be too minute or obscure for us to detect.

§12. The other interpretation of the facts comes to this. The amount of testimony in favour of the law is so great that it seems reasonable to go on believing that the law is general. The exceptional cases have no common and peculiar quality that I can observe. If I conclude that they *really* have none, and wish to keep my belief in the law, I must suppose that the exceptions are due to the occasional interference of some supernatural force with nature. This practically means some agent acting upon matter or mind in the same direct way as that in which our minds apparently act on themselves and on our own bodies. It is not necessary to assume that this force obeys no laws; we should still call events due to the direct volitions of God, or an angel or devil or magician, miracles, even if we knew that these volitions obeyed among themselves psychological laws. To say that a law of nature is true, but that there are miraculous exceptions to it, comes, therefore, to this: the law is true independently of all conditions in the material world, but it may be suspended by something acting upon matter or other minds in the same direct way as our minds seem to act on our bodies and on themselves.

The notion of a miracle belongs mainly to popular thought. We cannot, therefore, expect to give a perfectly satisfactory definition of it. What seems clear is: (a) That the mere rarity of an event is not enough to make it count as a miracle; though, on the other hand, extreme frequency would probably hinder any event from being called miraculous. (b) If the instances of the event have something common and peculiar to them, more especially if this be a material quality, the events will not be called miracles. (c) The epithet "miraculous" involves a special interpretation of the causation of an event which *need* never be assumed. But, when it is assumed, it always seems to contain a reference to the direct action of a mind on other minds or on foreign matter. I think we may fairly say then that we have no sufficient evidence for supposing that a miracle has ever been performed in the course of history; but, at the same time, we have no sufficient evidence for saying that miracles cannot happen. The trouble about miracles, as it seems to me, is not that no evidence *could* prove one, but that no evidence *has* proved one.

§ 13. It remains to say something as to the consistency of Hume's theory about miracles with his own views about belief and causation. Hume has told us that he can find no logical ground for induction. He cannot see why it should be justifiable to pass from a frequent experience of A followed by B, to a belief that A always will be followed by B. All that he professes to do is to tell us that we actually do make this transition, and to explain psychologically how it comes about. Now, this being so, I cannot see how Hume can distinguish between our variously caused beliefs about matters of fact, and call some of them justifiable and others unjustifiable.

Hume refuses to believe in a reported miracle, because it contradicts a constant experience of A followed by B, which has led to a strong belief that A always will be followed by B. A religious enthusiast believes a miracle because of a

natural tendency to believe what is wonderful and what makes for the credit of his religion. In each case we know the psychological cause of the belief. Hume's disbelief is due to his natural tendency to pass from the constant experience of A followed by B to the belief that A will always be followed by B. The enthusiast's belief is due to his natural tendency to believe what is wonderful and what makes for the credit of his religion. But Hume has admitted that he sees no logical justification for beliefs in matters of fact which are merely caused by a regular experience. Hence the enthusiast's belief in miracles and Hume's belief in natural laws (and consequent disbelief in miracles) stand on precisely the same logical footing. In both cases we can see the psychological cause of the belief, but in neither can Hume give us any logical ground for it.

We see, then, that Hume is really inconsistent in preferring a belief in the laws of nature based on constant experience to a belief in miracles based on the love of the wonderful. The inconsistency slips in when Hume says, not merely that we *do* tend to believe propositions with a strength proportional to the amount of experience and testimony in favour of them, but also that we *ought* to proportion our belief in this way. The first part of his statement is refuted by the case of the enthusiast, the second is rendered useless for him by his own sceptical theory of induction. On his own theories he has no right to talk about what we *ought* to believe as to matters of fact. For what we ought to believe means what we are logically justified in believing, and Hume has said that he can find no logical justification for beliefs about matters of fact.

Probably the cause of this inconsistency in Hume was somewhat as follows:—He seems to have thought that, as a matter of fact, there is some kind of harmony between our minds and the course of nature, so that, when a constant conjunction of A and B in our experience leads us to believe in a law connecting A and B in nature, this belief is actually quite

often true, though we cannot give any logical justification for it. On the other hand, Hume, like everyone else, knew that beliefs which are caused merely by prejudice, or enthusiasm, or love of the wonderful, are as often false as true. So probably he would have stated his position somewhat as follows :—I cannot pretend to offer any logical justification for your belief that A will always be followed by B which is caused by your constant experience of A followed by B ; but, all the same, we do seem to be so far in harmony with nature that beliefs caused in this way have, up to the present, turned out to be much oftener right than wrong. But beliefs caused by mere prejudice, or enthusiasm, or love of the wonderful, have, even up to the present, turned out to be much oftener wrong than right. So a wise man will believe that A will be followed by B with a strength proportional to the regularity of his experience of A followed by B, and will not let himself attach much weight to alleged exceptions which flatter his love of the wonderful or his religious enthusiasm. It is true that he cannot give satisfactory logical grounds for his belief that A will always be followed by B ; but he can give reasons for doubting alleged exceptions, since he knows that religious enthusiasm and love of the wonderful have no tendency to lead to true belief about matters of fact, and have often led to false ones. Indeed, whilst we cannot see why any of the causes that lead to our belief about matters of fact should lead to true belief, we can see that all such causes, except the regularity of our past experiences, have a strong tendency to lead to false ones.

Such a position is, I think, self-consistent. The only thing to be said is that it ought not to lead us to such a strong belief in any of the alleged laws of nature as to make us at once reject an alleged exception, no matter how good the testimony for it may be. We ought to be very slow indeed in admitting an alleged exception to a well-established law ; and it may well be that there never has been good enough

evidence for a reasonable man to accept any alleged mirac.e. But we have no right to say off-hand with Hume that no possible evidence *could* make it reasonable to suppose that a miraculous exception to some law of nature had taken place; and Hume, with his views of induction, has less right to say this than most people.

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## V.—MONISM IN THE LIGHT OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PHILOSOPHY

By C. E. M. JOAD.

### I.

MONISM seems to have gone out of fashion. Certainly, since Mr. Bradley published *Truth and Reality*, the Absolute has not loomed so large as heretofore in philosophical discussion. Under the influence of M. Bergson and the "New Realists," the centre of philosophical interest seems rather to have moved away from and beyond that question which fifteen years ago occupied the chief place on the stage, the question of the contending merits of monism and pluralism, a question which seems not so much to have received final adjudication in favour of one side or the other, as to have lost interest and faded into the background. When I say "lost interest," I am referring only to the peculiar form in which the controversy then presented itself. The fundamental points in dispute are still in dispute; and the new realists wage war on monism in all its forms. Only the clear-cutness of the old issue seems to have become blurred, and in particular monism in the old sense of the word seems to have lost in repute. It is the object of this essay to sketch some of the chief lines of argument which in quite recent years have led to what I might call the deposition of monism from its enthronement on the philosophical chair, and to consider the chief alternative suggested.

The lines of attack which occur to one as having most endangered the monistic stronghold in recent times, are those initiated by William James and the pragmatists, and by Mr. Russell and the new realists. The character of the

former is familiar, and may be treated briefly. The latter is to my mind more significant, and has not yet received the full attention it deserves.

When I said that monism had lost in repute, I did not, of course, mean to imply that its influence is not extensive. On the contrary, it is paramount in Oxford and may still be termed the orthodox philosophy in the Scotch Universities. It does appear, however, that a real contrast is presented between the position of monism to-day and that in vogue a dozen years ago, such as is indicated by the following quotation from an article of Sir Henry Jones, cited by William James, as evidence of the existence of foemen worthy of his steel. "It is hardly to be denied that the power exercised by Bentham and the Utilitarian School has, for better or for worse, passed into the hands of the Idealists. 'The Rhine has flowed into the Thames' is a warning note rung out by Mr. Hobhouse. Carlyle introduced it, bringing it as far as Chelsea. Then Jowett, Thomas Hill Green, and William Wallace, Lewis Nettleship, Arnold Toynbee, and David Ritchie, to mention only those teachers whose voices now are silent, guided its waters into those upper reaches known locally as the Isis. John and Edward Caird brought them up the Clyde, Hutchinson Stirling up the Firth of Forth. They have passed up the Mersey, Severn, Dee, and Don. They pollute the Bay of St. Andrews and swell the waters of the Cam and have somehow crept overland into Birmingham. The stream of German idealism has been diffused over the academical world of Great Britain. The disaster is universal."

Such was the weight of authority William James set himself to challenge. The monistic doctrine as he conceived it was grounded on a combination of four main presuppositions. I call them presuppositions because, although they are cardinal points in the finished structure, they indicate at the same time the lines of reasoning which originally led men to a belief in



the Absolute and the points of vantage from which its ascent appears least difficult. They are: (1) That things cannot interact if they are in any sense separate; (2) That knowledge is impossible between two things which are in any sense separate: and that in consequence there is no independence of being apart from being known; (3) A belief that truth is coherent; and (4) the belief that mind can only cognise the mental and, therefore, that the Real is mental.

(1) is Lotze's famous proof of monism. To act, says Lotze, is to exert an influence. If, therefore, A and B are two objects, A's interaction with B becomes the influence exercised by A over B. This involves the influence on B of the influence exercised by A over B, which involves the further influence of the influence of the influence of A over B, and so on *ad infinitum*. So that if A and B were really separate to begin with, an infinite regress of influences looms between them before any change in B can take place. Therefore, they were not separate to begin with. Further, the fact that the chain of influences exercised by A hits upon B, and not upon C, involves the supposition that B was somehow more fitted to receive them than C. This fitness is interpreted as some kind of kinship with A; and the fact that the influences produce a change in B implies a response on B's part which can be interpreted as sensitiveness to the influences of A. Instead, therefore, of B isolated and different from A, we now have B exhibiting kinship to A and sensitiveness to its influences in advance, before interaction can be supposed possible. Original connection is thus inferred.

(2) This is one of Professor Royce's proofs that the only alternative to the complete disunion of things, between which knowledge is impossible, is their complete union in the One. (I am here giving only the general drift of the argument. The illustrations are not Professor Royce's.) Knowledge, he argues, is impossible if things are separate. For consider the sentence, "The cat smells fish." If the cat and the fish are

originally independent, the smelling by the cat constitutes a connection between them. A third connection between this connection and the fish is thereby involved, and we have an infinite regress as before. Further, if the fish and the cat existed entirely independently and without foreknowledge of each other, it would never be possible for the cat to transcend the space of pure otherness between them and come at the fish. If each being is isolated to begin with, each is shut up entirely in its own isolation and is unable to pass beyond it in the sense that having knowledge of something else requires. Some intimacy must already exist between them in virtue of which the cat can know the fish, and this intimacy is due to the fact that they both partake of and are known by a higher mind.

(3) The view that Truth is coherent. This involves a rather different question. It is sufficient to say here that the view that the criterion of truth is constituted by its coherence with the general mass of our other knowledge, involves the conclusion that all knowledge is a single whole, and that truth is not attainable short of that whole.

(4) The belief that Mind can only cognise the mental and, therefore, that the Real is mental, seems to me to rest upon three distinct lines of argument, though they are not always distinguished as such in monistic writings. First, there are two considerations affecting the nature of intelligibility. (*a*) It is thought that a thing to be intelligible must be concrete. This position is the exact antithesis of Plato's. For the question as to whether we speak of the  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$  as concrete or abstract (and they are spoken of in both terms) is purely a matter of words. The  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$  are not, at any rate, concrete in the sense in which monistic idealists interpret concrete. They are mathematical truths, scientific laws, moral axioms, and so forth, which are regarded as abstractions by the idealist—universal abstractions, that is, formed from observation of their instances. As such they point forward to these instances, and are felt to be not

quite real or intelligible without them. (b) To be intelligible a thing must be self-sufficient. In this connection it is to be noted that the ordinary objects of sense are not intelligible. For the reasons given by Plato, and again by Berkeley, they are to be judged misleading, if taken by themselves, giving rise to changing and contradictory self-data, and pointing to other things beyond themselves. Thus, no water is so hot that it does not suggest to the mind hotter water, and no sky so blue that it does not admit the possibility of greater blueness. Thus, things of sense, though concrete, are not sufficient: they point forward. The kind of entity on the other hand which does begin to be intelligible is a piece of music. A piece of music is concrete, and it is a self-sufficient whole. It is a unity admitting diversity. Yet even this is not intelligible through and through. It appears to be divisible into distinct parts, and isolated notes with relations one to another. It is true that these notes are not in isolation what they were in the completed whole: they have lost significance: it is doubtful, indeed, whether thus isolated they can be considered the same notes at all, so that it is doubtful whether the analysing process could ever legitimately have been made. But it is undeniable that this process of separating up into notes can, in point of fact, be applied, and thus leads to confusion. Similarly, consciousness is a self-sufficient concrete unity admitting of diversity, and though apparently possessing parts in the same irritating way as the piece of music, it must be adjudged, at any rate, to be more intelligible than anything which is entirely non-mental. From this it is but a step to saying that only the mental is really intelligible. (c) Thirdly, a familiar theory of perception tells us that we know directly only our own sensations. Given the psychological atomism of Locke and Berkeley for our basis, we soon dispose of Locke's illogical "substance," and are left with only the mental as a possible object of knowledge. Not only is there no need then to drag in an alien matter, but it cannot, we are told,

even be conceived how mind could come to know anything so alien in substance as matter is assumed to be, even if it did exist. Therefore, as the Real must be intelligible, an assumption which hardly seems to a monist to call for question, the Real must be mental, while, for it to be thoroughly intelligible, it must admit of no inward diversity like the piece of music, but must be an unindividuated whole, "one through and through."

In the four doctrines outlined above, most of the paths leading to the familiar Absolute are, I think, indicated. I do not for one moment pretend that I have so far even touched upon many of the subjects involved in that conception, and I hope to go further into some of them in a moment, but I think that the above beliefs, the belief that there can be no interaction and no knowledge among separate things, the coherence theory of truth, and the belief that the Real is mental, may fairly be considered as the groundwork upon which the whole structure is based.

William James attacks the monistic position root and branch. For the most part his attack is a criticism of intellectualism as such. He accuses the Absolutists of a double rationalisation and falsification of the continual flux of sensible experience. There is, he says, "a loyal clinging to the Rationalist belief that sense-data and their associations are incoherent, and that only in substituting a conceptual order for their order can truth be found. The substituted conceptions are treated intellectualistically, that is as mutually exclusive and discontinuous, so that the first innocent continuity of the flow of sense experience is shattered for us without any higher conceptual continuity taking its place. Finally, since this broken state of things is intolerable, the absolute *deus ex machina* is called on to mend it in his own way, since we cannot mend it in ours."\* Experience, he asserts, is really a

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\* *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 72.

continuous process. Its alleged atomic constituents are the result of a falsifying psychological analysis. Monists first break up experience by means of concepts, and then introduce the Absolute, to put it together again. For the superior method we are referred to Bergson's subordination of concepts, limitation of their application, and recognition of the continuity of our experience. W. James pleads against the false abstractions of monism, and the quality of extremeness that characterises the monistic arguments.\*

It is plain that much of his objection to this philosophy is temperamental. He speaks of the "block" Universe, he dislikes its through and thoroughness, its severity on individuality, and its perfections. His disdain of intellectualist logic is, in fact, so great that he rarely condescends to meet the enemy with his own weapons, and to go into a detailed logical examination of the matters that lie at the root of the issue. He really gets down to the crux of the matter, however, when he realises the importance of the question of "relations" in this controversy between monism and pluralism. The result of supposing that there can be no such entities as relations between things is, Mr. Russell tells us,† "either that there can only be one thing in the Universe, or, if there are many things, that they cannot possibly interact in any way, since any interaction would be a relation, and relations are impossible." Now William James is very anxious not only that the existence of relations should be realised, but that the validity of our experience of them should be established. The central doctrine of his *Essays in Radical Empiricism* is that, "the relations between things conjunctive as well as disjunctive are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so than the things themselves."‡ The

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\* *Ibid.*, pp. 60, 74.

† *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 148.

‡ See also *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 280.

generalised conclusion is that "the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure."

I pass more rapidly, however, over William James's criticism of monism because, in my opinion, Mr. Russell has come much more closely to grips with the real difficulties in dealing with this very question of what he calls the externality of relations. This question I now propose to consider.

## II.

The most convenient starting point for discussion is afforded by a remark of Berkeley's to the effect that "relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without perceiving the former." Putting aside for a moment the question of whether relations are distinct from the things related, it is at least clear that the second statement, namely, that things may be perceived independently of their relations, is untrue. Were it true, any connected scheme of knowledge would become impossible. Such a statement would imply that we could perceive a thing entirely by itself, that is without distinguishing it from its surroundings, for in so doing we should be perceiving the relations which separate it from them. But I cannot perceive the picture in my room, without also perceiving that it is on the wall, and, therefore, related to something which is not the picture. If I perceive two pictures together, I can only perceive them as being some distance apart, that is as related in space. It is quite true that I may not perceive the relation in the same way as I perceive the picture, and that the being of the relation may be a kind of being different from the being of the picture. It is a fact, however, that the relation is perceived. This conclusion does not alter the

inference that we can perceive things without perceiving all, or even the majority, of their relations. Everything must, for instance, have a relation of likeness or unlikeness to everything else in the Universe, yet it is not necessary to perceive all these relations to perceive the thing. If a knowledge of all a thing's relations were necessary before we could know the thing, we could never attain to a complete knowledge of anything this side of the Absolute. Now this is precisely what the monistic theory maintains. By denying the externality of relations and explaining them away as states of the terms related, monists are logically driven to the position that there is only one thing in the universe, the Whole or Absolute, and that we can have no complete knowledge until we know the Absolute. Now this view is closely bound up with the traditional subject predicate logic upon which it is based.

If we accept, for instance, Mr. Bradley's definition of Judgment, as "the act which refers an ideal content to a reality beyond the act," and hold that all propositions are of the type which ascribe a predicate to a subject, that subject being continually the same, namely Reality, we shall tend to regard this combination of subject with predicate as some sort of organic unity. By this will be meant among other things that the unity is a whole, the nature of which is such that it determines and conditions the nature of its parts, just because they are its parts. In fact the relations of each part to the whole modify the part to such an extent that its nature is entirely determined by them, and to analyse the whole, in the sense of breaking it up into its component parts, isolating the parts from their relations, and considering them separately, as we certainly can do for practical purposes, is to falsify the parts. We cannot, in fact, consider parts as such, *i.e.* as distinguished from the whole of which they are parts, without destroying the nature of the parts by the process. Thus everything is determined by its relations to everything else. Whereas the pluralist would admit that each thing has a place in the whole, the monist goes on to assert

that it only is what it is because of that place. Thus this book upon the table is not the same book as it is upon the floor, for its relations are an integral part of it, and its relations are changed, and the clock upon the mantelpiece will be altered, however slightly, every time a German is shot in the trenches.

The main criticism which Mr. Russell makes upon this reasoning is his detection of an ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase "nature of." "The whole point of view turns," he says, "upon the notion of 'the nature of the thing,' which seems" (*i.e.* according to the monists) "to mean 'all the truths about the thing.' It is, of course, the case that a truth which connects one thing with another could not subsist if the other thing did not subsist. But a truth about a thing is not part of the thing itself, although it must according to the above usage be part of the 'nature' of the thing."

Herein lies the crux of the matter. The monists seem to me to confuse two distinct propositions. It may be agreed that a thing is what is, because it has a place in the Universe, and because of its relations to other things, but also because those relations are not the thing. To assert this latter statement involves a second and quite distinct proposition. Thus the table is what it is because it has a place in Reality; an incorrect way of putting the truth is to say that the rest of Reality must be assumed and co-implicated in the proposition in order that the table may be what it is. But Reality is not assumed, it is given. The table indeed presupposes Reality and its connections with it, just as our apprehension of the truth about the table presupposes Reality. But when we assert that the table is what it is because of its connections with Reality, we do not mean that the table is its connections. They condition it, but it is separate from them. Similarly it is a truth about an egg that if it is kept too long it will smell. But this truth about the egg is only true because the egg is an egg independently of the truth. The egg is in fact not an egg



because it is true that it will at some future period smell. The egg conditions the truth, not the truth the egg.

The other main monistic argument mentioned above was to the effect that the ultimate Real, being one and indivisible, all analysis by means of which we arrive at a world composed of things and relations is a false abstraction of thought, which leads us away from Reality. Admitting that this argument embodies a real truth, Mr. Russell insists that its application should not be unduly extended. It is true that a whole, although created by its parts, is more than their arithmetical sum. By a whole, as opposed to an aggregate, we mean a unity, a new entity which has come into being by their synthesis. Thus a proposition has obviously an import, meaning, value, call it what you will, quite independently of the grammatical words and phrases of which it is composed. Hence when we analyse a whole of this kind, falsification of some kind obviously takes place. But what is falsified? The Whole, the unity, the new entity which came into being as the result of the combination of parts. The parts themselves are not falsified. If a whole is really a whole and not a unit, it clearly has parts which it cannot be a fiction to distinguish from one another. The fact that analysis of a whole into its parts destroys the whole, does not mean that it also destroys the parts, or that the parts are not really its parts, or that they cannot exist as distinguished from one another. This conclusion appears very plainly if we consider a numerical whole, such as ten. Ten is a whole composed of parts two, three, and five. But the fact that these integers are parts of ten does not mean that they are any less real than ten, or that, when we abolish ten by dividing it up into component parts, the parts are in any way invalidated in the process. Just as in the former instance, monists, having discovered the truth that a thing is what it is, because of its relations with the rest of Reality, pushed its application too far, by going on to confuse the thing with its relations, so in

the present case the doctrine of the falsification of wholes by analysis is extended to comprise a denial of the validity of parts.

There does, therefore, seem to be some case for the existence of objects independently of other objects, and of parts independently of wholes. Such an independent existence presupposes the further existence of relations to connect any particular object with other objects, which, as the object may or may not have the connection in question, cannot exactly be explained as inherent states or modifications of the object.

It may appear that an undue amount of time has been expended over the arguments which appear to have led us to this conclusion, nor have we yet arrived at any conclusions as to the nature of the being of relations, and as to the sense, if any, in which they are independent of the things they relate. So far I have tried to establish only their externality. What, then, is the nature of their being?

Tradition is of great importance in philosophy, and either directly through its influence, or indirectly through reaction to its influence, plays a large part, not so much in discovering what are the really fundamental questions, as in determining those which, in point of fact, get discussed. In the present instance it was the extreme position taken up by Berkeley and his followers in asserting not only that relations existed independently, but that *relata* could be perceived independently of them, that led to the monistic reaction which denies the independent existence of relations altogether.

Berkeley and Hume went so far as to maintain that any one term of a relation could be perceived by itself. "All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, among which the mind never perceives any real connection," says Hume, whose object in taking up the position was mainly to destroy the need for believing in external space. The relations by means of which, as we noticed above, we distinguish one thing from another are mainly spatial relations,

and if it is maintained that a perception of such relations is not necessary to the perception of the thing, one of the reasons for believing in the existence of external space disappears.

Furthermore, while holding relations to be independent of relata, Berkeley naturally regarded them as mental creations. This view of their nature arose very readily from the atomistic psychology mentioned above. If we hold that sensible objects, whether they be conceived as material or mental, make distinct disconnected impressions upon the brain, and that the mind then apprehends these disconnected impressions, and apprehends these only, it is a natural corollary to assume that the relations and connections, which we think of as existing between them, are the work of the mind, which arranges and groups them together according to certain laws (those laws being, by the way, unexplained, and a rather tough proposition for the English empiricists had they ever tried to explain them). The realist answer to this position takes the form of a simple question. Unless objects are originally presented to the mind in some juxtaposition, why should the mind supply certain relations and not others? If A is not given to the left of B in reality, why should the mind supply the relation "to the left of," instead of the relation "to the right of," between them? This is a question I have never been able to answer, and if a slight digression may be pardoned, it may be observed that it appears to apply equally pertinently to the modern psychological, pragmatistical, Bergsonian, theory of sensations as a continuum which has so triumphantly shattered and displaced the discredited atomism. William James may lay stress on the importance of realising that relations are given in experience. His theory of perception, however, tells us of a reality that comes to us in experience as a continual flow, or change, without individuation or distinction of any kind. Upon this the mind operates, carving out of it concepts and relations for the purposes of life or self-interest. But if reality is really presented as this enormous blur, as void of distinction, as a

piece of white paper, why do we carve out of it such and such objects and not others? For instance, when I see a chair, it must clearly be in virtue of some distinctive mark in Reality that I carve out a chair and its relations, and not an elephant and its relations.

The truth would seem to be that our perceptions are not purely arbitrary, but depend upon and are conditioned by differences within our field of presentation, differences which account for relations as well as for relata. These differences may be given in a rudimentary and embryonic form, but they are given. It is the function of mind to make them clear and distinct. Thus, although mind may be said to construct relations in the sense that it groups and pieces together, elaborates and defines, the crude sense-data which form the material from which the relation is evolved, it does not create them in the sense of arbitrarily imposing distinctions and connections upon a Reality which is itself devoid of them. If it were really true that relations are entirely a mental product, and that they are not in some form or other presented to the mind in reality, either because Reality is composed of unrelated monads, or is a unified whole flowing from and into the Absolute without break of any kind, and if thinking consequently involves putting in relations and connections which are not really there, we cannot avoid the inference that the more we think the further we drift away from Reality. This is a disastrous conclusion for those who nourish a fluttering hope that thought is not totally devoid of value, and who, while admitting it to be possible that philosophy has not, in fact, increased our knowledge of Reality, believe it to be possible for philosophy to do so.

I do not intend to imply by this reflection that if a doctrine be true, the fact that it abolishes philosophy as superfluous and misleading is any objection to it. There are scientists perhaps who would not hesitate, on that account, to subscribe to it, and the cry, "experiment on Reality instead of thinking about it,"

is not a new one. But monists at least cannot be expected to agree with them. Monism, often entitled logical monism, is presumably a product of thought. I do not see, therefore, how monists, holding the views they do, can avoid the conclusion that the more care and thought they bestow upon their doctrine, the more false it progressively becomes, as an account of the nature of Reality. Other systems indeed become false too, but in proportion as the philosophy of the Absolute has laid claim to more complex and profound thought than any of its rivals, in just that proportion, if the considerations advanced here be justified, it becomes more misleading than any of them.

I have tried to deal, up to the present, with two views as to the nature of relations which seem to me to be untrue, and to bring forward arguments which seem to operate in favour of their rejection. These views are (*a*) that relations are not independent of the terms they relate, but are modifications of them. Things are not separate and brought into connection by entities which are also separate, but derive their interaction and knowledge of one another from mutual participation in the Absolute, in virtue of which they were interconnected from the beginning. This is the monistic view. And (*b*) that relations though independent of relata are mental, either because they are divine ideas, put into our mind by God, as Berkeley thought, or because they are created by our own mind to bring into connection our atomistically distinct sensations, as Hume and the later empiricists thought.

If it be true then that relations cannot be explained away, either as states or parts of relata, or as creations of the knowing mind, it seems to follow that they must have some kind of being of their own, and forms a valid existence as part of Reality. The question then arises as to the nature of their being.

## III.

This important question has not, perhaps, received sufficient recognition among philosophers. The existence of external relations has been so generally disbelieved, that few have paused to consider its possible nature. The following is Mr. Russell's theory, which is described as briefly as possible.

Mr. Russell divides, or used to divide, all reality into two classes of terms, objects and concepts. The word term is used in the widest possible sense. Anything which can be an object of thought, or can occur in any proposition, is a term. As such it is immutable and self-identical. Of objects, we say, that they "exist"; of concepts, that they "have being." For instance, existence is itself a concept, and, as such, has being. Existence does not exist in the same way that objects exist, but this cannot mean that it is nothing, for if it were nothing it could not significantly be ascribed to anything. To show the extent of the implications of this doctrine, we must mention the corollary (though this takes us on to dangerous ground, from which the existence of objective falsehood is not a far cry), that in order to make the denial of the existence of any term significant, the term must itself be; for as Mr. Waterlow remarks in a paper on Mr. Russell's theory, "if Jupiter had not being, 'Jupiter does not exist,' would be an empty sound." The whole trend of thought is, in fact, an elaboration of a suggestion in the *Parmenides* (directed against the supposition that the εἶδη are mental creations), to the effect that we cannot have a νόημα of what does not exist. In order to be thought of at all, a term must have some sort of being. Now relations are terms of the kind which have being yet do not exist. Mr. Russell considers the instance, "Edinburgh is to the north of London."

It seems plain, he says, that "the relation 'to the north of,' subsists independently of our knowledge of it." The fact apprehended was there before we knew it. Something else is

moreover asserted and known beyond Edinburgh and London. "To the north of" obviously stands for something and means something additional. This "something additional" is the relation "to the north of," and the "being" of this relation is independent both of Edinburgh and of London.

The above theory constitutes in many ways a fresh departure in philosophy, maintaining as it does the independent being of prepositions, and of verbs. Much remains to be done before its validity has been sufficiently tested to convince us of its truth; in the meantime, however, it claims respect as the best explanation yet advanced of the externality of relations, a doctrine which, as I have tried to show, is the essential corner stone of any form of pluralism, and the only alternative to monism.

The following possible objections, however, present themselves.

(1) The first objection is one that operates very strongly against all forms of realism; I mean, the difficulty of accounting for error. According to the above view, the mind does not create ideas of facts for itself: its function is to apprehend facts existing independently of it. If, therefore, everything that the mind can perceive, objects as well as relations, already exists in Reality, if the mind does not even put in connections disconnected sense data, for these connections are already given, the only duty left to mind is to become more and more aware of the reality presented to it. Now the mind cannot become aware of what is not there, and, on the hypothesis that its only function is to become aware and not to create, it cannot create error for itself. We may evade this difficulty by resorting to the Spinozistic view that error is due to our partial apprehension of the given reality, and would disappear as our apprehension became more complete. But the theory of external relations is essentially and fundamentally opposed to any aspect of Spinoza's philosophy, which it can scarcely invoke in its own support.

(2) The infinite regress of secondary relations involved every time two objects are brought into relation, and mentioned above as one of Lotze's proofs of monism, must be admitted as a necessary implication, some would say a defect, of the theory. If the relation *R* holds between *A* and *B*, this statement implies that *A* has a certain relation *C* to *R*, and *R* a certain relation *D* to *B*. The relations *C* and *D* involve other relations, and so on perpetually. Thus we populate the world with hosts of existential entities every time a relational statement or proposition is made. Mr. Russell boldly accepts this implication of his theory. The fact that the truth of our relational proposition involves the truth of an infinite number of others does not invalidate the truth in question, or infringe upon its isolation as a single definite entity. This implication, disturbing as it may at first sight seem, is really on a par with the existence of an infinite number of integers, and of the infinite regress involved in halving which must always occur, however minute the first number with which we begin the process. Nobody, however, interprets this infinite regress as a reason for supposing that we may not validly halve any number we please.

(3) The most serious difficulty is occasioned, however, by the nature of the being of relations. To begin with, the distinction between having being and existence may seem to some merely a distinction of words. The distinction is so peculiarly vulnerable to the type of argument employed by the early Greek Cynics and Megarians. They would point out to us the necessity of asking ourselves whether we are really asserting anything in any true proposition we may make. For instance, there is Mr. Russell's own statement, that the concept "existence" has being. If existence really has being, you are, they would say, simply asserting an identical relation. But if the two are not the same, how can it be said that the one is the other, that is, that existence has being? Suppose, however, the distinction to be a real one: what is



meant by "has being"? Is a relation, in fact, a true universal? If the cat is on the wall, and the egg on the table, what is the relation between the two "ons?" Mr. Russell is, in many of his beliefs, a Platonist. One way out of the difficulty then would be to go the whole hog, and postulate an *εἶδος* of every relation. This would solve the problem of how all the different instances, say of "on," come into being, and indicate the common relation between them all, in virtue of which we call them all "on." This solution rather savours of cutting the Gordian knot with a bludgeon, for all the familiar difficulties of the Platonic *εἶδος* rise to confront us. Is the *εἶδος* of "on" transcendent? If so, what are the relations of its instances to it; are they relations of *μίμησις* or of participation? Is there any distinction between the being of "on-ness" and the being of a more orthodox *εἶδος*, such as that of goodness? And so on to all the other difficulties with which the writings of Professors Stewart and Jackson have made us familiar. Mr. Russell rejects the Platonic *εἶδος* view altogether. Transcendence in any form is repellant to him, and, like all mysticism, simply a device to avoid hard thinking, a *deus ex machina* invoked to get us out of the difficulties into which our deficiencies have landed us. "Relations," he says somewhere, "are unlike most concepts in that they have no instances." A relation is one and the same in all the propositions in which it occurs just as the same "cat" may be employed in two different propositions—"the cat is on the table," and "the cat is drinking milk"—at the same time, so it is the same "on" which both relates the cat and the wall, and the egg and the table.

This is not sufficient, however, to quiet all our perplexities on the subject, a study of which reveals further considerations which may help to clear it up. It is important, I think, to distinguish the study of spatial relations from the observation of the instances of these relations. If we consider the relation "on" in abstraction, it is quite clear that the being of "on" is

in no way affected by the nature of the things it relates. In this sense, it is independent of them. Thus it is possible to study quantitative relations, quite independently of the qualitative difference of the things they relate. The proposition two plus two equals four, to take an analogy, is quite unaffected by the particular objects you take as the units of two. Yet it does imply and is conditioned by the possibility of there being such objects. You cannot, in fact, think of any mathematical relations except as relations between terms. Similarly, although the meaning of "on" is not affected by the terms it relates, it has no meaning whatsoever, except with reference to the possibility of there being such terms. The problem is, in fact, exactly analogous to the position taken up by Kant with regard to space and time. We cannot think of space as a separate thing existing by itself: it would be just nothing. Similarly a relation divorced from the possibility of relating, what Mr. Russell calls a "bare relation," would be meaningless. This does not, however, to continue the analogy, mean that space is *only* a relation between sensible objects, for it is implied in every perception of objects, and not derived from the study of them. Similarly, the relation "on" is already given in Reality, and not in any way arrived at by an analysis of the terms it relates. It is, in fact, the presupposition of there being such a relation.

Here the problem must, at present, be left. But the unsatisfactoriness attending the nature of the being of relations should not induce us to doubt its reality. Relations are fleeting; they change much more rapidly than relata. They are mainly spatial, and, as perception, at least, is concerned mainly with spatial relations, we tend to fancy that we do not perceive them, for empty space cannot be perceived, and a line must be drawn between two spatially connected objects to enable us to judge of their distance. These considerations should not, however, invalidate our conclusions that relations are real, are external, and are experienced.

One or two questions may summarise the arguments which have led to this conclusion: Can we have experience of what does not exist? I take it that the answer is in the negative. When we say "the cat is on the wall," do we not attach a definite meaning to the word "on," which is in no way affected by, or part of, our conceptions of cat and wall? To this, I think, we must assent. Have we any right to reject, as in any sense unreal, anything we experience? A negative answer only is possible. It follows, then, that the relations which connect experienced objects are experienced relations, and as real as any other objects in our metaphysical system.

Yet when all is said that can be said in favour of pluralism, and of the externality of relations as the basis of it, it must be admitted that the chief inducement which has led philosophers to embrace it, lies in a dissatisfaction with the monistic alternative. This dissatisfaction is with many temperamental; William James felt it strongly. He speaks of "the impeccable and complacent perfection of the Absolute," and complains of the "stuffiness" of the whole doctrine, whimsically likened to the atmosphere of a seaside boarding house. To something of the same feeling I must confess; yet I think that what I may venture to call the comparative obscurity into which monism seems recently to have fallen is due to more serious and fundamental logical objections which have become increasingly subjects of comment. I have, for instance, never been able to understand, if the Absolute is a purely perfect, complete, and indeterminate being, such that determination or characterisation of any kind would infringe its perfection, how the possibility of evolution or development from it can be conceived. How, in short, does the principle of difference emerge from perfect one-ness? It will be said that the principle of difference is fallacious, that it is due to partial apprehension, and disappears with increasing knowledge. Granting this, it may still be asked, how came it that we ever thought that there was difference? How can perfect

unity be the ground, I will not say of pluralism, but of the appearance of pluralism? And this difficulty receives expression, I think, in a certain duplication of conception among monists. When they dwell upon the unity and perfection of the Absolute, it is thought of as the universal ground or condition of all the appearances that make up the world as we know it: when its fulness or completeness, its all-absorbing nature, is to the fore, it is thought of rather as the perfect sum or fulness of Reality, in which all contradictory appearances find perfect reconciliation. Yet the universal ground of things is not the same as the sum of all the developments from it, while neither conception seems to account for the origin of that element, whatever it is, negativeness, partiality, or what not, which produces apparent error, apparent multiplicity, and apparent dichotomy between knowing mind and known object.

We are told that all these are "ultimately" one. But the word "ultimately" gives the game away. The distinction between "ultimately are" and "one" is not, indeed, clear, but if the word "ultimately" means anything, it implies a contrast, to something other than one-ness now. How that something other can ever have been generated from the completeness of the Absolute, or become merged into it without carrying with it the principle of difference,—a principle of difference which can best be described as the fact that there does *appear* to be a difference between appearance and Reality,—is the insoluble difficulty which seems to me to be implicit in the whole elaborate structure of the Absolute. To put it briefly, assuming pluralists to be misguided, how can monists account for the fact of there being pluralists at all. As an alternative to these difficulties, Mr. Russell has put forward the doctrine of external relations adumbrated above. The fact that it has not yet, perhaps, attained its final and definite form should not deter us from affording it the consideration it deserves.

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## VI.—VALUATION AND EXISTENCE.

*By* F. C. BARTLETT.

IN this paper I shall deal first with the attribution of value; secondly, with the nature of the objects to which value is attributed; and, thirdly, with "value itself." First, I propose to attempt to indicate the main stages in the course of the development of the act of valuing, and to enquire how far, at any of these stages, the assertion or assumption of existence is involved. In the second place, taking the three most commonly recognised forms of the developed judgment of value, I shall consider in what sense, if at all, the objects valued must be regarded as existing. In the third place, I shall discuss whether the value which, in all instances of valuation, is attributed to something or other, is itself to be treated as an existent.

## I.

The form of valuation with which we are most familiar is that of the fully developed value-judgment. This, however, has already attained considerable complexity. It has a long history behind it, may arise under very varied conditions, and be directed upon the most diverse objects. It defies immediate simplification, and, so long as our attention is confined solely to this one type of the attribution of value, we are apt soon to become involved in a maze of delicate distinctions between presuppositions, assumptions, presumptions, acceptance, and many other factors which valuing is sometimes said to include or to involve.

Our inquiry should therefore first of all be directed upon the nature of the most elementary kind of attribution of value. Taking this for our starting-point, we may then be

able to trace the changes that the act undergoes in the course of its advance to the familiar developed forms.

Twenty-four years ago Prof. James Ward pointed out that it is legitimate to assume that the individual, active in all cases of cognising, is at the same time "not equally ready to receive all impressions."\* The suggestion, simple though it may seem, is an extraordinarily important one. If it be admitted, as I think it must be, we assert the presence in an individual of an original bias, or bent, or interest. When an object is presented, or a situation arises, which the individual is relatively ready to receive, it is very easily apprehended. Such readiness of apprehension possesses its peculiar tone of feeling, which may be best termed "feeling of ease." Thereupon arises an attitude of contentment or satisfaction. In the ordinary jargon, the particular object or situation presented or experienced at the time is "acknowledged" or "accepted"; other objects and situations are "rejected." "Acknowledgment" here seems to mean nothing more than "readily apprehended," and "rejection" means "turned away from," or "passed over without notice." Both give us, however, what may be called "preferential treatment," and that constitutes the rudimentary basis of valuation. If we care, we may select the feeling which is the invariable accompaniment of such treatment, and assert that, at the beginning, it is this feeling which is the mark of the moment of worth.

It has, however, often been denied that such an instance as the one just contemplated is a real case of valuation. Meinong, for example, distinguishes very definitely between pleasure-pain and true worth-feeling.† *Lust* and *Unlust* are never to be confused with such attitudes as are indicated by the terms *Freude* and *Leid*. The latter do not name feeling-experience which is the mere accompaniment of an act of apprehension.

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\* *Assimilation and Apperception, Mind*, N.S., vol. 2, pp. 347-62.

† See, e.g., *Über Urteilsgefühle, was sie sind und was sie nicht sind*, *Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol.*, vol. 6, pp. 22-58.

They indicate states which are, indeed, properly called "feelings," but which contain, nevertheless, as part of their nature, a "something else," an intellectual element, a reference to that which is regarded as giving rise to them. Thus Urban, who in this respect tends to follow Meinong, speaks of "feeling towards an object" as distinct from "merely presentational feeling," and agrees that only in the former instance can valuation actually occur.\*

There is no doubt that much of Meinong's careful analysis is true and extremely valuable, yet I think that his view does involve a difficulty which is clearly brought out by Urban's phrase "feeling towards an object." Such feeling I believe literally to be a sheer fiction. The expression becomes possible only if we identify feeling proper and "attitude." An attitude is never merely feeling, and is never simple, but always calls for analysis. Feeling may accompany it, or may perhaps be one of its constituents. And while the term "attitude" may certainly indicate a whole state which has a direction towards an object, feeling, if the term is properly used, indicates what is merely an accompaniment of some act or other, and can never itself be said to possess direction upon an object.

Quite obviously, however, we escape no real difficulty by substituting "attitude" for "feeling." It might still remain possible that there can be no valuation unless there is an attitude which contains an element of direction towards an object.

By "direction" it is clear that something psychical is meant. The term is intended to name one of the *Voraussetzungen* which Meinong considers to be demanded by any instance of the attribution of value. A *Voraussetzung* has no reference whatever to anything in the nature of the object, but only to the process in experience by which the object is related to the individual. Meinong considers that judgment or assumption is the process that must be selected in this case. When,

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\* *Valuation : its Nature and Laws*, pp. 38-41.

therefore, we have attribution of value, there is an attitude containing direction towards an object; and it is a prior condition of such attitude that the object is judged, or assumed, in some sense to exist, or at least to be real.

But the instance already described by the terms "There is satisfaction," or "There is contentment," appears to contain no trace of such direction. All that happens is the ready appreciation of something presented. Such ready appreciation has its peculiar tone of feeling, and thereupon the attitude of satisfaction arises.

Goethe, for example, in the *Farbenlehre*, comments on the peculiar emotional potency of a bright orange or yellowish-red. Here, he says, "the active side is in its highest vitality, and it is no wonder that energetic, healthful men especially rejoice in this colour. The fondness of savage men for it has been remarked everywhere." Supposing that what Goethe is here asserting does actually occur, it is clear that the experience could be used as an illustration of the case under discussion. When the orange is presented, whatever in this instance is meant by "ready reception" occurs, and the attitude of contentment may supervene. If that is so the bright orange may receive entirely different treatment from, say, the dark blue. The latter is ignored, perhaps. But the contentment in the one case involves no more assumption or judgment of existence, than does the ignoring in the other involve an assumption or judgment of non-existence. The orange may, as a fact, be preferentially treated without there being the slightest definite discrimination of orange from blue, or realisation *that* the first is more agreeable than the second. If we should be able to ask the individual in such cases: "What is it that is valued?" the answer would be literally: "Nothing." Nevertheless there is a difference of reaction according to whether what is presented is something to which the individual is "ready to respond" or not. And it is, I think, out of that basic difference of reaction that all valuation grows.



Is it, then, the case that the feeling which accompanies the attitude of contentment is a "mere presentation feeling"? Great difficulties, none the less formidable because of their familiarity, arise here. If "mere presentation" indicates an experience in which what *is* experienced and the experience itself are, as a matter of fact, one and the same, there seems to be no good ground for holding that such a case ever occurs. But if "mere presentation" is to be used of an experience in which the distinction between that which is experienced, and the experience itself, is not made by the individual in whose life the instance occurs, then the attitude of satisfaction is undoubtedly marked by a "mere presentation feeling." It is a commonplace that a difference may occur in fact, when no corresponding distinction is made in experience. There is no case of apprehension whatsoever in which the something apprehended and the apprehension itself are actually identical. But there are many instances in which that which is apprehended, and the apprehension itself, and the feeling accompanying such apprehension, are all mingled together into a total experience within which, for the experient, no such distinctions occur. It is precisely from such an instance that the whole development of valuing takes its rise. Thus it is true to say that in the primitive instance of valuing the individual values nothing, nor is such statement in the least inconsistent with the further truth that in no case can that which does, as a matter of fact, call forth the valuation be identified with the feeling that may be taken as a mark of the value experience.

But, just because differences are in fact present from the beginning, distinctions come to be made in the course of development. An important stage is signalled by the change from the attitude "There is contentment" to the attitude "It is agreeable," or, "I like this." Here that which is apprehended begins to be more or less dimly differentiated from the experience of contentment which is consequent upon its

apprehension. The something which begins to be discriminated from the feeling might, however, be the act of apprehending, or it might be the object apprehended. Really it is neither ; that is to say, it is both. It is not, for example, the bright orange, and it is not the seeing of the bright orange. It is "something" which contains them both, but within which neither is clearly marked off from the other. Of this something, absolutely nothing whatever is asserted, except that it is agreeable, or pleasant. And I do not see that anything whatever is assumed. There is merely a rather vague realisation that it is different from the feeling which marks the attitude "It is agreeable."

At the same time, I cannot in the least see why we should refuse to call this an instance of valuation. As before there is "preferential treatment." The "something" which is agreeable is readily apprehended, often a tendency arises to continue in its apprehension, and it usually gives rise to one of that class of experiences which are most frequently revived. The last characteristic very speedily confers upon it the additional value of the familiar, which is one of the earliest of values to develop, and remains most powerful and persistent throughout life. These characteristics—readiness of apprehension, a tendency to continue, if possible, a certain form of experience, and constant recurrence—are the chief marks of positive valuation at this stage ; while such negative valuation as is now found is marked by the opposite behaviour, namely, by confusion, and a turning away. Neither, so far as I can see, requires as a pre-condition any judgment or assumption whatever, on the part of the individual, with regard to the reality or existence of an object.

There is an incident in the childhood of Edmund Gosse which illustrates very well the kind of thing I have in mind. He tells us how, in his eighth year, his father and he read together the Epistle to the Hebrews. "I was incapable of defining what I felt, but I certainly had a grip in the throat,

which was in its essence a purely æsthetic emotion, when my father read, in his pure, large, ringing voice, such passages as 'The heavens are the work of Thy hands. They shall perish, but Thou remainest, and they shall all wax old as doth a garment, and as a vesture shalt Thou fold them up, and they shall be changed; but Thou art the same, and Thy years shall not fail.' But the dialectic parts of the Epistle puzzled and confused me."\* Here was a situation welcomed, dwelt upon, often remembered. Yet there was at the time no possibility of a clear definition of the object of the appreciation. The man speaks of "the matchless cadences and images of the first chapter," but the child did not. To him the words so woven as to make beauty of sound, the glimpse of hidden meaning, the swift flash and change, maybe, of vague, indefinite images, the ringing tones of a familiar voice, all came together to make "something" which produced the grip in the throat, and the pure æsthetic emotion. We, no doubt, can judge that "something" to be real—though not surely to exist—but to a mind yet immature, no judgment and no assumption of that kind need come. Nor is the "something," definitely judged to be beautiful. It is just enjoyed, liked. And beyond the beginning of the realisation that it is "something" which is appreciated, and that there is not merely satisfaction or contentment, the act of valuing itself contains, at this stage, no further assertion or assumption with regard to the object valued.†

But obviously the stage contains within itself the possibility of further advance. The "something" which here begins to be separated out from the whole attitude of contentment

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\* *Father and Son*, ch. iv.

† At the same time I would not for a moment agree with the statement of Urban (*op. cit.*, p. 66) that "psychologically the 'it' of the impersonal judgment is contentless." Because we are unable to give any definite specification to the "something" we have no good reason to deny that it possesses for us any specification whatever.

itself needs further specification. As a matter of fact, it may unite, say, the hearing and the sound heard, or the seeing and the thing seen, or the apprehension and the meaning apprehended. The individual has yet to learn how the sound, the thing, the meaning, may themselves be picked out, and how to *these* value may be definitely attributed.

Exactly how we come to make transition from the attitude "It is agreeable," to the definite judgment-form "This is beautiful, or useful, or good," is an important psychological problem, but one not strictly relevant to the present enquiry. We follow exactly the same course that we adopted in taking the first step. We learn to make a distinction where all the time there has been a difference. We now clearly differentiate in our experience between that towards which a relation is held, and the holding of the relation. Isolating either the object or the relation held, we definitely characterise *this* as beautiful, useful, or good. It is extremely interesting to notice that, together with the unequivocal attachment of value to an *object*, a number of value-specifications at once tend to make their appearance. Of these, probably the most familiar are the æsthetic, the economic, and the moral.

It now becomes true to state that no mere feeling accompaniment of an experience is adequate to give rise to a definite act of valuing. When we assert that this is always the case we make a mistake, which is probably due to the fact that in much of our discussion of the question we confine our attention to the advanced form of the definite value-judgment.

If, then, feeling accompaniment is no longer enough to give us all that we want, we must search for other necessary conditions. Perhaps, now that the object is at length clearly discriminated, it may be true to hold that a pre-condition of valuing is some judgment, or assumption, with regard to the reality or existence of an object. That is what we have next to determine. I do not agree that considerations with respect to the nature of the objects valued are irrelevant to the settlement

of the questions involved, and it is such considerations that I propose to enter upon in the second section of the paper.

## II.

The determination of the ultimate forms of the developed value-judgment and the discussion of their nature raise questions of very considerable interest. Three such forms are most commonly discussed, and it is with these only that I shall be definitely concerned. At the same time, I do not wish to deny that there may be many others. Already I have mentioned the specific value of the familiar, as being one of the earliest to develop. Wit and humour might both very well be treated as giving forms of value. There may, perhaps, be a religious value entirely distinct from the moral. Certainly we seem justified in holding that there is an independent intellectual value, such that it cannot be identified with the æsthetic, and has no necessary or immediate reference, either, to truth. All of these call for careful analysis and discussion, but I propose to set such tasks aside for the present.

Moreover, I shall make no attempt to deal with what is often called "truth value." In point of fact, I am not convinced that this does give us an independent form of value. And in any case its discussion would probably raise questions concerning the relation of value and validity, which are not important for my present purpose. In this section, therefore, I shall confine myself to a consideration of the three forms of judgment which we commonly call the æsthetic, the economic, and the moral. I shall consider, in each case, whether anything is asserted or assumed with regard to the existence of that which is judged to possess value.

The æsthetic judgment is the most nearly related to those primitive forms that we have so far considered. Not infrequently we speak of æsthetic appreciation, or of æsthetic emotion, rather than of æsthetic judgment. In the experience of beauty we in no way dwell upon the opposition between that

which we value, and ourselves as valuers. For such experience no swift and searching power of analysis is needed, but rather a delicate sensibility, untaught by the schools, through which we may have

“unconscious intercourse with beauty  
Old as creation.”

If, for a few moments, we were to try to recall the varied things that, at one time or another, have appeared beautiful to us, we should perhaps be astonished at their range. There is, in fact, nothing whatever, which may be treated as object, that cannot possess æsthetic value. The consideration of this truth has led many thinkers to assert that no single judgment can be treated as a necessary presupposition of the attribution of æsthetic value. And in particular it has seemed impossible that that to which beauty is ascribed should of necessity be judged to exist. To Kant the judgment of taste is emancipated from all interest in the existence of the object.\* To Schopenhauer æsthetic appreciation appears to involve no judgment at all, but is rather, in its true form, pure intuition.† Witasek regards it as pre-judgmental.‡ To others, the experience of beauty, while it appears, in its purity, to possess affinity with the life of the mind, yet contains no trace of that analysis which characterises judgment. It is given to us by

“Those hallowed and pure motions of the sense  
Which seem, in their simplicity, to own  
An intellectual charm.”

How should a poem be judged to exist? But it may be beautiful. So may a patch of colour, or a flower, a cunning combination of tones, a problem and its solution, an old man, or a cloud of smoke. In no case is it existence that confers beauty, and much that never could exist, yet is beautiful. Absolutely

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\* *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, 2, 6.

† *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, tr. Seth and Haldane, vol. 1. Bk. iii.

‡ *Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik*, pp. 64 ff.

all that the æsthetic judgment asserts is that "This is beautiful," or, "That the property of being beautiful applies to this." Whether the "this" exists or not is entirely irrelevant.

The difficulty, it may be urged, can be met, and an important truth preserved, if we assert that it is existence "within some universe" only that is demanded as a prior condition of the æsthetic judgment. I do not see that anything is to be gained by such "hedging." In the first place, existence is certainly not "being within any universe," but rather "being within a certain universe." And if, recognising this, we use the wider term "real" instead of "exist," it is no help. For if we ask *what* reality is assumed to be possessed by that which we regard as beautiful, we can but reply "æsthetic reality." To affirm that that which is æsthetically valued is æsthetically real, does not appear to be an illuminating discovery. Also it requires a gloss.

In whatever way the distinction between the real and the unreal arises, it comes to be connected in our experience with the distinction between percept and image. That which we perceive we treat as real, in opposition to the "merely imaginary." Suppose we judge something to be beautiful. If, then, the question is raised whether that thing is "merely imaginary," we at once tend, as has often been pointed out, to lose our æsthetic experience. That is, whatever reality is assumed to be possessed by that "something" which is judged to be beautiful, is not assumed in response to any question. And the thing to which we ascribe beauty is in no sense opposed to something else which is regarded as relatively unreal. Thus it becomes extraordinarily difficult to see that "æsthetically real" can mean anything more than "being real, *and also* being the object of æsthetic appreciation." This sense of "real," however, is merely that very wide sense of the term in which there is no opposition between being real and being unreal. Æsthetic reality, as a matter of fact, in so far as the *reality* is concerned, is no more than that formal reality

which belongs to anything that can be mentioned. And even then I find it extremely hard to believe that the assumption that "so and so is real," in this sense, takes us a single step nearer to the æsthetic appreciation of that thing. Such an assumption does not seem to be a presupposition, or a precondition, but, if it is present at all, it is to be found only when the whole attitude has been already achieved. It is as true to say "This is real because it is beautiful" as it is to say "This is beautiful because it is real." In neither case has "because" its customary significance.

It may, however, be urged that what we really say is "This is beautiful because something else is real." The reality then held to be involved is not that of the thing itself which is judged to be beautiful, but of some psychical processes which must be actualised in the æsthetic experience. Lipps' position is of this nature: "Die ästhetische Wirklichkeit," he says, "ist deise einfach 'fraglose' Gegenständlichkeit oder Objectivität, das einfache und unbestrittene Gegebensein als Gegenstand meines Denkens. Das Bewusstsein davon ist das Erleben dies Sachsverhaltes."\* Detailed consideration of Lipps' view is impossible here. But even if it were admitted it would in no way lead to the position that the æsthetic judgment asserts the existence of that upon which it is directed, and it is the latter with which I am here concerned. It may quite well be that the ascription of beauty is made possible only through the presence of a peculiar bond of sympathy between the individual and that to which beauty is ascribed. But it is not that bond of sympathy, or any of the psychical processes by which it is realised, that he judges to be beautiful. Nor, so far as I can see, do such psychical processes in any way enter into any assumption or assertion made by the æsthetic judgment. At the most they are simply conditions without which æsthetic experience cannot occur,

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\* Weiteres zur "Einfühlung," *Archiv f. d. ges. Psychol.*, 4, p. 489.



and are not anything which the æsthetic judgment itself asserts or assumes.

The term of chief significance in the phrase "æsthetic reality" is, in fact, not "reality," but "æsthetic." No mere pleasure consequent upon the apprehension of an object can of itself give rise to a definite judgment of beauty, probably. But it is equally true that no assumption concerning the reality of the object can do this either. The determinants of the judgment are to be looked for elsewhere. Perhaps, then, it may be found to be true that "beauty is a gift of the spirit for which all things are possible objects."\*

Upon first thoughts it may appear a far cry from the æsthetic to the economic judgment. In the latter case it is tempting to affirm that the field of possible objects is far more limited. We have now to deal with worths of consumption, with values leading to exchange within a world of markets, and of human desire for existent things. All the things that are economically valuable may appear to be objects that in some way or other are capable of being apprehended through sense-experience. And so it may easily seem that when we value one commodity in terms of another, or when we attribute usefulness to anything, we should, if we were challenged, readily admit that what we value is to be considered as existent.

But doubts will soon begin to arise. In the ordinary way, a phoenix or a salamander has no economic value, but a freakish fancy might construct a world in which one phoenix is worth, say, two salamanders. In this case, however, the objects would be regarded as existing in a way precisely analogous to the sheep and oxen of primitive markets, or the varied objects of exchange in a developed society.

Yet there are many things which possess economic value that we do not commonly regard as existing: labour, the power

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\* E. F. Carritt, *The Theory of Beauty*, p. 227.

to think, the ability to organise, a proposition, the gift of humour. These certainly all have to be expressed or actualised in some definite manner before they can be economically valuable. It is not the proposition as thought of, but the proposition as embodied in some manner—so as to form an effective advertisement for example—which is useful. But what seems to be really presupposed is a realm of human desires, balanced more or less by a realm of human needs. That which, satisfying the desire of one, meets the need of another possesses economic worth ; or it may be that one need balances another. Very likely it is true that all of the things which meet a need are existent, but that many of the things which satisfy desire are not. If this is the case then in one way all attribution of economic value presupposes existence in a sense in which æsthetic valuation does not. But it also becomes evident that it is too much to assert that everything which we judge to be useful must *itself* be assumed to exist.

We have seen already how, in the course of the gradual development of the definite forms of value-judgment, that which *is* valued comes to be clearly differentiated, and to occupy the central position. It falls, also, into two broad classes. On the one hand we have objects and relations among them, and, on the other hand, acts, the holding of relations, and the bodily states which arise in consequence of the holding of relations. The more clearly these two classes are discriminated the more definitely we come to use different terms in the valuing of any member of either class.

Of objects and their relations, or of the relations of parts of objects, we choose, as we have just seen, to use terms like beautiful or useful, and we adopt attitudes which we describe as æsthetic or economic. Of acts, and the holding of relations generally, we choose to use terms like good, and we adopt attitudes which we describe as moral. Of bodily states we continue to employ terms such as pleasant, agreeable, and

we speak of our appraisalment of them as hedonistic. I shall say nothing further about the last form of valuation.

Now we speak of a beautiful act, or life, or of a beautiful feeling. That, however, only means that an act, a series of acts, or a feeling, may be treated as an object, in the wide sense in which I am here using the term. An act, for instance, may no doubt be imagined or thought of. But it then never offers itself for moral valuation. That which is morally valued is the very performance of the act, the holding of the relation itself.

The question then arises whether an act should be regarded as existent. It appears to be a safe and not superficial impulse which leads us to connect the existent directly with what is given to sense-apprehension. But if we do this, the phrase "act as performed" is more accurately descriptive of what is morally valued than the phrase "act as existent." When we pass a moral judgment our immediate basis is most commonly some observed form of behaviour. But it is not this that we value. We take this to be evidence of the fact that there is something else concerned, which we may call an act. Again, it is not *the fact that there is an act* that is valued, but the actual performance itself. Of course it happens often enough that the act valued has not been performed, nevertheless, in the valuation, it is contemplated as though it were performed.\* In the moral judgment, then, we get a further limitation still of the possible objects of valuation.

But this limitation to acts and groups of acts is not always admitted. We may take the instance of Moore's two worlds. In one of them every prospect pleases, and in the other everything is vile. "Even supposing them quite apart from

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\* No doubt "act as performed" is not by itself an adequate characterisation of what can be morally valued. It is at present sufficient to state that "All moral judgments are directed upon acts or series of acts as performed, or upon character as achieved." It is not necessary here to enquire what additional characterisation the morally valuable act requires.

any possible contemplation by human beings," he says, "still is it irrational to hold that it is better that the beautiful world should exist rather than the one that is ugly? Would it not be well in any case to do what we could to produce it rather than the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that it would."\* I should judge so, too. But then production of such a world would be an action. The judgment is that this act, if it were carried out, would be good. Concerning either world considered by itself I, at any rate, can pass no moral judgment. I say that one is "better" than the other, but when I say that, I mean that it is preferable; and when I say that it is preferable, I mean merely that it is more beautiful. Preferable is a term that may be employed either in the moral or in the æsthetic spheres. To me, in this instance, it has an exclusively æsthetic significance; or if it signifies anything else, it means that the *act* of preferring one world to the other is preferable.

Sidgwick's position, against which Moore is arguing, is that "if there is any Good other than Happiness to be sought by man, as an ultimate practical end, it can only be the Goodness, Perfection, or Excellence of Human Existence."† Sidgwick appears to hold that it follows from this that no one would consider it rational to aim at the production of beauty in external nature apart from any possible contemplation by human beings. I do not see that this does follow. The *aiming* is a matter of actual human performance, whatever it is that is aimed at. And so, when Dr. Moore shows that it might be considered rational to aim at beauty which nobody could contemplate, he by no means shows that anything out of relation to acts and character can be called good.

Thus a consideration of that to which value is attributed shows that in this respect, at any rate, the æsthetic judgment

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\* *Principia Ethica*, pp. 83-5.

† *Methods of Ethics*, 7th Ed., 1907, p. 115.

makes no reference whatever to existence; the economic judgment may probably refer to existence indirectly, but does assert or assume a balancing of needs or of desires, or of desire and need; the moral judgment always has reference to an act or a series of acts, considered as performed or as achieved.

But "after last returns the first." Under primitive conditions, valuation takes always the same form. And now reflective abstraction, treating values more or less substantially, attempts to arrive at a single form again. What do we mean when we assert simply "This has value" or, "This is a value"? What is it that is common in all instances of valuation? And what relation, if any, has this common characteristic to existence? If, for example, it should turn out that value itself exists, then all attribution of value must, after all, assume or assert existence.

### III.

It is often maintained that value is really something different from the values that have been dealt with in the preceding section. They themselves require to be evaluated. They are not a final attribution of worth. They may be qualities, or relations, by means of which we are able to apprehend value, but the latter is not to be identified with any of them.

Sometimes value is held to *be* a relation, either of an object to some desire, interest or tendency in us, or of an object to other objects. Again, it may be maintained that, although certainly, the moment of worth occurs through a relation, worth itself is not relational, but is rather a specific quality. And, yet again, it may be argued that value is really a "form of objectivity."

I shall consider first one development of the last of these views, which has been put forward fairly recently by Professor W. M. Urban.\*

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\* "Value and Existence," *Journ. of Phil., Psychol., etc.*, Aug. 17th, 1916, pp. 449-465.

For the characterisation of the class of views within which his has place, Urban says that: "three points are sufficient: (1) Value is ultimately indefinable in terms of categories of matter of fact—as object, or quality, or relation; (2) the judgment of intrinsic value, that an object ought to be, or ought to be so and so, on its own account, apprehends an ultimate and irreducible aspect of objects; (3) this value is itself not a *quale* of some objects, but is a form of objectivity in contrast with being and existence."

The positive arguments which he adduces in favour of his view may be briefly summarised. The notion of intrinsic value, Urban agrees, requires "the proposition *that* the object ought to be, or ought to be so and so, on its own account (or what amounts to the same thing, is worthy to be, or to be so and so, on its own account)." What we here apprehend is "*that an object ought to be.*" But the "that" construction is the sign of an "objective." When we say "A ought to be on its own account," the judgment gives us no knowledge of the object A, "for in many cases at least it is implied in the very judgment itself that the object is not known." Also it gives us no knowledge of a specific quality of oughtness or worthiness. "It gives me knowledge, not of a 'what,' but of a 'that,' a unique relation of the object to being and to non-being." This unique relation, which Urban here purposely leaves completely undefined, has nothing to do with existence or non-existence of the object to which worthiness is attributed. The value-judgment specifically asserts nothing save "that the object is worthy." This, itself an objective, presupposes no other objective, such as "that the object should exist in its own right." In proof of this it is pointed out that value may not only be attributed to objects of which it is "not yet known whether they will exist or not," but may be ascribed to objects "of which it is not known whether they *can* exist or not." Urban has already decided that value is not a relation of a object to a subject, and not a quality of the object. He

concludes, therefore, that it is "a unique and independent objective." It remains, he says, to determine the relation of this objective to reality.

I cannot see that all this throws light upon any important difficulty. If I am told that "value is a unique relation of something to being and to non-being," I do not feel much the wiser. Surely this is only a more elaborate way of saying "value is value."

It is a main point of Urban's argument that the value-judgment gives us no knowledge of that to which value is ascribed. For I can say "A ought to be" when A is not known at all. "If I say that perfect happiness is a good, or ought to be, not only is the object not known, but it is not known whether it is possible or not." The last clause is true enough. But all that it means is that the judgment gives me no knowledge *that* A exists, or is achieved. What precisely is meant, however, by the statement that the object is not known, I cannot make out. It is perfectly obvious that I need not know everything *about* perfect happiness, or perceive it, or experience it, but it seems to me that unless, in the judgment in question, I am merely multiplying words, I must know it in some sense. If we knew nothing that we did not know everything about, we should be even more ignorant than we are. And in fact, when I significantly assert "A has value," I hold, both that in some sense I know A, and that the judgment gives me information concerning A. That, of course, is not to assert that no objective is involved. The form is judgmental, and what I am given to know is "*that* A has value." But I can see no reason whatever for asserting this objective to be identical with a supposed "value itself."

At the same time, Urban appears to me to be certainly right in one respect. It is the thing that is valued, and not an objective. When I judge "This is worthy," what I am really valuing is not, as seems to have been suggested, the fact that this exists or does not exist. Rather is it true to hold that I

am concerned with the thing itself, and that I am simply and directly valuing "this."

It still remains to attempt to determine exactly what is meant by the attribution of value to a thing. The phrases commonly used to express this are "that X ought to be on its own account," or "ought to be so," or "is worthy to be." In this "oughtness," however, there is no real imperative significance. We do not go to something which already is, and say to it "Be!" And in fact "oughtness" is a less suitable term than "worthiness."

Now it is urged sometimes that if worthiness is regarded as a quality, the value-judgment becomes either an absurdity or a tautology.\* But this appears to be the case only if, in some obscure manner, we identify worthiness and being. If the very quality which confers being upon a thing (supposing that such a phrase conveys any sense at all) also constitutes worthiness, obviously to say that the thing is unworthy is to say that it is other than it is, and to say that it is worthy is to assert that it is as it is. Yet worthiness may be simply one specific quality among others. A thing's worthiness may be quite other than its being, and it may very well *be*, without being worthy.

All this in no way proves that worthiness is in fact a specific quality. And I do not think that we have adequate grounds for asserting that it is. We come to talk of value itself only as a result of reflexion upon values. Perhaps the term is, after all, merely a convenient device for referring to something that we desire to leave relatively undetermined. Worthiness may, upon a close scrutiny, always turn out to be either beauty or goodness, or some other particular value.

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\* Urban, *op. cit.*, p. 459, takes this view, and refers also to Croce, *Über die so-genannten Werturteile*, *Logos*, 1911, vol. i, p. 71. In another article, *Journ. of Phil., Psychol., etc.*, Dec. 7, 1916, Urban repeats the argument practically word for word.



Urban himself, for example, in another place,\* after pointing out that existence must not be identified with reality, and that existence, as such, is valueless, remarks: "Existence *becomes* a value, when, as distinguished from non-existence, it becomes a criterion of reality. There are many objects . . . in the case of which existence is better than non-existence, and sometimes non-existence is better than existence. In such cases existence becomes a value, . . . in that it is the necessary presupposition of value."

Leaving aside the sheer assumption that what value necessarily presupposes must *be* a value, and the difficulty of understanding how existence can be a criterion of reality, it seems to me that the value that Urban has in mind here cannot be called mere worthiness, but is in fact either moral, or, possibly, economic. For example, Hell, no doubt, may have a value of beauty, and be so far worthy, yet I consider that its "non-existence" would be "better." That, to me, means that certain acts, or experiences, are bad, that is to say, are "better unperformed, or unachieved." And I think that the value of existence will always be found to lead to considerations of this nature.

Similarly in other cases. There is no "mere worthiness." The value-judgment is not something additional to the judgment that a thing is beautiful, or useful, or pleasant, or good. It is quite true that value includes more than the good, as Urban says. It includes also the beautiful, and perhaps the useful, and the pleasant, and whatever other characterisations of value there may be. And none of these can be wholly reduced to terms of any other. But to pass from "value includes more than the good" to "value is in itself a characterisation of reality, different from any of the values, and yet as specific as they are," involves a leap which only a very vigorous theorist can take.

Worthiness, or "that a thing ought to be," then, indicates

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\* *Phil. Rev.*, vol. 23, pp. 180-1.

this, or that, or the other group of qualities, which must be present if anything shall be judged beautiful, good, or the like. But although reference to qualities is demanded, I think there is no good ground for regarding it as adequate. It might also be said that anything valued must enter into relations with other things, or that its parts should be set in certain relations one to another. Moreover, it may still be true that, although beauty, say, requires all this, yet the value may not be complete unless the qualities and relations enter also into relations with us who judge. Thus it is that fulfilment of interest, or of tendency, plays its part, and I do not see that we are ever justified in assuming that this part is not essential, before there may be value in any of its forms.

Neither the things which possess the qualities, nor the qualities themselves necessarily exist; and the relations do not. Whether in any case that which is valued is regarded as existent can be determined only by detailed consideration of the particular value concerned, such as was carried through in the second part of this paper. Finally "value itself," or mere worthiness, becomes, on close inspection, one or other of the particular forms of value. These may certainly possess common characteristics; but it is an error to take the latter as constituting all that is meant by value. Anything that is beautiful, for example, may have to possess certain properties, and yet beauty may require that the thing and its properties enter into relations with an individual. And this whole complex—the thing, the properties, the relation, and all the necessary characteristics of the relation—we cannot judge to exist, though we may judge to be real.

Thus, neither in the rudimentary attribution of value, nor in the developed value-judgment, is anything of necessity, in all cases, assumed or asserted with respect to existence.

## VII.—THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE AS CONCEIVED BY MALEBRANCHE.

*By* M. GINSBERG.

IN this paper I propose, firstly, to state the views held by Malebranche regarding the nature of knowledge; secondly, to inquire whether, granting its presuppositions and within its own limits, his theory offers a consistent account of the way in which we arrive at a knowledge of the world of experience; and, thirdly, to determine and criticise the assumptions and presuppositions upon which it is based.

### I.

Malebranche adopts Descartes' conception of mind and matter in all its sharpness. The essence of matter is extension, side-by-sideness, and the essence of mind is thought. Mind is a simple and individual substance, but in it there can be distinguished two faculties, viz. Understanding and Will. These two faculties, Malebranche points out,\* are not to be conceived as entities different from the soul itself. No one is more strenuous than Malebranche in protesting against the appeal to faculties, natures, virtues, in explaining mental or physical phenomena. These are dismissed by him as being vain phantoms of the human imagination, fictions of the philosophers, on a par with the substantial forms of the Schoolmen. Indeed, the faculties of the mind were no more distinct from the mind itself than the capacities of matter were distinct from matter. The capacities possessed by the latter of receiving movements and figures are not entities

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\* *Ecl.* II.

distinct from its essence, and, had we as clear an idea of the mind as we have of the body, we should see quite clearly that it is essentially a substance which thinks or is aware of all that affects it, but that it is the soul which is aware and not something distinct from the soul. Similarly the will is not a separate entity but is the soul itself in so far as it loves perfection, in so far as through the impression implanted in us by God towards the good, it is capable of loving what appears to it as good. Throughout this line of thought Malebranche reminds one very much of Locke's later protest against faculties. Like Locke, too, he points out that we ought not to speak of the will as active or as free, but that we ought rather to say that the soul is active or that the soul is free.

Malebranche develops the parallel just indicated between matter and mind very fully. Matter has two properties: in the first place it has the capacity of receiving figures, and in the second place the capacity of movement. So, too, mind has, firstly, understanding or the faculty of receiving ideas, and, secondly, will or the capacity of receiving inclinations. Further, just as matter is capable of receiving two sorts of figures, external and internal configuration, so, too, the mind has, on the one hand, pure perceptions which do not penetrate or modify the soul sensibly, and, on the other hand, sensible perceptions which do penetrate and affect the soul, *e.g.* pleasure, pain, light, colours, odours. Malebranche is sometimes anxious to restrict the parallel, especially when he finds difficulty in the problem of the freedom of the will, and then he urges that matter is purely passive and has only the capacity of being moved, whereas the will is at once active and passive. But, despite this restriction, it is clear that the whole object of the parallel is to bring out clearly that neither mind nor matter have any power or activity of their own, and that just as God is the ultimate and real cause of all movement in the sphere of extension, so He is the universal cause of all ideas and inclinations. Just as for Descartes, judgment means for Malebranche

acquiescence on the part of the will in what the understanding presents to it. The understanding does not judge but merely apperceives, and the will is free to give its consent or to refuse it to what is supplied by the understanding. The latter can know things in three ways. Firstly, by means of the pure understanding we know spiritual things, universals, common notions, ideas of perfection, *e.g.* that of the infinite perfection, that of extension and its properties. Secondly, by the imagination we know material things in their absence by means of images in the brain. Thirdly, by the senses we know sensible objects by impressions produced upon our sense organs by the objects themselves when present and by the animal spirits when absent.

Without entering as yet into the details of the various modes of knowledge distinguished by Malebranche, we can see clearly that in essence the mind is regarded by him as passive. It has, it is true, the faculty of volition, for just as the world would be an unformed mass, deprived of the infinite variety which constitutes its beauty, if matter were infinitely extended but without movement, so the understanding or intelligent mind would remain idle and useless, if it had not the active faculty of will which leads it towards the object of its perception and makes it love the good. Nevertheless, will is not included in the essence of mind; it is secondary in character, and our knowledge of it is so obscure that we are unable to deduce its properties. Finally, it should be remembered that even this active element is ultimately due to God, so that the finite mind is really left without any power of its own and is dependent upon the Infinite mind for all that appears to us to be the result of its own efficacy.

It is this idea of absolute dependence upon God, this intense desire of Malebranche to place all real activity in the Absolute Being and to deprive both matter and finite minds of any genuine efficacy of their own, which underlies Malebranche's whole metaphysic and above all his theory of knowledge. But, before

bringing this out more fully, it is necessary to draw attention to the fundamental assumptions made by Malebranche with regard to knowledge which followed from this attitude and from the sharp separation of mind and matter which he accepted from the teaching of Descartes. "*Il est evident*," he says, "que les corps ne sont pas visibles par eux-mêmes, qu'ils ne peuvent agir sur notre esprit ni se représenter à lui. *Cela n'a pas besoin de démonstration*." So too in the *Recherche*, Bk. III, Pt. II, he says, "*We are all agreed* that we do not become aware of objects *through themselves*." All direct and immediate knowledge of an external world is thus assumed to be impossible from the outset. How can a body, he argues, which has not even the power to move itself, have the power to make itself known by the mind? On the other hand how can the soul have *body* for its object? It is not probable that "l'âme sorte du corps et qu'elle aille pour ainsi dire se promener dans les cieux pour y contempler tous ces objets." The immediate object of the mind must be something which is actually united with it, and this is what is meant by an idea. An idea is, that is to say, "ce qui est l'objet immédiat ou le plus proche de l'esprit quand il aperçoit quelque objet."

The ideas of which I am aware are something real, have "une existence très réelle." There may be some doubt as to the existence of the objects of which by their means we imagine ourselves to be aware but the ideas at least must be real, for "le néant n'a pas de propriété," and one non-entity cannot be distinguished from another, whereas ideas differ from one another,\* the idea of a square, *e.g.*, being plainly different from that of a triangle. The existence, on the other hand, of objects corresponding to the ideas and supposed to resemble them is problematic. If the created world were destroyed, or if it had never existed, the ideas would still remain. Visibility is not a property that belongs to objects, for what can extension, which

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\* *Entr.* I, 4.

constitutes their nature, have to do with the mind? Ideas alone are visible in themselves; they alone can act upon and be present to the mind, but the objects which they represent are invisible to the mind, can neither act upon it nor be present to it. There are, indeed, certain things of which the soul can be aware without the medium of an idea. Such are, *e.g.*, the soul's own modifications, *i.e.*, its own sensations, passions, inclinations. These are within the soul, or rather modes of the soul's being. Perhaps also when we are delivered from the captivity of the body we may be able to see purely spiritual things immediately though they are outside our soul, but as regards all other things outside the soul, especially material things, it is clear that the soul cannot be in immediate union with them and that therefore it needs a *tertium quid*, an idea, which being spiritual can be immediately present to the mind. Two fundamental assumptions are thus here made. Firstly, it is assumed that the soul is passive and that all knowledge must come to it from without; secondly, that whatever is known must act upon the mind or be immediately present to it. It follows, since bodies cannot be immediately present to the mind, that what we know or the immediate objects of our perception must be ideas. The existence of bodies, as we have seen, may be doubted. In this connexion Malebranche, repeating what Descartes had already urged, draws attention to the delusions of dreams, the deceptive character of our senses, the possibility of there being false principles in our reasoning, the further possibility of the existence of an evil spirit who deceives us. But in addition to the certainty of our own existence, there is also the certainty that when we are aware of anything, that which is apprehended, that which is the immediate object of our perception, must be, at least during the time in which we think of it, for "*le rien ne peut pas être aperçue*" (1) To think of nothing means not to think at all. All that we see clearly and distinctly, therefore,

must be. The immediate objects of our perception, uncritically identified with our ideas, have then an existence. You may say that they are not substances, Malebranche urges, but still they are spiritual things ("C'est toujours une chose spirituelle")

The next question, therefore, is, Whence do these ideas come? In the *Recherche* Malebranche endeavours to deal with this question by the method of exclusion or elimination. Into the details of the alternatives enumerated by him it is not necessary to enter. Since neither finite minds nor bodies have any genuine efficacy of their own, and are, at the best, only "occasional" causes, it is clear that the production of ideas, which, as we have seen, were regarded by Malebranche as "choses spirituelles," cannot be ascribed to them. Here the deeply religious side of his nature finds outlet in eloquent passages insisting upon our dependence upon God. Say, rather, he urges that bodies have the power to move themselves, but let at least all that is noble in the world, the ideas and ideals of Truth and Justice, depend directly upon God. Man cannot be a light unto himself, he insists in the language of St. Augustine. The finite mind can only know things in and through God. The Divine Being has within Himself the ideas of all things, and because we are in immediate union with Him, in accordance with laws which He has laid down for all eternity, we can see in Him the ideas of all His works, or at least as many of them as in His goodness he discloses to us. It should be noted that, underlying the theory of a "vision in God," was not only the sense of the dependence of the finite mind upon God, but also the conviction that, to know anything, the mind must in some sense *be* that thing. It is obvious that, upon this assumption, only a universal being, "which was at the same time one and all things," which, as Malebranche often puts it, was composed of an infinity of perfections and yet remained one, could know all things in and through himself. Finite minds, on the other hand, since clearly they cannot contain the essences or



perfections of all things within themselves can know things only in and through union with the universal mind.

In the *Éclaircissements* and other later writings, the problem of knowledge, as well as its solution, present themselves very much in the manner in which they appear in the writings of St. Augustine. The *rationes æternæ*, St. Augustine saw, had an immutable and timeless validity, the kind of being, indeed, resembling that ascribed by Plato to his Ideas. They are *a priori* in character, independent of experience and the senses. The laws of Geometry, *e.g.*, are not due to or abstracted from experience, for experience does not furnish us with figures which accurately represent geometrical properties. What, then, St. Augustine asked, is the ground of the universal validity of the eternal truths, and of their independence of the individual knower? In answering this question, St. Augustine distinguished what may be called the act or process of perception from the content perceived. The former is bound up with the individual subject who is aware. The latter is independent of the individual, it stands over against him as that which is to be perceived. It is eternal, necessary, unchangeable, but as such it cannot be due to the individual finite mind. The latter may, indeed, discover it, but cannot be its source: man cannot be a light unto himself. The answer to the problem here raised is found in the hypostatisation of truth and the ascription to truth of a reality over against the individual mind. Truth, the intelligible light, is God Himself. Further, to explain the possibility of knowledge on the part of the finite mind, St. Augustine makes use of the Neo-Platonic theory of illumination or radiation. The finite soul is illumined by the eternal light. We see the eternal truths in God, in whom and through whom all things have being and light, in the Eternal Wisdom, the Divine Logos. Following Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists, St. Augustine conceived of the eternal truths as thoughts of the Divine Mind. Ideas or truths were not something different from

God himself—rather are they the archetypes and models of all that is created, the eternal, immutable, self-identical numbers, in accordance with which and upon the model of which the world of change and succession is moulded, framed, and regulated. True reality lies in them alone. All else exists or has being only in so far as it participates in or is an imitation of the true reality of the *mundus intelligibilis*.

Malebranche deals with the problem of truth in a closely similar way. We all admit, he argues, that truth is common to all. That  $2+2=4$ , that one should prefer one's friend to one's dog, are truths which are accepted by all. Ideas are admittedly eternal, immutable, necessary. But in the finite mind there is nothing immutable or necessary. I may be other than I am, there may be other minds different from mine; yet somehow I am sure that there cannot be other minds which will have truths contradicting mine. The universality, necessity, and immutability of truths thus admitted by all can only be accounted by the fact that we all share or participate in a common reason, that man is an "animal rationis particeps" in the sense that he is united with the Universal Reason which is co-eternal and consubstantial with God, a reason which contains the essences of all things, and in whom all truths abide eternally.\* God is not only wise but wisdom itself, says Theodore,† not only does He know but He is knowledge itself, not only is He illumined, but the light itself which illumines both Himself and all intelligence. It is in His own light that you see what I see and that He himself sees what both of us see. But He cannot see anything except in His own substance. Hence the truth which I see must be in Him. The acts of perception are individual, are peculiar to individuals, though they may resemble one another, but the truths which we all see are common to all, immutable, necessary, and eternal, and therefore they can have their being

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\* *Ecl. X, Med. Chr. 1.*

† *Entr. VIII, 11.*

only in the eternal and immutable substance of the Divinity. Malebranche further strengthens this argument in the earlier *Entretiens*, and in *Ecl.* X by drawing attention to the inexhaustible and infinite character of certain ideas, such as those of extension and number, which shows clearly that they cannot have their origin in a finite and limited intelligence, but must be due to the Infinite Being who contains within himself in an intelligible fashion all that has being and truth.

We are thus led once more to the celebrated theory of a vision of things in God, and it will perhaps not be disputed that that theory as it is worked out by Malebranche was a result of the tendency of Cartesianism to deprive the finite of all real activity, combined with the Augustinian, Neo-Platonic doctrine of a hypostatised truth which receives additional religious colouring by being identified with the Word or Divine Logos. The influence of St. Augustine is admitted by Malebranche in several places, especially in the Preface to the *Entretiens de la Métaphysique*,\* where he indicates clearly that his theory of knowledge was the result of a combination of the teaching of Descartes and that of St. Augustine.

It may also be pointed out that the argument from the eternal verities, and indeed the whole Augustinian doctrine of ideas as in the mind of God or the Eternal Wisdom, is very clearly expounded by André Martin, whose book† Malebranche quotes with approval in the *Eclaircissements* to the third and sixth books of the *Recherche*. Ideas are described by Martin as the essences of things, immutable and self-identical and existing from all eternity in the mind of God, themselves uncreated but the models upon which all that is created is formed and sustained.‡ This is proved by arguments which Malebranche

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\* This preface belongs to the edition of 1696, but is not given in Jules Simon's edition.

† *Philosophia Christiana seu Sanctus Augustinus de philosophia universum*, 1671.

‡ *De Deo*, Caput XXVIII.

also employs. God must have known or had ideas, it is urged, of all that he created: "Deus certe non aliquid nesciens fecit." The ideas further are not distinct from God; they are in God or thoughts of the Divine Wisdom. "In illo erant non sicut creatura quam fecit; sed sicut vita et lux hominum quod est ipsa sapientia et ipsum Verbum unigenitus Dei Filius."\* The ideas existed in God before creatures were called into being and are eternal and unchangeable, whereas created things are considered in Platonic fashion to exist only by participation in the ideas "quorum participatione fit ut sit quidquid est quoquomodo est."† The close resemblance of all this to Malebranche's thought is apparent.

Malebranche, however, differs in many important respects from St. Augustine and Martin. According to St. Augustine no doubt was thrown on the existence of the sensible world. With the Platonists he draws, it is true, a distinction between a *mundus intelligibilis* and a *mundus sensibilis*. But the existence of the latter world is not disputed. We become aware of it by means of the senses and the latter give us a reliable and accurate picture of the world, though St. Augustine admits, following Plato, that the knowledge we thus obtain, dealing as it does with the world of change and generation and not enabling us to arrive at the unchangeable truths of the realm of ideas, cannot be called knowledge proper and is merely opinion.

Malebranche's difference of opinion from St. Augustine with regard to the sensible world is due to the distrust of the senses which he learnt from Descartes, and above all to the distinction which he accepts between primary and secondary qualities. With regard to the latter, the senses plainly deceive us, Malebranche argues. Colours, *e.g.*, are not really expanded over the surface of bodies as the senses lead us to believe, but are sensations or modifications of the soul. The real character of bodies, their extension, does not involve colour or any other sense quality.

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\* *Ibid.*, XXIX.

† *Ibid.*, XXX.

It follows that the senses are utterly misleading. They have, indeed, the valuable function of warning us of the existence of bodies; the sensations which the soul experiences on the occasion of their presence serve as a "revelation" of great importance for the preservation of life, but they are false witnesses with regard to the real nature of bodies, and, in order to become aware of that real nature, we require an idea which is representative of them, in other words, we can know them only by seeing their archetype in the mind of God. Malebranche was, in fact, aiming at a synthesis between the Augustinian and Neo-Platonic theory of ideas and the doctrine of essences imperfectly worked out by Descartes. Descartes, Malebranche complains,\* never investigated fully the nature of concepts, and for this complaint there was some justification, since Descartes does, in fact, hesitate a good deal in this connection.† Further, essences and laws are regarded by Descartes as dependent upon the arbitrary will of God.‡ For Malebranche on the other hand, they are not in the first place to be accounted for as abstractions or generalisations made by the individual consciousness. General ideas, Malebranche urges, cannot be confused collections of particular ideas, neither can they be due to the individual mind. There is not enough reality in particular ideas to give rise to a general idea. We can form general ideas at all only because the idea of the infinite which is inseparable from our minds can become united with our particular ideas and thus enable us to give generality to them.§ In the second place, Malebranche strenuously denies that either ideas or truths, which are relations between ideas, are due to the arbitrary will of God. In this respect Malebranche is nearer to the Augustinian theory of ideas, in which truth is identified with God himself.

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\* *Réponse*, Ch. 24.

† Cf. *Med.* V, and *Principles*, Pt. I, LIX.

‡ Reply to 6th Objection.

§ *Entr.* II, 9.

If ideas are immutable, eternal, necessary, Malebranche argues,\* they must be seen in the infinite reason, which reason cannot be different from God. Indeed, in a sense, it must be independent of God himself, for the latter cannot act except in accordance with it. Since, however, God cannot consult any reason which is outside Himself, this infinite reason cannot be distinct from Him but must be co-eternal and consubstantial with Him. Truth does not depend upon the arbitrary will of the creator; on the contrary, the divine will itself is dependent for its activity upon the immutable order of relations which subsist between the ideas and which constitutes truth. Were this not the case, Malebranche is strenuous in maintaining, there would be no longer be any science in the real sense of the word. God contains within Himself in an intelligible manner the perfections of all beings which He has created or can create, and it is through these intelligible perfections that He knows the essences of all things, while it is through his volitions that He knows of their existence. Further, because our souls are intimately united with God, or, as Malebranche sometimes puts it, because God is the place of spirits just as space is the place of bodies, these perfections in the divine intellect are also the immediate objects of the human mind. In truth finite minds were called into being only to know and love God, and they can know all things only in God. The idea of the infinite underlies all knowledge and is presupposed in it. Particular ideas are only participations of the general idea of the infinite, just as God does not derive His being from creatures, the latter being nothing but imperfect participations in the divine being.† In fact all our knowledge is really a determination of the knowledge we have of God, just as all our volitions are but determinations of the general tendency towards the good or the love which God bears

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\* *Ecl.* X.

† *Rech.*, Bk. III, Pt. 2.

towards Himself out of the necessity of His own being. Truths are relations of equality or inequality between ideas. Thus, since it is true that  $2+2=4$  and false that  $2+2=5$ , there is a relation of equality between 2 and 2 and 4 and a relation of inequality between 2 and 2 and 5. These relations of equality or inequality are as immutable as the ideas themselves, and it is impossible that they should ever become false. Further, in a manner which reminds one of Kant, according to whom the transcendental unity of apperception is the source not only of the restraint imposed upon us by the objective world but also of the moral imperative, Malebranche supplements his theory of truth with a theory of order or divine law which is the basis of justice and morality. The relations which subsist between the ideas are, he argues, of two kinds. On the one hand there are relations of equality or inequality in magnitude (*grandeur*), and, on the other hand, there are relations of perfection. The perfections which are in God and represent beings possible or actual are not always equal in value. Those which represent bodies, *e.g.*, are not so noble as those which represent minds, and again within each of these spheres of existence there are infinite differences of degree of nobility. If it be asked how this can be the case, seeing that all perfections are infinite in their nature, Malebranche replies that there are the same relations between infinite perfections as between finite things, and that all infinities are not equal. Hence just as we can discover the relations which subsist between incommensurable numbers though we are unable to determine the relations in which these numbers stand to unity, or to any part of unity so we can determine to some extent the relations between the infinite perfections. It is again, Malebranche admits,\* difficult to reconcile the multiplicity of intelligible ideas with the divine simplicity; nevertheless, the fact must be admitted, he urges, for if all the

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\* *Ecl.* X.

ideas of God were equal He would not be able to distinguish between His works, knowing His creatures, as He does, only through the ideas which represent them. If, then, ideas are not of equal perfection there must be an immutable and necessary order expressing relations of perfection just as there is a necessary and eternal truth expressing relations of magnitude.

The conception of an immutable order which we thus reach remains, however, so far, merely a speculative truth. But now we must remember that God loves His own substance necessarily. It is this love, in fact, which constitutes His Will, which latter cannot be an impression coming from, and directed to, anything outside Himself. He can love nothing except in relation to Himself, but He loves more that in Him which has more perfection than that which has less. He esteems and loves everything in proportion as they are worthy of love and esteem. The latter are regulated by the immutable order which consists in the relations of perfection, subsisting between His attributes and between the ideas which He contains in His substance. God is just in essence, and by the necessity of His own being. His volitions are not arbitrary. He wills only in accordance with the immutable order of his perfections; He loves Himself necessarily. If, however, this be so, then the immutable order is not a merely speculative truth but has the force of a law or moral imperative for God and *a fortiori* for us. For God acts only for His own sake, and therefore He has made intelligences capable of knowing and loving only in order that they should know and love Him, in order that they should judge according to the immutable order, in order that they should judge as He judges and love as He loves. Finite minds are capable of willing or loving only because of the irresistible movement towards the good which God impresses upon them. But God can act upon us only through His Will, only through the love which He has for Himself, or His divine perfections. Since our love is the effect of His love He cannot



will that it should tend towards that to which His love does not tend. The immutable order which is His law must therefore be also our law and that of all intelligences, and that love is indeed always within us, unless our "amour propre," as Malebranche puts it, corrupts our "amour naturel."\*

In this connexion it should be pointed out that, in the conception of an immutable order constituting the divine will, Malebranche is developing the doctrine of St. Augustine precisely as he did in the case of truth. For St. Augustine happiness and truth were identical. In truth lay happiness, but truth, as we have seen, was God himself, and, accordingly, the knowledge and love of God was the aim and the end of all human endeavour. The object of this knowledge and love was the *lex æterna*, the moral norms, rules of wisdom and of virtue, of universal, eternal and immutable validity, independent of time and place, the fount and origin of all laws of a merely temporary character. The *lex æterna* was, in fact, according to St. Augustine, the divine reason and will, and in God there was the immutable order of justice as well as of truth. The ethical laws were divine laws, expressing the divine wisdom and will, and having their basis in the immutable order of things.

With the conception of an immutable order, Malebranche also connects his explanation of beauty. All beauty, at least that beauty which is the object of the intellect ("esprit"), is plainly an imitation of the immutable order. He instances painting and music. Sensuous beauty, however, is deprecated. "Il n'y a rien," he says, "qui affaiblisse tant l'esprit et qui corrompe tant l'esprit."†

In this whole line of thought, it is, I think, clear Malebranche is following St. Augustine, except that, as has already been noted, he differs from him in regard to sensible

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\* *Traité de l'amour de Dieu*; Entr. VIII; Ecl. X; Med., Ch. 4; *Traité de la morale*.

† Med., Ch. IV.

qualities, and consequently in regard to the way in which we know individual objects. According to St. Augustine, the latter are known directly by means of the senses, and, at the same time, because the laws of truth are also the laws of being, we are able to apply to particulars the eternal truths constituting the divine wisdom. According to Malebranche, in the *Recherche*, and throughout the line of thought dealing with the conception of a hierarchy of ideas, it would appear that, in the mind of God, there are ideas of individual things corresponding to the things that we know. "Toutes les créatures même les plus matérielles et les plus terrestres sont en Dieu quoique d'une manière plus spirituelle et que nous ne pouvons comprendre." In the knowledge of a sensible object, there is involved, on the one hand, an idea, and, on the other, a feeling, sentiment, or sensation. The former is in the mind of God, and is communicated to us by Him when He wills to disclose it to us, because of our intimate union with Him. The latter is a modification of our own soul, also caused in us by God, in accordance with certain laws, laws, namely, of the conjunction of soul and body.

Throughout this discussion, it will be noted, no use is made of the idea of an intelligible extension, which plays such an important rôle in Malebranche's later writings. In the earlier editions of the *Recherche* the word does not even occur, as has been pointed out by several writers, and, indeed, already Arnauld has drawn attention to the fact that Malebranche spoke at first of particular ideas as in the mind of God, and only later replaced them all by the idea of intelligible extension. That Malebranche shows some hesitation in this respect cannot be doubted. At the same time it should be pointed out that in the *Recherche* the distinction between extension and thought is fully developed in the manner of Descartes and a point is made of denying essential differences, at any rate in inorganic things. There can be no individual essences, because the essence of *all* bodies is extension and as

we have seen it is really the essence of things which corresponds to Malebranche's ideas. Hence the transition from particular ideas of sensible objects to one all-embracing idea constituting their essence is easily made, and it may well be that, though not explicitly dealt with in the *Recherche*, it was the underlying thought in his treatment. At any rate there can be no doubt on this point as far as his later writings are concerned.

We have now to see how Malebranche endeavours to explain our knowledge of objects by means of the one all-embracing idea of infinite intelligible extension.\* This idea is immutable, eternal, necessary, the archetype of matter, that in God which is the source of all that is real in bodies, the substance of God in so far as it is representative of bodies, and in so far as it is capable of being participated in by them. It is that which in the phraseology of a later time might be called the objective element in our apprehension of the material world. Sensible qualities do not represent anything that belongs to the nature of material objects. That nature or essence is exhausted in extension, and its modifications can consist in nothing but relations of distance. Sensible qualities therefore cannot belong to bodies but must be due to the soul. In other words they are modifications of the soul which God causes in us in accordance with the laws of the conjunction of soul and body. They are, therefore, essentially subjective, particular, and do not represent the universal element of the material world, the element which is common to all minds. The universal or common element, the *idea* of matter, is in God, for all intelligible reality, as we have seen, is in God. "God sees in himself the intelligible extension, the archetype of matter out of which the world is formed and in which our bodies dwell."† We shall see later how Malebranche endeavours to distinguish this intelligible extension from the Divine immensity on the

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\* *Ecl.* X; *Réponse à Regis*, Ch. 11; *Entretiens de la Métaphysique*; *Réponse à Arnauld*.

† *Entr.* I.

one hand, and from what he calls local or material extension on the other. Meanwhile we have to notice the way in which he considers we arrive at a knowledge of particular objects by means of the idea of intelligible extension. Malebranche is not always very clear in this connexion; sometimes he seems to maintain that God applies, so to speak, the whole idea of extension to us in different ways, at the same time calling up within our minds certain sensations of colour, etc. At other times he speaks of intelligible figures being applied to the mind in a similar manner. But, by combining the explanations given by him in the *Entretiens*, the *Réponse à Regis* and the tenth *Éclaircissement* to the *Recherche*, we get a fairly consistent account:—

Intelligible extension is of the same character throughout. Its parts are as ideas, the same in kind, just as the parts of local or material extension, *i.e.*, of existing bodies, are the same when viewed as substances. It is a single and unique extension which affects us or acts upon our souls in different ways. Further, this idea of extension is always present to the mind and cannot be effaced from it. In other words it underlies all our knowledge of objects exactly as the idea of being or the Infinite is presupposed in all our knowledge. "We cannot sever ourselves from it or lose it entirely from the view."\* It is present to the soul even when the eyes are closed; only then it does not modify our soul with a sensible perception, but only with a "perception plus légère ou purement intellectuelle qui la représente immense mais sans aucune diversité dans ses parties."† By diverse applications of this immense idea we are enabled to obtain, on the one hand, intelligible figures, *i.e.*, the objects of the mathematical sciences, and on the other hand, sensible figures and the knowledge of bodies. All intelligible figures and all objects are potentially contained in the vast idea of extension. "Just as one can with the aid of

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\* *Entr.* I.

† *Réponse à Regis*, Ch. 11.

a chisel make all kinds of figures in a slab of marble, so God can present to us all the material things by means of diverse applications of intelligible extension to our mind.\* When we have a clear idea of a figure, say a circle, what happens is that intelligible extension is applied to our minds with determinate limits equally distant from a fixed point and all in the same plane. When we imagine a circle, what happens is that a determinate part of intelligible extension, whose limits are equally distant from a point, touches the mind gently. Finally, when we see it, a determinate part of extension touches the soul and modifies it by a feeling of colour. In other words, it is the sensible qualities and especially colour which render it possible for intelligible extension to become sensible and which enable us to get a knowledge of different objects out of the idea of extension which is the same throughout. "If I distinguish this desk from this floor it is because the idea of extension modifies my soul now with one colour and now with another."† The extension of which we think is not different from the extension which I see or which resists my pressure; only in the one case it is a pure idea and in the other it touches or modifies the soul through some feeling, and then it appears hard, coloured, perhaps painful. In other words, we are aware of a bodily object because, mistakenly, we attribute to a piece of extension the feelings which it causes in us at at the time.‡ In a somewhat similar manner, Malebranche explains the way in which we apprehend movements. In intelligible extension there is of course no actual movement. Indeed, it is immovable even intelligibly. For God does not see the actual movement of bodies in his own substance or in the ideas which he has of them, but only in his volitions; in truth, he only sees their existence in his volitions since his substance contains only the essence of things and not their

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\* *Entr. II.*

† *Réponse à Regis*; cf. *Entr. I.*

‡ Cf. *Entr. II.*

existence. But these volitions do not change anything in his substance, and they do not move it, in other words, the intelligible parts of intelligible extension always retain the same relation of intelligible distance to one another. Despite all this, however, Malebranche thinks he can explain in what way our apprehension of movement comes about. If we conceive, he argues, of a created or material extension, we see at once that, although intelligible extension is not movable, yet any actual material body is, for the parts of a body need not always retain the same relations of distance; in other words, though intelligible extension is itself immobile it yet renders it possible to understand the *possibility* of movement in the case of material bodies. If now an intelligible figure, rendered sensible by means of colour, is taken successively from different parts of intelligible extension, in other words, if we attach the same feeling of colour successively to different parts, we shall see this figure successively in different places, in other words, it will appear to us to be moving though the intelligible extension remains unmoved.

Intelligible extension thus contains within itself potentially all intelligible figures, thus rendering possible the science of geometry which investigates the laws of their relations, which hold good eternally, and also affording us the means whereby we know sensible figures or bodily objects with the aid of the sensations which God produces in our souls, and which He attaches to the intelligible figures on the presence of these bodily objects in accordance with the laws of the conjunction of soul and body and the laws of our union with the Universal Reason.

We have now to see what account Malebranche has to offer of our knowledge of ourselves, of other minds than our own, and of God.

As regards the knowledge we have of ourselves, Malebranche differs profoundly from Descartes and the strict Cartesians. He agrees, indeed, with them as regards the certainty of the existence of the soul and of its distinction from the body,

but whereas they thought that the soul was better known than extension, Malebranche is of opinion that as regards the nature of the soul we are utterly ignorant. We know by a sort of inner feeling *that* we are, but we do not know *what* we are. To know a thing clearly is to have a clear idea of it, to be able to ascertain the modifications of which it is capable, the relations in which it stands to other things. Thus, in contemplating the idea of extension I can see clearly that bodies can be round or square. I can meditate upon the relations of extensions eternally and discover new truths incessantly. But this is not the case with regard to our idea of the soul. "The inner feeling ('sentiment intérieur') which I have of myself teaches me that I am, that I think, will, feel, suffer, but it does not make me know what I am or what is the nature of my thought, my will, my feelings, my pain, nor what are the relations which subsist among these things."\* From the idea we have of extension, we can see that it can be round, square, in motion, or at rest, but if we had never felt pleasure and pain, *e.g.*, we should never know whether the soul was capable of them. Further, we cannot compare our minds with other minds in order to see the relations between them; neither can we see the relations between pleasure and pain, heat and colour, nor even between green and red, yellow and violet, nor indeed between violet and violet. We are unable to say whether the soul in itself and separated from the body is capable of memory or habit. If the nature of the soul were clear, Malebranche argues further, how comes it that so many people confuse it with the body? Do not people constantly ascribe sensible qualities to bodies, and would they do so if they had a clear idea of the soul, and could deduce from it all the modifications of which it was capable? Though we feel pain and see colours, we yet are unable to discover by merely contemplating ourselves whether these qualities belong

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\* *Entr.* III, 7.

to the soul. Indeed the Cartesians themselves are constantly discussing the question and they can arrive at a conclusion only in an indirect and roundabout manner. They do not argue directly from the idea of the soul, but have recourse to the idea of extension, the modifications of which they know clearly can consist in nothing but relations of space-extendedness—so that any other modifications must belong to the soul, seeing that soul and body are the only two substances of which we have any knowledge. The Cartesians would not proceed by this circuitous method of elimination if there were an idea of the soul.\* No doubt in the mind of God who possesses the perfections of all things there must also be an idea of the soul, the archetype and model of all created souls and minds, but this idea or archetype God does not disclose to us, so that “*nous ne sommes que ténèbres à nous-mêmes*,” and though we have an inner feeling (“*conscience ou sentiment intérieur*”) of our own existence, an inner feeling, the reliability and trustworthiness of which Malebranche somewhat inconsistently does not question, we yet remain ignorant of our real nature. Malebranche is aware that the question will be pressed upon him why God should give us a clear idea of extension, while at the same time refusing to give us an idea of that which we most of all want to know, namely of ourselves, and he offers some very singular reasons of a theological character. If we had a clear idea of ourselves, he argues, we should be aware by merely contemplating ourselves of all the modifications of which our self is capable, in other words we could have whatever feeling or sensation we wanted without depending on the experience of objects external to us. “I should not need a concert in order to know the sweetness of music, and though I had never tasted a certain fruit I could, I do not say feel, but know clearly the nature of the feeling which it excites in me.”† This is more

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\* *Ecl.* XI.

† *Entr.* III, 7.



clearly developed in the *Méditations Chrétiennes*\* where two reasons are given. Firstly, it is argued, if we had a clear idea of what we were, we should not be so united to the body and would no longer attend to the needs of life. On the contrary, we should look forward to death, and then it would come to pass that we should no longer have a body which was given to us to serve as a victim or sacrifice to be offered in atonement for our sins.† Secondly, the idea of the soul is so perfect that, if we knew it, we should be able to think of nothing else and should be absorbed in contemplating ourselves instead of contemplating God, for which purpose we were made.‡

That there is value in Malebranche's remarks with regard to our ignorance of our own mental states cannot be doubted. We certainly are not directly aware of the processes that occur in the brain on the occasion of an act of perception. At the same time it must be admitted that, apart from theological reasons, Malebranche would find it extremely difficult to account for the singular restriction of knowable ideas to the external world. Further, his reference to the Cartesians' circuitous method of proving that sense qualities belong to our souls and not to bodies, cannot be borne out, at any rate as far as the arguments employed by Descartes in this connection are concerned. According to Descartes§ we have a clear knowledge of our sensations if we take care to confine our judgments of them to that alone which is contained in our perception of them and of which we are immediately conscious. In other words, as sensations, we have a clear and distinct knowledge of pain, colour, etc., and as such, of course, we know that they belong to the soul. It is only when, because of the prejudices of our childhood, we judge them to be qualities subsisting in external things beyond our mind, and then find

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\* *Med.* IX.

† Cf. *Entr.* IV, 11.

‡ Cf. *Traité de l'amour de Dieu*.

§ *Principles*, Pt. I, LXVI, LXVIII.

that we are unable to form any conception of them, that we have recourse to the idea of extension, and, being convinced that its modifications can consist in nothing but relations of space-extendedness, we conclude that there can be no such qualities in external objects resembling the sensations of colour or of pain of which we have a clear and distinct awareness. Further, as was pointed out by Arnauld, the nature of matter, just as the nature of thought, has given rise to countless discussions. The clearness and distinctness which Malebranche ascribes to the idea of matter is due to the fact that he takes matter to be pure extension. Let him but do the same with regard to the soul, *i.e.*, look upon it as pure thought, and then it will be apprehended, at any rate, as clearly as the idea of extension. Indeed, the comparison instituted by Malebranche is not rightly drawn, for he ought to have compared the soul not with intelligible extension but with an individual body. Again, Malebranche's argument in regard to sensible qualities cuts both ways, for if we had a clear idea of extension we should know without any hesitation that sense qualities do not belong to it, even if the idea of the soul were hidden from us. The real motive of Malebranche's teaching in regard to the idea of the soul was his fear of a pantheistic notion of the soul to which he felt himself to be drifting against his will. If we had an idea of ourselves, *i.e.* if we knew ourselves as in the mind of God, the conclusion that our individual existence is an illusion, and that finite souls were particular modifications of the Divine or universal mind could hardly have been resisted. Malebranche himself was keenly aware of this.\*

Malebranche's explanation of the way in which we come to know other minds than our own is still more precarious. It is clear that we cannot know them in themselves or directly, for God alone can "penetrate our minds and reveal Himself to us." Neither can we know other minds through means of ideas,

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\* Cf. *Med.* IX.

for as we have seen, though God contains within Himself the archetypes of all minds, yet He does not disclose them to us. The third method, viz., that which Malebranche calls "conscience," is unavailing here since we can have no inner feeling of what is outside us. These considerations compel Malebranche to say that we can know other minds only by conjecture. I guess or infer that there are other minds similar to my own, because I sometimes have thoughts not occasioned by my will and accompanied by certain sensations, *i.e.*, sounds which lead me to conclude that they are due to beings who resemble myself. There is, of course, the possibility that it is God who is carrying on this exchange of thought with me, but Malebranche does not allow this to trouble him. The thoughts which come to me in the way indicated above are such, "*qu'elles me portent naturellement à croire qu'il y a quelque esprit semblable au mien qui les a conçues et qui a voulu qu'elles me fussent communiquées.*"\* It is therefore merely this "natural inclination" which leads me to the belief in the existence of other minds; for the sensations of sound and colour, etc., which accompany the thoughts arising in my mind on the occasion of the presence of other minds are subjective, *i.e.*, modifications of my mind, and do not warrant the belief in the existence even of bodies, and even if they did, there is still the possibility that God is making these bodies an occasion or instrument for the communication of ideas to my mind. If this be so, it is difficult to see what ground Malebranche has for relying upon the natural inclination to believe in the existence of other minds, seeing that in the case of bodies he refuses, as we shall see later, to trust it, differing in this respect from Descartes, and being compelled in the end to have recourse to faith for a proof of their existence.

As regards our knowledge of God, it is difficult to get a clear and consistent account. In a sense all our knowledge is

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\* *Med. Met.*, p. 68.

a knowledge of God. Indeed, it was largely the conviction that God is or ought to be the end of all human love and knowledge, that inspired Malebranche's theory of a vision in God, and when under the influence of this conviction, he insists that all our knowledge is a particular determination of our knowledge of the infinite, just as all our love is a particular determination of the general tendency towards the good, or of the infinite love wherewith God loves Himself. On the other hand, our knowledge of ideas, immutable and eternal though they be, is not really adequate to represent God. It is true that when we see ideas, it is the Divine Substance that we see, for that substance alone is visible and capable of illumining the mind, but we do not see it, Malebranche insists, in itself but only in so far as it is representative of creatures, only in so far as it is capable of being participated in, or imitated by them. God contains within Himself the perfections of all things. In His absolute reality He is, as Malebranche often says, at the same time one and many, composed of an infinity of different perfections, and yet so simple that each perfection contains in itself all the others without any real distinctions. He is the Infinite, the Unlimited, the Indeterminate. All beings participate in Him, but no beings, actual or possible, can exhaust the immensity of Being. This line of thought is sometimes emphasised so much by Malebranche that he runs the risk of identifying God with the bare abstraction of Being in general, of which all that we can say is that it is; but what Malebranche more often insists upon is that God is infinite in every way, combining within Himself the perfections of all things, and yet possessed of an incomprehensible simplicity and unity of character. The intelligible perfections are indeed communicated to us, but though we see them we do not see God as He is in His absolute and individual reality, but merely in so far as His perfections are representative of finite creatures and under the conditions attending finitude.

It follows from the nature of the Infinite Being that there

can be no idea which is representative of Him. God or the Infinite can have no Archetype; He is Himself His own Archetype. All things are seen in the Infinite, but the Infinite can be seen only in itself. Essence and existence cannot here be separated. The idea of being has no meaning without being, and accordingly the thought of the Infinite involves His existence, for since nothing finite can represent the infinite, we can only think of Him in Himself. At the same time Malebranche is careful to point out that we see Him in Himself only in the sense that we do not see Him through any finite being representing Him, but not in the sense that we can attain to His simplicity or discover His perfections as they are in themselves.

## II.

Malebranche's theory of knowledge aimed, as we have seen, at effecting a synthesis between the ideas of St. Augustine and the essences of Descartes. Throughout his writings these elements jostle together; but, while in the earlier writings it appeared that God contained within Himself the essences of all things, including particular things, it is quite clear that later on all these ideas were absorbed in the idea of intelligible extension, though God is still said to contain an infinity of intelligible numbers, and sometimes the essences of things are put alongside the idea of intelligible extension. Leaving aside for the moment the difficulties that are involved in the latter idea and in its relation to the Divine mind, we have to consider how far, if at all, it is possible to give a satisfactory account of our knowledge of objects, intelligible and sensible, by means of it. We have seen that intelligible extension contains within itself potentially all figures, and accordingly furnishes the basis and justification for the science of geometry. We become aware of certain spatial relations when God applies intelligible extension to our minds in certain ways, *i.e.*, with certain limits,—figures, as Malebranche puts it, being

but boundaries of extension. Further, these intelligible figures become sensible when there arise within our minds sensations of colour, etc., which we mistakenly ascribe to the intelligible extension, but which are really not involved in it, but belong to ourselves or are modifications of our mind. Now, it is exceedingly difficult to see what is meant by this potential inclusion if all intelligible figures are in intelligible extension. It is clear that they are not actually contained in it as it is in the mind of God. For actual figures are conceivable only by means of movement, but God does not see movement in his essence; His volitions, as Malebranche puts it,\* do not change anything in His substance, do not move it, so that intelligible extension is admittedly immovable even intelligibly, since the intelligible parts of intelligible extension always retain the same relation of distance to one another. But if movement cannot be in God, even intelligibly, it is difficult to see how figures can be. If, then, God is to see a certain figure of intelligible extension, in order to apply it to our minds He must limit intelligible extension, which itself is figureless in a certain way, but to do this He must have an *idea* of the figure which He wishes to make, and thus it is clear that the general idea of intelligible extension helps us but little.

The difficulties are enhanced in the case of our knowledge of particular objects. What happens here, according to Malebranche, is that God applies to our minds a certain intelligible figure and at the same time excites in us certain sensations. The latter are a confused complex of purely subjective character, they belong to the individual and are modifications of His consciousness. They are indeed of use in so far as they help in the maintenance of life but they do not represent anything that is objective, *i.e.*, universal and common to all, the objective element so far as the material world is concerned being

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\* *Ecl.* X, rep. 3.

exhausted in the idea of extension. Now, in the first place the question has to be met how it is that God who has no sensations in Himself, is able to call up sensations in my mind at all. To obviate this difficulty Malebranche tells us that though God does not feel pain or any other sensation, yet He *knows* them because He has within Himself the archetype of all minds and can see in that archetype the modifications of which our soul is capable. But this does not really remove the difficulty, for, in the idea of the soul as it is in God, there is no pain or any other sensation, and since God can know only that which is within Himself it is hard to see how He can know whether our soul is capable of feeling certain sensations. Malebranche is aware of this difficulty but can offer no satisfactory solution and is indeed compelled to take refuge in an asylum of ignorance. "My conscience," he says, "teaches me as well as other men that I sometimes suffer pain, and my reason tells me that God and God alone can cause me to suffer. But, since neither I nor anyone else has a clear idea of the soul, or of the archetype in accordance with which God created it, I cannot throw any light on this difficulty."\*

In the second place, even granting that God somehow can cause sensations in us, these sensations are of course subjective, particular, not involved in the essence or idea of the thing of which we are aware. There is, therefore, in them nothing that is universal or necessary and *prima facie* they ought to be quite irregular and haphazard. How then are we to explain the regularity of these sensations? How is it that certain complexes of sensations always come together in my mind in fairly uniform manner and indeed not only in my mind but also in other minds than my own? The answer is that God acts in accordance with certain necessary and universal laws, in this connexion,—laws of the communication of movements and of the conjunction of soul and body. Now, as we have seen, intelligible extension is similar throughout. What then

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\* *Reflexions sur la pr  motion physique*, IX.

determines God to call up in our minds, now one complex of sensations and now another, must be the *occasions*, as Malebranche calls them, which regulate the exercise of the invariable laws, which occasions are in this connexion nothing but the *presence of objects*. If our sensations are not to come to us at haphazard; if they are to come to us (as they do) in regular and orderly fashion, they must be determined by certain laws; but our complexes of sensations are of varied character, and, since all the parts of extension are alike, the element of differences must be due to the occasions, *i.e.*, on the occasions of the presence of certain objects God always calls up certain sensations in my mind as well as in other minds similar to my own. There must, therefore, be objects differing in character which determine God to act in different ways on different occasions in accordance with universal laws. But if that is so, the existence of objects becomes a metaphysical necessity, since without them no explanation can be given of the order and regularity of experience—a necessity which, as is well known, Malebranche refuses to recognise. Further, even waiving this point, the whole difficulty involved in knowledge of the particular is not removed, but only removed a stage further back. For if the order of our sensations is determined by objects as occasional causes, then God must know these objects, and He must know them, not merely in their general character as extended, but as individual and particular. The knowledge of the particular is still therefore unexplained, at least as far as God is concerned, or at any rate is presupposed in the explanation of it that Malebranche offers. Arnauld's story of the sculptor applies here. When the sculptor was requested by a friend for a picture or likeness of St. Augustine, he brought him a slab of marble and told him that he need only remove the superfluous matter to discover the likeness he wanted, forgetting all the time that, in order to do this, it was necessary to know first of all what St. Augustine looked like. Arnauld presses this difficulty with reference to the individual knower. How, he asks, can we



know how to limit intelligible extension and clothe it with certain sensations so as to represent a certain object, unless we already have an idea of the object we want to know? As against this Malebranche might reply that it is not the individual who limits extension, and at the same time calls up sensations, but God or the Infinite who possesses ideas of all things, and also knows the modifications of which our soul is capable. But this reply would be unavailing against the difficulty urged above, for we have seen that in order to account for the regularity of our sensations, it is necessary that the universal laws in accordance with which God acts should be determined by occasional causes, *i.e.*, the presence of objects of determinate character which God must know in order to be able to act upon our mind in regular and orderly manner. But God can know only that which is within Himself, only His own ideas, and no effort whatever will enable us to see how out of these ideas—universal in character as they are—either the Infinite mind or we ourselves can ever arrive at a knowledge of the particular objects of our experience.

It may be noted in passing that this difficulty illustrates a more general difficulty involved in the doctrine of Occasionalism, that on the one hand it denies all real efficacy and independent being to the finite, while on the other it leaves it the power to determine the activity of God and thus assigns to it a function which is incompatible with the main motive that gave rise to the formulation of the doctrine.\*

It must then be admitted that Malebranche did not succeed in effecting the synthesis between the Augustinian or Neo-Platonic doctrine of ideas and the teaching of Descartes, which he desiderated in order to reach a comprehensive theory of a vision of *all* things in God. Our knowledge of the particular is so far from being explained that the question is often forced upon Malebranche whether the material world

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\* The difficulty of accounting for our knowledge of the particular was, to some extent, realised by Dom Lamy, quoted in *Bouillier*, p. 371.

exists at all. God and ideas, and the relations between them, constitute the intelligible world; the soul and its modifications account for the sensible world. What need, therefore, is there for an external world to which no intelligible meaning can be assigned, a material extension which it is difficult to define, and which can hardly be distinguished from the intelligible extension, which alone would seem to be real? In dealing with this question Malebranche, as I have already mentioned, repeats the arguments used by Descartes in this connexion as to the delusive character of the senses, etc. Malebranche is not, however, and cannot be, satisfied with Descartes' solution. According to Descartes,\* our passive faculty of perception, *i.e.*, of receiving ideas of sensible things, involved the existence of a corresponding active faculty of forming or producing these ideas, and the latter faculty could not exist in me, seeing that ideas are produced in my mind without my contributing to their production, and often against my will. It must, therefore, Descartes argued, exist in a substance other than myself, which must be either a body or God. Yet as I have a very strong inclination to believe that ideas arise from corporeal objects, and as God has not given me any faculty whereby I can discover that this is not the case, it is clear that God would be a deceiver if my natural inclination did not lead me to the truth. This argument cannot satisfy Malebranche, for, in the first place, he will not agree that bodies have an active faculty to excite ideas in our minds, for the only active power lies in God, and, in the second place, the argument based on the fact that God is no deceiver does not amount to a clear proof. We must not believe anything beyond what we are compelled to believe. Thus, when we see bodies we must conclude only that we see them, and that these visible or intelligible bodies really exist. But what reason have we for saying positively that there exists outside

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\* *Med.* VI.

of us a material world resembling the intelligible world which we see? It is true that we see these bodies as external to us. But do we not see the light outside us, and in the sun, and nevertheless is it not clear that light is a modification of our soul and does not exist in the external object at all? Our natural inclination is not evidence. Indeed, as Malebranche frequently points out, no clear and incontrovertible proof can be given of the existence of bodies. On the contrary, a demonstration may be given of the impossibility of such a proof, apart from what is offered us by faith. For a clear proof consists in the establishment of a necessary connexion between the ideas which are being compared; but there is no such necessary connexion between the infinitely perfect Being and any creature. God is abundantly sufficient unto Himself. "Matter, therefore, is not a necessary emanation from the Divinity." If bodies do exist they must depend upon the volition of God, but whereas all volitions of God are dependent upon the immutable order of His perfections, and are, so to speak, the expressions of the relations subsisting necessarily between His ideas, the particular volition to create the world is not a necessary consequence of the Divine nature, for the notion of the infinitely perfect Being involves no necessary relation to a created world, and, indeed, excludes the possibility of such a relation. The existence of bodies, therefore, is arbitrary, and cannot be rigorously deduced from the nature of God. To save the existence of the material world Malebranche is compelled to have recourse to faith. There is no other way than revelation to assure us that God has willed to create bodies.

It would, I think, be a mistake to hold that Malebranche's belief in the existence of matter was philosophically insincere, and that, when he speaks of creation, he does so only in order to avoid conflict with the religious opinions of his time. This apparently is the opinion of Novaro, but as Pillon\* points out,

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\* *Année phil.*, 1893.

Malebranche did not divorce reason from faith, but mingled them very closely and spoke quite seriously of a union of two substances in man. Further, as we shall see later, it is, in Malebranche's own opinion, the doctrine of Creation which saves him from the pantheism of Spinoza. Be this as it may, it is clear that the existence of the material world is left exceedingly problematic, and as Berkeley said, referring to the followers of Malebranche:—"That they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any effect in nature and which, therefore, are made to no manner of purpose since God might have done everything as well without them; this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition."\*

We may perhaps be able to throw some further light upon the problem here raised by considering the distinction that Malebranche draws, on the one hand, between local or material extension and infinite intelligible extension, and on the other between the latter and what he describes as the Divine Immensity. What precisely is meant by this last term, it is exceedingly difficult to determine, but it is said to indicate the omnipresence of God, "not only in the Universe, but infinitely beyond." Malebranche will not have it that God is present everywhere through His operation alone, for the operation of God cannot be distinguished from God and, therefore, if the act whereby God produces anything is everywhere, it follows that God himself must be present wholly and entirely in all the places in which He operates. Nor will the analogy of the presence of the soul in the body serve us. For in truth the soul is not in the body nor the body in the soul, rather are they both alike in the divine substance. They both derive their being by participation in His being. The mind can think, the body is extended, only because God, who possesses all the perfections of

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\* *Principles*, 58.

creatures without their limitations, gives them their reality. It is in God alone that they live, move, and have their being, it is in Him alone that the world subsists.

Malebranche is well aware that the immensity of God is incomprehensible, but he endeavours to throw some light upon this obscure notion by comparing it with eternity. Material or local extension is to the divine immensity as time to eternity. God is eternal, and, though times and moments succeed one another in His eternity, He is all that He is without any temporal succession, in His entirety eternal, and in His entirety throughout all the times which succeed one another in His eternity. So, too, God is immense, and, though all bodies are extended in His immensity, God is not extended, and fills all His substance without local extension. In His existence and duration there is no past nor future, and in His immensity there are no parts nor divisions. God is all that He is whenever and wherever He is. He is not so much in the world as the world is in Him, just as eternity is not so much in time as time is in eternity.

It will be seen that in all this Malebranche is perilously near the pantheistic doctrine of Spinoza, which he regarded with horror, and to which he felt himself to be drifting against his will. When we are told that minds are in the divine reason and bodies in his immensity, the conclusion seems difficult to avoid that the only real being is God, of whom minds and bodies are modifications. All that is said by Malebranche to bring out the contrast between the divine substance on the one hand, and finite minds and locally extended bodies on the other, might with equal justice be applied to Spinoza's substance as contrasted with its modes. Indeed, the comparison of the immensity of God in its relation to local extension, with eternity as related to time, is, as de Mairan pointed out, actually used by Spinoza. It is therefore a matter of great importance for Malebranche to offer some explanation of the way in which the divine

immensity is related, on the one hand, to what he calls intelligible extension, and, on the other hand, to local, created, or material extension.

Infinite intelligible extension is not to be identified with the divine immensity. The latter is the divine substance, spread out everywhere without local extension, at the same time one and many, made up, as Malebranche often puts it, of an infinity of perfections, and yet so simple that each perfection contains within itself all the others without any real distinction. This is utterly incomprehensible to our limited intelligence. Intelligible extension, on the other hand, is in his view quite clearly apprehended by the human mind. It is not the divine substance as spread out everywhere, but only this substance in so far as it is representative of bodies, in so far as it is capable of being participated in by them under the conditions attending finitude; it is the archetype of matter, that to which matter corresponds perfectly, whereas to the divine immensity matter corresponds but very imperfectly. This distinction between the divine immensity and intelligible extension is undoubtedly very obscure. For that in the divine substance which has any reference to extension, that which, so to speak, without being extended, is the ground of extension, in other words that by participation in which the extended world has being, is exhausted by intelligible extension and there does not seem to be any meaning in ascribing to God an attribute conveying a mysterious reference to extension, but which really indicates the possession by God of infinite perfections in indissoluble unity—a unity which contains within itself the attributes of mind as well as of matter, and which, therefore, ought not to be described by a term like immensity.

Intelligible extension is, as we have seen, the divine immensity in so far as it is representative of bodies; it is that in God, therefore, which contains whatever there is of reality and perfection in matter, that in God of which all created things

are infinitely limited participations. But, if so, then God must really contain extension within Himself formally and not merely eminently. This conclusion is urged by Arnauld, who supports it by drawing attention to the arguments adduced by Malebranche against the contention that the idea of extension can be in the finite soul. The finite soul, Malebranche had argued, cannot contain intelligible extension within itself because extension has figures and is divisible, whereas the mind can have no figures nor be divisible. In other words if the soul contained extension within itself it would be material. From this, argues Arnauld, it is clear that Malebranche, when he spoke of extension as being in the mind of God must have meant in God formally and not merely objectively or as a content of mind; for as a content of mind extension may very well be in the finite soul without the latter thereby becoming extended. Malebranche replies that extension exists in God not merely in ideal fashion as it might exist in our mind, but effectively ("effectivement") and he will not have it that it exists in Him formally. But it is exceedingly difficult to see what difference there is between these two terms, and indeed he is compelled to take refuge in the unknowability of God. God, he says, contains the idea of matter eminently, *i.e.*, without its imperfections and limitations, but this idea is not a modification of God, for God can have no modification. The ideas which God has of His creatures are nothing but His essence in so far as it is representative of them or imperfectly imitable by them, for God contains in a divine and infinite manner all that there is of perfection in His creatures, seeing that it is characteristic of the infinitude of God that He is at the same time one and many.

Malebranche was, however, aware of the difficulty of this position and apart from his discussions contained in his replies to Arnauld he has dealt with the subject in the ninth *Méditation*, the *Entretiens d'un philosophe chrétien avec un philosophe chinois*, and above all in the exceedingly interesting

series of letters between him and de Mairan. De Mairan pointed out to him that his doctrine really led to that of Spinoza and that he was merely hiding his real position under the cloak of ambiguous distinctions. Malebranche's reply, both in his letters to de Mairan and in the places mentioned, is troubled and evasive. Spinoza's main fault, he argues, is that he confuses the ideas of things with the things themselves, the ideas of bodies with bodies. No doubt the idea of extension, *i.e.*, intelligible extension, is eternal, necessary, infinite, and, therefore, it is in God, but created extension is neither eternal, nor infinite, and, so far from its possessing necessary existence, we can only know that it exists by means of revelation, natural or supernatural. No doubt, he urges, it is true that what we can assert of anything whatever is involved in its idea since God can only have created things in accordance with the ideas which He had of them, and these ideas are, as we have seen, not different from those which we possess. But this principle applies only to the properties of things, not to their existence. Accordingly I cannot infer the existence of an infinite extension, though I cannot doubt the existence of the idea of extension or that which is the immediate object of my mind when I think of infinite spaces. The intelligible world is in God and is God, for all that is in God is consubstantial with Him. It is not a modification of God, for there can be no modification of the Infinite; there can be no non-being in His Being. God is all that He is wherever He is, and although intelligible extension is in God, yet in seeing it we do not see the essence of God as it is absolutely. We can only see what God saw Himself when He willed to create the world. Spinoza's mistake lies above all in assuming that creation is impossible and hence he is led to an identification of intelligible extension with created extension, but the latter is really not in God nor a necessary emanation from God, but depends upon God's arbitrary will. Further, Malebranche insists, he does not understand what is meant by modifications or modes of extended substance in the



sense in which Spinoza uses the term. Modes of extension are its figures, but it is meaningless to speak, *e.g.*, of Rome and Paris as modes of extension. They are rather parts of it, and, when this is admitted, Spinoza's argument, that there can only be one substance, will be seen to be false, and all that we can legitimately say is, that there is one Reason which contains within it ideas of all things, and that particular bodies are not modifications of the idea of extension, but only parts of the created extension called into being by the will of God in accordance with the idea of intelligible extension.

Despite Malebranche's efforts, the idea of intelligible extension remains, as Arnauld puts it, most unintelligible and the distinction which Malebranche draws between it and the Divine immensity does not lighten the difficulty. It is further exceedingly difficult to see how local and material extension, or at any rate what is real in it, can be distinguished from intelligible extension, especially if we remember that it is the latter which acts upon the mind and becomes sensible when we are aware of a body. Malebranche objects to Spinoza's use of the word modification, but he himself often speaks of finite things as participations of the Divine Being,—a term which is not more intelligible than modifications, and which certainly does not make it clear whether finite things have a reality of their own. Malebranche distinguishes participations from *parts*, but his distinction surely will not avail, for Spinoza would not have spoken of substance as having parts, and indeed, he proves quite clearly that it can have no parts. Further, Malebranche argues that from the idea of infinite extension we cannot infer that the extension of which the world is made is infinite and has necessary existence, despite the principle laid down by the Cartesians, that what we can assert of anything whatever is involved in the idea which is representative of it. But if from an idea *admittedly infinite*, we cannot infer necessary existence, then doubt might also be thrown on the existence and infinitude of God, and even if a plausible case can be made out for

regarding the idea of God as an exception in this respect, it will still follow that *if* material extension exists it must be infinite, since infinity is involved in the idea which is representative of it. Nevertheless, Malebranche does, though on the evidence of faith, admit the existence of the material world, and consequently there exists an infinite substance outside of God, which, on Malebranche's own principle, is impossible. He, of course, denies the infinity of the material world, but it is hard to see how the denial can be justified.

Malebranche is aware that the crucial point in the connexion is the doctrine of creation, and he often accuses Spinoza of having *assumed* that creation is impossible, forgetting that Spinoza *proved* it to be impossible consistently with his definitions of substance. Malebranche, on his part, tries to give what he calls negative proofs to show that matter is not uncreated. Sometimes he argues that matter cannot be a necessary emanation from the divinity because God is fully self-sufficient\*—an argument which is far from convincing, since, if matter is in some way involved in the divine nature, it would constitute part of the abundance wherewith He is satisfied, and not something external to Him, and requiring Him to come out of Himself in order to attain satisfaction. Similar remarks apply perhaps to the argument insisted on by Malebranche in the ninth *Meditation*, the *Entretiens avec un philosophe chinois*, and elsewhere. If matter were uncreated, he urges, God could not move it, for He could only move it if He knew it, but He can only know it if He Himself gave it being, seeing that nothing can act upon Him or illumine Him from the outside. Hence if He did not see the existence of matter within Himself it would be unknown to Him, and, consequently, He would be unable to move it. Movement and creation in fact alike depend upon God and involve an activity of the same kind. Movement in truth means succes-

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\* *Ent.* IX, 3.

sive creation on the part of God, of a body in different places. God does not make *things* and then communicate to them a moving force. The moving force of bodies consists in the efficacy of him who gives them being incessantly and successively in different places. Apart from God there is no real power, and all activity, however small, is divine and infinite. We must not imagine because we can move things, while we cannot produce them, that movement and creation are effects of different powers, for both alike depend upon the efficacy of God. It follows, then, that if He did not create matter He would not be able to move it, and that either there is no movement or change, or else change has no cause which produces it, nor is there any wisdom which regulates it. It would not be difficult to show that even accepting Malebranche's doctrine of creation it is not easy to reconcile change and movement with the immutability which, according to him, is one of God's attributes. No doubt the latter difficulty remains in a pantheistic doctrine, but the above arguments surely have force only against the position that matter is uncreated, and at the same time something foreign or external to the Divine substance, in which case no doubt God could neither know nor move it, but they do not apply as against the view that matter is an integral element or, as in Spinoza's doctrine, an attribute of, the Divine substance, for in that case no action from the outside world would be required to render it possible for God either to know or to move matter. As regards the whole doctrine of Creation, Malebranche is, in the end, compelled to take refuge in an asylum of ignorance. The creation of this world is due to the arbitrary will of God, and all difficulties are dismissed as illegitimate. We have no right to ask, Malebranche urges, how being can come from non-being. God is omnipotent, and seeing the idea of extension within Himself He can create something that corresponds to it. How the will of God has such power cannot be explained. We have no clear idea of the Divine

power nor can we know what the Divine will is. This, however, clearly leaves the whole world of particular fact unexplained, and it is, moreover, difficult to see why the volition to create the world should be arbitrary, while all other volitions of God are said to be determined by the immutable order of His perfections, and this question seems to me to be all the more troublesome, because Malebranche is in the end compelled to find means—though theological in character—whereby the created world is made worthy of the Divine will, and the most perfect possible, so that the question is forced upon us whether, this being so, the creation of the world must not be regarded as following necessarily from the Divine Being.

I have already dealt with what Malebranche has to say regarding the knowledge we have of our own mind and of other minds. It remains to be added that had he consistently applied the same arguments in regard to the existence of minds which he applied in regard to that of bodies, he ought to have refused to be satisfied with our "natural inclination" to believe in the existence of other minds and with the confused awareness of our own existence. It is true that this awareness is enough to prove *that* there exists something which thinks, but since, confessedly, we have no idea of minds, since we do not know what minds are, we are not entitled to speak of this something as a substance with modes, or to predicate of it any kind of identity amidst the change of the presentations which make up its life. Moreover, here again, what is left to the finite mind is hardly enough to distinguish it from non-entity. God alone is the source of ideas as well as of mental modifications. "*Corps esprits, pures intelligences, tout cela ne peut rien. C'est celui qui a fait les esprits qui les éclaire et qui les agite. C'est lui qui a créé le ciel et la terre qui en règle les mouvements. Enfin c'est l'auteur de notre être qui exécute nos volontés : semel jussit, semper paret.*"\* Malebranche

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\* *Rech.* VI, Pt. II, Ch. 3.

does, it is true, make an attempt to reconcile this position with freedom of the will, but it is only a semblance of freedom which is compatible with such an extreme denial of any real efficacy to the individual, and the conclusion is forced upon us once more that the only real being is God, of whom finite minds are merely modifications.

Leaving aside this large question of the relation of God to the finite world of minds and bodies, let us inquire how far Malebranche's conception of the world of ideas is compatible with the unity and simplicity of the Divine Being. The ideas, according to Malebranche, have a real existence. They are spiritual things, if not substances. They act upon the mind, and often they are conceived after the manner of forces. Thus, to take but a few examples, we are told in the *Recherche*, III, Pt. II, 6, that "it is certain that ideas are efficacious, since they act upon the mind and illumine it, since they render it happy or unhappy," and, in the *Entretiens avec un philosophe chinois*, we are told that it is through the action of ideas that we feel our body, etc. Further, we have seen that they form a system or hierarchy with relations of magnitude and perfection between them, thus giving rise to the two orders of Truth and Justice, to which even the will of God must conform, and which are said by Malebranche to be even more independent than God himself.\* How can we reconcile this multiplicity of ideas,—constituting as they do real existences, existences which are not even products of the divine thought, but upon which the divine mind and, within certain limits, all finite minds are directed—with the unity and simplicity of God? Malebranche tells us that, since God can consult only Himself, since He cannot, so to speak, go out of Himself, the eternal orders of Truth and Justice, or the divine reason, must be co-eternal and consubstantial with Him, and this divine reason is identified by him with the Logos

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\* *Ecl.* X.

Incarnate. But this assuredly does not remove the difficulty, since the unity and simplicity of the Divine Being is still philosophically unexplained, and the conclusion can hardly be resisted that God could no longer be looked upon as a personal Being, but is in truth a system of Ideas. Malebranche's theory is thus, I would urge, confronted with the double difficulty of explaining the relation that subsists, on the one hand, between the Divine Being and the system of universal essences, and, on the other, between them and the inexplicable world of particular fact.

### III.

So far, I have dealt with Malebranche's theory of knowledge mainly from the point of view of his own system, and as it were, from the inside. I wish now to examine its presuppositions and assumptions. In this connexion I cannot do better than refer to the exceedingly acute criticisms that were urged against Malebranche by Arnauld in his *Livre des Idées* and many other shorter writings. It will be found that Arnauld lays bare all the vulnerable points of the doctrine of Representative Perception, and that he furnishes a foundation for a thoroughgoing realistic theory of knowledge.\*

The burden of his criticism is that Malebranche, who was himself so vehement in his protestations against any appeal to the substantial forms of the Schoolmen, and who was always warning us against prejudices and confused ideas, is himself guilty of basing his whole theory upon a principle, the validity of which he never questions, but which, in fact, is a mere assumption which may not only be questioned but totally denied. This principle consists in denying the possibility of direct perception, and in insisting on that account upon the need of a *tertium quid*, an "être représentatif,"

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\* The attention of this society has already been drawn to Arnauld's work by Professor Dawes Hicks in his paper on "Sense Presentation and Thought," *Arist. Soc. Proc.*, 1905-6.

standing between the mind and the object known. Having *assumed* the need of such "êtres représentatifs," Malebranche proceeds to inquire where they are to be placed, and by a method of exclusion or elimination he concludes that they can be possessed by God alone. But if they can be proved to be hypostatised abstractions—mere chimeras—akin to the scholastic forms so much ridiculed by Malebranche, it is assuredly absurd to inquire whether they are in our own minds, in the objects known, or in God. Every idea, Arnauld insists, though in itself a unitary whole, has yet two relations. In the first place, it is related to the soul which it modifies, *i.e.*, it involves an act or process of the mind, and in the second place it is related to the thing known, in so far as it is objectively, *i.e.*, as a content of the mind, present to the mind. But these two relations do not entitle us to speak of two different existences. We are not entitled to hypostatise the idea in so far as it indicates the objective presence of an object to the mind, and regard it as something which has an existence prior to all perception, and which must act upon the mind in order to be perceived by it. In an act of knowledge there is only one thing to which existence may be ascribed, the modification, namely, of the mind, but this modification involves two relations, since I can have no perception which is not a perception of my mind as knowing and the perception of something which is known. Any attempt to represent the latter side of the relation involved in knowledge, the objective presence of an object to the mind, after the manner of local presence or on the analogy of an image or picture must be doomed to failure. For it is a relationship which is peculiar to the mind, that indeed which constitutes its very essence, and it cannot be expected that we should find analogous relations outside the mind. To be objectively in my mind is to be in my mind intelligibly. The idea of the sun, *e.g.*, is the sun in so far as it is known by my mind, in so far as it is in my mind, not formally as it is in the sky, but

objectively, *i.e.*, as a content of an act of knowledge. But it is absurd forthwith to interpret this notion of an intelligible sun as implying a real existing object standing between the mind and the real external sun, and rendering a knowledge of the latter for ever impossible.

The principle that the soul can only know by means of ideas in the sense of representative beings is based, Arnauld points out, on mere prejudice, retained from childhood. In the first place, it is assumed that whatever is known by the mind must be immediately present to it, and since the soul is immaterial, and on that account allows of no immediate union with bodies, it is argued that the objects of the mind cannot be bodies themselves, but must be spiritual things or ideas. But now the idea of *presence* in the sense implied in this argument is due to an unwarranted transference of the conditions which are assumed to limit the sense of vision to what we call the vision of the mind. In vision the object must be present to the eye, or at any rate there must be an image or reflection. The immediate presence of the object is a condition which cannot be fulfilled in the case of mental vision, for the soul is regarded as immaterial, or else it is looked upon as a subtle matter enclosed within bodies from which it cannot come out, and to which objects cannot be joined. The Schoolmen therefore found it necessary to have recourse to the second analogy furnished by visual apprehension, and it was therefore maintained that we do not see bodies, but merely their images, and the only difficulty was to determine the nature of these "êtres représentatifs." This is precisely the assumption which Malebranche makes when he argues that the soul cannot leave the body and search the skies for objects, or when he says that an idea is that which is the immediate object of the mind and most intimately united to it. Malebranche ought to have known that the analogy of an image is wholly misleading, for the mind does not see the image on the retina at all, and is never directly



aware of it. Further, the question of distance is wholly irrelevant, for even if the soul could leave the body and come into immediate contact with the sun, the immense journey would have been undertaken in vain, since, even if it came as near to the sun as to its own body, it could only see an intelligible sun. No doubt the object of our perception must be present to the mind, but the word "present" is ambiguous, and both the Schoolmen and Malebranche have interpreted it after the analogy of local presence, but, in truth, it implies only *objective presence*, i.e. presence in the mind as an object known. An intelligible sun is nothing but the material sun as it is in the understanding of him who knows, "*secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente*," in the language of St. Thomas, and this intelligible object must not be opposed to what it is in itself. In fact, from the principle that to be known an object must be present to mind, properly understood, nothing can be inferred, as it is really a bare tautology asserting that to know a thing it is necessary that the thing should be known.

In the second place, the supporters of the doctrine of Representative Perception had argued that bodies were too gross to be seen by the soul, and that the latter could only see what was like itself spiritual in nature. This might be an argument against attributing to bodies a capacity for knowledge. To know is, indeed, a perfection which bodies are too gross to possess. But to be knowable it is sufficient not to be an absolute nonentity. Only non-being is incapable of being known. To be knowable is a property inseparable from all that is or has being, and it is therefore mere prejudice to insist that the soul can only know ideas.

In the third place it was assumed that, whatever was incapable of acting upon the mind could not be known by it, and since material bodies were presumably incapable of thus acting upon the mind, it was inferred that only ideas of intelligible bodies were knowable. But this proof again is based upon an unjustifiable assumption. How do we know

that nothing can be known by the mind except that which can act upon it? To be known does not, on the face of it, involve an active faculty, but rather a passive capacity of being known. To argue in this manner is as absurd as to argue that matter cannot be moved in itself and, therefore, there must be something else to be moved instead of it.

Again underlying the whole theory of Malebranche was the view, that not only were objects not capable of acting upon the soul, but that the soul was incapable of any activity of its own, being possessed only of a passive capacity of receiving ideas and inclinations. Yet, argues Arnauld, it may be proved, on Malebranche's own showing, that the soul is not purely passive. He admits that the soul is capable of willing different things by turning, in the direction it wishes, the general impression towards the good which it receives from God. But volitions are modifications of the soul. If then it can initiate them, why should it not be able to initiate perceptions? Malebranche admits that the faculties of volition and perception must not be regarded as entities distinct from the soul, but merely as different ways in which its simple essence expresses itself; but if that be so, the admission that it is active in regard to one of its faculties involves the admission that it is in its nature active. Further, the mind can only determine the general impression to the good towards a particular good, if it knows that good. Consequently the power which the will has to determine its inclinations necessarily carries with it the power to direct the understanding towards any object it pleases. Elsewhere Arnauld points out that it is true that it is no explanation of knowledge to say that the mind has a faculty of knowing, and that it is certainly a mistake to regard faculties as entities distinct from the soul. At the same time he insists that it is as unreasonable to ask why the soul can think, as to ask why extension is divisible, since the capacity of thought and divisibility constitute the nature or formal cause respectively of mind and extension.

Despite his protestations, therefore, Malebranche has based his entire theory upon a vague and confused principle leading us to a mysterious realm of intelligible ideas of which nothing can be said, not a whit superior to the occult forces or substantial forms whose aid the Schoolmen invoked. Further, the theory does not even accomplish its object; Malebranche's aim was to explain how the soul which is immaterial could know objects which are material, but he concludes his investigation by telling us that we do not know material objects at all, but only ideas. This is on a par with the procedure of a man who, setting out to reconcile Providence with freedom of will, finishes off by denying freedom altogether.

In yet another respect Malebranche's own arguments may be brought against himself. He had insisted that God acted always in the simplest manner possible, but the doctrine of representative perception ascribed to God a circuitious procedure totally incompatible with the "simplicity of ways." To know a body A my soul must become intimately united with an idea B. There must, therefore, be a modification of the soul, through which it becomes aware of B. There must then take place another act of the soul, whereby through B it becomes mediately aware of A. Is it not infinitely more simple, Arnauld argues, for God, who having placed the soul amidst a world of bodies must have desired that it should be capable of knowing them, to give the soul the faculty or power of knowing objects directly, instead of having recourse to these mysterious representative beings which can easily be proved to be hypostatised abstractions and vain chimeras?

Malebranche's replies to Arnauld, whether in the *Réponse au Livre des idées* or in his numerous other writings, do not as much as touch the main points of Arnauld's criticism. He seems, indeed, to have found it impossible to realise that the point attacked was above all the whole need of representative ideas, taking it for granted, as has been remarked above, that direct knowledge was impossible. Thus in the *Réponse*, Ch. 5, he

urges that Arnauld's view of knowledge amounts in fact to one of the alternative solutions enumerated by him, viz., that the soul has within itself all the perfections which it sees in bodies. This, of course, is not at all what Arnauld meant. The soul, he had insisted, does not have ideas of all things prior to all perception. It is merely endowed by God with the faculty of knowing things, but this does not mean that it has their perfections in it. On the contrary, Arnauld's whole point was that, to know a thing, the soul need neither be that thing nor be intimately united with it, and, once this is grasped, the assumed need of representative beings, whether in our own souls or in the mind of God, is seen to be without foundation. Most writers on the controversy between Arnauld and Malebranche have admitted the justice of the criticisms raised by the former. They have, however, objected that he did not succeed in working out a consistent theory of knowledge of his own, and that he overlooked the difficulties lying in the way of such a theory. Thus, *e.g.*, Cassirer\* argues that Arnauld ignored the difference or contrast between the original and unformed sense impressions and the *idea* or concept of an object. Objects are for Arnauld, it is maintained, assured, and given immediately in sensation, and he does not trouble to inquire into the objective value of the manifold data of consciousness. Malebranche, on the other hand, wishes to trace the way in which, from the first indications of the senses, we arrive at an "intelligible" object, the object that is of the exact sciences. It was, above all, the science of optics which furnished the most assured proof of the difference between perceptions and objects, since this science shows us what must be done to the sensations of sight before we can arrive at the knowledge of the real properties of objects, properties which consist in spatial relations alone. An object is for Malebranche, Cassirer argues,

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\* *Erkenntnisproblem*, I, p. 581.

the result of a gradual objectification of given impressions—a procedure which eventually leads simply and solely to the mathematical determinations contained in the idea of extension, and thus it comes to be seen that an object is nothing but intelligible extension itself, which, under certain physiological conditions, comes to be clothed with certain subjective qualities.

It is in other words the distinction between secondary and primary qualities which on this view stands in the way of a theory of direct perception. Spatial relations known by means of ideas are taken to be the only real qualities of objects, whereas the secondary qualities known through sensations are subjective and afford proof of the unreliability and, indeed, impossibility of direct perception. This line of criticism is worked out more fully by Pillon.\* Arnauld's mistake lies, he argues, in thinking that, granting immediate perception, there is no longer any problem. Had he noted the distinction between primary and secondary qualities he would have seen that perception is a complex fact, and must, indeed, be mediate since even if ideas are proved not to be a *tertium quid* standing between the object and the mind, yet it is only through feelings or sensations that our mind can reach external reality; in other words, we still have to pass from an inner datum to an external object.

As against this criticism, it ought, I think, to be noted, in the first place, that Arnauld never undertook to give a complete theory of knowledge of his own. Indeed, as it is well known, the polemic about ideas had its origin in a purely theological discussion about the "Traité de la nature et de la grace." "Il m'a semblé," says Arnauld, "que je ne pouvais mieux faire que de commencer par là à lui montrer qu'il a plus de sujet qu'il ne pense de ce defier de certaines speculations, afin de le disposer par cette experience sensible à

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\* "L'Évolution de l'Idéalisme au dix-huitième siècle," *Année phil.*, 1893.

chercher plutôt l'intelligence des mystères de la grace dans les lumières des saints que dans ses propres pensées," from which it plainly appears that his purpose was mainly to offer destructive criticism—a purpose which he undoubtedly fulfilled. In the second place, his own theory, in so far as he works it out at all, is capable of an interpretation which does not render itself liable to the above criticism. It is not at all clear that he regarded an object as immediately given in sensation. This only appears to be his meaning, because he always speaks of perception as giving us knowledge of objects; but by perception he really means, as he says in definition 9, all that the mind conceives whether by simple apprehension, judgment or reasoning. And that he does not regard objects as simply given in sensation is clear from the illustration which he uses in this connexion. The idea which I have, he says, of the sun and the stars as really existing is no less an idea though it may be obtained by a process of reasoning, than if it were obtained without reasoning. His point is that in knowledge there is not involved any *tertium quid* having an existence of its own, any elements *given* to us by the objects themselves in the form of species or by God in the form of ideas which have to undergo a mysterious process of objectification before we can obtain knowledge of the real. Rather is it the case that God, having made the soul essentially active, *i.e.*, capable of the process of perception, the soul is able to know objects directly or to have objects in the mind "intelligibly." The having objects in the mind does not mean that we know objects immediately by sensation alone. There is no virtue Arnauld might have urged in any such immediacy, and a process essentially akin to judgment may be involved in arriving at the "intelligible" object. But this intelligible object must not be contrasted with or opposed to the real object. An intelligible sun is nothing but the material sun according as it is in the understanding of him who knows it, *secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente*. The advance of knowledge or the growth of the sciences may

correct our first notions of objects, but there is no reason to suppose that in knowledge we are not dealing with the objects themselves, and that we need a process of objectifying the subjective.

There is, however, one point in regard to which Arnauld was inconsistent. He regarded secondary qualities as subjective, whereas a rigorous development of the argument essential to his criticism leads to a recognition of their objective character. It should, on the other hand, be remembered that his view as to secondary qualities was quite natural in a strict follower of Descartes and of the principles of optics as developed in the *Dioptric*. However this may be, it is difficult to see why the writers above referred to, emphasize the distinction between primary and secondary qualities in this connexion. It is, I think, clear, as subsequent thinking has shown, that if the arguments adduced against the external reality of secondary qualities be accepted, they can with equal force be urged against the external reality of primary qualities.

There is one other point upon which some writers on the controversy between Malebranche and Arnauld are inclined to agree with the former, the doctrine, viz., of a vision of the eternal truths and of the immutable order in God. Arnauld is no less emphatic in denying a vision of truths in God than he had been when dealing with a vision of bodies in intelligible extension; and even apart from the polemic with Malebranche he fought hard against this position. Thus, he wrote a Latin treatise entitled *Dissertatio bipartita* to combat this view as advocated in the thesis of the Louvain Theologian, Huygens, called *De veritate æterna, de sapientia et justitia æterna*, and later he wrote a fuller criticism in his *Règles du bon sens*,\* a work which is of considerable importance for a thorough understanding of Arnauld's philosophical position. Here abandoning, as he says, St. Augustine for St. Thomas, Arnauld

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\* *Œuvres*, Tome XL.

attacks the whole theory of a vision of things in God. He is aware, as he points out in the beginning of his *Book of Ideas*, that in one sense the notion of Being, as a whole, is involved in all knowledge, but he protests against the "bizarre" interpretation of this notion, given by the "New Philosophy." He begins by drawing attention to the ambiguity of the word "in" God. By seeing one thing in another, we may mean that the knowledge of the one gives us a knowledge of the other; the knowledge of A may carry with it the knowledge of B, *tamquam in objecto cognito*, and in this case we must know A better than B. On the other hand, we may mean that it is the efficient cause of our knowledge of B, as he puts it, *causaliter non vero objectivo*, e.g., we are said to see corpuscles *in* a microscope. In this case the use of the word "in" is misleading, we ought rather to say "by means of." If now, as is clear, the advocates of the theory of a vision of things in God use the word as indicating a knowledge *tamquam in objecto cognito*, then our knowledge of God ought to be clearer than our knowledge of anything else, and whenever we see a truth we ought to be aware that we are seeing it in God. To obviate this difficulty, it had been replied that knowledge of this fact is really implicitly in our mind, though it is not brought forward into clear consciousness. Arnauld, however, will have none of the doctrine of unconscious states of mind or of "pensées imperceptibles." The essence of thought is consciousness, and to speak of an unconscious thought is meaningless. Those who support the doctrine are confusing differences of degree with differences in kind, in other words, they take what is least perceptible for imperceptible.

Further, what need is there for this doctrine of a vision of things in God? No doubt God is the cause of all our knowledge "causaliter," but for that very reason there is no need for Him to be our light "objectivo." The divine understanding can see all truths, but God has also enabled the finite mind to see truths, since He had endowed it with the faculty of forming



ideas, of connecting or combining them in various ways, and of drawing inferences. The truths of the science are universal, eternal, and immutable, and there is also in the case of morality a law and a justice which are binding upon all. But their universality and eternity does not entitle us to hypostatise them, in other words, they must not be regarded as "êtres subsistants." "When we say a thing is always and everywhere we may mean two things. In the first place we may mean that it has positive existence in all places and throughout all time, and in this sense only God can be said to be everywhere. On the other hand, we may mean that it is not attached to any place or time, and in this sense every universal is *ubique et semper*. It is in this sense that the truth that  $2+3=5$  is *ubique et semper*, and from this it does not follow that it is in God." The same thought is developed in another place with regard to eternity. There are, he says, two kinds of eternity. In one sense the term is applicable to a being who has existence always, without beginning or end, and no one but God is eternal in this sense. On the other hand, "on appelle éternelles beaucoup des choses qui ne sont que dans notre esprit qui ne sont point des êtres subsistantes à cause seulement qu'elles ne sont pas attachées à aucun temps. Ce que signifient les termes généraux, l'homme en général, le cercle en général, etc., sont des choses éternelles en cette manière impropre."

These remarks are not directed against Malebranche, but they clearly apply to his theory just as much as to that of Huygens. They enable us, moreover, to deal with a difficulty insisted upon by Malebranche against the view that the act of perception and the idea perceived are aspects of one and the same fact, and are not to be regarded as separate entities. This, Malebranche urges, cannot be the case, for the act of perception is always concrete and particular whilst the idea is or may be universal. It is clear that this objection is plausible only because Malebranche regards ideas as belonging

to the world of existence. If, however, it is recognised that ideas are parts of the system of truth and not of existence there is no reason why an act which is concrete and particular should not be able to apprehend that which is not particular.

Malebranche's main merit lies, perhaps, in the fact that he deepened the distinction between essence and existence, and laid stress on the universality and necessity of truth and its independence of the arbitrary will of God. On the other hand, he tends to hypostatise the essences themselves and to make them into veritable existences, and he does not realise that when this is done they can no longer serve the purpose of accounting for the universality of knowledge, since, as existences, they cannot but be particulars themselves. In other words, if the essences or ideas are regarded as having a transcendental existence, they are open to the charge which Aristotle brought against Plato's Ideas of affording no explanation, on the one hand, of the possibility and nature of knowledge, and, on the other hand, of the existence of the world of particulars.

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## VIII.—FACT AND TRUTH.

By C. LLOYD MORGAN.

PURPOSE here to deal with fact and truth in their so-called objective aspect. I leave therefore on one side, so far as is possible, the facts and truths which are distinctively characteristic of enjoyment as such; not because I regard them as less important, but because those of contemplation—non-mental in Mr. Alexander's sense of this term—are, I believe, in large measure, susceptible of independent treatment. This means that the modes of relatedness which I shall consider are common to what I shall call the sphere of knowledge, as content of mind, and the sphere of the knowable, as extra-mental, and have, as I believe, their primary home in the latter sphere. In brief, I have here chiefly in view the basal attitude of the man of science towards fact and truth.

On this understanding, what do we mean by a fact? Without prejudice to further developments as we proceed, we may start with *facts of appearance*, using the word "appearance" for that with which we are, at any given time and place, directly acquainted in sensory experience. Such facts may be first-hand for each one of us; or they may be second-hand, when we rely on the testimony of others. This reliance on testimony is, of course, rather a complex affair. We must be content, here, to assume that others have first-hand acquaintance with facts of appearance, and that their statements may be taken as a satisfactory substitute for the outcome of one's own first-hand acquaintance with these facts.

Now, such statements describe the facts of appearance, and we will assume that they describe them accurately. They

take the form "that a cloud is in the sky," "that the pendulum is swinging," "that the river flows," and so forth, in each case referring to what appears at some particular time and place. Of course the "that" belongs to the statement, and not to the fact itself to which the statement refers. But the "that" of the statement always refers to some relational feature of the fact as actually observed. *The facts referred to always comprise relations.* Relations are included in what here at the outset, and throughout, I mean, and I think the man of science means, by a fact. Statements of fact, then refer, for example, to the relation of this thing to that, of this part of a thing to that part; to some change in relation of this thing to that, or of this part of a thing to other parts. Whenever we have immediate experience of those facts with which, in a sense, we start in daily life and in science, we are directly acquainted not only with things, as we call them, but with things, or part of things, in their relatedness. No doubt facts of appearance may be pretty complex. What I wish to emphasise is that even the very simplest and most naïve of them always has a relational structure, and that it is this relational structure which is of the very essence of fact as I understand it.

Statements strictly limited to facts of appearance, such as those presented to vision, are seldom inaccurate so far as they go. If I say that those railway lines, as I see them from this bridge, are convergent, or that yonder stick partially immersed in water appears bent, or that those distant mountains look blue: so long as my statements have reference to facts of appearance, I am merely expressing, in language brought down as near as possible to the level of perception, what I actually see. But my companion, a well-instructed schoolboy, may inform me that, as a matter of fact, the railway lines are not convergent but parallel; that the stick that looks bent is a straight stick; that the mountains are not, in fact blue, but only appear to be blue under present atmospheric conditions.

We seem here already to be in a dilemma. Some facts of appearance are seemingly not facts—presumably in some rather different sense of the word; and what, in this sense, are really facts are not in all cases facts of appearance. Let us follow up, just sufficiently for our purpose, the stick partially immersed in water. If we say that it looks bent, we simply state a fact of appearance. But if we assert that, when wholly immersed or when wholly in air, it will still look bent, we are going beyond the fact of appearance as directly given. We are making an assertion, not with regard to this fact of appearance, but with regard to some other such fact; and with that fact it is found on trial not to tally. The locus of error lies in reference to facts of appearance which we expect, and not to facts then and there directly experienced. We have not, however, escaped from our dilemma. It is, let us assume, the same stick; and yet now it appears to be bent, and now it looks straight. Is it, as a matter of fact, a straight stick or a bent one? We shall at once reply that it is, in fact, a straight stick, and only looks bent from certain points of view, under certain conditions of partial immersion. The bent stick, as fact of appearance, is somehow taken as a sign that "in fact" the stick is not bent.

The dilemma of the bent stick is, of course, only an example, chosen because of its comparative unfamiliarity in daily experience, of one with which we are faced every hour of our lives in quite ordinary cases. The match-box on my table is, as a matter of fact, a rectangular body; but so far as facts of appearance go, from my present position I am not directly acquainted with it thus. What I actually see is not seen as rectangular. In daily life the dilemma, which faces us continually with regard to pretty nearly all we see around us, seldom troubles us. We have acquired knowledge of what we call the real shapes and other properties of things. The outcome of our experience is that, from the facts of appearance with which we are directly acquainted, we pass, without realising that we are so passing, to certain other facts which we

may call the *facts of knowledge*; and when we describe any familiar thing, in its relational structure, we describe it in terms of the facts of knowledge, and not, as a rule, in terms of the facts of appearance. So readily do we pass from the one to the other, that it is difficult to persuade some people that they do not actually see the match-box as rectangular. Most of us who are not artists draw the surface of a round table, seen across the room, rounder than it looks; and we are somewhat surprised when our rapidly sketched outline is compared with a photograph from the same point of view. We paint the distant field of grass a good deal greener than it looks. It is part of the business of the artist faithfully to represent the facts of appearance as such; and in this part of their business not all who claim to be artists are successful.

We have, therefore, to consider the relations of facts of appearance to facts of knowledge. It may, perhaps, be said that there is no valid distinction; for quite obviously *all* facts of appearance are facts for knowledge. Taking this as it stands, we may agree. But it has introduced, by substituting one little word for another, a further distinction between facts *for* knowledge and facts *of* knowledge. Let us deal, briefly, with the case of the penny as presented to vision. From one specially selected point of view the head-surface looks round and, as we say, is round. Here the fact of appearance and the fact of knowledge are, let us assume, in perfect accord. What it looks, that it is. From an indefinite number of other points of view the head-surface looks oval, while it still is round. Here the many different facts of appearance are also facts *for* knowledge; but none of them is what I here call the fact *of* knowledge that the penny is round. We need not here proceed to circumvent our penny so as to get edge-views and views of its tail-surface, nor need we consider the facts of appearance in respect of the relation of surfaces. There are an indefinite number of facts of appearance, each of which is a fact for knowledge. Among these are two "rounds" where

there is, for monocular vision, approximately perfect accord with facts of knowledge, and an indefinite number of edge-views where there is some measure of accord. Combining all the facts of knowledge we say that, so far as shape is concerned, the penny is thus and thus—describing it. If we call the result thus reached knowledge by acquaintance, we must, I think, regard this expression as elliptic for knowledge of fact based on, and in close touch with, the accordant facts of appearance with which we are directly acquainted.

Now, in this penny affair, at any rate two, and, perhaps, only two, selected facts of appearance are, for human perception, in approximately perfect accord with the facts of knowledge. But why speak of perfect *accord*? Why not frankly say that these selected facts of appearance *are* the facts of knowledge? I see no valid reason why we should not do so. None the less, so long as no denial of identity is suggested, it is at least convenient to speak of accordance. All the facts of appearance when the head-surface is visible may be grouped in a number of zones of nearer and nearer accordance, centering round the one fact of appearance which, on similar terms, is in perfect accord with the one fact of knowledge. Description in such terms seems at any rate serviceable.

But a further distinction is needed. It is commonly said that the facts with which we start in daily life and in science are those with which we are directly acquainted, that is to say facts of appearance. It may, therefore, seem pretty clear that these, which are also facts for knowledge, are primary, and that the facts of knowledge are secondary, derived from them if only by selection. This may well be valid in essence from the psychological point of view. Yet there is another point of view, from which it may be urged that what this purports to show is the mode of genesis of knowledge of fact within the domain of knowledge. If the roundness of the penny is a fact of knowledge in its reference to what the penny really is, that roundness in fact is prior to any appearance from this, that, or

the other point of view, including that of so-called perfect accordance. We surely do not make the penny round by coming to know by psychological process, however direct or however devious, that it is round. There seems here to be some little interplay between knowledge of fact and fact of knowledge. I seek to render this further distinction explicit by speaking of the fact of knowledge as that which belongs to the domain of knowledge, and of the *knowable fact* as that which belongs to the penny.

We pass, then, to the existence of a knowable penny. And here I must be content boldly to lay bare certain assumptions which may enable us to proceed on our way. Since, however, pennies did not exist till there were people to have knowledge of them, I will substitute something else—say, moonshine. I assume, then, (1) that there is real moonshine as something *knowable*; (2) that this moonshine has continuous existence independently of any *actual knower*; and (3) that being actually known does not make any difference in the nature of moonshine *as knowable*. Moonshine was existent as knowable, though, perhaps, not yet as known, long ages before any sentient being appeared on the surface of the earth. The question whether moonshine may not exist "in itself" in some other guise than that which is knowable, I must leave to those whom it may interest. As knowable, this moonshine is out there streaming through the heavens; but there is also much reflected moonshine in our own minds. In what serious sense?

The answer to this question introduces the ideal factors of knowledge—its recollected or anticipated facts, and so forth. Thus far we have regarded the fact of knowledge as *accordant* with the selected fact of appearance; it is also *correspondent* to the knowable fact. Correspondence in this sense holds between the known and the knowable. But we may know that the penny is round when we see it as oval, or when we see it not at all. Have we, then, in this case, too, a fact of knowledge? It would surely be contrary to usage to give a negative



reply to this question. It seems, then, that we must widen the connotation of "fact of knowledge" so as to include, not only presented facts when we are in actual touch with the knowable, but also represented facts or ideal facts—still on the distinct understanding that, in either case, they are particular.

Permit me now to put the matter figuratively thus. There are two spheres as parts—but distinguishable parts—of reality, the sphere of knowledge and the sphere of the knowable. On the surface of the knowable sphere there are myriads of knowable facts; on the surface of the sphere of knowledge are the facts which are known. As contemplated, these are, in Mr. Alexander's phrase, non-mental, and hence, in my figure, on the surface of the sphere. They are content of knowledge, as Berkeley would say, "by way of idea."

Now, the sphere of someone's knowledge is, let us suppose, in contact with the correspondent sphere of the knowable, and some one given fact of knowledge, accordant with a fact of appearance, is then and there a point of contact of the two spheres. It is, of course, as relational in structure, not in all strictness a *point* of contact, but near enough for the purpose of my figure. Since, then, radii of the two spheres to the point of contact give one continuous straight line, there is accordance and correspondence with identity of direction. The knowable fact on the one sphere, and the fact of knowledge by acquaintance on the other sphere, are correspondent and accordant *on the same right line*. We are here seeing and knowing straight on to that which is knowable. But the knowable sphere has an indefinite number of radii reaching the surface at an indefinite number of factual points. These points are the knowable facts. For only one of these, however, is there, at any given moment of sensory experience, right-line continuance with a radius of the sphere of someone's knowledge. This gives, in each case, the fact, not only as knowable, but as then and there known by acquaintance. Facts of knowledge, on their many radii, include, however, not

only presented facts of right-line correspondence and accordance, but also imaginal or ideal facts with possible correspondence, *reached by suitably rolling the one sphere on the other, so as to get right-line contact.*

Let us go back to the penny business. I spoke of the oval views of its head-surface as facts *for* knowledge, and I spoke of the one, full, round, head-surface view, as the one fact of appearance which is accordant with the fact *of* knowledge that it is round. And I have, since, spoken of this fact of knowledge as correspondent to the knowable fact. How, then, may the relation of any given fact of oval appearance which is a fact for knowledge, to the fact of round appearance, which is accordant with the fact of knowledge, be expressed in terms of our spheres? May we not put it thus: that to get from the fact for knowledge—the non-accordant appearance—to the fact of knowledge—the accordant appearance—just so much rolling of the spheres, and in such and such a direction, is required to reach right-line contact? That seems to indicate the kind of process which occurs. And the correlation of facts for knowledge with facts of knowledge may, I think, always be expressed in terms of rolling. Yet surely, it may be said, we are in actual contact with the knowable penny-surface from the oval points of view no less than from that which gives the accordant and correspondent round. Yes, assuredly. But these ovals are not in that one right line which we get when we look out from the centre of knowledge right on to the knowable as it is. They are non-radial lines from points within the sphere of knowledge which are non-central. They give an angle and not a straight line at the point of contact. And I suppose it will be admitted that we do take skew-views of the knowable, and not seldom mistake them for right-line views.

A few words of *résumé*. We started with facts of appearance because we had to start somewhere, and that seemed as convenient a point of departure as any other. The fact of

appearance was taken as itself relational in structure. All that followed depends on the presence of inter-factual relations. We sought to trace them to their original home. We winnowed out from the multiplicity of facts *for* knowledge thus presented certain facts *of* knowledge which have a privileged status, and we spoke of a fact of knowledge as accordant with a privileged fact of appearance without denying that accordance may merge in identity. We then further distinguished between "the sphere of knowledge" and "the sphere of the knowable"—a fact of knowledge as an item of content on the sphere of knowledge was said to be correspondent to a knowable fact, when the radii of the two spheres in contact are in the same right line. And here again correspondence may merge in identity—the difference between knowable fact and fact of knowledge being a difference in context. The relation between any knowable fact on a non-contact radius of the sphere of the knowable, and any imagined fact on a non-contact radius of the sphere of knowledge, is given in practical determination by the nature and amount of rolling of the spheres requisite to establish right-line contact. And right-line contact is that of direct acquaintance when the knowable and that which is then and there factually known are one.

Let us now follow up my figure of the two spheres a little further. Suppose that, on some autumn evening, the distant field on yonder hill-slope looks bluer than it really is, or than it is in fact, as we say with our prevalent emphasis on the fact of knowledge. Are we then in right-line contact with the knowable as it is? Clearly not. The fact of appearance is not accordant with the fact of knowledge, nor correspondent to the knowable fact. But it may, perhaps, be said that we are in right-line contact with the field *as knowable under these conditions*. Is not that, however, tantamount to saying that there is no valid distinction between facts *for* knowledge and facts *of* knowledge? If we introduce the qualifying phrase "under

these conditions," does not every fact for knowledge become a fact of knowledge? No doubt in a sense it does. And the sense in which it does is this. When any appearance is a fact for knowledge it is always something more than a pure appearance. It is a fact of appearance which has significance for knowledge. If it be not known as non-accordant we cannot play the game. And as knowledge progresses the conditions which render it non-accordant are also known; known, too, is just what is required to give accordance. The conditions themselves take rank as facts of knowledge. Following as far as we can the usage of common speech, it seems therefore that our aim is to get *from* facts for knowledge under these known conditions (which must be knowable) *to* those facts of knowledge the characteristic feature of which is that these conditions are removed, or, if that be impossible, ideally allowed for. In terms of our figure this is effected by rolling the spheres to, or as near as possible to, right-line contact.

Granting, then, that to get from the fact of appearance—a blue-green field out there—to the green field, as "a fact of knowledge through direct acquaintance," we must allow for the knowable atmospheric conditions—what about the field as given when we are close by? Are we then in what I have termed right-line contact? In a sense, I take it, we are. We are up against the sensible quality of the knowable object. But it may be urged that in a sense we are not. What we are really up against is electromagnetic oscillations of a certain assignable frequency. For the physicist these are the knowable facts, though they may not be directly perceivable by us. In the former sense we accept the green as a fact of knowledge under the conditions of normal vision. In the latter sense we seek an answer to the question, What is knowably there when the conditions imposed upon normal perception by its irremovable retino-cerebral spectacles are allowed for, and when certain specific *qualia* of enjoyment are disregarded? I shall here resist the temptation to be drawn into the controversy

over so-called secondary qualities. As a matter of pious opinion, I regard the sensory quality green (and indeed every sensory quality *sensu stricto*) as a *quale* of enjoyment referred outwards to the knowable object along the line from which awareness proceeds. As all sensory qualities have the reflected *qualia* of sensory enjoyment, and as all facts of appearance owe their *sic esse* for perception—but not, I conceive, the *esse* of their relational structure (with which I am here concerned)—to such reflection from enjoyment, the knowable world gets its basal sensory *values* in relation to enjoyment. And if it be said by some that this involves a reversion to the heresy of “internal relations,” so be it. All this is, however, another story. It seems a not unreasonable view that perceptually we are in right-line contact with the field as green for human vision, while perceptually we are not, and cannot be, in right-line contact with electromagnetic oscillations; but that, for some conceivable Maxwell’s demon within intellectual call, though the sensible quality green would be perhaps too coarse for his specially differentiated powers of perception, the electromagnetic oscillations would not improbably be a matter of right-line contact. Yet if, in these rather different fashions, our sphere of knowledge may be regarded as actually or ideally in right-line contact with the sphere of the knowable, now in one way and now in the other, it is, I think, unquestionable that this way is quite definitely correlated with that way; and I regard it as doubtful whether, as we are constituted, we can know the facts both ways at the same moment—though “the same moment” is somewhat ambiguous. What I mean is that, if the fact of knowledge that the field is green is in right-line focus, the electromagnetic business is a sort of marginal fringe, and *vice versa*. On these grounds I should say that just a little rolling of the spheres is always required to get from the one to the other.

I have done my best, in what has so far been said, to keep truth out of the picture. But truths, of a sort, have been

lurking in the background all the while. Every particular fact I have given has, I feel sure, been taken as illustrating some general truth. What I said of the penny, the partially immersed stick, the green field, has in each case, I suppose, been accepted as holding good for any such coin, any straight stick, any green field. When we substitute "any" for "this" we pass from the particular to the universal; and we pass, as I hold, from fact to truth. No doubt we have a habit of speaking of certain well-established truths as facts. We should probably call it a fact that calcite exhibits rhombohedral cleavage. Yet may we not regard this as an elliptical expression for: This is a truth which is exemplified by facts as instances thereof?

As I have used the word—and as I venture to suggest the word should consistently be used—fact is always particular, always a "this" or "that" dateable and placeable. Itself of relational structure, it is always in relation to a wider and more comprehensive structure. It is always of the perceivable order; and if not actually perceivable by us, it is still, if I may so phrase it, conceivably perceivable by a percipient freed from the limitations of human perception. But owing to the enormous amount of repetition in the total fact-structure of the knowable world—repetition both in time and place; repetition in varying measure of purity, but still repetition—truths, as well as facts of knowledge, enter into the structure of the sphere of knowledge. Within *that* sphere truth emerges with repetition of experience of facts in the knowable world and forms a structural link between the facts thus experienced. Hereditary dispositions—so differently interpreted among us—provide in some way for progressive development of knowledge-structure correspondent to the pre-existent structure in the knowable sphere. To revert then to the crystal of calcite. There is structural connexion—knowable but only partially known—between any one of the hundreds of forms which this mineral assumes, and the cleavage form which is observable when certain things happen to it. In any particular case, the

cleavage form developed or partially developed is just an observable fact. Yet this observable fact is an instance of knowable truth as constitutive of the structure of the sphere of the knowable.

By an instance, I here mean a fact of appearance, accordant with a fact of knowledge, in right-line contact with the knowable. But the trouble is that there are some truths that have no instances in this sense. Take the truth that the earth rotates on its axis and has been doing so at any time, say, in the last few million years, and wherever it chanced to be in its orbit. Where are the instances? We can neither see nor feel the rotation of the earth. And yet we should say that there are numberless facts with which we *are* acquainted that may be adduced *in support of* this truth. Such facts (those observed in connexion with Foucault's pendulum, for example) are, however, facts from which the truth may be inferred, not facts which, in the sense I here intend, are instances of the truth. I wish, therefore, to distinguish *facts as instances* from *facts in support*. There is a crowd of facts in support of the electromagnetic hypothesis, and some of these were deduced from it, and were predicted before they were observed. Yet never a one is, for us, an instance of the truth. They might be, perhaps, for a Maxwell's demon; but not for us mere mortals.

Now, in the present state of scientific knowledge, the observed knowledge-facts, whether as instances or in support, are set in an intricately organised network of generalisations for which at least some claim for truth is entered. And experiment or observation gives, not isolated facts, but trains of facts on relational lines, and always in significant relation to other lines in the network. Remembering this, let us take an illustrative example of the way in which the rather complicated business works. The discovery of Neptune will serve my purpose sufficiently well. The story (I follow Herschel) is a familiar one. Uranus showed certain perturbations, for which the known influence of Jupiter and Saturn did not

suffice to account. From these, Adams and Leverrier, independently, inferred the existence of a planet hitherto unknown (but all the time knowable), and calculated its orbit. The orbit thus calculated was, so to speak, inscribed on the sphere of knowledge. But, so far, there was no factual right-line contact. Leverrier communicated his results to Galle at Berlin; and on the following night (September 23, 1846) Galle saw Neptune in the field of his telescope within a degree of the position assigned by Leverrier. What he actually saw was a spot of light of the eighth magnitude; that this little spot was, probably, Leverrier's planet was wholly a matter of the context of truth-significance in the meshwork of astronomical knowledge. Now, inscribed on the periphery of the sphere of knowledge, and accurately recorded on Bermiker's chart, were all those spots of light for astronomical interpretation, in respect of which right-line contact had already been established. This spot of light was not recorded. Still a further fact in support of its planetary nature was required. On the following night it was observed that this spot had changed its position in relation to other spots. Hence, in the light of a fairly consistent body of astronomical truth, the spot was interpreted as a planet in the knowable world, the orbit of which Leverrier had already inscribed on the sphere of knowledge. And, as further facts came in, it was found that when the orbital line inscribed by Leverrier on the sphere of knowledge was rolled in contact with the orbit of the new planet on the sphere of the knowable, there was pretty close correspondence. The Adams-Challis story runs nearly parallel; but it seems that Challis did not possess a Bermiker's chart.

Suppose, now, one is looking through a fixed low-power telescope, suitably directed. One expects, let us say, to see the moon. Inscribed on the sphere of knowledge is the apparent course of the moon in the heavens. One cannot yet actually see her; but one pictures her drawing nearer and nearer to the field of the telescope. Now she enters, sails across in full view,



disappears, and one pictures her beyond the limits of actual vision, proceeding onwards. Here there is actual rolling contact so long as the moon is visible. Yet beyond the limits of vision through the telescope there is ideal rolling contact of the moon's image, sliding on the sphere of knowledge, and the moon herself sliding on the sphere of the knowable. And if one had sufficient knowledge of astronomical truth, one could pass from the facts *for* knowledge—the facts of observation—to the facts *of* knowledge—so much moon's proper motion in the heavens, and so much apparent motion due to the earth's rotation on its axis. *But during actual rolling contact the facts of knowledge in the one sphere and the knowable facts in the other sphere, are then and there the very same facts save for context.* How far I am here quite at one with James I cannot stay to consider.\*

Take as a further example of sphere-rolling, the procedure of the embryologist. The development of the embryo chick has been studied with great care; and a vast number of facts, set in a framework of organised truth, have been inscribed on the surface of the sphere of knowledge. How then do we test what has, so far, been inscribed? By an appeal to observed facts in the light of repetition. But any such fact is particular and related in time within the sequence. An embryologist tells us, or we find it recorded, that such and such structures, representing such and such phases in the sequence of events, will be visible, say, at the close of the third day of incubation. We roll the sphere of knowledge to the position of right-line contact with the knowable embryo. We open the egg and examine the developing chick. If we find that the fact of knowledge on the one sphere is substantially identical with knowable fact on the other sphere, we claim that our knowledge is true in so far as what is recorded for any chick is then and there substantiated by direct acquaintance with this particular instance.

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\* Cf. *Radical Empiricism*, p. 13.

Whether we take, as example, astronomical truth, or embryological truth, we have, then, something more than the passage, or leap if you will, from "this" and "that," and "the other," to "any." We have an organised system with not only factual points where right-line contact may be established, but also interconnecting relations which justify the use of the word "organised." We must, therefore, picture the factual points of right-line contact as connected by relational threads; *and these relational threads are the guiding lines for the rolling of the spheres.* If the relations in the sphere of knowledge are such as to guide aright the rolling of the spheres from one point of right-line contact to another, our system of knowledge is, at any rate, so far serviceable; and this is one sense in which it may be said to be true.

This brings us up against a question in the answer to which it seems difficult to secure agreement. Is there, as I here claim, truth in the knowable world, quite irrespective of whether it has anything correspondent in the sphere of existing knowledge? The answer of the man of science, if I read it aright, is quite distinctly, Yes. Ask the physicist, the chemist, the physiologist—ask any representative man of science—where truth lives and has its home awaiting discovery, and he will say it is out there in that which it is his special business to interpret. Even those who hold that factual contact does not give the real objects, but only "the images we substitute for the real objects which Nature will hide for ever from our eyes"—even they assure us that "the true relations between these real objects are the only reality we can attain, and the sole condition is that the same relations shall exist between these real objects as between the images we are forced to put in their place."\* But then the man of science is told, by William James for example, that "Truth is a relation . . . of conceptual parts of our experience to sensational parts."†

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\* Poincaré, *Science and Hypothesis*, Eng. Trans., p. 161.

† *Meaning of Truth*, p. 82.

"Theoretic truth thus dwells *within* the mind, being the accord of some of its processes and objects with other processes and objects."\*

I suppose we should all agree that truth belongs in some way to reality, and, of course, the sphere of knowledge is itself part of reality. Does truth obtain also in the rest of reality? In other words, is there truth in that part of reality to which the researches of the man of science have reference? Now James says of "the pragmatist way of seeing things," that "it owes its being to the breakdown which the last fifty years have brought about in the older notions of scientific truth."† In these more enlightened days, "the notion that even the truest formula may be a human device and not a literal transcript has dawned upon us."‡ Are we, then, to understand that the outcome of scientific progress in the last half-century has forced us to confess that the older view, according to which there is truth in the structure of the knowable world, must be abandoned? Not so do I read it. There are certain empirical truths which are susceptible of verification by an appeal to experimental facts—to direct observation which affords instances of these truths. But does such a truth—the law of falling bodies may serve as an example—furnish a literal transcript? Is it not, for science, rather of the nature of a continuous curve to which is attached a mathematical expression? Unquestionably, in the economy of scientific thought, this curve does *stand for* the truth in question, and we may freely admit that the curve itself is a device and not a literal transcript. Now, on this curve any relevant fact, as instance of the truth, is represented by just a little bit of the curve. And I think that James himself would have conceded that the fact itself, for which this little part of the curve stands, *is*, very nearly, at least, a literal transcript, in the

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 98.

† *Ibid.*, p. 57.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

sense that it is an instance of the truth, and is knowable by acquaintance. I suggest, then, that when we have an empirical truth, verifiable by *instances* of right-line contact, that truth in the sphere of knowledge may be regarded as identical with, a literal transcript of, a truth in the sphere of the knowable.

There is, however, a sense in which it may be said that, even in the case of empirical laws, the fact as instance may not be *quite* a literal transcript. For the law, as formulated, has this much of convention—that it is stated in terms of an ideal exactness which goes beyond the limits of experimental accuracy. As an ideal construction in the sphere of knowledge, we make the curve which stands for the law, perfectly continuous and smooth; but we cannot prove that what it stands for in the knowable is correspondent with this full ideal exactness. All we can say is that there is correspondence within the limits of our closest scrutiny. Hence, we may admit that, though the instance presents no discrepancy with the knowable truth, of which it is an instance, still it may not be quite a literal transcript. In such cases the man of science assumes that it is, until someone shows that it is not.

But when we pass to the claim that, say, the kinetic theory of gases expresses not only a consistently organised system in the sphere of knowledge, but one which approaches identity with the structure of the knowable, it is questionable whether that claim can be established. Grant that it is *supported* by correlated facts of right-line contact; nay, grant that from the kinetic hypothesis such facts may be deduced; are there any facts by which it can be *instanced*? It deals with molecular transactions which lie wholly beyond the range of our direct perception. If it be urged by physicists of robust faith that they would be perceived by a Maxwell's demon, one can only say: No doubt they would, if the kinetic hypothesis reveals the true structure of the knowable. That, however, is just what has to be established; and a hypothetical demon does not help us. Until it is established, all we can say of the kinetic hypothesis

is that it looks very much as if it may reveal the true structure of the knowable sphere. Yet surely, it may here be urged, in admitting that the kinetic hypothesis is supported by correlated facts, experimentally verified, one is admitting that it so guides the rolling of the sphere of knowledge on the sphere of the knowable as to reach points of right-line contact. What more does one want? The pragmatist perhaps wants nothing more, or, at any rate is convinced that this is all we can get. Assume, then, that it is all we can get in the case of many of the hypotheses of modern science, of which I have taken the kinetic theory of gases as a type. Does that show that, beyond the reach of these conventional hypotheses, there is *no* truth-structure of the knowable world to be gotten, *if* only we could get it? I think that the man of science, while he admits that the hypothetical connexions which give consistency to much of our knowledge are conventional, is none the less convinced that there is a truth-structure of the Universe, and in the light of this conviction will steadily pursue his quest.

Enough has now been said in this connexion to indicate the point of view I here advocate. From that point of view there is (1) truth in the structure of the knowable world, the world whose fluent process the man of science seeks to interpret. And here, of course, there is no shadow of error. This truth in the knowable world may not yet be known—perhaps may never be known by us; but it is there all the same. Then there is (2) truth in the structure of the sphere of knowledge, and perhaps its leading characteristic is consistency. Anything contradictory therein betokens one kind of error. But, no matter how self-consistent a scheme of knowledge may be, the truth-connexions within such a scheme may not correspond to the truth-structure of the knowable—or they may. Hence we have, under (3), truth as correspondence of the structure in the sphere of knowledge to the structure of the knowable sphere. For omniscience this correspondence would merge in flowing identity, every

progressive change in the one sphere being at one with the progressive change in the other sphere. For mere mortals this, however, is not so. And that is where another kind of error comes in.

In terms of my figure a test of what I should much prefer to call the instrumental value of knowledge rather than a test of truth—though such it may also be—is what I have spoken of as the rolling of the spheres. The Ptolemaic system of astronomy was of great instrumental value, and not only seemed to be, but was, amply justified by its results. Epicyclic ingenuity rendered sphere-rolling good enough in its day. But, as we now view the matter, this was rather a confirmation of the serviceableness of the Ptolemaic knowledge-scheme, than of its true correspondence to the structure of the knowable. And who is prepared to assert that *all* that is serviceable in modern scientific knowledge is true under the third heading distinguished above?

Now, it may perhaps be asked whether what has been said about truth-structure is not tantamount to asserting that truth is irretrievably static. There is, it may possibly be said, no room here for truth in the making,—*truth-structure* is something quite fixed and irrevocable. Well, at the close of a paper already long enough, all I can say is that this is just what I do *not* mean. The knowable world is ever-fluent. What I do mean is—if the expression be not paradoxical—the structure of continuously flowing process. If the word “structure” be ill-chosen—choose at discretion a better word. In any case, leave ample room for change. As for truth in the making, let us distinguish. Quite obviously, truth-consistency in the sphere of knowledge is progressively in the making; so, too, is truth as correspondence. But truth in the knowable world—is that, too, in the making? Unquestionably it is: that is at the back of what we mean by development and evolution. And not only is the truth-structure of the knowable in the making, knowable facts are also ceaselessly

in the making, as the world process forges forward. Furthermore, since we, too, are just parts of the knowable, and as parts are in effective relation to other parts, the developing structure of the knowable includes all that happens to us and all that happens through our instrumentality. But since both fact and truth are in the making, much that is being progressively made in the sphere of the knowable can have no place in the sphere of knowledge, the truth-structure of which depends on experience of the past. On the abundant repetition in the sphere of the knowable, truth-connexions in knowledge are dependent for their being. But in the sphere of the knowable the genuinely new falls outside the rubric of repetition. Hence at any given time there must always be much in the sphere of the knowable to which there is nothing as yet correspondent in the sphere of knowledge. Here again, therefore, as throughout, knowable fact and truth have a certain primacy over the facts and truths of human knowledge.

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## IX.—ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF VALUE.

By W. A. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE.

§ 1. I wish to examine a question which sooner or later presents itself as a preliminary to any study of Value, viz., the question of its relation to our consciousness. Is there anywhere to be found a criterion of it, *i.e.* any object of any other kind more immediately obvious to us, through which we can judge of it? If not, how is it apprehended, and its existence distinguished from its non-existence, genuine value from merely sham or supposed value, and so forth? The answer which I hope to make good is that there is no criterion of value, and that the various criteria offered us are either unenlightening or positively misleading: instead, we have of it and of its several forms a direct knowledge which, while unique, is also innate in every human soul, and therefore, while it does not admit, also does not require any guidance from any other form of experience—nay, which merely though sorely needs that the overgrowth of these other forms of experience be cleared away in order that it may shine through and reveal to us Value as it is.

§ 2. Of the *particular* forms of Value, it is generally admitted that any experience presupposes an intuition, unique and incommunicable through any appeal to any other kind of experience, and therefore present innately or not at all.

Thus any attempt to communicate such an intuition to anyone naturally devoid of it is admittedly bound to fail. A man unable to discriminate between "true" and "false," "real" and "imaginary"—an idiot, in short—is unteachable unless or until (as we rightly put it) his mind "clears itself." A man with no "sense" of beauty cannot be given it by any explanation in



terms of any other character (*e.g.* "symmetry") that may belong to a good work of art.\* There is plenty of symmetry about any barrack, or the dullest academic figure, even in an Anglican chant or one of Stainer's hymn-tunes.

All attempts, again, to define any of these particular values are obviously forced to be and to remain misleading or else to become circular and uninformative. The pragmatist definition of truth as that which "works," or "fulfils a purpose," is false if we do not, and uninformative if we do, specify that purpose as the purpose of finding out the truth. The attempt, again, to define moral goodness in terms either of the material advantages or the "pleasures" it brings or of the sacrifices it demands fares no better. For the only material advantages or pleasures which are distinctive of morality are those which under the circumstances can be enjoyed "honourably" or conformably to the demands of morality;† while not every sacrifice of the right hand or plucking out of the right eye belongs to, or indicates, moral goodness, but only that which is needful to "everlasting life." And the definitions which (*e.g.*) M. Arnold or M. Salomon Reinach offer us of religion are, as Mr. Webb has sufficiently shown,‡ in the same condemnation. All alike when unrestricted are materially false, while when restricted they are formally circular. They are driven to presuppose in us, and appeal to as already existent, the knowledge which they profess to impart.

While, however, in regard to each particular value or valued experience, attempts to define and find external criteria have generally given way to the recognition of an immediate intuition, in regard to the conception of Good or Value *in general*, the old unsound mode of thought still prevails.

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\* Cf. Plato, *Hippias minor*, for the breakdown of attempts to find criteria of Beauty, *e.g.*, its practical usefulness, or capacity to promote goodness or to please the eye or ear.

† Vide Plato, *Meno*, 79 b-c, *Gorgias*, 499 b ff.

‡ C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relation of God and Man*, pp. 4-5.

Definitions and criteria are still offered us, and the doctrine thus preached upon the housetops by some still seems to haunt the ears and echo itself in the occasional phrases of others, however discordant it be with their general position, to the great confusion of the whole subject. It is therefore in relation to Value generally that I wish to raise the question, making appeal to this or that particular kind of value merely by way of illustration.

§ 3. It is natural and convenient to start with the distinction which we commonly draw in our experience of good, as in any other form of experience, between its "objective" and "subjective" factors. There is, on the one hand, a "value" or "goodness" belonging to the things or activities which we call good, and this we regard as "objective," residing in the things or activities themselves, whether or not recognised or appreciated by us. We name it by the terms "good," "true," "beautiful," "noble," and the like. On the other hand, we recognise as in relation to it certain states or activities in ourselves which, while other than the valued object, are aroused in us by it, and these we count "subjective": they belong to us rather than to the object (be it a thing or an activity) which we value. Thus before experience of such an object we "desire" it; in the experience we "enjoy" it; in either form have an "interest" in it, and it is this "interest" which we express when we call the object arousing it by such terms as "nice," "jolly," "agreeable," "pleasant," "delightful," etc. The same contrast between the objective quality of the thing or activity and the subjective "interest" it arouses in us, we sometimes express by calling the first "value in itself" and the second "value for us." (Thinking or Art, says the dolt or the Philistine, may be "all very well in itself," but I have no "interest" in it; it is "no good to me.") Or, again, we are moved to "choose" a thing for its value, or to pass "judgments" upon its value or upon the feelings, etc., that it arouses in us.

Now, the common resort of those who seek a criterion,

whereby to define or estimate "good," is to one or another of these subjective states or activities. These, it is held, are matters of immediate experience, in regard to which we can make relatively little mistake, and they are, moreover, a faithful witness on whom we may confidently rely, for it is claimed by all as a universal property, and by the extremists (*e.g.*, Ehrenfels) as the very essence and definition, of Value to stir up one or another of these. In proportion, then, as one or another is aroused, is the degree of the value.

Accordingly, we may conveniently divide our enquiry in relation to this antithesis of the subjective and objective factors in our experience of Value. (1) Of the various subjective states or activities which the presence of a valued object awakens in us, can any properly serve as a criterion of the existence and degree of value in it? If not, (2) does Value then belong "objectively"—in the abstract sense, *i.e.*, independently of all relation to consciousness? Or (3) is it essential to its being to arouse affections or activities of the kind in some consciousness—if not in ours, at least in that of some "ideal critic," and, if so, will the subjective affections of such an ideal critic serve to us weaker brethren as a criterion? Or, if none of these views is tenable, (4) how, then, do we apprehend it?

#### I. SUBJECTIVE THEORIES OF VALUE.

§ 4. *Varieties of Subjective Theory.*—Subjective theories of Value differ accordingly as different subjective attitudes are taken as the criterion or basis of definition. Thus (*a*) either of the two states described above as "interest" may be taken, *i.e.*, (i) we may, with Ehrenfels, take the antecedent *desire* of the valued object or activity (the "pleasure which we derive from the vivid idea of it"), and define the valuable simply as "what we desire or, were we not already assured of its existence, should desire,"\* and value itself as "desirability" or "a

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\* C. v. Ehrenfels, *System der Werththeorie*, Part I, ch. 4, § 18.

relation between an object and a subject such that a state of greater pleasure is caused in the subject by the idea of the object's existence than by the idea of its non-existence."\* Or (ii) we may take the other form of interest, viz., the *enjoyment* or *pleasure* we derive not from contemplating the idea of the thing, but from the actual realisation or possession of it, *e.g.*, what has value for us, when hungry, is not "the bare imagination of a feast," but the actual presence and consumption of one; and its value (on this view) depends on the pleasure we derive from it. Such (*e.g.*) is Hume's definition;† objects are "denominated good," because they produce an "agreeable sensation," either "immediately by the original structure of our organs" (*e.g.*, moderate warmth), or indirectly "by being naturally conformable to passion" (*e.g.*, the punishment of an adversary, by gratifying revenge). Or (*b*) we may appeal not to our interest but to our *judgment*; and this too in different ways. We may make the existence of Value dependent on a judgment respecting its existence, as when Hamlet says: "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so,"‡ or when W. James says, "A thing is important if anyone thinks it important";§ or the judgment selected as a criterion may refer not to the value itself but to something else, *e.g.*, to some feeling which the valued object arouses in us; as when the hedonist, driven into a corner, defines Value as "the power to cause in us a pleasure that we judge to be noble"; or when Brentano defines it as that which evokes "a love characterised as" (*i.e.*, judged to be) "right."||

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\* *Ibid.*, § 21. Even Dr. Bosanquet seems to lend countenance to this kind of criterion when he approves as "proper" the remark that "our interest in the content of an idea is itself what is meant by value" (*Individuality and Value*, p. 296); although elsewhere he plainly rejects the view that "value" consists in "being wanted" (*ib.*, pp. 70, 137).

† *Dissertation on Passions*, § 1.

‡ *Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 2, 257.

§ *Psychology*, II, 675 n.

|| *On the Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, § 23.

Or we may appeal with the Puritan to our moral judgment, and define Value as "what we judge it right to choose." Or, again, (c) we may neglect all judgment as well as all desire or feeling, and look simply to actual *choice*: "You can tell what has value for anybody, not by what he says, but by what he does."

All such suggestions, I maintain, are delusive.

§ 5. *General Criticism of Subjective Theories.*—The first requisite to an understanding of "good," as it seems to me, is to dispose of these subjective theories. For into this Serbonian bog of personal desires, enjoyments, preferences, and so forth, into which the subjectivist would lure us, there disappears the whole possibility of any philosophical theory of Value, as distinct from a mere history or record of valuations. The conception of the "valuable" as opposed to the merely "valued," of real or genuine as distinct from merely supposed values, of right as opposed to merely actual valuations—in short, any doctrine of Value that can claim truth or universality—can find in that morass no standing ground at all. Nothing appears except a troubled sea of contrasted feelings and conflicting opinions. We must, therefore, try to dig down at once to the underground stores of unsubstantial illusion whence the Jack-o-Lantern of the subjectivist is supplied, and, if we can, explode them once and for all.

These may seem to be harsh words to use of a school of thinkers whose chief concern seems to be to keep everybody in countenance, and who certainly contrive (like their logical ally, the humanist) to find a home somewhere within their doctrine for almost every kind of human infirmity and error. But the question is, Can we in honesty say otherwise? I invite attention to the fate of C. von Ehrenfels—certainly the ablest and most thorough representative of this way of thought whom I have yet read.

Ehrenfels\* makes all value in anything conditional upon

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\* *System der Werttheorie*, Part I, ch. 4.

our desires, *i.e.*, upon our feelings of pleasure and pain as we contemplate the idea of the thing's existence or non-existence. But no sooner has he established his definition than on the very next page\* he realises what has come to him, and struggles wildly to regain his feet. For any theory of values is bound to strive after an "assured, more or less comprehensive, universality": and whereon, amid feelings of pleasure and pain and the valuations based on them, varying as they do from individual to individual and from moment to moment, can any claim to such universality be founded? In despair he clutches at the idea of an *average* value (Normalwert): extract this from a long enough series of such feelings and valuations, and we can then say that it is constantly and properly ascribed to the thing, despite the "actual" ups and downs of our feelings about it. Thus a child's attitude to sweets may "actually" vary from eager desire to abhorrence, according as its surfeit of them is shortly expected or but lately over: still, the balance is distinctly on the side of the desire, for the fit of desire "always returns with periodical regularity,"† and lasts longer than its opposite: and this justifies the unqualified statement "sweets are desired by or have value for the child." On the other hand, we can likewise say that "a cold plunge is bad for X, when very hot," although he may invariably find the desire of it at such times irresistible, because the subsequent pneumonia and repentance or aversion‡ last "disproportionately longer," and the balance is thus definitely swung in this case away from the side of desire to that of abhorrence. Thus in the "average" valuation Ehrenfels hopes to find a constant or true "value" whereby to correct our actual valuation of any given moment.

Unfortunately, however, it evidently has in fact no philosophical justification at all. It is struck, and therefore is

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\* *Ib.*, p. 66, and ch. 5 *passim*.

† *Ib.*, p. 67.

‡ "The reaction of pain at the impressions that accompany pneumonia" (*ib.*, p. 68).

valid, not, as Ehrenfels claims,\* universally for the valuations of a given age or sex or nation, much less (as he also claims) for all human valuations, but only for those of the unrecorded but strictly limited number of individuals examined. Its basis is sheer enumeration, not insight: it belongs to history, not to philosophy. It could hope at best to tell us how things have been valued, not how they should be: it can record valuations only; it cannot itself evaluate them.

"But why," it may be asked, "cannot a constant average properly serve as a criterion of the validity of fluctuating opinion?" The answer is that the suggestion assumes a miracle, viz., that the mean opinion of any and every possible collection of opinions, true and untrue, on any given subject, will always be the truth; and for this there appears no warrant, whether the opinions averaged be those of one individual, or of a crowd, or even of the world. *Securus indicat orbis terrarum*, no doubt: but why assume that *securus = recte*? The suggestion of such an equivalence, of which one instance at any rate is classical,† is well enough when thrown out as a smoke-screen by a renegade theologian to cover his retreat, but it is a "dialectical" device in the sinister sense of the word.

On the other hand, strain at such assumptions (and I for one could not swallow them), and the "average value" of Ehrenfels is left as it began, a mere historic statement of how a certain person or group of persons has valued things, differing from a full catalogue of the various valuations only in this, that even as a statement of them it is plainly false. To make good this last remark, let us take an example. Suppose, for argument's sake, that the pleasure of a child at the idea of sweets =  $+50^{\circ}$  on the pleasure-pain scale, and that the disgust aroused by that idea after a surfeit =  $-50^{\circ}$ ; suppose, moreover, that the first feeling regularly lasts twice as long as the second. Then the method of averages invites us to say as a general proposition

\* *Ib.*, pp. 68-9.

† Newman, *Apologia pro vita sua*, ch. 3.

that "sweets have for the child a constant value of  $+25^{\circ}$ " (*i.e.*, of pleasure), when plainly the facts are (1) that they have no constant value for it at all, and (2) that the value quoted is not even usually attributed by the child to the thing, but only during a tiny fraction of its life, *viz.*, for a brief moment during its descent into, and recovery from, nausea. In short the attempt, starting from a subjective basis, to rise by this method above the point of view of a mere chronicle, gives us not a better or more philosophical point of view, but simply a false chronicle.\*

*Criticism of Special Forms of Subjective Criterion.*

(A) *Interest (Desire and Enjoyment).*

§ 6. The plausibility of these criteria rests partly on simple confusion of issues, partly on two assumptions concerning them, neither of which seems to be sound.

1. *A Psychological Confusion.*—The suggestion that good is essentially dependent on the state of our desires or our powers of enjoyment is seductive enough, because at first, and often for long, our judgments of value do work in harness to these. We are first awakened to the existence of value in things by the double consciousness of wants in ourselves and the satisfaction of those wants by certain things. Growing experience brings with it a long and lengthening list of "goods," miscellaneous enough, but all alike deemed to be good because we find them to satisfy a want, or at least, when present, to be enjoyed. Accordingly, unless we are careful to distinguish the question of history and origin from that of validity, we readily jump to the conclusion that primitive man is right in his criterion, and that the original meaning he gives to "good" is also its proper meaning, *viz.*, "that which satisfies desire" or "that which we enjoy." But clearly this is a different doctrine, requiring to be shown on its own merits.

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\* Ehrenfels himself allows that the "state of feeling" so represented is "fictitious" (pp. 67, 69).



§7. (ii) *Two Doubtful Assumptions*.—Those who will fully admit the last criticism may still claim for desires and enjoyments, considered as criteria of value, the two great advantages (a) that they are matters of immediate experience, and so of certainty: (b) that they are more or less exactly measurable—at least that we have in them immensely more clear and measurable objects than the value of anything, looked at directly, can ever hope to be. I question both these assumptions.

(a) “Of course I know that I desire this or that, and that I enjoy it.” Well, but do you *really* desire or enjoy it? And once our candid but tactless friend raises this question, awkward misgivings begin to arise. The spectre of that other problem begins to haunt our feast—is it *worthy* to be desired or enjoyed? In short, Is it good? Has it value? And so far from this question being answerable by appeal to the certainty that at least we desire and enjoy the object, this very certainty may (and, if we mean business by ourselves, probably will) become problematical until we have somehow rid our minds of the spectre. We can do this, no doubt, in different ways: we may lightly forget it, or we may face it and lay it. But in either case it is absurd to pretend that desire and enjoyment are the charm that lays it, when neither will come to us until it is laid. Clearly the assurance that the object is “good” is (as Aristotle would say) “naturally prior and more certain” than the assurance that we desire and enjoy it.

§8. (b) The vexed question of how far the intensity of psychical states like desire or enjoyment can be measured would require a whole paper (or a series of papers) to itself. I can only put very briefly the difficulty I feel in accepting what is *prima facie* the common-sense view that they can. Only of the visible (*e.g.* of lengths or distances) is exact measurement immediately possible. In regard to the amounts or intensities of other sensible objects or mental states we

can sometimes immediately find a zero, and estimate equalities. Thus, of sound (*i.e.*, not of the motions which the physicist measures but of the object heard) we have a natural though, from the physicist's point of view, fluctuating zero in the silence wherein nothing is heard, and two sounds can be pronounced "equal" when the ear can detect no difference of intensity. So of heat (again, not of the motions measured by the physicist but of the object felt) the natural, though again (to the physicist) fluctuating, zero is the temperature of the hand; while two things are said to emit equal quantities of heat when the hand can feel no difference. Of desire again we can find a zero in a state of complete apathy, and an equality when we stand between two desired objects, like the proverbial donkey, wholly unable to determine between them. But if we want any more exact measurement than this of the intensities of these and other invisible objects—time, motion, forces of nature, psychic states, etc.—then we can get it only *mediately*, through some related visible phenomenon and subject to certain assumptions as to the relation between them. Thus in the measurement of "temperature" or "heat" (in the physicist's sense of the term) we directly measure only the distance travelled by the end of a column of some expansible body between two arbitrarily selected extremes, divided into an equally arbitrary number (say 80 or 100 or 212) of units or degrees: and it is assumed (*e.g.*) that the amount of heat required to move the end of the column through one degree is the same for any degree of that scale.\* Now, so far as the physical objects go, I am not here concerned either to cry up the amount of practical gain or to cry down the amount of intellectual gain derivable from trying to believe the conclusions, or rather to follow the kaleidoscope of dissolving views—for there is no conclusion nor prospect of conclusion to them—which the physicist or chemist most

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\* There are, of course, other assumptions, which serve as a check, but into these I need not here enter.

inappropriately commends to us as "science." I want only to question whether the degrees or intensities of objects of sensations (*e.g.*, of heat or sound, pleasures and pains), or of such mental states as desire, are in any way measurable by observations or assumptions of the kind. These, dependent as they are on individual sensibilities, notoriously lack any regular relation to their physical conditions, even supposing these to be exactly measurable: *e.g.*, one man hears a loud noise where another hears nothing. And they are, further, not amenable to any but the roughest comparison in the case of any two individuals.\* No doubt there are limits of variation: we should refuse to believe that the extraction of a very loose tooth hurt a man very much, however loud he might yell, or that the extraction of a firmly-rooted one was anything but very painful, however stoically endured. Yet nowhere is generalisation more precarious: nothing is more irritating to A than to be told (*e.g.*) that an extraction under a so-called anæsthetic cannot possibly hurt him because it does not hurt B: and it is the more irritating because there is no adequate retort but physical violence: no rational measurement or test of rival estimates is possible. The assumptions here all break down: those which at a certain level seem reliable enough lead presently into what, if not palpably false, is at any rate no longer obvious. It is (*e.g.*) plausible to say that an object whose temperature is  $20^{\circ}$  higher than that of the hand feels double as warm as one only  $10^{\circ}$  higher: but is there any difference between the heat felt in objects at  $1,000^{\circ}$  and  $2,000^{\circ}$  respectively? Again, it is plausible, if two trumpets separately yield equal sounds, to call their combined sound double as intense: but it is not plausible that 2,000 trumpets yield double the sound of 1,000. for with the dulling

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\* The authority of Plato (*Rep.* ix) seems at first sight against this, in making the philosopher the judge of the comparative worth of both his own and others' pleasures. But the estimate there is qualitative rather than quantitative.

of the ear the distinction of sounds becomes progressively less; and clearly there will come a point, if only  $n$  be a sufficiently high number, when  $n$  trumpets will yield not  $n$  times the sound of one, but no sound at all, because the ear drum will burst. Further, in the case of desires and enjoyments, pleasures and pains, hopes and fears, etc., there is not even any visible or other exactly measurable indication to which appeal could even plausibly be made, for there is no guarantee that any two men are equally demonstrative of such states, or even the same man on two different occasions. Attempts like those of the ancient Spartans, or the Tory M.P.'s a few years ago, to prove intensity of conviction by obstreperous noise may be well or ill in politics, as the proposal to measure the degree of a man's boredom by the width of his gape may be in melodrama; but the suggestion has, I think, yet to be made which can show even a *prima facie* case for consideration by science or philosophy. In fact, whatever obscurity may attach to an expression like "six times as good" seems to me to attach no less to an expression such as "six times as keen a desire or enjoyment."

§ 9. But even supposing both the above claims to be made good, and desires and enjoyments to be more easy both to recognise and to measure than values, still the central question remains, Does the one measurement give any clue to the other? Is the degree of desire or enjoyment any index to the value of what is desired or enjoyed?

We may admit at once a fragment of truth in the theory we are considering—a fragment the exaggeration of which perhaps gives rise to the whole illusion. The satisfaction of a desire, like the enjoyment of anything whether previously desired or not, is always in itself a good thing. The gratification even of the so-called unnatural or perverted desires (*e.g.*, the desire of Phalaris to eat a child)\* is in itself good,

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\* Aristotle, *Eth. N.*, vii, 5, § 7, 1149 a, 14.

however wrong it may be morally, and however great the evils of other kinds to which it may give rise. The pain of unsatisfied desire, like all pain, is in itself evil, and its riddance is good. If this be challenged, it is enough to ask, If you could, without pain, attain a result in which pain is normally involved, would you not think it "better" so to attain it? So the enjoyment of anything is in itself a good, and the value of anything in itself valuable is enhanced if it be enjoyed or satisfy a previous desire. More good (*e.g.*) is derived from a concert ticket if used by someone who can enjoy the concert or wished to hear it, than if used by someone who is and remains indifferent to it; and the phase of virtue shown by the enthusiast who has a touch of the crusader spirit in him, and hungers and thirsts after righteousness, is better than that of the Puritan who rigidly but dully plods away at his "duty for duty's sake." And to this *one* kind of good the criterion proposed is relevant enough. The value of a satisfaction is directly proportionate to the strength of the desire, *e.g.*, the "pleasure" to be found in intoxication is of greater value for a violent dipsomaniac than for a mild one: while, if so, then the means necessary to the desired gratification (themselves sometimes miscalled the "desired objects"), provided they be really effective in securing it, will possess a certain kind of value, viz., "economic value," or "usefulness."

§ 10. But to admit this is in no way to grant the subjectivist contention that either antecedent desires or enjoyments are essential to the existence of all value as such, and still less that the variations of them are a reliable index to the amount of value which anything may possess. Against this I will try to establish four propositions:—

(a) *Desire and Enjoyment are not the foundation of Value or even necessarily implied in it.*—To represent our desire of anything (as does Ehrenfels) as the primary or root fact, and the thing's value as the secondary or derivative fact, seems at least exactly to invert the natural order. For desire is of the

good, and if anything be desired it is so *sub specie boni*, because it is apprehended, or at least supposed, to be good.

Moreover, desire and its satisfaction are not even "inseparable accidents" of value, let alone essential to it. All satisfactions of desire may be good, but it does not follow that all things that are good are preceded by and satisfy desires for them, much less that they are therefore good because they do so. Plato\* (*e.g.*) admits concerning even pleasure—of which, if of any value, we should be inclined to say that it is universally desired—that the gap filled by the intellectual pleasures, which are highest in value, is a gap of which we are previously unconscious and which therefore gives rise to no pain or "desire" of anything to fill it. And the same is true of love or of religion. The shyness or "coyness" felt in a first experience of love, the fact that religious observance requires at first to be enjoined as a duty, is evidence of how little the intrusion of such complications into life may be antecedently desired: yet their value does not suffer therefrom.

What is here said of previous desire is equally true of enjoyment. The Puritan (*e.g.*) is a familiar enough type, hardened against the devil and all his works, but equally hardened against such fruits of the Spirit as "love" and "joy." We have indeed already rejected the Kantian doctrine that enjoyment, if admitted, would degrade the high virtue of such a character, but the doctrine is at least a forcible, if exaggerated, reminder that virtue of a high (though not, I should say, of the highest) order is well possible without it. Aristotle,† as his manner is, puts the matter in a nutshell:—"On many things we should set a value even if they brought no pleasure in their train, *e.g.* sight, memory, knowledge, habits of virtue; that of necessity pleasures do follow upon them makes no difference, for we should choose these things even though they yielded none."

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\* *Phileb.*, 51 a, *Timæus*, 65 a.

† *Eth. N.*, x, 8, § 12, 1174 a, 4-8.

The doctrine that interest in either form is necessary to value, or that its absence implies the absence of value, is belied by what are usually accepted as familiar facts of experience. Is not one of the chief obstacles to progress to be found in the fact that people so little appreciate and display so little interest in the things which are highest in value? Is it not the despair (*e.g.*) of the social worker that people so little desire even cleanliness, let alone godliness? The stories of Irishmen and their pigs are familiar; while from a nation which had no particular affection for the pig comes the well-known lament over an equal degradation in taste of another kind—"The prophets prophesy falsely . . . and my people love to have it so."\* The man who lacks interest in some good thing often thus tries to cast the shadow of his own indifference over the thing, and to disparage its worth in the phrase "It is no good to me"; but the reality to which the disparagement, like his shadow, properly belongs is not the thing but only his own obtuse, dense self.

" If she be not so to me,  
What care I how fair she be?"

What, indeed? But that is all there is to be said. The philosopher has no right to read into the poet's words a reflection, which the poet himself has wisely not made, and for which in any case his apathy gives no warrant, upon the looks of the lady.

§11. (*b*) *Degrees of Desire and Enjoyment, even when these occur, are no test of higher or lower Value.*—That there is one kind of good to which degrees of desire are strictly proportional—viz., the enjoyment to be found in the satisfaction of the desire—has already been illustrated by the case of the dipsomaniac. Yet degrees either of desire or of enjoyment are no criterion at all as between values of *different kinds*. Clearly

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\* *Jeremiah*, V, 31.

(*e.g.*) no degree of dipsomania will make a pleasure like that of intoxication to be really a higher good than science or art, even if these arouse little or no interest; and if any one attempts to say "it is at any rate worth more to me," the answer is that he is quite mistaken. It is possible—though even here the Puritan (*i.e.* the man to whom right-doing is the criterion of all value) would jump down our throats—that it is the best which he can attain; but that is only because, having taken to drink, he has put the better out of his reach; had he taken instead to philosophy or art or religion, he would, at least, have been in the way to achieve something better. So a man in love may be incapable of diverting his mind to anything else; and, if so, his remarks will doubtless all tend towards the form of variations on the theme *omnia vincit amor*. But he will not be right, as any sane person will tell him, and if he says "anyhow, it is most valuable to me," this means only (what no doubt is the fact) that, of the things he can enjoy or appreciate, he enjoys it most, and therefore *thinks* it most valuable. But the fallacy of the slide from "I desire" or "value" to "It is desirable" or "valuable" requires no elaborate proof.

This mistake also has its reverse side. If "good" consisted only in being desired or enjoyed, then "evil" would consist only in being detested and the source of misery, and as good would be proportionate to the strength of desire, so would the evil of anything be to the strength of this recoil. But is this so? Consider (*e.g.*) a disappointment, in a career or in love, or a bereavement or anything else against which we have struggled and prayed, and which, when it comes, may for the moment paralyse us with misery. In our haste we say that it "takes the whole value out of existence" or "is a supreme evil," and if anyone protests we add feebly "at any rate *for me*." Again, however, the answer, clear to any detached observer, is that it does not do anything of the sort at all, and therefore not "for me" nor for anybody. All that has happened is that



the stricken man is for the moment unbalanced and insane, in this sense: he is so vividly conscious of one aspect of the whole situation that he cannot see the situation as a whole, or its more central features: hence he judges, perhaps inevitably, but none the less erroneously, that with the loss of what he desired, all value, or at least the supreme value, of life is gone. Yet, surely, it is significant that always, if a man can retain enough reason to pull himself, or if his friends can pull him, over the immediate shock, and he can ever again take stock of the situation as a whole, he discards all such language and strikes out new paths towards the good that yet remains. Poetry, of course, is full of such recoils or recoveries from despair: and, if anyone objects that poetry is no guide to fact, there are abundant instances in history—the present war (*c.g.*) is full of them—where men have come on reflection to see that the evil they have endured was in no sense proportionate to the forerunning dread or immediate misery, but that all the while there shone through it, though unperceived at first, a more than compensating good.\* And it seems quite impossible to judge that the loss first *becomes* a gain when the misery of it turns to thankfulness—in other words, that the good and evil of things go up and down with either our desires and aversions or our appreciations and failures to appreciate.

Further, except in the single case mentioned above, degrees of desire or enjoyment are not proportionate to degrees even of *one and the same* kind of value. The zest or interest of any occupation *may*, of course, continue to grow with the range and value of the activity involved: but not uncommonly, if not usually, the heat of the first attack cools off. The interest with which we plunge into a book of 400 pages often begins to evaporate about p. 20 and has vanished by p. 100: thereafter

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\* Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. N.*, i, 10, § 12, 1109 b, 30, ὁμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν. I doubt, at any rate, whether many parents a year afterwards would wish (even without regard for public opinion) to see their sons back in the flesh, but struck off the roll of honour.

the reading of the book is a weariness of the flesh, until (say) p. 350 begins to spur our interest by the vision of the approaching end. We may not "enjoy" the book again till the second reading, if even then. But it would be absurd therefore to say that the value of the book or of our labour in reading it fluctuates likewise. The broadening of our horizon, the stimulus it gives to thought, have been uninterrupted: the truth-value of the book, if it be a good one, has been steadily and continuously apprehended, however unexciting the apprehension of it may have been. Or again, consider religion: empty pews hardly show an adequate appreciation of the value of acts of worship; but they are a very just nemesis upon the attempt to advertise that value in terms of the feelings or emotions it arouses.

§ 12. (c) *What is Desired or Enjoyed need not be intrinsically good at all.* — The contrary is sometimes held, and even Dr. Bosanquet seems to lend it some, albeit rather ambiguous, support in his admission that "every purpose no doubt implies a subjective value."\* A word therefore must be said in defence.

Enjoyment, or the satisfaction of desire, is, as we have admitted, itself always intrinsically good, although not necessarily a good of high rank: but it may quite easily itself be the *only* good element in a given situation. The object desired or enjoyed must, doubtless, have economic value, as the means necessary to that satisfaction: otherwise, *i.e.* intrinsically and by itself, it may well be evil through and through. In drunkenness (*e.g.*) we have thus a state of enjoyment attached to what, regarded in itself, is an utterly evil state. Again, suppose we were invited by some mischievous, upstart journalist to murder some distinguished statesman or soldier who has treated him with a proper contempt, how should the invitation be met? Not on the treacherous ground of any general rule

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\* *Individuality and Value*, p. 127.

against assassination ; for justifiable homicide is a well recognised category. The proper and sufficient answer would be, "I do not propose to do such a thing *just to please you*," *i.e.*, to bring about a situation which, however much the journalist may desire, or would enjoy it or may think it good, would, in fact, except for his enjoyment of it, be wholly evil. Moreover, supposing (as may very well be the case) that the desired object is such as not, in fact, to yield the satisfaction or enjoyment hoped, then even this residuum of value is gone from it.

In short, the "subjective value," which Dr. Bosanquet notes as implied in every "purpose," *i.e.* (I suppose) in every desired object, is no value at all of any kind whatever, but merely someone's *belief* (which may be quite illusory) that this object has value.

§13. (d) *Desire and Enjoyment, so far from being properly, are not always even actually used as criteria of Value.*—That the philosopher will reject them, if the foregoing criticisms be well founded, is obvious ; but in this the philosopher is by no means alone. Even the quite unphilosophic person often accepts his view of the values of things from someone else, when his own desires or power to enjoy would point him in quite another direction ; witness (*e.g.*) the attitude of any open-minded person towards a new movement in art, before it has taken hold of him. So, without relying on authority, he may trust his own judgment against what his own personal "tastes" or "interest" in things would lead him to suppose, *e.g.*, "I quite realise," he will say, "that Shakespeare and Beethoven are better art, but I like ragtime and melodrama better : they give me more pleasure," etc. Again, I do not see how the burglar can be said not to recognise, even with uncomfortable clearness, the moral virtue of the conscientious policeman ; yet he neither desires it, nor derives enjoyment from it. The Biblical story of Ahab and Micaiah\* again illustrates the

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\* *I Kings*, 22.

same point in regard to yet another kind of value. Ahab undeniably knew the value of the truth and of Micaiah's peculiar insight, for he angrily refused to be put off with any make-believe. But he hardly enjoyed Micaiah's news; at least he took a very odd way of showing it, if he did. And I suppose that most people have been at some time or other in a like predicament towards that most indispensable but irritating person, the candid friend.

(B) *Choice.*

§14. If then Desire and Enjoyment both fail us as essential or constitutive elements in value, does Choice serve us any better?

Certainly not actual or *de facto* choice. The whole "slavery of passion" consists obviously in this, that its victim cannot help actually choosing what he knows to be relatively or utterly worthless. *Vide meliora proboque: deteriora sequor.* Nor does an appeal to moral choice help us: it is not necessary to the goodness of anything that we choose it as our duty. In fact, evidently the question, "Is anything good or bad?" is a question for judgment: our practical choice is irrelevant.

(c) *Judgment.*

§15. (i) *Moral* judgment will not serve. A good thing, to be good, cannot any more require that I should judge it to be *right*, and be therefore good, than it can require that I should actually choose it as right. For this would involve either an objective conflict of duties,\* which is the negation of any duty at all, or else (if we reject this) a corresponding rejection of any competition or antagonism between "goods" at all: just as duty enjoins one course as right, and rules out all the rest

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\* I take the real meaning of this common phrase to be "a conflict of *opinions about duty.*" The man whose duty is to go and preach is *eo ipso* absolved from burying his father, and *vice versa*. To hold that he really has a duty to do both at once, when the two are incompatible, is to use words without meaning.

as wrong, so on this view what we judged our duty to bid us choose would alone be "good," and all else valueless.

But this, in the first place, would reduce moral choice itself to a helpless standstill. To say that all goodness depends on rightness makes it quite impossible to say what has either. If it is a matter of indifference to me where I land, I cannot be bound to sail in any direction rather than in any other. All possible courses are equally "right"; *i.e.*, none is "right" at all.

And, secondly, so far is what we judge to be our duty from being the sole good before us that it often is not even the thing of highest intrinsic worth. The essence of the self-sacrifice that duty demands is that we are called on not to resign what is no good at all (where would be the sacrifice in this?), nor even to resign what is a lesser good (this would be merely a good bargain), but it may be, to resign utterly and for ever what is intrinsically far better than anything we shall find along what we judge to be the path of duty.

(ii) Nor can the goodness of anything require that I should recognise it as *good*. Make goodness vary with our judgments about it, as do Hamlet and W. James in the passages already quoted,\* and we are obviously defining in a circle ("Value is that which belongs to anything to which you suppose it to belong"); and falsely as well, for it is obviously possible to be deluded about the values of things; witness the miser's delusion that gold is valuable for its own sake.

(iii) This circle is put off if we take as our criterion a judgment referring not directly to the value of the object, but to some quality of something else, such as a state or activity roused in us by it, as (*e.g.*) when the hedonist tries to save his pleasure-criterion with the proviso that the pleasure must be honourable. But is it avoided?

§ 16. I take as a test case Brentano's account of "good" as that for which we entertain a "love characterised as" (*i.e.*,

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\* P. 220, *supra*.

judged to be) "right."\* The views connected with his general division of mental phenomena into three classes:—

(1) "Ideas" (concrete sensuous impressions, and abstract conceptions).

(2) "Judgments," wherein to the bare "idea" or presentation of an object is added a relation to the object, either of "recognition" (belief) or "rejection."

(3) "Emotions," wherein to the simple presentation of an object is added a relation of "love" or "hate," which is explained to be a certain form of "pleasure" or "displeasure."

This last class ("emotions") is the miscellaneous "*voluntates sive affectus*" of Descartes' third Meditation. It is understood "in the widest sense of the term, from the simple form of *inclination* or *disinclination* in respect of the mere idea, to joy or sadness arising from conviction, and to the most complicated phenomena as to the *choice* of ends and means."† The phenomena, in fact, to which Brentano refers us as criteria of good, are the same phenomena (desire, enjoyment, and choice) whose fitness so to act has already been discussed. Only, instead of taking them in the lump, he directs attention especially to a certain character ("rightness") attaching to a certain relation ("love" or "hate") which these phenomena necessarily involve towards the object whose goodness is in question. For just as the "belief" which forms the distinctive relation in judgment may be either right or wrong, so may the "love," which is the distinctive relation in "emotion."‡ Our judgments are often "blind," mere records of early prejudices: so our loves may be simply "instinctive or habitual impulses."§ On the other hand, just as other judgments are "self-evident,"||

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\* *On the Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, § 23.

† *Op. cit.*, § 20, p. 14, italics mine. The references to pages here are to those of the English translation by C. Hague, published by Constable.

‡ §§ 26-27, pp. 17-20.

§ P. 18.

|| P. 17.

so other loves are "characterised as right." Again,\* as the difference in the case of the two judgments is not quantitative (intensity of belief), but qualitative ("clearness"), so too in the case of the two loves: "rightly loved" does not mean "more intensely loved." What exactly it does mean, Brentano is hard put to it to explain, for this "rightness" of love marks a class for which "language has no common name. † We can detect it, however, if we refer to the "phenomena of choice" or "acts of preference," and see (*i.e.* judge) whether the "act of preferring" the loved object has the "character of rightness." ‡ If so then our "love" (or "pleasure") will also be "right" and the object which evokes it will be "good." Thus the question "Is X good" or "better than Y?" must be answered by first asking, "Do I judge that the love (or pleasure) which enters into my emotion towards X is a right love?" and this in turn must be answered by first asking "Is the act of choosing X, or preferring X to Y, a right preference?"

§ 17. But alas! this criterion turns out, like the rest, in cases where it is available, to be circular, and in the rest to be unreliable, and indeed Brentano hardly tries to conceal its defects.

(1) *The proof of Goodness through an experience of right love or right preference, even where such experiences occur, is circular.*

The order of proof, as enunciated in §§ 29-30, is as follows:—"The act of preferring  $x$  is 'right': therefore 'our love of  $x$  is right': therefore ' $x$  is good.'"

But what is the "rightness" in our choice or preference? It cannot mean that our choice is "morally right," for reasons already given, and Brentano would be bound to subscribe to those reasons because he, too, frankly allows that we need *first*

\* §§ 29-30, pp. 21-23.

† § 27, p. 19.

‡ §§ 30-31, pp. 22-23.

to know what is good and "best among attainable ends," before we can hope to know what is morally right.\*

If, however, "right choice" does not mean choice of what is known to be morally right, what can it mean save choice of what is known to be "good"? But if so, then the very knowledge which was to be given us by the last step in the proof is presupposed before we can take the first step! Fortunately, there is no need to labour the point, because Brentano himself naïvely makes us a present of it: "Many might say, *and with a better right . . .*, that instead of our learning the preferability from the actual preferences, the preferences have the qualification of rightness because they already presume the recognition of the standard of preferability"†: and this "knowledge of the better," as he explains in a note (No. 36), is attained from the experience of "acts of pleasing and displeasing" (*i.e.* of love and hate) qualified as right. In short, the three terms—"right preference," "right love," "good object"—do not constitute, as originally proposed, a straight line of proof at all, but a circlet round which it is well to go, if we like, in that order, but still better to go in the order "Our love is right"; therefore "The object is good"; therefore "Our preference is right"!

It is worthy of remark that, despite his difficulties in expounding his criterion, Brentano still sticks to it that *some* criterion is necessary. The one point on the circle where he is reluctant to let us start is the direct apprehension that the object is good. Yet his own admissions, to which I next invite attention, compel us to start there or nowhere, seeing that admittedly we have, at least in certain cases, a knowledge that something is good without any lead from either criterion.

§ 18. (2) *Neither Criterion is necessary to the knowledge of Good.*—Brentano candidly confesses, "We have no guarantee that everything good will arouse in us a love with the

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\* § 17, p. 12.

† § 31, pp. 23-24, italics mine.



character of rightness";\* while again, as between two acts, we sometimes get no inner witness as to which it would be "right" to prefer, or that it would be right to prefer either:† in the case he instances "real measurements are impossible:" our "criterion fails us completely."

Now, if the criterion were sound, the proper inference would be that, since it fails completely to show us any "good" or "better" in the case, there cannot really be a "good" or "better" there at all. On the other hand, Brentano has precluded himself from this by admitting that a thing, though it causes no "right love," may yet be good; and then the only proper inference is that the criterion is unsound and unnecessary, since without its aid the goodness at least of some things is known to us.

What inference, then, does he in fact draw? Unable to take the first, and unwilling to take the second, he falls back on the regular device of the subjectivist at bay. He first tries to save the face of his criterion by saying that the "good" (or "better") is in this case non-existent, and then he tries to save his own face by adding (in effect) the familiar tag—"at least *for us*."‡ The simple English of this is (I submit) that there *is* a "good" or a "better" here, known to us as such; only Brentano's criterion is powerless to show it to us. If, therefore, we want to know what good is, and how known to us (and, in view of his admissions, to Brentano himself), we must look elsewhere than to the experience of a

\* § 27, *ad fin.* p. 21.

† § 32. On p. 26 he illustrates this by reference to the question, "Which is better, insight (knowledge) or noble love?" The idea that *any* act of unselfish love is "better than all scientific insight taken together," he rejects as "not merely doubtful, but utterly absurd"; on the other hand, Plato and Aristotle thought "quite unjustly" in supposing *θεωρία* to be in itself a higher good than *ἡθικὴ ἀρετή*. The criterion gives no result.

‡ §§ 27, 32 *fin.* pp. 21, 26. "So far as our knowledge and practical account of it go, the good" (or "the better") "is as good as non-existent."

"love," or an "act of preference, characterised as right." Suppose we, on the other hand, know this goodness directly, then we should have a ready explanation of the "rightness" whereby our love, or preference, is sometimes characterised: right love or preference would simply mean love or preference accompanied by a knowledge that what we love or prefer is good. Whether or no this be so, I do not for the moment argue; but at least we must abandon Brentano's central thesis that the order of experience lies the other way.

§19. *Summary.*—The subjective criteria of value above examined all seem to fail us. We cannot postulate the occurrence of any of these states or affections in ourselves as a condition, or use it as a test, of the value of anything. Not all desires, enjoyments, choices, etc., imply an intrinsic value in that which is desired, enjoyed or chosen, but only those that are "right": and this rightness is not even then the medium whereby we know their goodness, for we know objects as good even when we don't desire or enjoy or choose them thus "rightly," or even at all. The existence of good and our knowledge of it are thus clearly independent of any such subjective states.

## II. VALUE AS ABSTRACTLY OBJECTIVE.

§20. Can we then find refuge in precisely the opposite abstraction, and hold that value exists independently of all relation to consciousness, utterly unknown, directly or indirectly? Clearly an abstract objectivity of this kind, even could any clear meaning be attached to it, would not meet our need: for our problem is how value is known to us, and on this the unknown can throw no light. Moreover the idea of a value thus contained in itself is a familiar absurdity: "objectivity" is meaningless in that which is not an object. The value which concerns us must be a value apprehended by some mind, at least capable of being understood and rightly judged, however little A or B may understand or be aware of it.

And can we stop here? Can the value thus apprehended, however little it may interest us personally, be such as to awaken no emotional response in any consciousness? Can we drive a wedge between intelligence and feeling or will, and hold that what is an object for one is (in Brentano's phrase) "as good as non-existent" for the others?

At first sight it looks as if a different answer could be returned here for different kinds of value. In the case of "pleasure" or "beauty" such a restriction would be evidently outrageous. A pleasure trying not to be felt would be like the cow that tried not to be an animal; while in acknowledging things to be "beautiful" (and we have seen this to be possible even though they leave us "unmoved") we at least mean that they will be enjoyed by someone, whose taste (or faculty of enjoyment) is better educated than ours. Otherwise, the heart would be wrenched out of the term "beautiful" altogether; it would be reduced at best to a synonym of "symmetrical" or "formally balanced," to an indication of external features such as those measurable in painting or statuary with a foot rule, or in music with a stop-watch.

On the other hand, truth or knowledge may easily seem, at first sight at any rate, to be, in comparison, an unemotional, dry-as-dust affair, accessible even to the joyless individuals whose veins run (as it is said) not with blood but with cold tea. But does this distinction hold? A theory could in any case hardly be maintained unless someone were "interested" to maintain it, and found some satisfaction therein; while if we judge any theory to be true, we imply, surely, that it is such as to delight the heart, as well as to persuade the reason, of someone—of any person who without prejudice is seeking the truth—however much more we ourselves, like Ahab, might on other grounds desire or enjoy its being false. Else, as "beauty" would be reduced to formal symmetry, so would "truth" be reduced to formal consistency, *i.e.*, to something which on its own account (*i.e.*, except as an element in "truth") is of no value at all.

Still more clear is it, when we pass to the general term value or good, and say "truth is good" or "beauty is good," that the epithet is eviscerated unless we mean that these are things that at least some mind desires or enjoys, whether they interest us personally or not. Even of what is not intrinsically but only economically good ("useful" or "convenient") the same is true; *e.g.*, when we say of a very stout man, "it is a good thing that X lives near the station," an integral part of our meaning is to imply that the fact is satisfactory, and that anything else would be more distressing, to somebody or something—*e.g.* to himself or to the horse that has to pull him. Else we might barely note the fact; we should hardly call it "good."

### III. THE IDEAL CRITIC.

§ 21. What then is the right inference to draw concerning value and our knowledge of it, if, on the one hand, value cannot exist in utter detachment from understanding, judgment, desire or enjoyment, while, on the other hand, our crass misvaluations, and such common confessions as "A is good but does not interest me," "A is better, but I enjoy B more," etc., warn us not to trust our own judgments, desires, or enjoyments at any particular moment, as final criteria?

The natural suggestion that at once occurs is of a new subjective criterion—an "ideal subjectivism." We may know the good (it is suggested) by considering, not what we think to be good or desire or enjoy or should choose, but what would be so thought, desired, etc., by a thinker whose whole mind (judgment, will, and taste) was ideally trained and developed, just as Aristotle tells us that the rule of right action is, in every case, what would be fixed by the ideally "sensible" or "prudent" man.

The obvious problem, however, arises, "who, in the case of value, is the ideal critic, and how is he known?" The suggestion of an appeal to such a person is plausible, because

in regard to the "right" we have access to him in the shape of the good man, from whom, when in doubt, we can get at least approximately trustworthy guidance. No circle is involved here, because our power to apprehend virtue or holiness in another often far outruns our power to settle how either he or we ourselves ought to act;\* and we know, moreover, that such virtue implies a general power to judge truly what is right. We can, therefore, with some confidence trust the virtue which we apprehend in anyone as a criterion of the trustworthiness of his advice about what is right.

But in the case of value there is no such criterion available whereby our ideal critic may himself be known. The meaning of truth, beauty, etc., as was said in the beginning, must by common consent be known immediately or not at all, and the same is true of our judgment when and where they are to be found. There is no character whereby we can recognise the expert in any one of them as we can recognise by his virtue the man who is fit to advise us in morality. We can of course recognise in an artist executive skill, or in a thinker dialectical subtlety; but if we argue from these to soundness of judgment about beauty or truth, we make a blunder not indeed uncommon, but fatal. Nor even if we are assured of a certain competence in him, can we safely trust it beyond the limits within which we have tested it. The fact (*e.g.*) that a man is a good interpreter of classical music will not necessarily imply that his opinion is better worth listening to on modern music than on any other subject; and there is no presumption that because a man is a good scientist he will be a good philosopher, but rather the contrary. We have no knowledge of the tree save by its fruits, nor of the goodness of the fruit save by our own insight into what good fruit should be: and every fruit offered must submit to the same test.

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\* *E.g.*, the first Christian disciples undeniably appreciated the holiness of their Master, though clearly they often as little understood what He did as what He said.

The suggestion is, therefore, once more, circular and barren that we may distinguish true from sham value as that which the ideally wise man approves, when we have no check upon the wisdom even of those whom we can consult and cross-question except by deciding whether in our view they distinguish the two aright. We could as well expect a mirror of whose soundness or distortion we were not informed to tell us the true shape of the objects in the room behind us. And we need no Tale of a Tub to tell us that, as a matter of history, the make-believe that any body of men derives its views from the authority of a revered founder is kept up only by the simple but transparent expedient whereby the body makes its founder, as Humpty-Dumpty made his words, mean what they think he ought to mean.

Still more obviously is the suggestion barren when the ideal critic is avowedly purely ideal, and we are left to our own resources to supply not only the distinction of the reliable from the unreliable images in the mirror, but the very mirror itself.

#### IV.

§ 22. Where, then, is "the place of understanding"?

I come to the only positive suggestion I have to offer, to the only one indeed that seems to be left over, viz., that it is found in the understanding and judgment of every individual, —that every individual is himself and for himself that ideal spectator or critic to whose intelligence, will, and taste, true value is indissolubly related.

I do not know whether the suggestion is a truism or a paradox.

It is a truism that for the answer to our question "what and where is  $x$ ?" (whether  $x$  be value or anything else) we must look to understanding and judgment. And that this understanding and judgment in the case of value are our own seems clear whether we reflect on the life of our minds or on the nature of value. On the one hand, we find that the whole

of our spiritual life and effort is directed upon the Good, *i.e.* upon the genuine Good, the one thing for which (as Plato points out)\* we will let nothing stand substitute. It is true that we are not always thinking or imagining or rousing ourselves to practical action, and even when we begin we may of course break off our effort in the middle: but the true direction of the effort, while and in so far as it is maintained, is clear from this, that it finds no *natural* end or completion, save in some result that we can judge to be in some way good—true or beautiful or useful or right. That our judgment is often false here makes no difference; for a suspicion of its falsity simply means that off we have to go again, tinkering our composition, rewriting our thesis, till again we are satisfied of its goodness. The reasonable soul is nothing but activity,† and to that activity reflection can assign no character except the progressive realisation of the Good. From the side of the analysis of the Good itself the same result follows: if one by one our supposed tests or criteria of the value of anything have been found wanting, the balance in which they have been weighed has in each case been a knowledge of its value which we have found ourselves on reflection to possess, other and better than the suggestions we could extract from them.

It is, on the other hand, a paradox in view of this very conclusion, to which we seem irresistibly driven, that all these suggestions, all the judgments which we pass in our haste, with whatever degree of conviction we may pass them, are subject to revision and correction by later reflection. We can pass no judgment except in the form of a “decree *nisi*,” and if so, how can we be said yet to apprehend or to know?

I may perhaps be forgiven if, even at the end of a paper

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\* *Republic*, vi, 505 d.

† If it be asked, “how then comes it that each of us can be so sluggish and inert?”, I should (I think) reply that just in so far as any one is so, he is not a “reasonable soul,” is not “himself”; he is what the Psalmist picturesquely calls “a worm and no man.”

already overlong, I add some brief remarks on this apparent contradiction.

§ 23. The difficulty is to distinguish between apprehension and awareness. It is a difficulty applying in general to all forms of apprehension, but pressing with peculiar insistence in regard to our apprehension of value. Can we apprehend that of which we are hardly aware? And if so what, and of what, is that awareness which we mistake for knowledge, how comes it to fall short of our knowledge, and how can we be rid of it?

It seems undeniable that we do apprehend that of whose nature we are but very imperfectly aware. How else can we account for the state in which, as often, we detect an error before we can rightly express the truth? Or how could we detect an error at all? For nothing save a better knowledge can convince a man of this.

Moreover, if apprehension of the real is to be possible at all, then what we apprehend must be the real that is there to be apprehended. But then, on the other side, unless anyone is prepared to claim omniscience and full awareness of the nature of the real, and to disclaim error altogether, it follows that we apprehend that of which, as yet, we are at best but imperfectly aware. Thus, suppose that in spring a small boy in a neighbouring wood emits two notes a minor third apart, and I think to myself "I hear (*i.e.* perceive) the cuckoo," clearly the individual who is symbolised to me by the audible notes, and whom I perceive, is all the time the small boy, although my words show my very inadequate awareness of his character. Otherwise, we are landed in the utter absurdity of saying that I perceive a cuckoo which was not there to be perceived, but existed only in my imagination. So again, in regard to our conception or understanding. Of the kinds of being to which we assign the individuals we perceive, men, trees, tables and chairs, etc., it is highly probable that any account we could give, like most attempts at definition, would prove on reflection



not to bear thinking out ; certainly anything that "science" has so far been able to tell us of the constitution of the physical world, like the very categories it employs, turns out to be self-contradictory "appearance." Yet all the while the object of our understanding must be the true universal or essence of what we perceive ; otherwise, unless we are going to confess that we understand nothing at all, we should again be driven to the absurd result that we did at a certain time understand or conceive what on reflection is transparently seen to be, and, therefore, must all the time have been, in itself unintelligible and inconceivable.

The apprehension of things unawares, if a paradox, is at least a paradox whose acceptance seems necessary, as Plato thought the doctrine of prenatal knowledge necessary, to any rational account of the process of coming to know. It is, in fact, merely that doctrine shorn of mythological embroidery ; and there seems to be no reason why it should not apply as well to our knowledge of value as to any other.

§24. How then is this slumbering apprehension to be awakened, and the mists of misapprehension dispelled which we continually have discovered, and must always be prepared to discover, hanging over our conscious understanding and thought ? How is that true knowledge which we have, though unawares, to become realised ? Not, I am convinced—though I have no space here to argue the point—by any mystical abandonment of the path of conscious reflection, but only by a more faithful and unremitting pursuit of it ; in the words of Socrates, *εάν τις ἀνδρείως ἦ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν*.\* The one thing needful is *μὴ ἀποκάμνειν*.

§25. "But," it will be asked, "what guarantee have we of this ?" The question may be put from the other side—what are the obstacles in the path, and should they lead us, like the

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\* Plato, *Meno*, 81 d.

mystic, to despair of reason,\* and to search for some alternative way?

The errors about value that, as we have seen and indeed must insist, continually beset the suggestions of our desires, enjoyments, choices and judgments, spring not from these activities but from their failure or remission. The *immediate* failure that constitutes the error is of course intellectual: it is the cessation of thought in the affirmation of something that has not been and could not be thought out. We will nothing, desire nothing, enjoy nothing, save that which we judge to be good;† only, our judgment is often limited in its outlook, premature, and therefore false. At the same time, we must clearly beware of supposing that the intellectual is the *only* kind, or is always the *primary* kind of failure. The intellectual heresy, that what we judge to be good we therefore always desire or will or enjoy, is as untrue as the subjectivist heresy, that what we judge in our haste to be good, and desire, will, or enjoy as such, is therefore always really good. The order of misapprehension is often the opposite. We fail to make the effort of will necessary to realise what we know to be better worth while, and thereupon we persuade ourselves that the worse which we choose, or do not mean to give up, is as good or even better.‡ Or, again, our taste fails us: we find we enjoy the poorer form of occupation more than the better, and we are readily lulled into forgetting how poor it is: Plato's remark§ is profoundly true of our thought about values, that we can hardly help supposing that whatever causes us the keenest pleasure must be most real. Thus, to

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\* The *μισολογία* of Plato, *Phædo*, 89 d.

† Even the angry man thinks thus of his vengeance and the fool of his follies: seriously shake his assurance, and both his resolution and his enjoyment are shaken too. Cf. *supra*, § 7.

‡ The familiar process whereby, to the abominable and faithless, "even their mind and conscience is defiled" (*Ep. Tit.*, i, 15). The *ἀκαρίης* sinks into the *ἀκόλαστος*. Cf. also Aristotle, *Eth. N.*, VI, 12, § 10. § *Phædo* 83 c.

the case where an original failure of judgment paralyses the will and taste and beguiles us into acquiescence in a false will and taste instead of leading us on to the vision of objects that we can whole-heartedly will and enjoy,\* we have to add the case where failure of will or taste paralyses the judgment and beguiles it into one or other of the subjectivist errors above discussed.

The progress of our thought, itself seldom too active, is thus yet further retarded at every step by other laggard faculties: and nowhere is this hindrance more marked, and progress accordingly slower, than in respect of the general theory of Good or Value, just because the problem is fundamental and all-inclusive,† and because we have so many points of contact with it; for there is no form of experience but bears more or less directly upon it.

§ 26. Nor have we only our own natural inertia to reckon with, but also that of any others with whom for any practical purpose we may be brought into contact. Any purpose other than thinking, which it may be our duty to realise at any moment, may demand the sacrifice of our freedom of thought.

The discipline of a State, as Plato did not hesitate to say, can only be maintained if falsehood is taught and believed, *e.g.* that there never was such virtue and wisdom on earth as there was in the progenitors, or is in the tradition, of the race, or (as it may sometimes be among a stupid people) in its present king or rulers. British policy (*e.g.* as it is would go to pieces, and, taking the British as they are, it is more than

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\* Πάση δεδογμενα τῇ διανοίᾳ (Plato, *Phaedrus*, 256 c). Plato does not deny that the incontinent lover wills and enjoys his course of life. His will and enjoyment are genuine so far as they go, but the vitality of will and keenness of enjoyment are nothing in comparison with those which lie along the path of self-restraint. It is in this sense that we may apply the antithesis "true" and "false" to will and taste as well as to judgment. (So far as "enjoyment" or "pleasure" goes, there is ample authority for this use in Plato; as to will, *cf.* the antithesis ποιεῖν ἂν δοκεῖ . . . ποιεῖν ἂν βούλεται in *Gorgias*, 467-8.)

† Μέγιστον μάθημα, *Rep.*, vi, 514 d.

doubtful whether anything nearly so healthy would take its place, if any large proportion of them could be brought to believe it possible (except perhaps as an occasional freak of nature) for an Indian or Austrian, or any sort of foreigner, to excel a Britisher in the qualities that really matter. Probably no existing nation could wage war with even a dim prospect of success if it were encouraged nicely to weigh the truth about either itself or its enemy. The maintenance, again, of religious fervour, and the efficient conduct of industry, require likewise a belief in those particular forms of imaginative mythology which masquerade under the once revered titles of theology and science. Even in a philosophical society, *si parva licet componere magnis*, there is always a danger lest the due exposure of error be sacrificed to regard for the feelings of members, and lest truth therein, like the famous Metaphysical Society itself, "die of too much love."

These hindrances are certainly not to be thought of as inevitably fixed in the nature of the activities involved. There is no insuperable reason why a man should not be, as Plato demanded that his guardians should be, at once a thorough-going thinker, a patriot, and an efficient scientist, a devout worshipper withal and good tempered under correction! If a State could be brought to act vigorously together, or a Church to worship together, on the basis of an unsparing determination to seek out truth and be done with illusion, it would unquestionably open a new and nobler chapter than any in human history. But it is quite certain that such an ideal does not yet belong to practical politics, simply because, of men as they are, not one in a thousand is capable of the spiritual activity required, or could even form a conception of it. Most men, if they are to rise to any of the above purposes, imperatively require to be taught the particular form of "noble lie" appropriate to that purpose. At least the results so far reached by those who lack such dogmatic convictions are not inspiring. The stagnation of political life in a cosmopolitan

community is proverbial, as is also the comparative sterility of intellectual liberalism in provoking either religious enthusiasm or social betterment. Immediate practical action requires deep and fixed convictions, and these are all alike jeopardised by the effort of thinking, with what is (for most people) its whole-time demand and its long intervals of perplexity and suspense.

This backwardness of the masses to combine thought and action affects their teachers also. The dogmas requisite to political action, to religion, etc., are most effectively impressed by those—be they politicians, priests, or scientists—who are convinced and not critical of them: and this means that those whose duty it is to organise the masses for such ends have so far also a duty, unless they be persons of quite exceptional calibre, not to foster in themselves the habit of philosophic doubt but to smother it.\*

Nor is this self-abnegation of intellectual life necessary merely in the interests of religion or of what is distinguished from either as "practice," but also through these (paradoxical as it may sound) to the continued vigour of the intellectual life itself. Each activity draws from, as well as surrenders to, the other. A hypertrophy of either soon passes into an atrophy. A nation which so far gave itself up to thought or religion as to become politically insignificant would be in danger in the next generation of losing these as well, just as a nation which sacrifices all for practical efficiency soon becomes merely stupid and inefficient. (Witness the decline of Greek art and thought following on the decline of political life.

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\* It is difficult to approve the double effort of thinking in one language and teaching in another, even in those who can both sustain and effectively conceal it. The Platonic guardian who teaches what he knows to be false, arouses little less dislike than a Blougram, and not a very great deal less than the Prussian who uses the press to work up the requisite *furor Britannicus* or *Americanus*. It is very doubtful whether a philosopher can be a fit person to undertake the religious education of young or stupid people, or to be a statesman in any existent state.

German history since the 16th century illustrates a like decay, first at the one extreme and now at the other.) But this means that if thinking itself is to continue vigorous and healthy, it must be content to go slow, lest it outrun the general development of the nation's spiritual life.\*

§ 27. In all these ways the "small coinage" (as Plato calls it) of human nature forces us to be imperfectly reflective, and so keeps us still unaware of the true nature of value and its varied forms. Personal inertia brings all, and duty even earlier brings some, to a halt at a point whence the vision of Good is still broken and filled in with imaginations of whose distorting influence we can from that point form no exact estimate.

Nevertheless, if such be the obstacle, and only such, it is evidently an obstacle not fixed and irremovable in the nature of things, although its removal can be accomplished only by such a general outpouring, along all its channels, of spiritual activity as we have no reason to expect in any near future, and to which any individual can contribute (it may be) but little. At least no argument can be founded upon it against the faith of Socrates, firstly, that reflection can progressively remove that obstacle, and, secondly, that to the spirit of man, dependent as it is simply and solely upon communion with itself for direction in every step that it awaresly takes, the goal which it seeks must already, though unawares, be known.

If to this faith I have tried in this paper to lend any fresh support, it is this, that already reflection sounds in our ears a constant warning against eating the lotus of the subjectivist.

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\* Of individuals, too, those who develop in many directions not seldom develop most vigorously in each. Thinking (*eg.*) ill flourishes apart from a reasonable domestic and social life, physical activity, and so forth. But this again obliges the thinker, for the sake of his thought in the long run, continually to give up time to exercise, or to social and domestic duties, which at the moment are mere obstructions to his thought. Plato's *Republic* reiterates warnings against such one-sided developments.

At least we need not fall into the one illusion, which would finally be fatal to us, of supposing that what from our present vantage ground (whether of desire, of will, of enjoyment, or of judgment) may appear to us is the true measure and vision of the Good. At least we need not mistake our temporary, though it be our inevitable, halting-place for our final home.

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## X.—SYMPOSIUM: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION.

By L. P. JACKS, G. BERNARD SHAW, C. DELISLE BURNS, and  
H. D. OAKELEY.

### I.—By L. P. JACKS.\*

ETHICAL principles, which we are to discuss in relation to the reconstruction of society, appear to me, in the last analysis, to be our formulæ for certain types of personality. Whence it would follow that our question is not, by *what* should society be reconstructed, but by *whom*? I say this to indicate my point of view.

To save myself as far as possible from wandering over the whole field of ethical controversy, which the title tempts me to do, I shall assume that the subject has an historical reference to actual conditions and circumstances—that, namely, we are discussing the ethical principles of social reconstruction, as this may take place after the war. By “after the war” I mean in direct sequence to the end of the war, and not at some undefined period, perhaps in the very distant future, when a totally different set of conditions may have arisen. The time-factor is especially important in this connexion, as, indeed, it seems to me to be important in every discussion of ethical problems. If “after the war” may mean a thousand years afterwards, our discussion will become an abstract treatment of general principles.

Furthermore, are we discussing reconstruction as we ourselves would carry it out, if we were free to act upon

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\* I may say that the whole of this was written before I had read Mr. Bertrand Russell's *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, which I expected would influence me, as indeed it has.



our philosophical convictions—a general question,—or are we discussing the particular question of the reconstruction that will be possible when the war is over—reconstruction, that is, as limited by the circumstances by which we are then likely to be faced? I shall assume the latter alternative. The former question is one that might have been raised at any time. But the scope of *our* problem seems to be defined in large measure by the fact of its having been raised at the *present time*. I take this to mean that we are not invited to go over again the ground covered by Plato's *Republic* and by social philosophy in general, without any reference to actual, existing conditions.

This being premised, it seems to me obvious that the ethical principles of social reconstruction after the war will be chiefly determined by the particular way in which the war ends. I mean that, whatever may be abstractly desirable, the actual reconstruction which we have to expect and prepare for will be mainly governed by an event whose precise nature we cannot at present foresee.

I base this statement on the belief—which may be open to question—that the war is in essence a conflict of ethical principles; or, if it is preferred—and it comes to the same thing—a conflict of a moral principle with an immoral. If the Central Powers, who represent one of these principles, win the war, not only will the victors be able to enforce the conquering principle and repress the action of its opposite, but they will do this with immense support from millions in all parts of the world who have not yet made up their minds between the two principles at issue, and are waiting for the end of the war to determine their moral allegiance. In the event of victory for the Allies, we may, of course, expect the same order of events on the other side. The point of importance in either event is that the possibilities of social reconstruction (in sequence to the war) are limited—and limited to one of two main forms, as these are indicated by the two ethical principles at stake. The conflict having been

transferred from the court of reason and committed to the sword, philosophers like everybody else will have to abide by the issue. They may, of course, maintain their former convictions, whatever the issue of the strife may be, but if the issue goes against their principles they will not be able, for a long time to come, to make them effective in the work of social reconstruction. For one thing, the victors will not allow the vanquished to carry out their ideals, as those of us who support the British ideal would soon find out in the event of a German victory. For another, the vanquished ideal would lack public moral support, especially among those who were neutral to begin with, the vast majority of mankind. This is not to say that *Might makes Right*. But *Might* does make or tend to make what the majority of men consider *Right* for the time being, and obviously must do so when the war is widely recognized as a strife of ethical principles. Can it be doubted for example that the victory of the Germans would be a world-wide advertisement for the State-philosophy of Hegel and its off-shoots, more effective on the course of opinion than the combined efforts of all Hegel's disciples up to date—and that this would profoundly affect social reconstruction? Surely, it would be absurd to say "this is essentially a war of ethical principles, but its result will have no influence on the ethical principles concerned," for in that case we should have to ask "what on earth are the two principles fighting for?" They are fighting, I take it, for the precise purpose of establishing the mastership of one or the other in the reconstruction of society, from which mastership when established there will be no escape for the defeated party—at least not immediately. As pure theorists we might be indifferent to the application of our principles, our concern being only with their theoretical truth; but we cannot profess this indifference when the principles are being discussed in relation to social reconstruction after the war, in which case the applications are the very matters in question.

Whatever principle, then, this Society might lay down as the

right one for social reconstruction, that principle, I take it, would have no chance of proving effective immediately if the event of the war were unfavourable to its assertion, as it well might be.

It remains then to consider what are the two principles or ideals which are thus fighting for the master hand in the reconstruction of society. They may, I think, be quite simply described—described rather than defined—as (1) The right to do good to others *with or without* their consent. (2) The right to do good to others *only* by and with their consent. Or, looking at the principles from the other side, and expressing them in the correlative terms of duty, the description would run thus: (1) The duty of inferiors to submit to the good done them by superiors; (2) The duty of all men to defend themselves and their neighbours against those who would do them good without their consent.

(1) The first principle has been clearly expressed in the State-philosophy of Germany and in a hundred classical mottoes\* which are now on the lips of every patriotic German, of which a well-known example is the couplet of Geibel:

“ Und es mag am deutschen Wesen  
Einmal noch die Welt genesen.”

From the point of view of its supporters this principle is genuinely ethical. It assumes (1) that there exists in the world a moral aristocracy; (2) that this is represented for the time being by a particular nation; (3) that the moral aristocracy so represented has the right to impose its will on all others, these being by hypothesis its moral inferiors; (4) that in so imposing its will on others the aristocracy is doing them good, and is, therefore, moral in its action—doing its own duty.

The smooth working of this principle as a rule of social

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\* They have been collected by Professor Bang, of Copenhagen, in his book *Hurrah and Hallelujah*.

reconstruction implies two things, authority on one side and discipline on the other, or—and it amounts to the same result—the moral superiors must know themselves as such and be able to recognize one another, while the moral inferiors must be conscious of their inferiority and be under no danger of mistaking one another for members of the aristocracy that is set over them. Clearly no nation could hope on moral grounds (as the Germans do) to dominate the rest so long as the question of relative superiority were regarded by either side as an open question. Smooth working would be impossible on these conditions.

(2) The opposing principle—commonly known as “public right”—is most sharply contrasted with the first precisely at the point just indicated. It asserts that in human affairs no working scheme (of social reconstruction or anything else) can ever be based on any *particular* division of mankind into moral superiors and inferiors. Doubtless the sheep and the goats exist, but no competent authority can be found for separating the one from the other, *and compelling both parties to accept its award*. The difficulty arises, in the first place, in having to find a nation, or group of people, who will be acknowledged as sheep by the universal suffrage of mankind; but this is as nothing to the correlative difficulty of persuading the goats to acknowledge their goathood, which, plainly, must be done if the arrangement is to work smoothly. And this, in addition to being practically unworkable, is morally wrong, for it demoralizes the sheep and is an outrage on those who are classed as goats. For though it may be right to acknowledge your own inferiority to another man, or nation, you have no right to impose a like obligation on your neighbours. It may be that the British are the moral inferiors of the Germans, but surely we should be doing the French, Italians, Belgians, Russians, a foul wrong in being parties to any arrangement which forced them to accept the same position. On these grounds, I take it, the right is set up for nations and individuals

to live their lives unmolested by other nations or individuals who would do them good without first seeking and obtaining their consent; and it is for that principle, a distinctly ethical principle, that the Allied nations are now fighting. It is not the abstract notion of a superman (or a super-nation) which the Allies are seeking to overthrow; it is the right of anyone to *constitute himself* a superman without consulting those who, if his claim be allowed, become his inferiors and have to submit to be treated by him as such.

Thus the conflict, so far as it is concerned with ethical principles (and it is largely so concerned), reduces itself to a very simple form or image. On the one side is Cain, fighting, on grounds believed by him to be moral, for the right to be his brother's keeper; on the other is Abel, fighting for his right, and for that of other Abels, to live his life without interference from Cain. The issue of such a conflict is bound to have a determining effect on any social reconstruction which is to follow the war.

At first sight the principles at issue refer to the rights of nations, and to international polity as founded on those rights. To be sure their most obvious application is in that sphere. But the mistake has been widely made of supposing that they have no other application. The truth is, of course, that they embrace and penetrate the whole sum of human relationships, and affect the rights of individuals as fully as they affect the rights of nations. Not only the relations between the different States, small and large, but the relation of each State to its own members, and the relations of each member to every other member—to all of these a profound difference will be made according as one or other of the principles now at war secures the mastery. This is as much as to say that the whole question of ethical reconstruction hangs, for the time being, on the issue of the war.

Let us assume, in the first instance, that the war ends in the victory of Abel and the defeat of Cain. That would be,

in essence, a victory for the principle of non-interference, and, as such, would exercise a profound influence on social reconstruction after the war. The first effects of it, at all events the intended effects, would be in the sphere of international relationships—there would be a reconstruction of international morality, in accordance with the principle which by conquering its opposite had proved its vitality. There would be a general agreement that all nations, great and small, have a duty to leave one another alone—the most obvious application of the Golden Rule. But I cannot believe that the effect would be limited to international affairs, to the relations between States. I imagine that it would affect the relations between individuals, groups, and classes, and the moral conceptions which govern those relations. The right of any man, or any group of men, to do good, by compulsion, to others would be seriously challenged. From the application abroad we should pass insensibly, but perhaps rapidly, to the application at home. In all States, certainly in our own, those large and powerful groups who, perhaps without realizing it, follow the German ideal in our domestic affairs, by claiming the right to do their neighbours good on their own terms, would be put upon their defence. The claim of the educated class to rule the uneducated, for example, would at once raise the question, *Which* is the educated class?—and all merely self-constituted pundits would be promptly sent about their business. In short, the ethical sequel to the victory of the Allies would be a revival of *laissez-faire*, of non-interference, of minding one's own business and rejoicing when other people minded theirs—a vast reconstruction, involving great changes not only in actual conduct, but in the philosophy of morals, especially that part of it which deals with the relations of the individuals to the State. And, lest it should be thought that *laissez-faire* is an unmoral, or perhaps immoral, principle, and that no *ethical* reconstruction could follow its triumph, let me point out in passing that, in the present state of our manners, there is no

type of conduct which involves so much self-mastery, so much sacrifice of pleasure we hold dear, so much indifference to the praise or blame of men, so much watchfulness and prayer, as does that type of conduct which consists in leaving other people alone and minding our own business. Non-interference is not, as many suppose, an easy rule of conduct. It is precisely the hardest.

Let us now reverse the supposition and consider reconstruction in the light of the defeat of the Allies. I say the defeat of the Allies rather than the victory of the Germans for a particular reason. In considering the war as a completed fact there is always the double aspect of its end to be borne in mind—I mean that the end will be not only the victory of the one side, but also the defeat of the other. Oddly enough this is frequently overlooked by people who estimate the moral consequences of the war in terms only of the ideal they assume to be victorious (generally their own), and forget to add the equally grave consequences which would follow simultaneously from the defeat of the other.

Morally considered, the defeat of the Allies would be a smashing blow to the principle of non-interference in every kind of human relationship, international, social, political, domestic, and personal. On the other side it would be a victory for every man, group, political tendency or school of thought, which claims the right to do good to others on its own terms. The reconstructed social ethic which would follow such a victory would be one in which the right of interference was developed, defined, and established, and the practice of it elevated to the dignity of a fine art. "Keeping our brother" would become the motto of the age. Moral Philosophy would have to provide us with some test or canon whereby we could distinguish those who have the right to be keepers from those whose duty it is to submit to be kept, and the main reconstruction, so far as theoretical ethics is concerned, would turn upon that question, which has never yet been solved—

unless it should happen that the German victors considered the question settled by their victory. Moral education would consist in infusing a spirit of energy into the keepers, and a spirit of submission into the kept. A class of persons would have to be marked out who, when their own good was in question, were not supposed to have wills of their own. Such at least would be the tendency, though not, perhaps, the immediate result, if we suppose the German ideal to be thoroughly and completely victorious.

In brief, the victory of the Allies points to the *minimum of government* as the ethical ideal of the next social reconstruction; the victory of the Central Powers indicates the *maximum of government* as the alternative ideal.

Which of these two ideals is more in keeping with the ultimate purpose of social life can, of course, only be answered if we have previously made up our minds as to what that purpose is—the fundamental question of Moral Philosophy. If it be granted that the purpose of society is economic—the exploitation of the natural resources of the earth, the production, accumulation, distribution, and enjoyment of material wealth, then frankly, I think, the German ideal is the better adapted to human wants. The economic enterprise when viewed as the joint enterprise of human society needs to be strictly governed and controlled. Authority and discipline are the keynotes of its success. A consideration of the process which has caused the large business to supersede the small one leads to the conclusion that, from the purely economic point of view, the best thing the human race could do for its own interest would be to form itself into a universal joint-stock company under iron management. A German victory would unquestionably tend in that direction. It would be a step towards universal economic organization.

If, on the other hand, we define the end of social life in terms of human qualities, rather than of economic quantities, our preference will incline to the other ideal, and we shall



pray for its victory. Our social reconstructions will then aim at what I will venture to call "inverted democracy"—a form of society, that is, which instead of being designed for the purpose of giving every man the maximum opportunity of tampering with the individuality of his neighbour, whether by "voting" on his affairs or otherwise, whether for the purpose of doing him good or for anything else, shall rather restrict this opportunity within the narrowest possible limits. The problem, then, would seem to be that of devising some form of human co-operation quite different from that represented by any of the existing States, all of which, whether they know it or not, embody the principle of authority and submission which the Germans are now seeking to apply, on their own terms, to the whole world. Such a reconstruction would not work through the existing governments, which are unfitted for the purpose, but behind their backs, or beneath their feet, and would gradually do away with them altogether.

I have said nothing about the third alternative—namely, that the end may be "a draw"—nor is it necessary to say much. A draw would give to the advocate of either of the principles in conflict a much greater freedom in pursuing reconstruction on his own lines than he would have if his side were definitely defeated. But he must not forget that the draw would give an equal advantage to the advocates of the opposite principle, which would go far to neutralize the advantage enjoyed by himself. The battle would have to be fought over again, with varying fortunes, on the field of argument, unless another war arose in the meantime to settle it. It is to be feared that a draw would only cause the energy needed for the actual work of reconstruction to be expended in an indecisive war of minds between the champions of the rival principles—which, in point of fact, is precisely what went on for many years, indeed for many centuries, before 1914, and with no satisfactory result. On the whole, I should be inclined to predict that no social reconstruction, good or bad, would follow. I cannot see that

reformers *on either side* have any good reason for hoping that the end will be "a draw."

In any event we shall have to reckon with the multitudes of men, in all the belligerent nations, who will come back to civil life when the war ends. These multitudes will have something to say about social reconstruction, and, if like-minded, they will be sufficiently powerful to upset all the schemes which have been drawn up, during the war, by the people who have stayed at home. It is conceivable, for example, I do not say likely, that the survivors of all the armies will form themselves into an immense international federation for overthrowing the whole system, moral and political, which has set them a-fighting. At present they are an unknown quantity. It is difficult to ascertain what they are thinking and impossible to foresee what they will think when their work is done. What I have chiefly observed in the few specimens who have come under my notice, in the interludes of battle, is a fury of indignation against the people at home who use the war as an opportunity for airing their views on moral questions, which is what I have been doing in this paper. I freely admit that all the calculations in which I have indulged, even if otherwise sound, may be upset by the action of these men. And the same risk attaches to calculations which differ from mine.

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II.—By G. BERNARD SHAW.

The ethical principles imposed on us by the war are simple enough. War throws us back on the crude ethic of immediate self-preservation. Every contrivance, however diabolical, which saves British and destroys German lives is right; and every contrary word and deed is wrong. It overrides all higher ethics, from the ten commandments to Herbert Spencer's principles. Liberty has become a public danger, and homicide a science and a virtue: we pray that friendly Americans may

be drowned; and we deliberately produce artificial famine, earthquake, and thunderbolt, on a scale which makes the most appalling natural catastrophe seem insignificant in comparison. And we take our part, directly or by consent and contribution, with a sense of ethical approval so heightened that manifest fools are seen in all directions almost bursting with their own importance, which nobody ventures to challenge, whilst philosophers are intimidated, or, if they resist the process, suppressed by force. All this is as inevitable as an act of trespass may be to a man pursued by a bull, or an appearance in the street with nothing but a nightdress on, if even that, to a woman escaping from a burning house. There is not much interest in discussing whether, being inevitable, it is also right. The inevitable is practically outside ethics; and the inevitabilities of war drag us back from the forward side of good and evil, to which Nietzsche invited us, to the side we thought, until war broke out, we had long left behind us.

It is important to note that our sense of moral superiority to the cruder ethic thus violently forced on us does not enable us to evade its consequences. We had arrived at the conclusion that, as William Morris put it, "no man is good enough to be another man's master," and that if we give irresponsible power over us to any man he will abuse it. At the beginning of the war, finding ourselves obliged to give such power, we tried to hide the gravity of the breach of the principle involved by an absurd idolatry of the persons we had to trust. During the first months of the war our generals and admirals were Cæsars and Nelsons; and the members of the Government were Solons, Solomons, and Marcus Aureliuses; whilst those who ventured to criticize them were pro-German traitors. None the less all these gentlemen abused their power and their irresponsibility; and most of them have had to be superseded. Whilst the higher ethic of peace remains in abeyance, and the crude ethic of war in full activity, not a single consequence of the violation

of the higher ethic is spared us. We are saving our skins at the cost of our souls, very prudently, because if we pawn our souls to the god of war we may redeem them some day ; but if we lose our skins there is an end of us, souls and all. Thus, though we must accept the bargain, we cannot escape paying the price. The reason people feel so much more virtuous during the war than they ever pretended to be before it is that it has debased the ethical currency to such an extent that the man who had not sixpennorth of virtue to bless himself with can now flourish a character worth twenty sovereigns of gilt lead.

The ethical situation is, however, not so simple as this, because our ethics of peace were very far from being the ethics of Immanuel Kant or Plato. When we say to Germany "Thou shalt starve e'er we starve," and she says the same to us, we are both only saying what we said to our own countrymen and neighbors in the false peace of commercialism. To many a man this war has brought salvation from the most callous selfishness and the most hoggish quarrelsomeness. The war between the patriotic German and the patriotic Briton is an ennobling activity compared to the war between the kitchen and the drawingroom, the farmer and the laborer, the employer and the trade unionist, the landlord and the tenant, the usurer and the borrower, not to mention the competitive war which each man wages with his fellows in all these hostile camps. The ethics of our trenches are higher than the ethics of our markets. A man may pass through a barrage with less damage to his character than through a squabble with a nagging wife. Many domestic and commercial experiences leave blacker and far more permanent marks on the soul than thrusting a bayonet through an enemy in a trench fight. We, therefore, have the complication that the retrogressive transition to the primitive morality of war may involve a progressive transition from a narrow and detestable private morality to a comparatively broad and elevated public morality.

We must also take into account the ethical illusions of the war. The primitive ethic of war, that they shall take who have the power, and they shall keep who can, is so revolting to highly civilized men that they can reconcile themselves to it only by setting up an elaborate fiction that they are acting in shocked self-defence against an unprovoked and wicked attack, and that, in defending themselves, they are defending liberty, humanity, justice, and all the other virtues, their enemies being consequently human fiends devoted wholly to the triumph of evil. This is manifest nonsense; but those who believe it sincerely may be cultivating their character at the expense of their intellect, just as those who look the truth in the face, and yet hack their way through, may be cultivating their intellect at the expense of their character. Those of us who believe that our intellect is a very important part of our character, and that stupidity and ignorance are more disastrous than roguery, will derive only a very doubtful and troubled consolation from the fact that both Germans and Englishmen believe that they are fighting for something more than the balance of power; for if sacrifice for an ideal is good for man, hatred of the enemy and assumption of moral superiority is very bad for him. Still, the thing exists and has to be taken into account. It may make the combatants fight more fiercely; but it precludes all terms of peace except those imposed by force; for none of the belligerents will agree to a stalemate on a footing of moral equality.

Now, it is not conceivable that a treaty concluding a war should have any higher ethic than war itself. All the belligerents will take what plunder they can. None of them are pacifist States: they are all steeped in blood; and most of them are empires holding down subject nationalities ruthlessly with all the circumstances of cruelty and oppression which attend such holdings-down. They have all kept treaties when it was their interest to do so and broken them when it was their interest to break them. All have been guilty of

frightful cruelties; and those who are not fighting for a European hegemony are fighting openly to wrest territories from one another. Germany will stay in Lille and Antwerp if she can; France will take Alsace-Lorraine if she can; Austria will keep Serbia and Bosnia if she can; Russia will get Constantinople if she can; Rumania will take Transylvania if she can; Italy will hold the Trentino if she can; and we shall keep the German colonies if we can. In addition to territory they will, if they can, bleed their enemies white in indemnities; and if they have to abandon territory they will devastate it so as to reduce to the utmost its value to the conqueror. And, according to the ethic of war, they will be quite right in doing so, and would be guilty of a political crime if they sacrificed the smallest fraction of the fruits of victory. What else is war for? Even Bismarck could not restrain Germany from annexing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871; and to-day there is no Bismarck to make the attempt. Thus there will be no ethical reconstruction. There will be a division of spoils and shifting of frontiers on the basis of the established militarist ethic. The proceedings will be governed by the example of England and Germany. Our war ethics were perfectly expressed at the beginning of the war by the late Lord Roberts. He founded himself on the "will to conquer" of the British race, claiming its satisfaction as a good in itself; and he held out to the rest of the world as its highest interest that it should be governed, as one-fifth of the human race is already governed, by men educated in the public schools of England, meaning thereby Eton, Harrow, Winchester, and Rugby. The Germans, though they may not have phrased this creed quite so bluntly, have adopted it as they have adopted so many other of our institutions, and opposed Pan-Germanism to our Pan-Anglicanism. There is a great deal to be said for both, but not relevantly to the present symposium, which pursues newer ethics, or reconstruction in the light of newer ethics. Suffice it to say here that neither England nor Germany

will change her ethics if she vanquishes the other; and that there is no likelihood of France and Italy rising above the moral level of England and Germany. As to Russia, it has cost her a revolution to catch up with her Allies in political evolution. She could not, if she would, be more magnanimous.

But all this presupposes that the fighting will produce a decision. It is not yet clear that this will be the result. Hitherto there has been no lack of victories; but these have been reduced to absurdity by the fact that among the most conspicuous have been victories of the Ottoman empire over the British. The Turks drove us into the sea from Gallipoli, and compelled us to surrender Kut at discretion. Yet we are now in Baghdad, leaving nothing for the Turks but a glorious page of their history. The Germans have a whole volume of victories to their credit. They have captured famous fortresses, and great seaports, and capital cities; and they have driven the British army, the French army, and the Russian army before them in the nearest approach to headlong rout that modern warfare admits of. Yet they have obtained no decision. All the belligerents, except perhaps Rumania, have plenty to boast of. The French have completely regained the military prestige they lost in 1871; and our improvization of an army on the modern scale, even before we resorted to compulsory service, shews that the new conditions have found us as formidable as we were when we fought Louis XIV and Napoleon. The honors of Verdun and of the Somme are with France and England. The exploits of Russia in Galicia and her rush almost to Cracow are as romantic as the rush of the Black Prince to Crécy. Italy is in Cortina. Belgium is aureoled with a ruinous glory. Heroes and victories and deathless pages of history are six a penny in Europe now; but there is no sign of a decision; and the cost of the operations is so prodigious that the belligerents begin to fear that a decision too long deferred, even if favourable, may be more disastrous than a present capitulation on any sort of reasonable terms.

Therefore it may happen that the war will end either in a stalemate, or in a decision manifestly not worth its cost. In that case there will be at least an attempt at a genuine ethical reconstruction. We shall admit that President Wilson is a great philosopher-statesman, and that Lord Roberts was a barbarous romantic schoolboy; and the Germans will agree, substituting Von Bernhardt for Roberts.

The principle of reconstruction is clear enough: we must renounce the Will to Conquer, and assert the rights of civilized communities to be governed according to their own lights and not according to those of English public schoolmen, Prussian Junkers, or any other persons claiming to represent a super-civilization. But this may not produce much change; for our lights are very largely snobbish lights; and the rule of the Junker, whether British or Prussian, is, in fact, very largely government according to our present lights. The Will to Conquer has dominated the European situation, not because of its rarity and elevation, but because of its vulgarity. The war may make us drop it as we drop a coin that burns our fingers; but that is not renunciation and conversion: the boy who drops the hot penny is as keen about money as he was before. How is the penny to be kept hot? Clearly by penalizing war and by police measures making the penalty judicial and certain. Yet as the nations can be policed only by a supernational authority, the renunciation of the Will to Conquer involves the renunciation of sovereign nationality and the subordination of nationality to a supernational power.

Half a dozen supernational schemes have already been put forward. Those which have been carefully thought out provide for a supernational legislature as well as a supernational tribunal backed by a supernational militia to enforce the laws of the legislature and the decisions of the tribunal. I take for granted a knowledge of these schemes, and proceed to point out their psychological superficiality. They assume either that the supernational authority will at once represent



the whole human race, thus fulfilling the dream of Anarcharsis Kloutz and Tennyson, or at least that because Russia and Japan are among the eight great Powers they must necessarily combine with the western Powers in the new organization. I suggest that such a combination would be wrecked by its psychological heterogeneity, or else, like the old Concert of Europe face to face with the Turk, avert the wreck only by paralysis. Really stable supernational combinations will not be parliaments of man and federations of the world: they will be civilizations, homogeneous in color, in religion, in tradition, in philosophy, and intermarriageable without miscegenation. The war suggests strongly that a combination between the Germans and the English is inevitable, because they abuse one another in exactly the same terms, and hate one another in the same way. They understand the French, the Poles, the Italians, the Hungarians, and the Irish very imperfectly; but they understand one another like brothers; and they are regarded by the other nations as the chief dangers to the liberty and peace of the world. They have largely peopled the United States of America. In spite of their misunderstandings of the French, Irish, and Poles, they are accustomed to them and have an admiration for them which is sometimes affectionate and often ridiculous. They can live with them and work with them comfortably; for they share the same religion and irreligion, the same Feudalism and Liberalism and Democracy. They wear the same sort of clothes; eat the same sort of food; and intermarry without the least sense of miscegenation. Thus, from Warsaw to San Francisco you have a clear unit of civilization; and if Germany, as is probable, has after the war to choose between alliances in the east and in the west, and, choosing the west, consolidates friendly relations with the United States, neither England nor France can prudently stand out of the combination, their accession to which would integrate the Netherlands and Scandinavia almost automatically. Russia would look

eastward; for the tradition of Peter and Catherine would fall with the tradition of Frederick the Great and Lord Roberts; and Russia would form an Asiatic unit. The Latin republics of South America would look to Spain and the south of Europe. Roughly, what will happen is that the nations, unable now to stand alone against the empires, will group themselves into alliances. The alliances which are too heterogeneous will fall to pieces as our present alliance must when the fear of Germany is dispelled; but the Powers will regroup themselves until psychologically homogeneous groups occur and produce stability. Every group thus stabilized will act as a nucleus, and enlarge itself until its possibilities are exhausted, at which point it will be a practicable supernational organization, and a unit of what may be called pretersupernational organization.

It is evident that one of the important factors in what I call psychological homogeneity is ethical homogeneity. Any combination between communities with different ideas of right and wrong can hold only for some specific purpose on the merits of which both happen to agree; and the most obvious of these is war, which all the civilized Powers consider wrong. After the present experience this conviction seems likely to be strengthened. Consequently, though supernationalism will be limited by general psychological homogeneity, it may be possible to induce the supernational groups to make pretersupernational compacts to maintain the peace of the world. Let us suppose, for example, that what may roughly be called a Lutheran group be formed in Northern Europe and North America, a Catholic Latin group in Southern Europe and South America, a Byzantine group in Russia and Russian Asia, and some groupings, at present incalculable, of Mahometanism in central Asia and of the yellow peoples further east. War between sections of such magnitude would be so calamitous that such notions as pan-Lutheranism, pan-Catholicism, pan-Byzantinism, pan-Mahometanism and so forth would be ridiculous: the only Pans left would be the Peter Pans, the boys

who never grow up ; and in relation to the maturity of the new social structure the Peter Pans would be seen in their just proportions, and not, as at present, admired as people with exceptionally big ideas, noble aspirations, and burning patriotisms.

In all this, however, it has been assumed that the nations now divided against one another are unanimous within themselves. This, as we know, is very far indeed from being true. Wars have always been to some extent a device of the propertied classes to confuse the issue between themselves and the proletariat, and to stave off revolution ; and the present war is by no means an exception. To say that monarchs resort to war to divert popular indignation from the throne is a commonplace, formulated long ago by Catherine the Second. What has not been as generally noticed is that revolutionary governments do the same ; for their inexperience, with that of their upstart officials, produces so much popular dissatisfaction that their downfall is inevitable unless they can, by engaging the country in a very dangerous war, make it afraid to venture on another internal change. Those who speak of the revolution in Russia as if it must be the end of all trouble for us in that country need to be reminded of this.

The tendency of revolution to produce war in this way depends for its force on the extent of the change effected by the revolution. If the class which gains the ascendancy has been politically trained before the revolution, the tendency will not exist : for instance, in the revolution which banished the Stuarts and placed William of Orange on the throne of England there was no substitution of an untrained for a trained class in the government : there was in that respect no change at all, and consequently no increase in belligerence. But in the French revolution the power fell into the hands of the middle class and the nobility. The middle class had no experience of government ; and the nobility, which had been reduced a century earlier by Richelieu to a mere retinue of

courtiers, knew nothing either of business or political administration: consequently the revolution was followed by twenty-five years of war for the sake of war. Taking these as the two extreme cases recorded for us by history, we may infer that a revolution in Germany, where democracy is more real because more scientific than in the great avowed democracies, would be much less likely to produce reckless belligerence than in Russia, where not even the Tsardom and the bureaucracy had mastered enough of the art of popular government to avert a revolution in the middle of a war.

This brings us to the question of political homogeneity, which is as indispensable to a supernational combination as any other factor. As long as it remains true that in a western federal democracy, where the President has no legal power to pledge the federated states to any foreign enterprise, his word is nevertheless as good security as minted gold, whereas in an eastern autocracy, where the autocrat can legally pledge the life and conduct of every soul in his dominions, his word affords no security that any provincial governor or general will not act in flat defiance of it according to his own tastes or the whims of his mistress, so long will it be impossible for states of the western democratic type to form stable combinations with states of the eastern autocratic type.

We must therefore postulate for supernationalism a certain political stability in the constituent nations which is unattainable without a considerable development of internal organization, sufficient at least to make it possible for the nation to enter into engagements which shall not be subject to the caprice or failing powers of monarchs or other individuals, or to private interests of any kind, whether they be the family interests of the reigning family and its courtiers, or the commercial interests of private adventurers. It is difficult to see how these can be got rid of except by getting rid of monarchs and courtiers altogether, and reorganizing the industry of the country as a public concern: that is to say, by adopting republicanism and

socialism. And as republican and socialistic institutions can have no stability in the presence of inequalities of income, which continually tend to upset them, and have historically always finally succeeded in upsetting them, we may take it that equality of income, involving the complete dissociation of labor with income, and consequently a system of compulsory labor for the community, will be the ultimate goal of internal reform as far as our present vision reaches.

In short, then, ethical reconstruction will take the form of a substitution of the ethics of communism for the ethics of commercialism, and of the ethics of democracy for those of feudalism. Nothing short of these changes will involve any ethical change at all except in the backward direction of crudity and barbarism. I am, of course, aware that the nature of the reconstruction may be entirely unforeseen, and that its ethics may be at present quite unthinkable. But we have no reason to suppose that war, which is nothing, after all, but an intensification of the fear of death, will enlarge our minds. An urgent possibility of death may induce a man to make his will after neglecting that duty for many years; but it does not alter the provisions of the will nor increase the sum he has to bequeath. In the same way a war may stimulate or frighten us into carrying out a number of reforms which we have merely dreamt of or written papers about before; but it cannot increase our intellectual capital. Everyone who has been face to face with death knows that it has the power, by the intensity of its reality, to reduce many of what we believed to be our gravest concerns and most important convictions to the idlest vanities and the shallowest affectations. It also, by the extraordinary efforts we find ourselves able to make to escape from it, reveals reserves of power in ourselves on which we had never drawn, and the existence of which we had never before discovered. Now, what the presence of death can do, war can do. Matters that seemed of vital importance in politics three years ago seem silly now; and national efforts

that would have seemed crazily impossible in 1913 have proved as easy as the Daylight Saving Act. Therefore we shall be able to consider many measures after the war that were not practical politics before it. Yet we shall not have new ethics, nor new politics, nor new economics, nor indeed any new synthesis or dogma. What will happen is that we shall no longer say of any important social reform that it is impossible because it would cost twenty million pounds. And we shall not say that the British people would never stand this or that sacrifice of their personal convenience, much less their lives, to social principles. That is a considerable advance in our executive effectiveness, and enlarges widely the possibilities of applying the principles we have already thought out. Therefore we cannot say that the war will make no difference. It will not, however, make a new heaven and a new earth; for these mean a new philosophy; and the war will certainly not produce that. We shall be fortunate if we recover without excessive effort the ground it has already lost us by throwing us back to the primitive ethic of the battlefield.

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### III.—*By* C. DELISLE BURNS.

Ethical principles are so many-sided that some addition to the statements already made will probably be more useful than direct criticism. It may, therefore, be taken for granted that certain general truths are accepted by most of those who desire to have a part in making the world better than it now is: and of practical principles the best is that those who desire the same structure of society should subordinate to that common desire their disagreement upon details. Incidental criticism will be sufficiently apparent in the attempt to express the same general principles from a different point of view.

First, we must establish the intellectual and emotional

hypothesis upon which our attempt at social reconstruction depends. For although the majority are not conscious of such an hypothesis, it is the business of those who are inclined to think to examine into its nature. And in a time like the present the nature of the foundation upon which civilised society rests is often obscured by the ruin of the superstructure. It is, therefore, necessary to say that a conflict of forces is no test of ethical value, and that the results of such a conflict have no ethical validity. This statement, unless it is misunderstood, will be seen by everyone to be obviously true. An ideal, or even an immoral creed, is not proved false if its adherents are beaten on the head. It is not proved false even if every adherent to it is killed. An ethical principle is not discredited if it can be shown that those who hold it are less numerous, less wealthy, or less powerful than those who oppose it. That is obvious. Such platitude must, however, be repeated, because during war moral ready-reckoning often takes the place of ethical judgment and good and evil are given the names of nations. War is not the application of an ethical criterion. It is a quite different proposition to say that the results of a physical and intellectual conflict may be ethically important: and this proposition should be clearly distinguished from the false idea that an ethical truth can be established by victory. The importance for ethical reconstruction of the results of war is due to the amount and kind of material which is left when the conflict is over. The importance is one of fact and not of principle. For the principle remains unchanged, the fundamental hypothesis of all civilised society, that force is no test of ethical value. The world will be different, however the war ends; but this difference will not affect the truth of the principles upon which we should act.

This conception of the results of war is so obvious that it has affected International Law. What is called a "settlement" after a war is, indeed, dependent upon the amount of force

surviving on the two sides. That is a matter of fact. But in International Law the settlement is *based* not upon the calculus of forces but upon a Treaty, which is supposed to be a contract between the belligerents. It is a mistake to suppose that "a treaty concluding a war cannot have any higher ethic than war itself." It may be absurd to say that a treaty between victors and vanquished is a free contract, as it is absurd to suppose that a contract for wages is a free contract if it is entered into by a capitalist and a starving labourer. The point, however, is that the situation which results is valid ethically upon the hypothesis that it rests upon the consent of the parties. The *jus postliminii* in International Law embodies the same conception that the results of force have no ethical or legal validity.

The results of war are important as the bricks and mortar are important to the intending builder: and our principles of ethical reconstruction must, therefore, have reference to what is likely to be left over. The principles themselves are not affected except in so far as it may or may not be possible to apply them. The ruin of the old house of social custom and belief is not yet complete, and we cannot tell exactly what material will be left to rebuild with if the war goes on for another ten years. We have lost already a large amount of genius and acquired ability: on the fifteen million dead, and the others maimed or mad, we cannot count. These and their children we should have had to build with in 1914, when social reconstruction was as necessary as it is to-day, although the necessity was not so generally perceived. We have lost also the emotions or the calm which once filled the places now defiled by national hatreds, false beliefs, and the disdain of simple and quiet life. But our losses are not easily counted, and may be left uncounted here. We have still, in April, 1917, some resources for rebuilding and some few gains which are the results of the ruin. It is a gain for a man to discover that he loves his children, even though he could only discover



it when his house was on fire. It is a gain for men to find that they can work together, even though only the danger to the ship that carries them can induce them to co-operate. And we have many more resources for rebuilding than our forefathers had a hundred years ago. We have a greater control of disease and a greater command of natural forces. There is a higher average of intelligence among the mass of the peoples. All this, however, is a question of fact; and we must now consider the principles upon which we should deal with such facts.

The general principles which should govern the situation we have in view are probably the two already selected. First, there is *Voluntaryism*. By that we mean the belief that a social situation is good in proportion as it allows for or promotes spontaneous individuality. And in that sense the fundamental problem of reconstruction is one of character or personality. The quality of a civilisation is to be estimated ethically by reference to the number and variety of the characters of fine quality which it produces: for civilisation cannot be judged ethically by reference to the ease by which it is administered or the power of each to do what he likes. But, with a view to social reconstruction, we must think of character as in some way dependent upon social structure. A society would not necessarily be good in which fine characters appeared by accident: nor should any society be allowed credit for the character of those who are in revolt against it. The England of his day should not be given credit for Shelley: nor should Heine be counted to the credit of his Germany. Again, a character of fine quality is one which is neither imposed upon from without nor seeks to impose itself upon others. The free play of all the higher activities of each man is the ultimate aim of ethical reconstruction, and therefore the foremost principle of social organisation.

Voluntaryism, however, must advance beyond the older Individualism. For there is a third possibility besides isolation and "tampering with the individuality of one's neighbour."

To have a will of your own does not involve owing nothing to anyone else. Independence is not isolation, and it is, indeed, difficult to distinguish from interdependence. Cain is generally believed by the approved authorities to have made a mistake when he seemed to deny that he was his brother's keeper. The principle of "non-interference" is not adequate: it is hopelessly negative and as such unethical; and in the relation of large groups, called states, it has been proved by experience to be profoundly immoral. A fine character, therefore, is not one which keeps away from others, but one which deliberately looks to others to get and to give. This is the second great ethical principle of reconstruction, and it may be called *Communism*. That is to say, a society is good ethically in which every member is able, to the limit of his capacity, to give to and to get from every other. The present situation is evil partly because men are not free to do for others all they might do if they were not compelled by commercialism to be egoists. We must embody in our social structure a more genuine sense of the social causes of all good and the social results of all action. The perception which many have derived from the immense evils of war must lead to a clearer vision of social life: the passengers who have learnt to be friendly during the storm must feel their common interest in the ship even when the storm is over.

The meaning of these ethical principles, however, is more clearly defined by reference to the methods by which they may affect action. There is, therefore, some more limited ethical principle which may guide us in attaining individual freedom and social co-operation: and that is a principle of method. For past experience not only indicates the sort of society which would be best, but also some of the means by which such a society may be brought into being. This does not mean that we can discover from history any economic or political formula which is easily applicable: but we can say in general terms that some methods have failed and some have not been tried.

A few thinkers might even argue that some methods have succeeded.

The immediate problem reduces itself not to that of making men virtuous but to that of establishing some form of organisation. Clearly the principles already admitted make it necessary that (1) organisation should not be superimposed, but should arise out of the spontaneous energy of individuals, and that (2) organisation should bring men together rather than keep them apart. But we must go further. Organisation must be considered (*a*) in the relation of man to man, and (*b*) in the relation of group to group.

(*a*) The organisation of the relations of individuals is ethically good, first, when every adult man and woman counts as equal in humanity. Differences of genius or strength or sex should not obscure the importance of a common humanity. To destroy the present domination of men over women, along with the equally pernicious clinging dependence of women upon men, seems to be ethically necessary. It is impossible to attain ethical reconstruction without economic and political changes: and the greatest obstacle to such advance is not that anyone objects to it, but that few, even among the victims of the present anarchy, strongly desire it. To accept ethical principles is mere sentimentalism unless they move us to vigorous action: and, therefore, our principle of method must be such that it catches the imaginations of men and women. The equality of men and women must be the basis for establishing the equal power of persons of all social classes to give as much as their intelligence or their strength will allow; and the destruction of castes will give place for reconstruction.

Secondly, in the relation of individuals the position of children must be changed. It is an ethical principle that the child should not be regarded as a deficient adult. And, indeed, there is more evil in the accepted habits of education than there is even in the accepted habits of marriage. The one lesson never taught is that of freedom to think and freedom

to act. But when the child is free the world will be rebuilt.

(b) In the relation of groups also there seem to be definite ethical principles which indicate the kind of organisation we should adopt; and in "groups" we mean to include every type of association—family, church, capitalist company, trade union, club, nation, and state. In the relation of some of these groups the ethical principle is already established and adhered to that no such group shall be judge in its own case, still less executioner of its own judgment. This principle must be extended. It must be made effective in the organisation of the relations of all groups. We must substitute for the method of anarchy in industry, strike and lock-out, ca-canny and exploitation, the real administration of a government which does not represent one of the parties to a possible dispute. Every group demands loyalty to the common end for which it exists, but no one loyalty is in every case supreme over all others. The interests of groups will occasionally be in conflict in any world that we can imagine, although it is mere nonsense to suppose that such conflicts are either continuous or inevitable. But our ethical principle of method will show that such conflicts should never be allowed to result in conflicts of force; and the only alternative is the establishment of an organisation which will embody what is usually called justice. As with individuals, so with groups, there are only two principles which can possibly govern their contact, one is that of contending forces and the other that of justice. Civilisation progresses by the effective establishment in organisation or in custom of this second principle.

The groups which are most important in view of ethical reconstruction are states; and for our present purpose we may omit the discussion of the relation of states to churches or trade unions, and concentrate our attention upon the relation of one state to another. In that sphere reconstruction is absolutely essential and the ethical principles upon which it should be

based are not obscure. Clearly a group of men united in one "sovereign" political administration is no more likely than any other kind of group to be a fair judge in cases which involve its own interests. Nor is a state any more likely than a trade union to be a good executioner of its own judgment as against other states. We should admit, therefore, that what is wrong at present is not the use of force as such but the use of force by the parties to a dispute. Force is only helpful ethically when it is *not* in the hands of those who will gain anything directly from the results of exercising it; otherwise the use of force destroys quite as much as it defends. There was indeed a dim ethical feeling in 1914 that those who used force for the maintenance of what they believed to be justice should not derive any economic or political gain from their possible success. But it now appears to be believed that if you are a virtuous policeman you may appropriate the possessions of others. This is not the embodiment of an ethical principle; it is the natural result of war. Therefore we need to establish some social situation in which each state shall *not* be able to regard itself as its own judge and executioner. And unless we establish some such situation we are but reconstructing for a new and more destructive war. Neither good wages nor good will can save us from a ruin which will leave not even the record of our hopes. Secondly, an ethical principle is involved in the known political progress from personal government to the rule of law. It is known that a law which is fixed or certain is better than the variable moods of a person, as a basis for social life. Institutions, therefore, have been our refuge from the caprice of persons, and the same principle holds good in regard to the relation of states. We must substitute for the caprice or even the benevolences of diplomacy some form of political organisation. We have reached the stage in which it is both necessary and possible to establish interstate organisation; and if the majority were not so politically apathetic and the politicians so politically unimaginative, it would be easy enough to put in

place of the capricious anarchy of diplomacy the organised rule of law in the relation of states. What is most pernicious ethically in the relation of states is that so much freedom is given to changing moods; and the moods are those of statesmen or citizens. We should not be misled by political mysticism into the belief that the state has a super-personal soul. Britannia is a reality, but the eyes she sees with are sometimes those of a journalist, and sometimes she squints. We do not any longer depend for the arrangement of the relations of individuals upon the character of the judge: why should we be so childish in our method for arranging the relations of states?

The ethical principles of method, then, involve the establishment of a league or union of states. Abstractly all states ought to be constituent parties in an organised rule of law: practically, since we are still primitive in our political conceptions, a few states must begin. The details of administration are not our concern here; but, whatever they are, they must involve (1) the removal (gradual or immediate) from every state of the power to judge and to execute judgment in its own case, and (2) the statement and continuous modification of the rules of law governing established governments.

Ethical principles have not yet begun seriously to affect the relation of one state to another, and they never will be effective until some few states are bold enough to recognise that the segregate state is an obsolete anomaly. But now, while men are seriously affected by the prevailing anarchy, we may establish the first interstate political system. All the homogeneity that is necessary for such a league is already in existence. It is not necessary to have homogeneity in the type of administration used by different members of the League; for within the British Empire there are greater differences than the difference between England and Germany. It is not necessary to have homogeneity of religion, since it has been recognised to be a waste of wood to burn heretics.

And, indeed, we have already an adequate amount of

intellectual and economic homogeneity. There is a definite and known relation between the values of goods in all parts of the world. Cotton unites men who are diverse in creed and speech. And men in strange parts may count chemistry heretical, but never yet has any man refused to use an electric lamp when he was given the chance. The fashion papers of Paris and Vienna in this third year of war show the same designs. And even if we had not thus adopted common customs in the use of common appliances, there would be no reason for delaying the establishment of interstate organisation. For to wait until the race is homogeneous before organising the relation of states is like waiting for men to be virtuous before directing them to drive on the left side of the road.

It is true that no definite and detailed political programme can be maintained as certainly the best. And it would be out of place here to set out a political scheme. But this does not imply that any political situation in the relation between states is equally valuable or important ethically: for the actions of states, that is to say of agents or of citizens, are human actions, and they are therefore to be estimated by reference to ethical principles. Only a fool would suppose that the action of a state is like a thunderstorm or the course of a tide, absolved from ethical criticism because it is part of a world process. And since the actions of a state can be judged ethically, it is an ethical necessity that the application of such a judgment should be made easier by the establishment of some organisation which may stand for justice without any interests of its own to serve. The alternative need not be described in detail: it is an increasing segregation of all states in deliberate and more skilful preparation for another war, and after that for another. The evil appears so immense to any vivid imagination that no plea of difficulty should induce us to defer the attempt to establish some form of league. That is practical policy. The greater truth remains, that no ethical reconstruction is secure which does not involve, as one of its reforms,

the substitution of the rule of law for the capricious egoism of political sovereignties. And if the rule of law governed the relation of states, we should see the first beginning of that true humanity of which the history of the past has given us an occasional hope.

For war has not displaced commercialism, but only clothed it in a disguise so subtle as to deceive even a dramatist. It has, indeed, in many instances, changed the meanness of the everyday struggle of individuals into the greater Imperial effort for markets; and for simple men it may be a gain to be high-minded and unconscious instruments in a vast commercialism rather than meanly conscious agents in suburban trade. But the ethical practice of humanity at large is not improved by war. We seek, then, in our reconstruction, that men, women, and children should be free at last from the continual danger of being flung back into primitive savagery. We seek freedom from that anarchy which compels us to join in the brute effort to preserve bare life, freedom to think of finer issues than a dog-fight or a pugilistic encounter, and freedom above all to judge for ourselves what actions are necessary for the ends we value most. We seek freedom from the enforcement of an irresponsible obedience, by which the majority become tools in the hands of the few, as they always must when war and the preparation for war are conceived as the highest service of the state. If, therefore, we cannot destroy for ever the possibility of war, our social reconstruction must at least diminish its frequency, because of the moral degradation by which it is invariably accompanied.

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IV.—*By* H. D. OAKELEY.

The method of treating the question under consideration followed in the last two contributions to the discussion appears to be determined by the belief that no ideal of social progress can go far towards realisation unless adopted by all nations, this having been demonstrated by the present war. The question with which they are mainly or largely concerned is, therefore, the international question: By what means so to reform the relations of states as to prevent the recurrence of wars which make vain the hope of any enduring reconstruction. This question, although of the first importance, does not seem to be the first question for the special purpose of this discussion. From one point of view personal reconstruction comes before social, and social before international. Looking deeper, however, we see that the abstraction of personal from social is false, but not that of social from international. In taking the society of the state as a unit of a certain kind, we are dealing with a reality. Within the national society relations prevail, however imperfectly, which enable us to forecast the ethical results of new social constructions. Whether we rely chiefly upon "voluntaryism" or chiefly upon "communism," we have in the community of the state to do with a being which has grown out of first immaturity; we have something to build upon. The conception of a society of states is, on the other hand, at present unreal. In principle, all persons have relations with all other persons. But the conditions of human history have limited the bearing of this principle, and it has only been fully actualised within the limits of certain groups, of which the chief are nation-states. It follows that when we are considering principles of social reconstruction we cannot regard the problem of international reconstruction as prior, though recognising that social reconstruction within any national society will be insecure until similar principles are acted upon in other states. On the other hand, any improvement in the relations of states

will be very transient unless brought about by motives more vital or persistent, or more likely to have similar effects on different peoples, in varying circumstances, than the motives suggested in the second paper, *e.g.*, fear of a repetition of the war. Such improvement will in the long run be possible only if the social spirit within the several states is developed and intensified to the point at which it must pass far beyond present limits, and become a reality also in the relations of states.

In the first paper, however, the argument is directed by the view that the war must be regarded as a conflict of social principles, each of which will stand or fall with the victory or defeat of that group of belligerents which represents it. Thus the controversies of social reformers within the state are conceived as referred to the vast arena of the world war, and the issue whether the principle of state-authority or of individualism is for some time to come to determine the form to be assumed by social life hangs upon the result of this combat. In reply to this contention, it might, perhaps, be suggested that the future will continue to surprise the present as the present surprises the past. It is not inconceivable that the victory of state-autocracy appearing in its most sinister aspect should be its own death-blow—at least, not less conceivable than the consummation so devoutly wished by some industrial and educational reformers that the victory of the principle of freedom should bring about in its native home the worship of organisation. The proposition in the third paper that a conflict of force is no test of ethical value may be taken as a commentary on the view of the first in regard to the conflict of principles. Nothing could be more obvious. The nature of the good is not affected by the phenomenal course of human history. Practically, however, it appears to be true that certain expressions of the good may cease to have any representation in human life for thousands of years, because the particular forms in which they were embodied have lost their spatial and temporal existence, and it is on this truth of

fact that the position of the first paper evidently rests. A species possessing such-and-such qualities has not survived because not fitted to its environment. Since all our values are not derived from the value of survival, we must agree with the third paper in not changing our belief in the goodness of the quality, but also with the first, in holding the fact of its disappearance from the stage of human history to be of supreme practical importance. It does not belong to this discussion to consider whether a defence of principle loses its purity by accepting the arm of physical force. But, as this assumption seems to underlie the arguments of the second and the third papers, it may be pointed out that, though force does nothing to prove the principle, it is difficult to deny that in this sorry scheme of things it may keep alive the principle. If a nation has a personality, it would seem to follow that a voluntary martyr-nation might in perishing be the ultimate salvation of other nations, and so give eternal life to its principle. Yet this possibility must be ruled out by the fact that the analogy between the state and the individual breaks down at the crucial point, since the kind and degree of unity necessary for the morality of the act does not exist in the spiritual being of the nation. In another more subtle sense than that above referred to, the war has been conceived as a conflict of social principles, viz., of distinct conceptions of progress existing within present-day civilization, of which the one in full vigour of life before the war has been depressed during its course, and the other, previously struggling for existence, has now gained some strength. In this conception the war is an inevitable outcome of the dominant tendencies of modern societies. The creed as to national greatness which has grown out of those tendencies, and the philosophy which rationalises them, have been more uncompromisingly accepted by the Germanic Powers than by others, but they have had influence everywhere in recent generations. These tendencies, as pointed out in the

second and third papers, have been within societies causes of dissensions very ignoble by comparison with the war of states. The view, which seems to be implied in these papers, that the war can be entirely explained as the product of commercialism seems, however, to involve an abstraction analogous to the abstraction of the older economists, in their theory of the economic motivation of human behaviour in industrial life. The impression is due possibly to the tendency to look at the relations between states through our social spectacles. For commercialism alone may be the source of a war spirit between different elements of a single society, since amongst members of the same community, it works with more bitterness, because more concentrated and more visible.

To resume. In the course of the last three years there has undoubtedly arisen, at least amongst the peoples of the "Allied Nations," whose undercurrents of thought we are alone in a position to appreciate, a consciousness that in the present experience we may read a notification that the unseen basis of modern civilization is crumbling. The poverty and barrenness of its standards have been revealed, and a different conception of progress has come to possess men's minds. In this light the question whether the latter conception is to endure and effectively to expunge or control the lower ideal and direct future efforts at reconstruction becomes the most vital question for social regeneration. Here, then, again, the international and social issues may seem to fuse, though not quite in the obvious way suggested in the first paper. The conflict will be fought out within each society, whilst in the panorama of the war it may be read in a gigantic parable. The importance of the international position in relation to reconstruction within the society or the state appears again from the consideration that there are certain ethical principles which cannot be realised within any one of the societies commercially related, unless all the others will agree upon them. But an agreement which involves a profound modification of the every-

day motives and behaviour of individuals will not be brought about or endure, merely through fear of the renewal of an event which, unthinkable as the suggestion may be to us now, may itself be unthinkable a generation or two hence. For

"Green earth forgets,  
The hungry generations mask her grief."

Only

"the gods forget not . . .  
By their great memories the gods are known."\*

The principles of reconstruction must then have some consideration apart from the international question, and the point of view may be taken from the last paragraph of the second contribution. What will be new after the war, we are told, will be not a new ethic or a new philosophy, but a new practical possibility of realising our ethics and philosophy. Is not this sufficient? Are we in need of finer patterns of the state or visions of the perfect society than philosophy has scattered in profusion over the firmament of thought? Is it only the power to bring them down from heaven to earth which has been lacking, and is no greater idealism needed than the belief that certain social reforms which idealists have demanded will become practical politics? It may be agreed that the revelation of unrealised or forgotten forces in man which has recently been given affords new hope of the practicability of a social regeneration which would mean "a new heaven and a new earth." Proceeding from this starting point, a speculation may be hazarded out of which to draw a hypothesis to go upon, viz., that the present is one of the few scenes of the turning-points of history, when unsuspected forces come into play, and the changeless logic of the human brain works with changed premises. A new religion, as in the beginning of the Christian era or the end of the Middle Ages, when the new comprehension of freedom of thought and spirit worked as a religious passion, is best fitted to usher in such

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\* "Ode to France."—G. Meredith.

new ages. But they may also come unheralded by such discoveries of a universal in relation to which all particulars are transformed. They may be the result of some extraordinary practical experience. It is assumed, then, that the present experience is the beginning of such an epoch, or that the effect of present events on thought, feeling, and will, will set men freer to shape afresh the foundations of social life.

Philosophy would do much if it could show, as it has never shown before, how the principle of the good is to be translated into actuality. There are times when the habitual estimates and measurements of history are seen to have but a partial reality, and we are not so bound down by the *axiomata media*, which give interpretations sufficient for customary life, as to be blind to evidence that these must be overpassed. The philosophic student of history should admit the possibility of rapid changes in the depths as well as on the surface of social life, or that the passage of a people or mankind into a new mental climate is not inconceivable. Whether or not philosophy gives this freedom to the few, history itself may give it to the many, when "ideas have hands and feet." On the hypothesis provisionally adopted, the virtue most demanded for social reconstruction would be courage, intellectual and moral—courage to take the moment offered, and see our dogmas in the light of wider principles, not fearing if in that light we also meet with dogmas supposed to be most hostile to our own. The practical question is how to utilise the force for reform which *ex hypothesi* exists, without allowing it to be exhausted, or at best diminished, through the efforts of different schools to turn it in diverse directions. What is to be sought is a basis of agreement as to the end desired, on which the various movements may be able to proceed in common. Moreover, if there is such a basis capable of acceptance without sacrifice of essentials by any true reformer, this would in itself be additional confirmation of the postulate that we have arrived at a turning-point in history.

Such a basic principle is to be discovered in almost all the social doctrines and constructive efforts of the present day, as well as in the thoughts of ordinary men. It may be described in one way as a new understanding of the principle of personality, which goes so much deeper than the sixteenth century affirmation of freedom of thought and will, is so much more positive and universal than this, as to mark a new chapter in the spiritual history of humanity. Recognition of this principle is the keynote of the first paper. The opposition in that paper between the scope for the development of personality under Individualism and under a system of State-control may seem to be supported by a good deal of modern experience. Yet the opportunity for personality cannot be regarded as identical with the opportunities offered under an individualistic social system, since *laissez-faire* has been shown by experience to be very inadequate to the general attainment of conditions necessary to the unimpeded growth of personality. Respect for the principle of personality is also to be found in the third contribution, especially in the estimate of the relations of Voluntarism to Communism, and the criterion indicated of a good organisation—that it should “arise out of the spontaneous energy of individuals.” In the recognition also in the second paper of “the rights of civilised communities to be governed according to their own lights,” there would seem to be logically implied admission of the right of all members of those communities to that complete individual development which is essential to the existence of a real general will. It must be noted, however, that no community of free persons could submit to a system of compulsory labour.

The special character of the present-day demand for freedom is well expressed by Mr. Bertrand Russell in his recent book,\* *i.e.*, in the thesis that the cause of social reconstruction depends upon the giving of full scope to the creative

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\* *Principles of Social Reconstruction.*

impulses in man. This interpretation brings out the new strength acquired for the principle of personality, both in conception and in practical expression. It involves the demand for conditions which will give true freedom to human energy to work positively in society, a demand now made to a more universal extent than ever before, if in more or less obscure forms. Appreciation of this fact is expressed in the social philosophy both of individualists and of socialists. It is found in the gaining prominence and profounder meaning of the ideal of equality of opportunity in Individualism. In the newer forms of socialism the emphasis is no longer so exclusively on the improvement of material conditions through raising the standard of wages, equalisation of payment, etc., as on the change to a system which would give the worker a positive freedom through the consciousness that he is organising his own activities, "the ideal of enabling men somehow to express in the daily work of their hands some part of that infinite and subtle personality which lives in each one of them."\* In the Syndicalist philosophy of M. Sorel, it also appears that the ultimate ground of the advocacy of the class-war, and the "myth" of the General Strike, is the belief that only by these means are the producers to maintain a heroic view of life, and to preserve their own ideal, their class-personality, their real will. Strife is advocated because spiritual vitality is supposed to depend on it.† It is the same principle seen through a somewhat distorting medium.

In philosophy something of the same idea is possibly expressed in M. Bergson's doctrine of Free-will, a doctrine which, compared with that of Kant, is more positive. It is Kant's transcendent will, at last realised and at work in the phenomenal world.

These interpretations of the spirit of the age do not appear strange or fantastic, because we meet with it in simpler

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\* G. D. T. Cole, *World of Labour*.

† Cf. *Reflections on Violence*, G. Sorel.



expression, or rather we meet in common experience with the data on which the interpretations are based. A truer psychology or philosophy of human nature will demonstrate the great and almost universal force, when allowed free play, of the motives which arouse the creative energy of man, or appeal to his creative instinct, the transformation brought about in personality when what may be called the real will comes into action. It is not very difficult to conceive a society in which the conditions of life would allow to all a far higher degree of free activity than has hitherto prevailed. As practical illustration of the feeling of present-day society might be taken the attitude of reformers from many stand-points of thought and action towards the problem of Juvenile Employment. It is not the fact that so much attention is being at last concentrated on this problem which is of great significance. Whatever conception of progress is adopted, it is obvious that the years from fourteen to eighteen are the years in which the history of the coming generation is being mainly decided. What is of significance is the consensus of the most thoughtful working-men and employers of labour, educational and social reformers, and Governmental Committees\* on the principle that this period of life ought not to be treated mainly from the economic standpoint, but that the human being has at this time a right to the social and educational opportunities which will enable him to put forth his whole moral and intellectual force in after-life.

To sum up. The chief reason for hope that the ethical foundations of social reconstruction after the war will have some stability lies in the fact acknowledged by those who agree on little else that the force necessary for reconstruction exists now, at least in some measure, together with the fact that there is also a very general agreement amongst those opposed in other

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\* Cf. (1) *Final Report of the Departmental Committee on Juvenile Education in Relation to Employment after the War*; (2) *Educational Reconstruction—Proposals of the Workers' Educational Association*.

respects, on the question *which* ethical principle should be taken as essential. To this it may be added that this central principle, if even partially realised, should from its own nature keep living and growing the force for social reconstruction.

A forecast as to probable social reforms based on this view of agreement on the central principle would suggest that some antagonisms of social reformers would be found to be not ultimate. The Individualist, recognising that there must be persons who are individuals in every sense of the term in the society which is to be a "Kingdom of Ends," will, without fear of bureaucracy, admit the action of the state where necessary to remove the conditions hostile to individual development, whilst the Socialist will recognise at what point the means he advocates defeat the end at which he really aims.

As regards the projects of supernational combinations or leagues of states discussed in the second and third papers as brought into the sphere of practical politics by the horror of war which will follow the war, it appears that the agreements on which these unions would rest, even though "the organised rule of law" be substituted for "the moods of statesmen or citizens," would shrivel up like similar agreements of more restricted scope, unless held together by bonds that will constantly grow in vitality and strength. The rule of law has only the strength given to it by the wills which are its source, and any organised force behind it is also dependent on will. If we put our trust in such agreements alone we appear to be accepting in the international sphere the assumption of Hobbes in the political, that the right of the individual to use his hand against the hand of every other individual, if given up to a common sovereign from motives of fear or self-interest, will not be reclaimed when motives on the same plane are at work, and opportunity arises. Out of this fatal cycle, men escape in the development of society when their eyes are opened and their wills adjusted to the fact that they are "by nature" social beings. For an analogous discovery in the international

sphere we can prepare by developing, to a far deeper intensity, the force which makes for unity within every existing society. This is not to suggest any postponement of the efforts to form inter-state organizations. It is merely to affirm the view that, in whatever way they are originally motivated, social reconstruction will be the source of their lasting success. In the most recent public utterance of "the great philosopher statesman," referred to in the second paper (to which in this later contribution there is an opportunity of alluding), it is said that "a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by the partnership of democratic nations. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honour steady to the common end." Democracy has not always been the guardian of peace. But the saying seems true if it be granted that freedom of spirit must also be realised in a deeper sense than it has been in the past in the various nations which are to form the concert. Conversely international peace will not contribute to social peace unless international unity is itself the result of social ideals.

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## XI.—THE BASIS OF CRITICAL REALISM.

By G. DAWES HICKS.

- § 1. *Introduction.—The Term "Critical Realism."*
- § 2. *Can Realism Dispense with a Theory of Knowledge?*
- § 3. *The Nature of Cognition.*
- § 4. *The Two-Fold Character of the Act of Perceiving.*
- § 5. *"Acquaintance" and "Description."*
- § 6. *Minds and Things.*
- § 7. *Conclusion.*

### § 1. *Introduction.—The Term "Critical Realism."*

THE term "realism" has been sufficiently prominent of late in philosophical discussion. It has attached itself, with or without their concurrence, to the line of thought that is being developed by Mr. Russell and Dr. Moore; it has been deliberately adopted by Professor Alexander for the strikingly original metaphysical theory he has been engaged for some years in working out and expounding; and the "neo-realism" of the six American essayists has been eliciting no less attention on this than on the other side of the Atlantic. I have no fondness for the title. Like all such labels in philosophy it seems to me usually more misleading than helpful; but I make use of it on the present occasion as perhaps, on the whole, best adapted to indicate the tendency of the set of considerations I am proposing to bring forward. Let me beg it to be understood, however, that, within the limits of a single paper, I can do little else than sketch the outlines of a point of view that has not been reached in a day, and must rest content often with the mere statement of positions which, under other circumstances, would properly call for justification. If I succeed in making clear that a coherent account of experience may be sought along the track I shall follow, it will be as much as I can hope to do.

Realism, as Professor Perry has defined it, stands for the principle that "things may be, and are, directly experienced without owing either their being or their nature to that circumstance."\* Provided no special interpretation be put on the phrase "directly experienced," I am prepared to accept this statement as a general description of the standpoint I wish to maintain; or, more accurately, of the result towards which various paths of reflexion seem to me to lead.

At the outset, it is worth while to remind ourselves that realism, in the sense indicated, is no novelty or new discovery in philosophical speculation. Long prior to the writings of any of the authors to whom I have alluded, there had been coming to light a steadily increasing recognition of the inadequacy of the central thought of the earlier idealist systems and of the *impasse* in front of which they appeared to be at a stand. I am not now referring to Thomas Reid and his followers. The so-called "natural realism" of the Scotch Common-sense School, with its reiterated appeals to the instinctive belief of the unsophisticated intelligence, disposed of the "way of ideas" in far too rough-and-ready a fashion to satisfy the demands of exact and methodical inquiry, although it is not to be forgotten that the acute and critical mind of Henry Sidgwick found in the philosophical work of Reid many features that seemed to him of enduring interest. I am thinking rather of a number of patient investigators who, whilst imbued with the lesson of Kant and Hegel, came to see that the place assigned to Nature in the idealist systems of the nineteenth century was unsatisfactory and impossible. The discrepancy between the large conceptions of the idealist systems and the important results which the special sciences were accumulating in such abundance came perhaps first into due prominence through the labours of Lotze. It has been said of Lotze's philosophical views as a whole that his is after all only a half-

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\* *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 315.

philosophy, and the estimate is doubtless a true estimate. But Lotze combined in singular measure the speculative instinct of the constructive metaphysician with the cautious attitude of the trained scientific inquirer, and the numerous detailed researches undertaken by him prepared the way for a more radical change in the interpretation of experience than he himself discerned. If, in the long run, he offered a final reading of the universe in terms of ethical idealism, yet "it is," he was convinced, "only inquiries conducted in the spirit of realism that will satisfy the wishes of idealism." The estimate I have just quoted of Lotze's philosophy as a whole is that of Professor Adamson, and Adamson may not unfairly be said to have remodelled and carried on much of Lotze's work. Like Lotze, he brought to the treatment of philosophical problems a profound and intimate acquaintance with the entire history of speculation and a critical faculty of rare power and depth. He had thought through every detail of the Kantian and post-Kantian systems, and, although he never had complete confidence in the Hegelian metaphysic, he certainly approached the questions of philosophy with more than "the companionable feeling," which he acknowledged to be his later, towards idealism. "For him," as Professor Sorley puts it, "the Copernican change consisted in displacing self-consciousness from the position it occupies in every system of idealism." Nothing in its way is more significant in the history of recent thought than the set of reasons that gradually led to that change. Adamson came to see, for example, that it was only in so far as the distinction marked by space and its absence was recognised by consciousness that a subject, in any intelligible sense of the word, was possible at all; that it was, therefore, reversing the real order of development to regard space as in any way a condition imposed by the subject on the contents of his experience. He came to see that, since the time-relation applied not merely to the contents supposed to be arranged by the subject but to the successive

processes of the subject's own mental life whereby those contents are apprehended, it must be pronounced an inconceivable thought that the subject invests the contents of his experience with time as a form which has only subjective significance. He came to see that it was the constancy of connexion exhibited amongst the elements of experience which first suggests the notion of cause; that it could not, therefore, be the notion of cause which first makes objective experience possible. In short, Adamson was driven to the conclusion, that throughout what the idealists had been taking to be the logical conditions of experience—viz., the general and abstract—are, in point of fact, the late results of experience—our interpretations, in other words, of those constancies of conjunction in the material of experience which constitute what we call the laws of real fact. And in the long run, it seemed to him, the basis of all logical necessity is the necessity of fact. A somewhat similar line of reflexion is pursued by Professor Hobhouse in his careful and suggestive work on *The Theory of Knowledge*. Quite in accordance with the thought of Adamson, Professor Hobhouse contends that the mistake of natural or intuitive realism was to start with the assumption that the independence of the object is immediately given, whilst the mistake of any subjective idealism was to assume that the object is first given as inward. In truth, he argues, it is not given as either. It is given as a content present to an inward state, but the distinction between inner and outer, or between subject and object, gradually comes to recognition in the course of mental evolution. At no point in the development of knowledge do we discover thought as such determining the nature of the reality which it thinks. Each judgment claims to be true of reality, and makes that claim on the ground of its special relation to the given. "The understanding makes knowledge, but it does not make nature." So, too, the various writings of Professor Fullerton, particularly his exhaustive work entitled *A System of Metaphysics*, are

devoted to the task of unfolding a view of nature and mind that is, in general, in conformity with the trend of thought I have been indicating. And I think it may be claimed that much of Shadworth Hodgson's *Metaphysic of Experience* tends in the same direction. Nor should one neglect to mention the name of Professor Lossky, whose valuable analysis of the nature of judgment makes unmistakably for epistemological conclusions of a like import.

The movement I have thus rapidly traced is a distinctive movement in philosophy,—a movement that for nearly half a century has been consistently progressing and maturing, and before which “the long and difficult path of facts,” that Adamson declared to be the only road to philosophic truth, lies open instead of being more or less closed as, I think, it came to be for the earlier idealism.\* Nevertheless, the movement in question may be looked upon as a perfectly legitimate development of what is contained in the “constructive speculation” of the period immediately preceding its own. Unlike the “neo-realism” now so much in evidence, it was no reversion to pre-Kantian modes of philosophising, but was carrying on the traditions of the critical method. To a large extent, the very premisses upon which it was proceeding were an inheritance from the long labour of the post-Kantian idealists. For one thing, the old arguments advanced by Berkeley in favour of idealism had been thoroughly sifted by Hegel and by such thinkers as T. H. Green; and the “objective idealism” of the nineteenth century had aimed, at all events, to free itself from the subjectivism that dogged the footsteps even of Kant. Nor would it require any long search in the recent literature of idealism to come across lines of reflexion from which a transition to realism of the type I have been depicting would be but

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\* I mean that the subordination of all fact to the conditions of thought tended so to emphasise the importance of the latter as to make it appear as though the detailed investigation of particular kinds of fact were of comparatively slight philosophical significance.



a short advance. "Idealism," writes one of its most distinguished representatives, "in dealing with the higher life of reason, has been intent merely upon the affinity of all objects with spirit. It is still occupied in endeavouring to reduce all things into spirit: it is trying to show that every natural object, and every atomic part of every natural object, and, I suppose, every point in space and every instant of time, if they are real, must be spiritual realities, that is, conscious or feeling centres. It is *assumed* that only in this way can the world be proved to be spiritual and the last dualism be overcome. And it is certainly not realised that if idealism succeeded in this enterprise and reduced all things into feeling, it would then be obliged either to content itself with a world without distinctions, or to evolve out of feeling the difference it had deleted. In part, this abstract idealism is not explaining the world of objects, but explaining it away."\* And he goes on to argue that its spiritualisation of the world will remain barren until it reinstates the variety of real being, and recognises that space, time, matter, and natural objects have each a real nature of their own. "Every object, in the degree in which it is known, is found," he adds, "to possess qualities of its own; and, in the degree in which it is understood, takes its place in a necessary order."

I have, then, I hope, sufficiently indicated the trend of thought towards which this paper is a contribution, and I need offer no further explanation of the term "critical" than the foregoing remarks and those of the next section will provide. In many crucial respects, what is currently called the "new realism" seems to me to be drifting into the very subjectivism it was intended to avoid, and I shall try to bring out the significance of certain positions I hold to be essential by contrasting them with those taken by the writers who have associated themselves with the "new realism."

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\* Sir Henry Jones, *The Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, pp. 77-8.

§ 2. *Can Realism Dispense with a Theory of Knowledge?*

Professor Marvin, the author of the opening essay in *The New Realism*, strenuously insists that the movement in question is "a return to dogmatism," and even suggests that its more appropriate title would be "neo-dogmatism." "Metaphysics should be emancipated from epistemology"—such is the thesis which he endeavours at some length to substantiate. A theory of knowledge is, he argues, no more logically fundamental to metaphysics than it is to the other sciences, for the actual conditions of valid knowledge can only be determined on the basis of data furnished by logic, physics, psychology, and metaphysics. Only inductively and empirically can it be shown either what knowledge is possible, or how it is possible, or what are the limits of our knowledge; only from the vantage ground of actual scientific achievement can we scrutinize the truth of our positive knowledge. Furthermore, no light can be thrown by epistemology upon the nature of the existent world or upon the fundamental postulates and generalisations of science, except in so far as the knowledge of one natural event or object enables us at times to make inferences regarding certain others; instead of furnishing the basis for a theory of reality, epistemology always presupposes some theory of reality in order to make headway at all. The source of any genuine theory of reality is positive science, and the business of the metaphysician is to think through, to make explicit, and to organise the theory of reality which the scientists are implicitly entertaining.

Now, if epistemology be supposed to have for its subject-matter knowledge or ideas as distinct from reality, and to have as its problem to inquire whether and how far from these assumed entities a transition can be made to things as actual existences, then I readily admit not only that such an inquiry is not "fundamental," but that it has no claim whatsoever to rank as a science. It would, however, be a sheer blunder

to identify the critical method with an "epistemology" of that description. The contrast drawn by Kant between his own method and that of the empirical school ought in itself to be sufficient to guard against such a misinterpretation.

Not only so, Kant neither raised any doubt as to whether knowledge is possible nor instituted any inquiry designed to test the legitimacy of such doubt.\* The problem with which the Kantian philosophy took its start was not *whether* knowledge is possible, but *how* knowledge is possible. The idea that the critical method, as Kant conceived it, was necessary in order "to show that we can know the trees, the birds, the rocks, the earth, and the stars"† is such an extraordinary caricature of the critical standpoint that it leaves one gasping in a vain attempt to imagine what unhappy phrase in the *Critique* can be responsible for it. Our ordinary common-sense experience of the world of nature and the world of mind, the systematised bodies of knowledge represented by the mathematical and physical sciences,—these were assumed by Kant as data that everyone admits, and he never dreamed of undertaking to demonstrate *that* they were possible.‡ What he proposed to do was to inspect knowledge in its character as apprehensive of fact, and to determine not the laws under which it is gradually attained, but the conditions implied in its

\* Dr. Bosanquet seems rather to countenance this misconception when, in describing the change in spirit which came about with the development of post-Kantian speculative philosophy, he writes:—"All difficulties about the general possibility—the possibility in principle—of apprehending reality in knowledge and perception were flung aside as antiquated lumber. What was undertaken was the direct adventure of knowing; of shaping a view of the universe which would include and express reality in its completeness."—(*Phil. R.*, January, 1917, p. 8.)

† *New Realism*, p. 62.

‡ Respecting pure mathematics and natural science, Kant writes:—"Von diesen Wissenschaften, da sie wirklich gegeben sind, lässt sich nun wohl geziemend fragen: Wie sie möglich sind; denn *dass* sie möglich sein müssen, wird durch ihre Wirklichkeit bewiesen."—(*Kritik*, B. 20.)

nature. The "dogmatism" to which he objected was not the naïve dogmatism, if the expression be permissible, incident to experiencing or knowing as such, but the metaphysical dogmatism which consisted in abstracting notions from the context in which their use is quite unimpeachable and applying them, without prior investigation, to a subject-matter in regard to which they may become wholly unintelligible and meaningless. The conceptions of substance and attribute, of ground and consequent, of cause and effect, and the like, had justified their position in the realm of experience by the functions they there perform, but, until their precise import and significance are determined, to employ them as likewise unconditionally valid in dealing with the universe in its totality seemed to Kant both unscientific and unphilosophical.

Professor Marvin's polemic against the critical method appears to me, therefore, misdirected. Kant did not claim that a theory of knowledge is "fundamental" in the sense in which his critic represents him as doing so. "A science of the mere criticism of pure reason, its sources and limits," was a propædæutic not to the special sciences, but to metaphysics, and explicitly to the metaphysics which was then prevalent. Thus, for example, when it was attempted to prove that the soul is immortal since it is a simple entity, and therefore irresolvable into a plurality of elements, the argument must remain an airy fabric without solidity or foundation, because the prior question had been left out of consideration, whether, namely, such a notion as substance can have any meaning except as applied to a composite object in space. Or, when Locke attempted to establish the existence of God by the "evident demonstration that from eternity there has been something," he was interpreting the relation between God and the universe in terms of causality, without having previously asked himself whether the conception of cause is a legitimate conception in a context beyond the range of sense-experience, and, consequently, his reasoning evinces itself as barren. In

the most explicit terms, Kant points out that *for their own* safety and certainty, neither mathematics nor natural science had any occasion for such a critical investigation as he desiderated, seeing that the former rests upon its own evidence, and the latter upon experience and its thorough confirmation. It was not for themselves, but for the sake of another science, viz., metaphysics, that both these sciences stood in need of the inquiry in question.\* Doubtless he did mean to assert that *ultimately* the special sciences are dependent for their truth upon the logical conditions which knowledge itself implies, but this assertion relates not to the specific truths which form the body of these sciences; it relates to the fundamental principles which they rightly take for granted, and which it is the business of philosophy to justify.

The question, then, is whether Kant was right in insisting upon the *philosophical* importance of a theory of knowledge, and in assigning to it, so far as philosophy is concerned, the fundamental position he did. Let it be noted that the question does not at all relate, as apparently Professor Marvin takes it to relate, to the temporal order in which the various branches of philosophy may best be pursued, but solely to the systematic order—an order, that is to say, corresponding to the nature of the subject-matter under investigation. And in respect to the systematic order, there is, it seems to me, but one principle of distribution which can be legitimately followed,—the fundamental department of philosophy must be that which involves the relatively least complex conceptions, and which handles what all the other departments of philosophy of necessity involve. Now, in the philosophical treatment of any order of facts—whether those of outer nature or those of the mental life—the thinker employs notions and depends upon general principles, the consideration of which, while naturally of the most abstract character, must, nevertheless, in strict logical

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\* *Prolegomena*, § 40.

sequence, precede the more concrete studies. Epistemology most assuredly cannot "give a theory of reality," but any "theory of reality" will certainly remain a dubious structure, until the conceptions that have been used in framing it have been examined and tested.\*

Nothing, I think, can be clearer than that the whole fabric of "neo-realism," as a metaphysical theory, rests upon and presupposes certain definite conceptions as to the nature of knowledge; and it is, in itself, a noteworthy circumstance that a volume which starts with demanding "the emancipation of metaphysics from epistemology" should, in the sequel, be mainly composed of efforts to provide an epistemological basis for the metaphysical doctrine it is written to expound. Even though the "ultimate crucial test" of all our theories, metaphysical and other, be, as Professor Marvin believes, "perception," and even though it be granted that "perception," as he contends, "simply is"—that is to say, is *ipso facto* an apprehension of reality—yet that assumption does not exonerate us from the task of inquiring how the act of perceiving is related to the object perceived and what is involved in such relation. If logical, mathematical, and physical complexes are independent of consciousness, that "independence" is just as much in need of the epistemological proof which Professor Perry, for instance, tries to give,† as is the opposite contention of idealism. And if these complexes, despite their independence, may become objects of knowledge, this means, as Professor Perry further recognises, that in being known any such complex "enters into a system which is internally determined," and must conform to "the conditions which knowledge

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\* In a footnote (p. 45) Professor Marvin tells us that under the term metaphysics he includes two subjects: (a) the study of the logical foundations of the sciences; (b) the theory of reality. I fail to see what the former of these subjects can consist of, if not of the problems I have been indicating.

† *New Realism*, p. 126 sqq.

imposes."\* Is it not obvious, then, that a "realistic theory of independence" will be left hanging in the air, until those conditions have been ascertained and their compatibility with the theory made manifest? So, again, even though, on the ground that "cognition is not the universal condition of being," it be allowed that "cognition must take its place within being, on the same plane as space, or number, or physical nature,"† yet our only approach to "being" is through the avenue of cognition, and the fact, if fact it be, that cognition is on the same plane with other things that are, or have being, does not absolve us from the necessity of inquiring into its nature, as an essential preliminary to the philosophical account we may have to offer of those other things. The very circumstance that, within the sphere of ordinary experience, the distinction between true and false plays the part it does is surely in itself a sufficient warrant for the contention that until the significance of that distinction has been made the subject of investigation, it is vain to speculate upon what is called the "ultimate truth of things." And the very circumstance that, within the sphere of natural science, it is possible to apply categories wrongly is surely in itself a sufficient warrant for insisting that a metaphysical employment of those categories needs some justification for their extended use.

I conclude, therefore, that an analysis of knowledge in its widest sense, a critical examination of the conceptions by which we endeavour to interpret the world, is in no way rendered superfluous for philosophy because we see reason for thinking that "the nature of things is not to be sought primarily in the nature of knowledge." Whether the group of problems which thus arise be described as epistemological, logical, or metaphysical, is a matter of small import; the important thing is to recognise that they have got to be faced, if we are to understand,

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 133.

† *Ibid.*, p. 33.

so far as may be given to us, the nature and significance of the universe in which we find ourselves.

### § 3. *The Nature of Cognition.*

Perhaps no feature in Kant's analysis of experience was more distinctly a new departure than his singling out the characteristic of objectivity as that which presented the central problem for the theory of knowledge. Why was it that that which is known *stands over against* the knowing subject, and is recognised as other than and distinct from the act of knowing? How came it that a subjective activity, be it produced or not produced by the influence of some external reality, should carry with it the unique characteristic—reference to an object?

It will be sufficient to recall very briefly the Kantian solution of this problem. Sense-data, received into the pure *a priori* forms of intuition, Space and Time, are apprehended as constituents of objects in consequence of being wrought into the texture of experience through means of the categories, or pure notions of the understanding. The object cognised is, that is to say, essentially a complex of heterogeneous factors; and, in and by the process of cognising, a conjunction or synthesis of these factors is effected. The process involves, in the first place, the manifold of sense-material—sense-presentations, or impressions, not *as such* cognisable, and devoid of any power to group or arrange themselves. These particular *a posteriori* elements Kant seems often inclined to say are given through the action of real things upon the faculty of sensibility. The process involves, in the second place, two general forms into which the manifold of sense-data is received. As universal conditions of sense-perception, the forms of Space and Time, although sensuous in character, do not belong to any sense, nor are they, although general, concepts or notions. They are pure *a priori* forms of intuition—ways in which any intelligence that is like ours sensuously



affected *must* receive what is thus given. The process involves, in the third place, the rules or principles according to which the given elements of sense are combined, and, in being combined, are cognised. The manifold of sense-material is, in itself, a mere *ἄπειρον*, a merely indifferent mass of disjointed particulars; it can become content of knowledge only through being brought into relation with the unity of consciousness, the one identity in the midst of difference. The supreme unity in experience is the unity of self-consciousness, and, as referred to this unity, the data of sense have imposed upon them systematic order and connectedness. The categories are just the ways in which the unity of self-consciousness expresses itself in relation to the empirical elements, or plants itself out, so to speak, in the given material. And the gist of Kant's contention is that it is precisely the function of the act of synthesis to give to sense-presentations that centre of reference, that unity in difference, which is what we mean by their objectivity—it is precisely its function, in other words, to be productive of the peculiar component in the object which constitutes it, apart from its special concrete clothing, an object at all. A contention of this sort would, indeed, have been paradoxical, had Kant meant to identify the unity of self-consciousness with the individuality of the finite subject. Such, however, is not his meaning. The unity of self-consciousness was not the unity of a finite individual—which, as Kant viewed it, was the specific unity of an object, an "inner" object, it is true, as contrasted with an "outer" object,—but the unity which is implied as a prior condition in making even the inner life matter of contemplation. As distinguished from the unity of the finite subject, the "transcendental" unity was the common element in all consciousness, that by which consciousness is what it is. Whilst actualised, if the expression may be permitted, in each concrete centre of consciousness, "consciousness in general" yet transcended the latter in the aspect of what Windelband has described as a "super-individual function." In every act

of knowing, the individual mind *must* conform to the conditions imposed by consciousness as such ; the object is apprehended by the individual known as standing over against himself, because the categories—the ways in which “consciousness in general” functions in relation to empirical data—are not his private property, but the common property of every self-conscious mind. As an individual knower, he is constrained to conform to the conditions of *Bewusstsein überhaupt* ; and it is that very constraint which evinces itself in the characteristic of objectivity.

The analysis thus rapidly sketched raises at once several issues, upon some of which it is important for my present purpose to dwell. (a) There is a loss of continuity in the working out of the position owing to the circumstance that Kant proceeds by severing what he takes to be the two components of experiencing, sensibility and understanding, in order to discover in what way and to what extent *a priori* knowledge is possible in either. When it is said that “by sensibility objects are given to us, by understanding they are thought,” it is hard to see from what point of view the first of these assertions has been framed. So far as Kant is concerned, it must, however, be taken to imply at least two things,—(i) that stimulation of the faculty of sense is an essential condition in the process of coming to know, and (ii), that only on occasion of, and in reference to, the sense-presentations resulting from such stimulation is there apprehension of objects on our part. Furthermore, the generic difference constituted between sensibility and understanding,—a difference expressed in one of its aspects by the opposing terms, receptive and active,—leads inevitably to the supposition that each of these is regarded as furnishing, taken separately, a special kind of knowing, somewhat after the manner in which “knowledge by acquaintance” and “knowledge by description” have been contrasted in recent discussion. But, as the analysis proceeds, it becomes very evident that such is not Kant’s real view. Understanding cannot, we find,

produce for itself the content of objects, sensibility cannot itself give rise to awareness of the content it receives. The former without the latter is empty; the latter without the former is blind. "In no other way than through the combination of these two can knowledge arise." (b) The assumed heterogeneity in nature of sense and thought,—the one characterised by receptivity, the other by spontaneity,—creates for Kant many perplexing difficulties, of which the artificial contrivance of the schemata is no real solution, when he has to face the problem as to the manner of their co-operation. Leaving, however, these difficulties on one side, the point I am more concerned to emphasise is the following. The particular generic difference upon which Kant insists obscures altogether from his view the genetic difference that does unquestionably present itself as we survey the various stages in the history of conscious experience. In a certain sense, the terms sense-apprehension, perception, imagination, and thought may be said roughly to describe successive phases in the development of intelligence. The crude primitive awareness of things, "the experience of the first look," prepares the way for the more accurate discernment of common-sense knowledge, and for that differentiation of "sensuous universals" by means of which things are grouped in classes and inferences are drawn "from particulars to particulars," until finally, through a reflective interpretation of what is offered in ordinary experience, objects are construed in terms of atoms and ions, forces or modes of energy, laws and relations of various kinds, the terms differing according to the special science concerned. A sharp antithesis, such as Kant repeatedly works with, between the pure generality of thought and the indeterminate particulars of sense allows no room for this progressive development. What he virtually did was to take scientific experience as typical of all experience, and with that alone before him no doubt the severance in question appeared plausible enough. No

sooner, however, is experience inspected in its entire range than the antithesis breaks down hopelessly, for it is just as impossible to imagine that the highly generalised notions unfolded in the table of categories are operative, even implicitly, in the primitive consciousness as it is to suppose that the primitive consciousness is condemned to the "blindness" of mere sense receptivity.\* (c) It is certainly not unfair to say that the antithesis alluded to is mainly responsible for the subjective character which is by Kant assigned to knowledge as a whole. There undoubtedly clings to his entire mode of exposition the view that cognition is brought about through a mechanical affection of the mind by a real agent, the result of such affection being the empirical elements of experience, and that a sufficient criterion of what in the complex cognised is due solely to the mind is furnished by the marks of universality and necessity. Thought is thus conceived as an instrument by means of which the crude materials given are worked up into the form of knowledge, and so to conceive it is at once to imply that the outcome of such work stands as a kind of intermediary, a *tertium quid*, between the cognising mind and the world of real existence. The object known must accordingly be a *construction* on the part of the mind itself, a *product* of the mind's own making, and as such lie within the limits of the mental life or conscious subject. And so the awkward predicament confronts us of having, on the one hand, to admit that what is experienced is constituted exclusively of mental elements, whilst, on the other hand, it has all along been recognised as the core of the whole problem, that the very essence of an act of knowing what we call "things" consists in a "reference" to that which is other than and distinct from the finite knower.

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\* "The common root," from which Kant himself, in one place, suggests that the two contrasted stems may have sprung, was only "hidden" from him through the unfortunately narrow sphere to which he confined attention.

A violent contradiction of this sort clearly indicates the necessity of a return to the premisses from which the start was made for the purpose of ascertaining in what respect they stand in need of revision. Where the initial false step was taken can hardly be a matter of controversy. Kant had accepted, apparently without scruple, the view of sense-data which he found in the writings of Hume, that is to say, a thoroughly atomistic view. As "affections" or "impressions," sensations could be no other than discrete units, constituting in and for themselves no more than an aggregate. And the unity which Hume searched for in vain Kant believed he had discovered in the general notion. The essence of the act of cognition was the reduction of the manifold to the unity of consciousness through general notions. Every apprehended content thus consisted of a plurality, combined into a whole. For knowledge, then, a synthesis or combination of the manifold was necessary; and the cardinal principle of the Kantian theory may be said to be that *the act of synthesising or combining is the very act of knowing.*

Now, precisely at this juncture it can be clearly seen where the roads divide—the one leading to a phenomenalism that will with difficulty be distinguishable from the subjectivism of Berkeley's earlier period, the other to a realism of the type I have depicted. For let it be granted, meanwhile, for the sake of argument, that the doctrine of sensations which Kant borrowed from Hume is an erroneous doctrine; let it be granted that the conception of sense-data as "impressions" received into the mind through a process of stimulation, or in any other way, is a mistaken interpretation of the facts, and that secondary qualities are no more mental "affections" than are spatial relations, according to Kant's account of them; let it be granted, in short, that sense-qualities are, what they purport to be, veritable properties of external things—things which, as Kant himself had agreed, stand over against the conscious subject as the objects of his cognitive states. Then, obviously, the act of knowing will no longer be an act of synthesising, in

Kant's sense: the act of knowing will, in that case, necessarily be an act of *discriminating*, of *distinguishing*, of *comparing*, features which, as presented, are already synthesised. The object, in other words, will need no construction; as already fashioned and constructed, it will present itself to the conscious subject, and to become aware of it the latter will need to discriminate its features, to distinguish it from its surroundings, to recognise, to some extent, its relations.\* Kant's problem in regard to objectivity will, it is true, still remain on our hands, for the mere circumstance that what is apprehended does, as a matter of fact, stand over against the conscious subject will not in itself explain his coming to be aware of that fact. But the chief difficulty of this problem, as it framed itself for Kant, will have been removed. We shall no longer need to inquire how features which are in fact subjective come to appear as just the opposite; we shall be left rather with the psychological task of tracing the way in which the distinction between inner and outer, or between self and not-self, attains gradually to recognition.

On what, then, does a decision between the two positions I have contrasted mainly depend? Clearly, I think, upon the answer given to the question as to the nature of so-called "sense-data,"—whether they, or their causes, are to be conceived as wandering detached elements ("*heimatlose Gegenstände*" as Meinong expresses it), affecting the mind, or as qualities or properties of physical things. To that question I now turn.

#### §4. *The Two-Fold Character of the Act of Perceiving.*

"That there cannot be an act of knowing without something to know; or, more generally, that there cannot be an

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\* I am not saying, of course, that no synthesis will be involved in the act of knowing. Synthetic, in a certain sense, I should say every cognitive act undoubtedly is. But the synthesis will not be a putting together of the parts of the object. It will consist in holding together different items of awareness.

act of judging, even an act of apprehending at all, without something to judge, something to apprehend, is," declares Meinong, "one of the most self-evident propositions yielded by a quite elementary consideration of these processes." And, with the doubtful exception of certain feelings and desires, he lays it down as a characteristic feature of the psychical, in contradistinction to the non-psychical, that it is directed upon something (*auf etwas gerichtet*), and that this "something" is neither identical with nor partially identical with the psychical act directed upon it. A mental act is not, in other words, an event which is complete in itself. In a sense the same is, no doubt, true of every event. A physical event is dependent for its occurrence upon what is other than itself. But the dependence here in question is a dependence of a totally different order. A physical event can be described in and for itself. Not so, a mental event. To speak of an act of awareness simply would be to speak of that which is never met with. Awareness in and for itself has no existence, and, indeed, no meaning; a "something" of which there is awareness is its indispensable correlative.

The "something" upon which the act of awareness is directed Meinong calls its object (*Gegenstand*); and to the term "object" he gives a very wide significance. As is well known, what he has called *Gegenstandstheorie* is an attempt to distinguish, differentiate and classify the various objects of apprehension, and to determine what can be known *a priori* about them. Under the general term, he includes such differing entities as sense-data—colours, tones, temperatures, etc.—the "things" of perception, qualitative differences, relations, numbers, propositions, scientific hypotheses, philosophical theories. All these are entities—they have being; but they fall into the three great classes of objects which exist, objects which do not exist but which subsist (*bestehen*), and objects, such as a false proposition, which neither exist nor subsist.

I am not now going to raise the question whether this

comprehensive use of the term *Gegenstand* is a wise procedure on Meinong's part. To me there seem to be serious objections to it. It gives countenance, for one thing, to the tacit assumption that a universal in being known *stands over against* the act of thought in a manner similar to that in which a "thing," in being known, *stands over against* the act of perceiving,—an assumption for which I, at any rate, can find no justification.\* But, meanwhile, I can avail myself of what Meinong has named "the prejudice in favour of the actual" (*das Vorurteil zugunsten des Wirklichen*), and confine attention to the case where the "something" we are concerned with is an existent fact of the kind usually described as physical. And so far the term "object" need signify for us no more than what it signified for Kant—viz., a specific and definite centre of reference for distinguishable predicates.

As referring to perception, no one, I take it, will challenge Meinong's assertion that the cognitive act is neither identical with, nor partially identical with, the entity upon which it is directed. So much even Berkeley allowed when he insisted that the qualities of bodies (extension, figure, etc.) are in the mind "not by way of mode or attribute," as the act of perceiving is, but "only by way of *idea*" (*Principles*, § 49). I pass, then, at once, to what I conceive is further involved in Meinong's contention, although I do not know to what extent he would accept the following analysis. A physical thing is related to the perceiving act by which it is apprehended in more ways than one. In particular, there are two relations which it is of the utmost importance clearly to distinguish. These are (i) the relation, whatever it be, whether causal or otherwise, which is expressed by saying that the physical

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\* I think it also tends to obscure the very important fact that whilst in the earlier stages of cognitive experience the act of apprehension has still the characteristic of being directed upon something (*das auf etwas Gerichtetsein*), it has not there that characteristic *for the consciousness in question*.



thing occasions, or gives rise to, the occurrence of the cognitive act, and (ii) the relation between the physical thing and the cognitive act which is involved in the knowledge or awareness of the former by the latter—a relation which, when we are dealing with consciousness that has reached a certain stage of development, may be expressed by saying that the physical thing is the object of the cognitive act. The distinction coincides very largely with that which Shadworth Hodgson was accustomed to draw between “consciousness as an existent” and “consciousness as a knowing.” Consciousness taken in the former sense, he used to argue, is dependent upon neuro-cerebral processes which go on concomitantly with it, and to the question why it is that such and such an act of perception occurs at such a time it is legitimate to answer—because such and such a neuro-cerebral process has just taken place, or is taking place, at that time. But, on the other hand, consciousness taken as a knowing—the nature of consciousness, that is to say, which, however, he regarded as made up of qualities that, for the most part, do not seem to me to belong to it—can in no wise be said to be dependent upon the processes mentioned; we are wholly incapable of conceiving the character of consciousness *qua* character as caused in any way whatsoever. When we attempt to do so, we are really conceiving not the cause of the conscious state being *what* it is, but the cause of its happening or existence. Let us, then, look more closely at the two relations I have thus contrasted.

(i) In treating of the first, we labour under the difficulty that any theory we can frame concerning the connexion between body and mind must be of an extremely hypothetical nature. But, without touching that controversy, I emphasise certain general considerations with respect to the matter before us. One can proceed best by means of a concrete instance. I am observing (say) a yellow primrose. On scientific grounds, it is certain that a complicated network of physical and physiological events has been instru-

mental in bringing about that mental state of mine. From the primrose there have probably emanated modes of energy—be they of the form of transverse vibratory motions propagated longitudinally through the ether conceived according to the undulatory theory, or of the form of the electromagnetic waves conceived by Clerk Maxwell and Hertz—and through them my visual organ has undergone impression or stimulation. In consequence of that stimulation, delicate changes, probably chemical in character, occur in the cones of the retina, the fibres of the optic nerve are thereby affected, and the influence, whatever it is, is conveyed by the optic-nerve fibres to the cerebral centres in the cortex with which the optic nerve is connected. What happens then? What is the next link in this chain of events? Commonly it is supposed that then, in some way admittedly mysterious, a transition is made, either in the brain or in the mind, from molecular motion to a so-called secondary quality. Under cover of the ambiguous term "sensation," there is supposed then to be produced both the yellow and the awareness of it, though why, in that case, the yellow should be projected into an object (say) "by the river's brim" is confessedly no less an enigma than its mode of production. As a matter of fact, however, this supposed final stage in the sequence of events is a gratuitous assumption which solves no difficulty but creates difficulties out of all proportion more serious than any it finds. All we are justified in asserting is that either concomitantly with or in consequence of the cerebral change there arises, not a brand new quality nor the awareness of one, but a mental state or activity, in and through which, *when a certain other set of conditions has been fulfilled, and not until*, there ensues awareness of a definitely coloured object. The entire sequence of physical and physiological events might have occurred as in this instance, and even have incited a mental act, but unless that mental act had been, as Meinong puts it, "directed upon something," the awareness in question would not come about.

In short, when we are inquiring about what I am going to call the content of the completed act of perception, wave-motions, retinal changes, nerve currents, cerebral disturbances, become totally irrelevant. They have been instrumental in awakening, if that term be appropriate, the incipient act of perception; it is, therefore, related to them, but it is not related to them as a knowing is related to things known. Our knowledge of them is based upon inferences drawn from different facts than the act of perception itself. And, in consequence, in describing the relation of the act of knowing to its occasioning conditions, our attitude must necessarily be that of the external spectator; we are then endeavouring, that is to say, to take up, in regard to the act of apprehension, the position of an onlooker, and to observe the way in which that act comes into being.

(ii) Leaving now its mode of occurrence, consider the cognitive act itself. Any accurate description of its nature can be obtained only by adopting an attitude which is the reverse of that just characterised. In other words, we must attempt to describe it not as it might conceivably present itself to an observer surveying it from the outside, but as it reveals itself to us conducting our analysis, so to speak, from within. We have got to dismiss, in making that attempt, all reference to the ways in which the cognitive act in question has come about, for, as we have seen, the cognitive act tells us not the tale of its own manner of origin. Now, a self-conscious subject is able, more or less, to take up this reflective attitude; it is possible for him to turn his attention upon his own mode of procedure in the act of knowing, and to convince himself as to how it is that the state of mind in which he finds himself achieves its end, and becomes a definite act of awareness. What report, then, does the cognitive act give of itself when thus reflectively treated? Not at all, I venture to urge, the report which Kant conceived it to yield. It does not reveal itself as an act of building up

or of putting together the parts of that of which it comes to be aware. That description of it is a result not of scrutinising it from within but of attempting to inspect it from without. Kant was really taking up in regard to it the attitude of one who, having followed some such sequence of events as we were considering a moment ago, proceeds to ask: What, now, should I further observe if I went on inspecting this series of events in its later stages?\*

And it seemed to him, naturally from his point of view, that what, in that case, he would observe would be the gradual emergence of a unified object from the data which he supposed the events up to that point had been the means of supplying. But a self-conscious subject, who has not thus been contemplating the mechanism that has been working behind the scenes, but who has been trying to discover what he has been doing, so to speak, in the act of perceiving, will have a very different story to relate. A concrete illustration will, perhaps, most clearly bring out what I mean, and I do not know that I can select a better than that used by Professor Lossky in his paper read before this Society three years ago. It is a summer's day, and I am walking on a river bank covered with vegetation, but instead of noticing the details around me, I am losing myself in and becoming one, so to speak, with the life of nature. In such a condition, nothing distinctive will manifest itself to me; all things will appear to be merged in one confused stream of life. There occurs, however, a sudden splash in the water, and thereby my attention is, as we may say, aroused. Forthwith, the scene becomes *for me* entirely changed. The mirror-like surface of the water, the green banks, the reeds near the shore—these gradually stand out as distinct from one another. And as the cognitive process continues, the growth near the banks, which before had appeared like a confused uniform mass, breaks up into the dark green

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\* This external attitude is, I need hardly say, especially prominent in the "Deduction of the Categories" of the first edition of the *Critique*.

of the reeds contrasted with the lighter green of the sweet sedge, and even in the dark mass of the reeds their stems, leaves, and dark brown brushes can be distinguished from one another by their colour, shape, and position. We have here, no doubt, an extremely complicated act, or succession of acts, of perception; but, so far as the general nature of the process is concerned, it is typical of perception in all the forms in which we are familiar with it. Whoever endeavours faithfully to describe, as he has lived through it, a perceptive act of his own will describe it in some such manner as that here exemplified. Viewed from within, it will invariably evince itself as a process, not of constructing an object, but of differentiating the features of an object, of gradually discerning distinctions which were not at first noticed, and of tracing connexions which were not at first discerned. It is perfectly true that in the instance I have been using the mind at work was a mind capable of bringing to bear in its procedure the results of a long prior experience—green banks, reeds, sedges, stems, leaves, etc., were all for it familiar objects, and hence the task of distinguishing them in the situation depicted was comparatively easy.\* But I am prepared, nevertheless, to carry the main principle the example illustrates right down the scale of conscious existence, and to maintain that wherever cognitive activity is exercised it is essentially a process *generically* the same as that which we thus find the process to be in our own mental lives. The mistake psychologists have too often made is to suppose that discrimination necessarily

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\* Cf. Hutchison Stirling's illustration:—"When, one morning, the day broke, and all unexpectedly before their eyes a ship stood, what it was was evident at a glance to Crusoe . . . . But how was it with Friday? As younger and uncivilised, his eyes were presumably better than those of his master. That is, Friday saw the ship really the best of the two; and yet he could hardly be said to see it at all . . . . What to Crusoe was *an* object, was to Friday only a dark and amorphous blur, a perplexing, confusing, frightening mass of (ill-differentiated) details."—*Textbook to Kant*, p. 54.

involves the abstract ideas of comparison and relation which it does unquestionably involve in its higher forms. There is, in truth, no ground for such a supposition, but on the contrary every ground for urging that "things" may be crudely discriminated from one another without the faintest recognition of either the relation of difference or of the differences as aspects distinguishable from the facts that differ.

The act of cognition, then, is no sooner called into being than it is "directed upon something," and evinces its character as an act of discriminating. Through such discrimination, the conscious subject gradually attains to recognition of the various features or characteristics of the object; the act of cognition gradually becomes the state of *being aware of the object*. What precisely does this phrase "aware of the object" imply? It does not imply that the object or any part of it is existentially contained in the act of being conscious; still less does it imply, as Professor Holt contends, that consciousness is "out there" where the object is. It implies that the cognitive act has now acquired a specific definite character; it has become awareness of something, of a more or less distinct and definite something. The awareness of a water-drop differs, for example, as an awareness, from the awareness of a primrose. Neither the water-drop nor the primrose, as existing entities, are in any way part of, or contained in, the awareness; the object of an act of awareness is always other than, and distinct from, the act of being aware of it. But, although act of awareness and object are essentially separate entities,—the former being always mental, the latter, in the case we are considering, being physical,—yet it is not indifferent to the nature of an act of awareness whether it is an act of being aware of a water-drop or of a primrose. Both acts are alike in being acts, and in being acts of discriminating; but they differ in so far as the discrimination has resulted in the one case in producing the awareness of a water-drop, and in the other case in producing the awareness of a primrose.

Cognition, in other words, is not a bare activity that remains entirely untouched by the attributes of the things which it discriminates; there is no such thing as awareness in general, just as there is no such thing as feeling in general or willing in general. Every act of awareness is a specific concrete act, and its specific character is determined, or partially so, by what it is awareness of. It has become customary to denote this specific character of an act of awareness by the term *content*, and what I am now desirous of doing is to make clear, if I can, the significance one would attach to this term. In the first place, it does not signify a part of the act of cognition that can stand over against the other part, so to speak, and be itself cognised as an object. Rather is it an inseparable aspect of the whole act, as, for example, extendedness is an inseparable aspect of a material body. In the second place, it is not a "representation," or copy, or picture of the object. That was the cardinal error of those who spoke of "presentations" or "ideas" as contents of the act of cognition. The "idea of blue" was taken to be itself "blue," the "idea of extension" to be "extended."\* And thus "ideas" as mental entities, although characterised by non-mental properties, came to be regarded as standing between the mind and things. Both these errors I believe to be due to the false severance that has been instituted between the content of a cognitive act and the act—a severance as false as that between the nature of a thing and the thing. Once conceive of the content as a separate entity, and the step is inevitable to regarding it as the immediate object of apprehension. But the content is a "what" that is inseparable from its "that." The content of the act of cognising blue is not blue, but the *awareness of blue*, just as the content of the act of perceiving a primrose is not a primrose but the awareness of

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\* "Psychologists must admit," says Professor Holt, "that a sensation of red is a red sensation, and the perception of a landscape is as big as the landscape."—*The Concept of Consciousness*, p. 148.

one. And when I am apprehending blue, I am not apprehending my awareness of blue, but the blue. The content apprehended, that is to say, is *not* the content of the act by which it is apprehended.

I can perhaps make my meaning clearer by reference to a well-known doctrine of Mr. Bradley's. Mr. Bradley maintains that whenever I apprehend anything as having a certain quality, that quality is always present in its entirety as a content of my own psychical existence. And in the act of apprehension this quality is divorced from the mental state of which it was a content and attached to another existence external to the mental state. Now, this account of the matter seems to me impossible precisely on the ground I have just been urging. In the concrete situation of my affirming hardness of the table in front of me, I can discern myself as being in a certain state—in the state, namely, of being aware of this hard table. And I as being in this state am an existent reality of a certain definite content or character. I can likewise discern the table, as another existent reality also with a certain character or content, part of which I am discriminating as belonging to the table. But the content of my mental state is neither the table nor the hardness which I predicate of the table. Part, at any rate, of the content of my mental state is no doubt awareness of the hardness which I have discriminated. I am not, however, ascribing awareness of hardness, in any sense, to the table. Analyse the character of the mental state as completely as you may, you will never find hardness as part of that character. Hardness is a content which I discover as belonging to existences other than myself, as, for example, tables and chairs. It is not a content of mind but a content of matter. Awareness of hardness is, on the other hand, a content of mind, but awareness of hardness is not a compound made up of the constituents, awareness and hardness.



§ 5. "*Acquaintance*" and "*Description*."

I have been confining attention to the concrete process of perception, and I am convinced that only in doing so is one, in reference to the main problem before us, on secure ground. In actual experience, our apprehension of the external world is always apprehension of individual concrete things and of their relations to one another. It is, however, natural to reflect that perception is a complex process, and to insist that the right method of procedure is first to analyse the complex process into its constituents and then to deal with these separately. In ordinary experience, it will be admitted, we are rarely or never concerned with the factors in isolation. Colours as seen are the colours of things; tones as heard are elements in voices or other complex sounds and are recognised as coming from a certain distance; temperatures as felt are the temperatures of warm or cold things, etc. But we may, by careful analysis, single out the elements that go, for instance, to constitute the perception of the brown table, and attend merely to the apprehension of the colour. And by such means we may observe the characteristics of the sense quality itself and determine the manner in which it stands related to the cognitive act.

That this mode of procedure is, within certain limits, legitimate, it would, of course, be absurd to question. But it is peculiarly liable, unless sufficiently safeguarded, to lead the inquirer astray. In the first place, it tends inevitably to suggest that the concrete process of perception itself is an aggregate made up of the factors into which it has thus been, by artificial means, analysed. Then readily enough we are led to imagine that we have on hand, as the result of our analysis, simple processes, each of which may be regarded as separately a specific kind of knowing, precisely as we have seen Kant was tempted to do in regard to sensibility and thought. It very soon evinces itself that the object apprehended in sense-perception cannot be treated as a mere complex of sense

qualities. That which makes it a whole and gives it meaning is quite inexplicable on such a supposition. So a process of thinking or judging is called in to do that which cannot be accomplished by any combination of acts of sensing. The consequence is that perceiving appears to be a sort of mongrel, in which thought loses part of its pure nature as concerned with universals and relations, and sense is raised above its crudeness in merely accepting the given. And, in the second place, the procedure is apt to conceal from us the important consideration that the analytically simple is not necessarily the genetically prior, and that it may be wholly erroneous to suppose that the elements reached by analysis of developed experience, or some of them, are the genetic elements with which experience began. "It is," a recent writer has declared, "almost a universal belief (among psychologists) that the child experiences colours, hears sounds, feels pressures, long before he sees balls, hears voices, or feels solid objects,"\*—a belief which, as the writer shows, is wholly without justification.

Now, I venture to submit that the distinction, which has of late been so much in vogue, between "acquaintance" and "description" illustrates the dangers just mentioned. Mr. Russell conceives that there are two main cognitive relations with which a theory of knowledge has to do, radically contrasted by the fact that the one, presentation or knowledge by acquaintance, is a two-term relation of a cognitive act to a single (simple or complex) object; whilst the other, judgment or description, is a multiple relation of a cognitive act to the several objects concerned in the judgment. Amongst the objects of which there can be "acquaintance" are those of the kind in which the presentation is a sensible presentation, and it is to this mode of "acquaintance" that I here confine attention. Obviously, Mr. Russell does not intend to identify sense

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\* Grace A. de Laguna, "Sensation and Perception," *Journal of Phil.*, xiii, p. 534 (1916).

"acquaintance" with the mere receptivity, nor judgment with the mere spontaneity, of Kant; but he does suppose that these are two specific kinds of knowing, and that there can, at least, be the former without the latter. And in this respect we have, I would urge, essentially a repetition of Kant's mistake, with the result that difficulties similar to those of the Kantian theory at once arise.

Mr. Russell does not, I have said, take "acquaintance" of the sensuous kind to be equivalent to mere receptivity of impressions. For knowledge at all, be it no more than simply awareness of a sense-particular, there is requisite, in his view, a cognitive act on the one hand and an object on the other; consequently, we are not entitled to say that what is sensuously apprehended is an affection of the mind. Yet when we scrutinise more closely the account offered of sensuous "acquaintance," its difference from the Kantian doctrine of sensibility tends, even in this respect, to disappear. There is involved, so it is maintained, an act of sensing that is totally distinct from the *sensible* which is sensed and which may exist when it is not sensed. But if one tries to form a conception of what an "act" in the situation depicted can really signify, the effort will end in failure. In the complex act-acquainted-with-object, the two terms, act and object, have to be so inseparably "married" that the independence of the "act" is reduced to a vanishing point. No error must be allowed to enter into this fast and imperturbable wedlock; the wife has it all her own way; the husband pays the piper but she calls the tune. "Objects of sense, even when they occur in dreams," must be "the most indubitable real objects known to us."\* One asks, then, in perplexity, what the term "act," under such circumstances, can possibly be supposed to indicate. An "act" implies ordinarily the exercise of some function, some mode of "doing"; but here it seems to imply exactly the

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\* *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 85.

reverse—a purely static condition of acquiescence in what is given—indeed, Mr. Russell expressly sanctions the belief that “we feel passive in sensation.”\* I am bound, therefore, to confess that in these *sensibilia*, pictured as wives, entering into questionable “relations” with the shadowy entities called “acts,” pictured as husbands, I can discover little else than the disjointed fragmentary “impressions” of former days, that made, however, less pretence to be things of importance. For, now, they are declared to be themselves “objects”—“objects” possessing “the highest degree of certainty”—and, needless to say, Kant’s problem concerning the way in which knowledge of an object is possible is silently passed over as though it were no problem at all.

If, however, Mr. Russell should ever undertake the task, which he more than once hints at, of shewing how, from “a world of helter-skelter sense-data,”† there has actually been derived “the common-sense world” of ordinary experience, he would assuredly find Kant’s problem confronting him with all its old persistency. As it is, one of the puzzles which baffle the reader of Mr. Russell’s recent writings is that of determining the denotation of the term “sensible object,” as employed by him. It is true, he explicitly informs us, in the *Lowell Lectures*, that when he speaks of a sensible object he does not mean such a thing as a table, but “just that patch of colour which is momentarily seen when we look at the table, or just that particular hardness which is felt when we press it, or just that particular sound which is heard when we rap it.”‡ Yet, throughout the subsequent discussion, he is repeatedly meaning by “sensible object” precisely what he has told us he does not mean by it. It will not do to dismiss this as a pedantic objection, and to retort that the language of common sense is

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 75.

† *Ibid.*, p. 107.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

only resorted to for the sake of brevity and convenience of exposition. Not one argument merely but a number of arguments would collapse utterly were the phrase "sensible object" understood in the way we have been bidden to understand it. Take, for instance, the argument about the "objects of sense" which occur in dreams, and which it is contended are, as such, "indubitably real." If Mr. Russell dreams that he is in America, but wakes up and finds himself in England, his dream may or may not have been an "insubstantial pageant," but it certainly did not consist simply of patches of colour and snatches of sound, or assemblages of these. Or, again, when it is maintained that if, while walking round a table, we press one eye and, in consequence, see two tables, "then there are two visual tables,"\* is it not manifest that the whole point of the argument would be lost unless the two visual objects are understood to be unified wholes of a distinct and definite kind? As Professor Whitehead, Mr. Russell's collaborator, puts it, "a single sense-object is a complex unity," and, as Mr. Russell himself admits, "each mind sees at each moment an immensely complex three-dimensional world." "We imagine," writes Professor Whitehead, "that we have immediate experience of a world of perfectly defined objects implicated in perfectly defined events, which, as known to us by the direct deliverance of our senses, happen at exact instants of time, in a space formed by exact points, without parts and without magnitude";† and although perhaps too much is here credited to our imagination, even as "moulded by science," I am not concerned at present to raise any question on that score. What I am concerned to urge is that ordinary common-sense experience, however crude and fragmentary it may be, is never made up of "wandering adjectives," which may be christened *sensibilia*; but that, at the stage of common-sense experience, sense-qualities are invariably apprehended, and directly apprehended, as belonging to "things"

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 86.

† *The Organisation of Thought*, p. 110.

(hard though it is to interpret philosophically the term "belonging to"), and that the directly apprehended "things" invariably contain factors which cannot be described as *sensibilia*. Mr. Russell acknowledges that "the world of pure sense has become strange and difficult to re-discover." I ask, then, what has happened to "the world of pure sense," or "the world of helter-skelter sense-data,"—which, be it remembered, is yet, according to the theory we are considering, the real world, or part of it,—that it should have come to assume for us unsuspecting mortals the form of "the neat, trim, tidy world" in which we imagine ourselves to live and move and have our being?

It is one of the merits of Professor Whitehead's treatment of the subject that he fully realises the importance of this question. The kind of answer he would give to it he indicates by calling to his aid "the whole apparatus of common-sense thought." He speaks unhesitatingly of "the thought-objects of perception." "The material universe is largely," he insists, "a concept of the imagination which rests on a slender basis of direct sense-presentation. But none the less it is a fact; for it is a fact that actually we imagine it. Thus it is actual in our consciousness just as a sense-presentation is actual there."\* And I take it that when Mr. Russell talks of "common-sense belief," and describes it as "a piece of audacious metaphysical theorising," he means very much what Professor Whitehead means by "common-sense thought," and that it fulfils, according to his view, very much the same function. But no sooner has this result been reached than it becomes evident that an object, as actually apprehended in common-sense experience, is taken to be largely composed of conceptual elements—elements, that is, which are in no way given, but which are introduced into the given by the apprehending mind. We have here, so far, a "return to Kant" in a more literal sense than even Otto Liebmann, who originally raised that cry, had intended. Once

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 155.

again, thought is conceived as an instrument by means of which the crude data of sense are worked up into the form of knowledge; and, as in the Kantian system, the known object turns out to be a product of the mind's making—a construction which possesses, as such, no claim to independent existence. Man weaves a web of his own and calls it "nature"; but according, at any rate, to this new Kantianism, the web is a fictitious artifice, and there is, in truth, no "nature" at all. Nor does there appear to be any reason why there should not be any number of such artificial creations. Indeed, the amazing thing is how the apparent world of "fairly permanent and fairly rigid bodies" should ever have come to be for human intelligences the one common world. For precisely at this crucial stage of the speculation the "return to Kant" is arrested. Kant, as I have already pointed out, sought to make good the position that the thought relations which he took to be essential components of any fact of experience of which we could become aware were in no sense accidents of the particular mechanism of thinking in the finite subject, but were relatively thereto objective, that is to say, universal and necessary. Finite subjects, as he viewed them, all belonged to one world, of which a unifying self-consciousness was the organising principle, so that the ways in which the manifold of intuition was combined were not at the mercy of individual caprice. Mr. Russell, on the contrary, conceives of "common-sense" as a process of imaginative invention set going by "our savage ancestors in some very remote prehistoric epoch." These "prehistoric metaphysicians" accomplished the marvellous feat not only of devising the belief in so-called "things"—"stones, mountains, the earth and moon and sun," etc.—but of somehow, without any of the modern means of propaganda, so impregnating with their theory the minds of their fellows that it has been for countless ages the universal belief of mankind. Verily, the achievements of historic metaphysicians pale into insignificance in comparison with theirs!

Reverting now to the antithesis between "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description," my contention, then, is that it calls to be rejected. There is no such relation as that which Mr. Russell would denote by the phrase "knowledge by acquaintance,"—no cognitive relation, that is to say, in regard to which the question of truth or error cannot arise. The crudest act of sense-apprehension is still an act of discriminating and comparing, an act involving, therefore, the characteristic that, in a highly developed form, is fundamental in an act of judging. And the presence of discrimination and comparison implies at once the possibility of error; indeed, the more purely sensuous the cognitive act, so much greater the liability to mistake and illusion. The capacity of discerning separately the sense-particulars, of which an object, that is always complex, consists, increases as discrimination proceeds. But to suppose that the primitive mind starts with clear and definite apprehension of such particulars is to set at defiance some of the best attested results of psychological enquiry. It is, however, easy to see why the tendency thus violently to separate sense-apprehension from the process of thinking or judging asserts itself so persistently in epistemological reflexion. All too readily it is taken for granted that the factors which by analysis may be detected in the contents of our knowledge *must be* the factors that have gradually been brought together in the process of its development. Yet you might as well suppose that the fragments into which you can pulverise a picture must have been the fragments which the artist used in its construction. For, if the "things" of common-sense experience—"tables and chairs, stones, mountains, the earth and moon and sun"—be veritable existences; and if, through a process of perception progressing in trustworthiness, our apprehension of those things has come to be more and more in accordance with fact, then it would still be possible to take such perception in one of its later stages, and by analysis, to bifurcate it into what would *seem*, from an external point of



view, to be two distinct modes of being aware. Only, in that case, these would be artificial severances made by our abstracting thought, not actual mental states or activities, and even farther removed from the concrete life of mind than the corresponding *abstracta* of Kant, because he *did* see that, if taken to operate in isolation, the one would be blind and the other empty.

### § 6. *Minds and Things.*

It is intelligible that, following the line of thought he does, the existence of physical objects, conceived as they had been conceived in *The Problems of Philosophy*, should have come to seem to Mr. Russell dubious. To infer the existence of "matter" (possessing the properties only, so far as science is concerned, of position in space and the power of motion according to the laws of motion) from "sense-data" by the aid of some *a priori* principle such as "that our sense-data have causes other than ourselves,"\* must inevitably evince itself as a precarious mode of argument, which, at the best, could only lead to a doctrine of things-in-themselves of the very type against which Kant directed his polemic. Accordingly, Mr. Russell contends that, if the "class of appearances" will fulfil the purposes for the sake of which the "thing" of common-sense and the "physical thing" of science were invented, then, by the principle of Occam's razor, we are justified in identifying the "thing" with the "class of its appearances." In that case, the "thing" may be regarded as the system of its aspects or appearances. All the aspects or appearances of a "thing" will be existents, whereas the "thing" will be a "logical construction" or a "symbolic fiction." Here, again, an interesting parallel is to be found in Kant's proposal to treat the "thing-in-itself" as a *Grenzbegriff*, a limiting notion, to which reflexion on the entire system of phenomena seemed to him to constrain us.

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\* *Scientia*, vol. xvi, 1914, p. 2.

Mr. Russell has worked out his theory with great skill, and has certainly succeeded in presenting an atomistic philosophy more thorough-going than any which had previously seen the light. At present, however, I wish only to lay stress upon two considerations in regard to it.

In the first place, I do not understand how it can be claimed that the procedurè adopted by Mr. Russell enables him to dispense with the notion it was expressly devised to avoid—the notion, namely, of unknowable things-in-themselves, wholly remote from the data of sense. He thinks it probable—indeed, he sometimes speaks as though it were proved—that sense-data “depend for their existence upon physiological conditions in ourselves”—that, for example, “what we see is causally dependent upon our body and is not, as crude common-sense would suppose, something which would exist if our eyes and nerves and brain were absent.”\* Now, it has to be remembered that, in accordance with the general principle laid down, eyes and nerves and brain, conceived as “things,” are themselves “logical constructions,” and that we have got to express them as functions of sense-data. In other words, eyes and nerves and brain are to be regarded as assemblages of momentary particulars. When, then—to take a concrete instance—we see, as we say, the sun, what we really see are groups of appearances that owe their existence to the physiological assemblages of particulars in relation, I suppose, to certain of the particulars that form the solar assemblage. The sun itself is declared to be “a whole assemblage of particulars, existing at different times, spreading out from a centre with the velocity of light and containing among their number all those which are seen by people who are looking at the sun.”† I waive the question as to the legitimacy of including within the “whole assemblage” the last named despite the fact that their

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\* *Monist*, vol. xxv, 1915, p. 407.

† *Ibid.*, p. 410.

existence is causally dependent upon other "assemblages." My concern is with the vastly greater number of the particulars that go to constitute the sun on the one hand, and eyes and nerves and brain on the other. These are not and can never become sense-data, simply because they are not dependent for their existence upon physiological conditions in ourselves. I ask, then, on what ground it is assumed that *they* either are or can be particulars "of the same sort" as our momentary visual objects? So far as I can discover, the only ground offered is that of the principle of continuity. "We have not," writes Mr. Russell, "the means of ascertaining how things appear from places not surrounded by brain and nerves and sense-organs, because we cannot leave the body; but continuity makes it not unreasonable to suppose that they present *some* appearances at such places."\* But surely the appeal to continuity suggests precisely the opposite conclusion. Does not the very absence of conditions such as those to which our sense-data owe their existence indicate in itself a breach of continuity between the particulars in question and the data of sense? These particulars, if not intrinsically incapable of being sensed, are, at any rate, *ex hypothesi*, precluded from being sensed; they are as rigidly prohibited from entering the sphere of experience as either the atoms of the physioist or the *Dinge-an-sich* of Kant. To christen them *sensibilia* seems, therefore, purely arbitrary. A *sensibile*, we are told, is an entity which may become a sense-datum by entering into the relation of acquaintance. That, however, is just what *these* unfortunate particulars are debarred from doing, unless, indeed, disembodied spirits frequent the universe, in which case, however, to speak of sense-data as their objects of apprehension is, to say the least, embarrassing.

In the second place, I urge that the use Mr. Russell makes of the term "appearance" is fatally misleading, and tends to

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\* *Scientia*, vol. xvi, 1914, p. 5.

slur over the vital distinction between "apparent" and "real"—a distinction which, nevertheless, the course of his own argument compels him to recognise. A "thing" may be regarded, it is contended, as "a certain series of appearances." And by "appearance" Mr. Russell desires to have consistently understood an existing entity—in other words, a *sensible*, as he has defined it. Now, it would not be denied that the substitution of "a certain series of appearances" for the "thing" of common-sense experience violently contradicts the deliverances of common-sense experience itself. Certainly, no unsophisticated person ever supposes a "thing" to consist of "a series of appearances." When common-sense contrasts a "thing" with its "appearances," it takes the "appearances" to be not existing entities, not constituent parts of the "thing," but ways in which the "thing" presents itself to a percipient, ways in which the "thing" is apprehended. I hold that, in this respect, common-sense is right; but the point is that, whether right or wrong, the common-sense distinction re-asserts itself in Mr. Russell's novel rendering of the facts. For, what this novel rendering virtually comes to is that "appearances," now regarded as existent entities, assume the rôle of newly invented "things" which usurp the place of the old. And, in reference to these newly invented "things," there breaks out again the familiar antithesis. Take, once more, a concrete illustration. The table in front of me is "to be regarded, not as one single persistent entity, but as a series of entities succeeding each other in time, each lasting for a very brief period, though probably not for a mere mathematical instant."\* That is the table's real nature. But the table of which in perception I am immediately aware appears to be of a very different nature; it appears to me one single persistent entity, lasting certainly for the considerable interval during which my act of perception may be directed upon it. And, be it noted, I am not now

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\* *Monist*, vol. xxv, 1915, p. 403.

referring to my "belief" that the table is still there when I am not perceiving it; I am referring to its at least apparent persistence whilst I am perceiving it. To retort that the table appears to me different from what it is because I make false judgments about it is surely to give the whole case of immediate acquaintance, as contrasted with judgment, away. Here am I in immediate relation to that complex of sense-data which, *ex hypothesi*, constitute what I call the table. This complex seems to me to persist. If the persistence be an illusion, due to false judgments on my part, then I ask, where in the world do I ever get the undiluted "acquaintance" with sense-data that is free from such illusion? Where do I ever contrive to become "acquainted" with *sensibilia* as they really are, namely, as "entities succeeding each other in time, each lasting for a very brief period, though probably not for a mere mathematical instant"? If the cinematographic deception is everywhere prevalent, what becomes of that infallible "knowledge by acquaintance," the objects of which are so indubitable as to be "the ultimate certainty on which all knowledge of what exists must be based"?\* In treating of the theory of continuity, Mr. Russell himself supplies an instance of the antithesis in question manifesting itself in regard to what he calls "immediate data." We may, he there urges, "suppose a single sense-datum, *e.g.*, in sight, to be a finite surface, enclosing other surfaces which are also single sense-data." A single sense-datum may enclose (say) the coloured surfaces A and B. And the colour A may, as a matter of fact, differ from the colour B, although the difference between the surfaces as directly sensed is indiscernible.† In respect to the matter under discussion, it is irrelevant to maintain that "the indistinguishability is a purely negative fact." Be the fact negative or positive, what it involves is that the single

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\* *Mind*, N.S., vol. xxii, 1913, p. 79.

† *Our Knowledge of the External World*, pp. 148-9.

sense-datum enclosing A and B appears in the act of sensing to be different from what it actually is—it appears, namely, to be all of one colour, whereas in reality it is not all of one colour.

In criticising this theory of momentary *sensibilia*, and in maintaining, as against it, the opposite position that the material world is made up of more or less permanent “things,” I have no intention, it need hardly be remarked, of coming to the rescue of the doctrine of the “physical object” as an entity *in toto* distinct from the “sensible object.” Far from it. My contention, of course, is that the “sensible object” is not one thing and the “physical object” another. To put the matter broadly, any real object, such as we are in the habit of describing as a single “thing,” is, I should say, enormously complex—a combined whole, comprising a manifold of parts and possessing a variety of properties or attributes. Many of these characteristics we are enabled, through the process of perceiving, to discriminate and to apprehend. Our apprehension is, however, never infallible; it is always liable to error. Through the effects of contrast, or what not, the red colour of a heated poker, for example, may appear to us otherwise than it would appear were the disturbing influences absent. And although, by the advance of science, numerous empirical means are at our disposal for distinguishing true “appearances” from false, yet, in the end, we may have to admit that we have no absolute criterion. But this is a practical difficulty: it is not a theoretical difficulty in the way of the contention I am urging. It affords not the smallest presumption that the real poker is colourless, or even that its actual colour deviates to any appreciable extent from what, under the normal conditions of vision, it appears to us to be. Further, in the real object there is obviously vastly more than our limited powers of perceptual discrimination enable us to discern. Nevertheless, there is no ground for supposing that the “more” in the object is inconsistent with the features that

are perceptible. Under the "more" may quite well be included the elements which the physicist has good reason for thinking go to constitute the "matter" of the object. A luminous body may *both* shine with a red light *and* consist of particles vibrating at the rate, roughly, of four hundred billion times a second. Probably the chief obstacle to conceiving how a quality such as red can be a property of a physical object is due to prejudice. We have become so inured to the physicist's account of light as a "mode of motion" that we are constrained to think the wave-motions must be the physical equivalent of the red colour, or the cause of the red colour. For that assumption there is, however, no scientific warrant. M. Bergson, for instance, speaks of the consciousness of a flash of light as being the condensation, into one simultaneously apprehended whole, of billions of successive vibrations. Thus, in one place, he tells us that a sensation of red light, experienced by us in the course of a second, corresponds in itself to a succession of vibrations which, if separately distinguished by us, with the greatest possible economy of time, would occupy more than two hundred and fifty centuries of our history.\* And, in another place, he affirms that any one quality, such as a colour, "resolves itself, on analysis, into an enormous number of elementary movements."† But a red colour is simply *not* a mode of wave-motion; and no explanation of its character whatsoever is afforded by taking it to be "the condensation into one second of duration of four hundred billions of successive vibrations." On the other hand, I can find no valid reason for denying that *both* the colour *and* the vibratory motions may be present in the luminous body, that these may be specifically related the one to the other, and that thus the wave-motions, although not the cause of the colour, are the cause of the stimulation of the sense-organ which occasions

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\* *Matière et Mémoire*, pp. 229 *sqq.*

† *L'Évolution Créatrice*, p. 325.

the act of apprehending the colour. Why should not the particles of a red-hot body be red? Or, if not that, why should we refuse to allow that the body as a whole may have qualities which its parts have not? As Mr. Broad admirably states it, "you cannot be sure that the perception of red is not caused by events in what is red until you know that they are events in what has *merely* primary qualities, and, therefore, you cannot use the scientific theory of the causation of perception to disprove the reality of colour."\*

I turn, now, to neo-realistic conceptions of the mind or mental life. Sense-qualities, we are agreed, form no part of the mind's structure. Just as ether-tremors or wave-motions throw no light on the coming to be of such a sense-quality as red, so the latter's mode of origin is left equally in the dark by appeal to a "re-action" of the mind upon stimulation. There is as little in the notion of mental "re-action" as in the notion of mechanical energy to render explicable the qualitative differences of nature. In fact, the two notions are by no means so widely divergent as they have usually been taken to be. For, after all, "re-action upon stimulation" is a "mode of motion"; and it is scarcely an effective way of disposing of materialism to transport into the "mind," and when there to use as your principle of explanation, the very mechanism you have shown to be unavailing in the domain of "matter." So far, at any rate, the "new realism" has helped to clear the ground of lingering fictions. But its doctrine of sense-data, which, except that they are no longer held to be mental in character, are precisely the "presentations" or "ideas" of the old subjectivism, precludes it from advancing to anything like an adequate account of the nature and functions of mind.

Mr. Russell, as we have seen, is content to leave the character of a "mental act" in total obscurity. On the other hand, Professor Alexander, whose general philosophical view

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\* *Perception, Physics, and Reality*, p. 224.



is, if I mistake not, far nearer in accord than Mr. Russell's is with that which I am trying to delineate, has been wrestling long and resolutely with the task which evidently devolves upon a realist who is not speedily to find himself at a standstill. Yet I am bound to confess that the attempt to reduce the life of mind to a system of "conations" strikes me as the least satisfactory part of a way of thinking with which, as a whole, I feel considerable sympathy. There is, Professor Alexander maintains, no difference of quality between conations of any order. They have, all of them, the single quality of consciousness, and the only difference they exhibit is a "difference of direction." But, if that were the case, I fail to see what could be meant by talking about "the riches" of mind and its "hoarded wealth of mental suggestion." A man revisits, let us say, the place of his childhood, and gazes, after years of absence, upon the house and garden that was once his home. There it stands, the familiar object, as though he had left it but yesterday. Certainly, his act of perception is directed upon it. Instantly, however, a crowd of memories, ideas, thoughts—using the ordinary phraseology—occupy his mind, reminiscences of former days, recollections of youthful ambitions, reflexions on the contrast between early dreams and actual achievements, and so on. These are not, I agree, elements of the object, not features he is discerning in it. But how can the theory of consciousness as possessing only the single quality of consciousness be reconciled with inner experiences of this kind? We "live through" or "enjoy" our own minds, Professor Alexander has been labouring to teach us; we do not "contemplate" them. Be it so; but what would there be to "enjoy" or to "live through," if our minds were simply complexes of activities that differed from one another *merely* in their modes of "direction"? Professor Alexander gives, I venture to urge, the case away when he admits that the mind may intrude itself upon the objects of its perception, that, for example, the æsthetic object is neither wholly physical nor wholly mental, but a form

of existence in which both these kinds are blended—for obviously what is thus “imputed” to the object is not the bare quality of consciousness. And when he describes an act of willing as the taking up of the willed object into the self—a mode of expression, be it said, I should be pedantic enough to object to—he is virtually recognising what I have been calling the “content” of a mental act. In short, empty consciousness of everything that gives it concreteness and determinateness, and you have deprived yourself of the right to speak, as Professor Alexander does, of the mind’s intellectual, moral, and spiritual “endowments.”

“‘Consciousness,’” said William James, “when once it has evaporated to the estate of pure diaphaneity, is on the point of disappearing altogether.” Professor Alexander will not countenance its dismissal; but the adherents of the “new realism” have not his scruples, and, according to the “relational theory” of consciousness, to which most of them are committed, what alone survives is the name. Professor Holt’s recently published volume on *The Concept of Consciousness* embodies an able attempt to work out this theory in detail, and I can perhaps best proceed by setting forth my case in opposition to his.

We are, so Professor Holt conceives, in the midst of a universe in which all things—physical, mental, and logical, propositions and terms, existent and non-existent, false and true, good and evil, real and unreal—subsist or have being. Concerning these entities, there is no question of substances, for, if we are to speak of substance at all, they must all be said to be of one substance—a substance which is “neutral.” These “neutral entities” form a system; they are graded in a strict order of complexities. As primary or fundamental entities are to be recognised the relatively simple—the concepts of identity, of difference, of number, and of the negative. Then follow the logical and mathematical entities—the forms of order, the innumerable algebras which are elaborated cases of order.

Next in this hierarchy of being come the "secondary" qualities, or, more properly, the qualities, and with them the concept of intensity. Upon these supervene geometry, the higher mathematics, space, time, motion (depending on purely mathematical change), mass, the subject-matter of mechanics, of physics, of chemistry, the larger material aggregates, vegetable and animal life, consciousness or mind, and, with the last named, the sciences of anthropology, psychology, history, etc. Finally, we reach the realm of values—the least fundamental, but for us human beings the most important, of entities. Admittedly, at certain stages of this curious simple-to-complex series, entities appear which do not seem to consist of what is simpler and more fundamental. Each one of the qualities is a case in point. And yet, it is contended, there is no improbability involved in supposing that qualities may some day be seen to develop deductively from systems which, at the outset, do not contain qualities. For, with the advance of knowledge, the tendency has been for entities, once taken to be unresolvable into simpler components, to turn out to be resolvable after all. Thus the "vital force," which to former generations of scientists presented the aspect of being quite distinct from the entities of the inorganic world, is now generally acknowledged to be explicable in chemical terms. It is, then, Professor Holt's contention that a "mind" or "consciousness" may likewise be interpreted as a complex or collection of more fundamental "neutral entities." Steering his course at night with the help of a searchlight, the navigator illuminates now this object and now that, and thus defines a new collection of objects, all of which, except occasionally the bow and foremast of the ship itself, are integral parts of the region through which the ship is passing (and remain so), although they have thus gained membership in another manifold—the class of all objects on which the illumination falls. A mind or consciousness may be regarded as just such a manifold—a cross-section of the universe, selected by the nervous system in any one of its

responses to the influences of the environment. So conceived, a mind or consciousness would be a class or group of entities within the subsisting universe. If, now, we are ready to recognise with Aristotle, that thought and its object are one, why should we hesitate to recognise that sensations and perceptions and ideas are likewise one with their "objects"? What reason is there for believing in the existence of *both* sensations or perceptions or ideas or thoughts *and* their objects? Objects there are, and these, when included in the particular manifold or cross-section which you call consciousness, may be described as sensations and perceptions and ideas and thoughts, whilst when included in the particular manifold or cross-section you call a room they may be described as material things.

Here, undisguisedly, the wheel has come full circle! A line of reflexion which took for its point of departure the necessity of distinguishing the act of consciousness from its object, and which emphasised the duality between sensing and *sensum*, between perceiving and percept, between thinking and thought,\* ends by reaching the conclusion that there is no such distinction, that seeing just means colours occurring, that hearing means sounds occurring, that thinking means thoughts occurring—all these in a certain context entitled a "psychic cross-section." Troubles and predicaments innumerable strew the ground at once. I confine attention to a few. In the first place, the "cross-section" which *is* consciousness is alleged to be defined by the responses of the nervous system. And the human being is asserted to be conscious of that to which his nervous system responds. But can any such principle as that be seriously maintained? Is it not manifest that a human being is conscious of countless things—of Prospero's enchanted isle, of the binomial theorem, of the law of gravitation,—to which his nervous system would seem to be profoundly indifferent, whereas the things to which his nervous system does

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\* Cf. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, pp. 274-5.

respond—ether-tremors, air-vibrations, and the like—make, at the time, no appearance in consciousness at all? To reply to an objection of this sort that whilst “the nervous system is nothing but a physical mechanism acted on by physical forces,” yet these physical entities are seen on analysis to be “aggregates of logical or neutral entities” would surely be futile. For, on the one hand, be they aggregates of the alleged kind or not, it is, in any case, *motions* to which the nervous system responds, and not to their assumed logical components; and, on the other hand, in such instances as those just cited, it is certainly not *the* “neutral entities” of which the physical forces may be supposed to consist that form the constituents of the “psychic cross-section.” In truth, it is only because “consciousness” is surreptitiously introduced into the nervous response on which it is declared to depend that the account given of the nervous response as selecting and defining the contents of consciousness wears even a semblance of plausibility. The contradiction comes plainly enough to the surface. On the one hand, in the simile I have mentioned, the nervous system is represented by the searchlight and consciousness by the totality of objects illuminated (and not by the light which illuminates them);\* on the other hand, it is insisted that “no neural responses are unconscious, or subconscious, unless this is meant as sub-selfconscious.”† Now, granting, for the sake of the argument, the identity of consciousness with its objects, it is clear, at any rate, that the objects are not identical with the nervous response, so that if the latter is conscious, its consciousness cannot consist of the objects responded to. In the second place, so far from consciousness being dependent on nervous response, Professor Holt’s reasoning would rather make for the opposite conclusion. For he vigorously enforces the doctrine that the component elements of a whole retain

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\* *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 209 *et passim*.

† *Ibid.*, p. 206.

their distinct self-identity, whatever be the context into which they enter. Grouped together in one context, tables and chairs and books form contents of consciousness, and may be called percepts; grouped together in another context, they form contents of a room, and may be called material things; in both contexts, however, they remain the same identical tables and chairs and books. And similarly in regard to the simple entities of which they are complexes. Being experienced, therefore, makes no difference to the facts; the individual items of the universe do not change their character when taken into the web of an experience; new combinations arise, but the elements in themselves are what they previously were. Nevertheless, we are explicitly told that any term or proposition of the hierarchy of being included in the conscious cross-section is itself conscious,\*—that is to say, not merely is the totality of the objects in the cross-section conscious, but each one of these objects singly is likewise conscious. If, then, the circumstance of constituting an element of the cross-section affects in no way the nature of the element itself, does it not follow that an object which is conscious in a cross-section is equally conscious outside that context? I do not suggest that Professor Holt intends this consequence to be drawn. All the same, it would be in accord with various subsidiary contentions of his to which otherwise it is difficult to attach a meaning. For example, pains and pleasures, or, at all events, large numbers of them, are declared to be not in us but “in the outer world”; and, generally, “emotions and feelings” are said to be “neutral entities, or groups of these, precisely as objective as the other components of being”;† so that presumably, whether within or without a psychic cross-section the entities in question “enjoy the air they breathe.” This leads me to note, in the third place, that whoever insists upon

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 207.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 110 and 292.

identifying knowing and the known virtually cuts the ground from under the doctrine of mind as being *restricted* to certain cross-sections of the universe. Or, changing the metaphor, he thereby opens the door through which the waters of Hegelian idealism, rushing in, will overflow the house. For a cross-section selected out of a wider whole of objective reality is only another way of expressing what idealist writers have meant in speaking of a *finite* mind as "a partial world." Only they would go on to say, and surely not without justification, that it is impossible, at this point, to call "halt." A finite mind that is able to recognise itself as but a section of a wider world, and to interpret what is outside that section, has, they would urge, already transcended the limits of its sectional character, and must be thought of as possessing within itself "the principle of infinity taken in the sense of the *nisus* towards unity and self-completion."\* In other words, the whole of which the finite mind is a fragment would itself be Mind or Consciousness; the "single, infinite, deductive system in which the entire variety develops deductively from a relatively small number of fundamental propositions,"† would only be another name for Hegel's Absolute.

There is no other basis upon which a realistic theory of knowledge can rest than the distinction between the act of knowing and the object known. The distinction requires however, if its real meaning is to be grasped, that we should be in earnest with it and recognise that it throws upon us the task of offering some intelligible account of the "act" in and through which knowledge of an object is possible. In perception, the mind is unquestionably directed upon an object. But to suppose that the specific character of the mental activity involved consists merely in such "direction" seems to me an error arising from the attempt to inspect that activity

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\* Cf. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 4.

† *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 164.

from the outside—as a part, so to speak, of the whole objective situation—instead of from within as a mode of the conscious subject's own life. Take up in regard to it the position of an external spectator, and its difference from any other mental activity may well seem expressible in terms of "direction." And from "direction" it is but a short step to "nervous response," and to the substitution of the latter in the place of the activity originally described as "mental." Scrutinise, on the contrary, the cognitive act from the point of view of the conscious subject whose act it is, and, as I have tried to show, it evinces itself as neither the source of what is "constitutive," in the Kantian sense, on the one hand, nor as "diaphanous" on the other, but as consisting essentially in discriminating what is presented to it, and as thus acquiring the definite content of awareness of certain features or characteristics. Nothing is easier than to fall into the blunder of abstracting the contents of such mental acts from the mental acts whose contents they are and of ascribing to them a fictitious mode of independent existence. From that to the "representative theory" is no far cry. We first speak, for example of "the idea of red" instead of "the awareness of red," and then, by a further transition, we go on to substitute "red" for "the idea of red"—that is to say, the content cognised for the content of the act of cognising it, or what is present *to* the mind for what is present *in* it—and all the paradoxes of subjectivism are upon our hands. Now, there is no getting out of this quagmire by following the path prescribed by the "new realism"—namely, by accepting Berkeley's identification of "idea" with "object," whilst rejecting his dictum that the *esse* of the "object" or "idea" is *percipi* and insisting that the term "idea" indicates no more than that the "object" is related to the mind that knows it. To cut the Gordian knot in this fashion, by brushing aside the crucial difficulty of the problem, is more dazzling than helpful. I agree in unreservedly rejecting the "representative theory," but I urge that



its rejection forces upon us in no way the conclusion that "knowledge and the object of knowledge are identical."\* It is just because the content of the act of knowing never is the object of that act, never is, in fact, an object at all, and, therefore, never can stand in the way of that upon which the act is directed, that the act of knowing is not disqualified for the discharge of its function. Were the awareness of shape not shapeless, the awareness of motion not motionless, and the awareness of colour not colourless,† apprehension of the shape, motion, and colour of things *would* be precarious indeed.

If, now, a perceiving act only acquires its specific content through being directed upon an object, and if that acquisition does not imply that any quality of the object has been transported into the act, or that the content of the act is, in any sense, an intermediary object (a "nearer object," as Dr. Bosanquet calls it), the *specific* character of the act is no impediment to adequate apprehension of the object. We need not assume, that is to say, that consciousness must be "diaphanous," if its report of what is other than itself is to be trusted. But the way in which the notion of its "diaphanous" character has arisen is not hard to trace. Try, as an onlooker, to observe the two states, the act of being aware of red, and the act of being aware of blue, and almost inevitably the former will appear to be made up of "awareness" *and* "red," and the latter of "awareness" *and* "blue." The "red" and the "blue" will appear to be readily distinguishable, while the "awareness" in the one case will appear to be indistinguishable from the "awareness" in the other, and each to be just something that can be looked through and nothing seen but the red or the blue. One reason for this is obvious. "Awareness," so regarded, has become a universal—just exactly the "I think" which Kant affirmed "must be capable of accompanying all my presenta-

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 223.

† Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

tions"—and naturally it will elude detection as a particular. Similarly, *in this respect*, take a "red colour" to be made up of "red" and "colour," and a "blue colour" to be made up of "blue" and "colour," and the "colour" will be no less difficult to detect; it, too, will seem to be "diaphanous." More important is it, however, to insist that, viewed from within, the act of being aware of red *is*, for the conscious subject, a specific act clearly distinguishable from the act of being aware of blue, and that, in the relation of perception, it is *this* act, with its definite content, "awareness of red," and not merely "awareness" *simpliciter*, over against which the "red" which is a quality of the object stands.

A continuum of such specific acts, along with those conditions of feeling-tone which seem to be their invariable accompaniments, is, I take it, essentially what we mean by a mind. The continuum involves certainly, and only becomes possible through, the retention and revival into subsequent moments of consciousness of the contents of previous states. I find not in conation but in knowing the fundamental characteristic of mental life. Doubtless, in psychology it is advisable to restrict the use of the term "knowledge" to cognition that has reached a certain level of psychical development; but the main principle is not thereby affected. A human mind, at any rate, depends for its very being upon knowledge; its place in the scheme of existence is determined by and through its capacity of knowing. But let us beware of demanding of knowing that it should do more than enable us to know—a demand the fulfilment of which, if it *could* be fulfilled, would prove destructive of knowledge, and of all that depends upon it. Even in perfectly completed knowledge the antithesis between knowledge and that which is known would remain, for it is an antithesis implied in the very notion of knowledge itself.

*§7. Conclusion.*

My object in this paper has not been to propound a metaphysical theory. The problem with which I have been concerned is essentially an epistemological problem, and I have striven to confine the discussion of it, so far as possible, within the sphere of epistemology. It may, however, conduce to clearness to add, in conclusion, one or two observations of a more general kind. And, first of all, let me guard against misunderstanding by disowning any attempt that may be made to see in what I have written a defence of the doctrine commonly called "dualism." That material things and mental lives are fundamentally disparate entities I have certainly tried to show reason for holding. But to me it seems that the world is full of entities, or modes of being, which are, in their way, no less disparate in character than mind and matter. Nor am I in the least concerned to deny that absolute independence cannot be claimed for any of the concrete particulars of the universe, or that ultimately they must form an interconnected system. So much I am, on the contrary, quite willing to grant. Yet a bare statement of that sort amounts in itself to little. The question for metaphysics to answer, if it can, is as to the kind of system that would be compatible with what we know of the contents of reality. I may be blind, but I fail to see why, in order to constitute a system, there must needs be one matrix from which all qualitative differences have arisen—one ultimate being of which everything else is a partial manifestation.

To come back, however, to the themes we have been handling. More than one writer has observed that the "new realism," notwithstanding its avowedly polemical attitude towards idealism, is, in truth, separated from the latter only by the thinnest of lines. The considerations I have been pressing amply bear out that contention.

When, for example, it is maintained that sense-data are

physical and not mental, and when the term "physical" is defined as meaning "what is dealt with by physics," while a particular is called "mental" if "it is aware of something,"\* there is plainly, so far, nothing to distinguish the point of view in question from subjective idealism of the most thorough-going type. Berkeley, at any rate, had no intention of asserting that the *esse* of sensible things was *percipere*, nor would he have considered it worth his while to protest that the *esse* of "what is dealt with by physics" might quite well be *percipi*. Underlying Berkeley's reasoning throughout there lies the conviction that the "mental" is not exhausted in what he called the "modes" or "attributes" of mind, but that "quantities" may be "mental" in the sense that they *are* only as perceived by a mind. It is true that Berkeley was disposed to regard pleasure and pain as allied in this respect to "ideas," whereas Mr. Russell conceives pleasurable and painfulness to belong to the act of being aware, and that, on the latter supposition, one of Berkeley's arguments in support of his position falls to the ground. But even on this point the "new realists" are by no means unanimous, and Professor Holt, as we have seen, advances a view of pleasure and pain which, if admitted, would make the argument in question relevant enough.

A more fundamental basis of agreement is, however, this. Both the "new realism" and the idealism it would displace interpret a "thing" as made up of its "appearances." Mr. Russell would have us free our minds from the "assumption" of permanent "things" with changing appearances. A "thing" he takes to be a certain series of appearances, connected with each other by continuity and by certain causal laws. Leaving, for the moment, on one side the atomism that is bound up with Mr. Russell's conception, this contention is in strict accordance with the view of nature with which the post-Kantian idealism has made us familiar. In his able

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\* Russell, *Scientia*, vol. xvi, 1914, p. 5.

paper read before this Society in 1915, Mr. J. W. Scott was proceeding on true Hegelian lines in maintaining that a sensible object is some kind of concretion of the entirety of its appearances into one appearance, that what is called the "real thing" may be said to be that "appearance" which contains the rest as its content, and generally that appearances constitute the content of reality.\* No doubt the two writers would differ radically in regard to the ultimate meaning to be assigned to what they both call "appearances"; but they are at one in refusing to recognise in the physical universe as such any particulars other than those which are expressible in terms of "appearances."

Now the "realism" for which in this paper I have sought to offer justification joins issue with idealism in respect to each of the positions just indicated. On the one hand, it meets the contention that the *esse* of sensible objects is *percipi* by laying stress upon the fact that the occurrence of an act of perception involves conditions which are not, and never can be, perceptible, and by showing that there is nothing in the notion of perception which at all implies restriction of the object perceived to the type of concrete existence called mental rather than to any other. And, on the other hand, it meets the contention that "things" are groups or complexes of "appearances" by calling in question the whole conception of "appearance" which lies at the root of the contention. "Appearances," according to the view I am taking, are not themselves existing entities, but ways in which existing entities are apprehended. In other words, the distinction between a "thing" and its "appearances" is *not* a distinction between the "thing" as a whole and its constituents. A "thing" is made up of parts and of qualities, and any one of its qualities may "appear" in a countless number of ways. But this quality is not resolvable into its ways of appearing; it remains

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\* *Proceedings*, N.S., vol. xvi, 1916, p. 63 *sqq.*

one, though its appearances vary, and is, as such, a quality of the "real thing," while the appearances of it are not. The appearances are no more than the orderly manner in which the quality is apprehended by a finite mind under the conditions and limitations imposed by sense intuition.

A "crude brickbat notion of physical object"\* is about as far removed from the notion of "thing" to which the course of reflexion we have been following would point as any notion could well be. How the different parts ("atoms," if you will) and qualities of what we name a "thing" are combined in one whole, and how they are related there to one another, are metaphysical questions with which I have not attempted to deal. But nothing could be more remote from my purpose than to suggest that "any and every property of the object can under any and all circumstances be predicated," or that "all its properties can be predicated of each of its parts." Absurdities of that order merit not serious refutation. On the other hand, certain propositions respecting the nature of a "thing" we are, I think, entitled, on empirical grounds, to lay down. The brown-shiny-oblong which I apprehend by sight and the hard-solid-oblong which I discern by touch I am entitled, it seems to me, to assert is a single thing—the table, namely, in front of me at which I am at this moment sitting. And, further that these properties of the table are on a different footing from the parts of it which are co-existent in space, because *their* co-existence is of a peculiar kind, for they jointly occupy the same portion of space, whereas the parts do not. And a "brickbat" notion of a physical object is disposed of, once for all, by that consideration alone.

In like manner, the notion of a "soul-substance," which subsists in "awful isolation" and "receives its own unique sensations,"† is utterly foreign to the notion of mind which the

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\* *New Realism*, p. 371.

† Holt, *Concept of Consciousness*, p. 110.

considerations I have been urging would lead us to adopt. The mind, from the point of view I have been regarding it, receives nothing; it is essentially an activity that finds and discovers and whose being is constituted by the awareness of what it finds and discovers. Whether, and, if so, in what sense, the stream of psychical activity is rightly conceived as constituting a substantial identity of existence is again a metaphysical question upon which, for our present purpose, it was not necessary to discuss. But, as outcome of our inquiry, this much, at least, can be said. Substance or no substance, the mind is certainly not one entity, and its states, or modes of activity, something else. The mind is its states; but these are connected together in a manner as little analogous to a series of beads upon a string as they are to a succession of films in a cinema entertainment. A mental life has not parts analogous to the atoms of physical things.

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## XII.—SOME ASPECTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLOTINUS.

*By* W. R. INGE.

THE position of Plotinus in the chain of great thinkers is a curious one. Many competent critics, as I shall presently show, have regarded him as one of the greatest names in the history of philosophy. For the student of historical theology he has an almost unique importance, as the bridge between the Hellenic philosophy of religion and the philosophy of the Catholic Church. He influenced Christian thought profoundly, through Augustine, the Cappadocian Fathers, and the Pseudo-Dionysius. His philosophy has been the intellectual foundation of Christian mysticism, and of many theological systems, from Scotus Erigena to some quite modern writers. And yet he is so little read that the best-known histories of philosophy copy from each other the most superficial and often erroneous descriptions of his views, and do so unreprieved. In our universities, the history of Greek philosophy is assumed to end with the Stoics, and so an artificial gap yawns between Hellenism and Christian speculation. Even men who have devoted their lives to the study of Plato have seldom taken the trouble to study the system which crowns five hundred years of continuous thought and disputation on Platonism. The chief reason, I have no doubt, is that the Greek of the *Enneads* is so crabbed that even a good scholar can make little of it till he has worked upon it for many weeks, with much tearing of the hair.

The following estimates of Plotinus may be interesting :—

1. *Augustine*.—"Os illud Platonis quod in philosophia purgatissimum et lucidissimum, dimotis nubibus erroris,



emicuit maxime in Plotino, qui platonice philosophus ita eius similis iudicatus est, ut simul eos vixisse, tantum autem interesse temporis ut in hoc ille revixisse putandus sit."

2. *Réville*.—"One of the most vigorous thinkers that humanity has produced."

3. *Troeltsch*.—"In my opinion the sharper stress of the scientific and philosophical spirit in modern times has made the blend of Neoplatonism and New Testament Christianity the only possible solution of the problem at the present day, and I do not doubt that this synthesis of Neoplatonism and Christianity will once more be dominant in modern thought."

This fearless prophecy, from a thinker of such eminence, naturally gives me great pleasure.

4. *Eucken*.—"The third century produced the one great philosopher of this movement, *den weltbeherrschenden Geist des Plotin*."

5. *Benn*.—"No other thinker has ever accomplished a revolution so immediate, so comprehensive, and of such prolonged duration."

6. *Whittaker*.—"The greatest individual thinker between Aristotle and Descartes."

7. *Drews*.—"The greatest metaphysician of antiquity."

In this paper I have chosen, out of the book which I have nearly finished, certain points on which I am sure that the criticism of this Society will be helpful to me. I have avoided topics in which an intimate knowledge of the *Enneads* is indispensable. I have not, in this paper, given my proof that to charge Plotinus with metaphysical "dualism" is to misunderstand him from top to bottom. I have not exposed the exaggeration by which the vision of the One has been made the centre of this philosophy. I have not demonstrated that he is very far from bidding us to neglect our duties and live in a world of dreams. All these and other delusions would disappear if students of philosophy would take the trouble to

read the Enneads for themselves. They are the result not of misunderstanding but of ignorance.

*Time.*

Plotinus is well aware that the problem of Time is one of the hardest in metaphysics. In the long chapter\* devoted to it he approaches it with diffidence, and does not claim to throw any new light upon it. "Some of the blessed ancients must have found the truth. It is enough for us to select the wisest of their opinions and try to understand it." We have, no doubt, an instinctive notion of Time, but, when we analyse it more closely, we are in difficulties.†

Time is, as Plato‡ says, the moving image of Eternity, which it resembles as much as it can. Eternity is the sphere of Spirit, and Time is the sphere of Soul. But we must not, with some of the Pythagoreans, identify Eternity with the spiritual world, and Time with the phenomenal world. For the spiritual world contains particular things as parts of itself, while Eternity contains them as a unified whole—it contains them as they are—*sub specie aeternitatis*. Eternity is the atmosphere in which spiritual existences live. As for the phenomenal world, "things that are born are nothing without their future."§ It is their nature and the condition of their existence to be always "making acquisitions." Each individual life in this world would be truncated and shorn of its meaning if taken, by abstraction, out of the temporal sequence in which it lives. To talk of "living in the present" is, on the plane of ordinary experience, an absurdity. The present is an unextended point, and, therefore, reality, on this theory, consists of two parts, the past and the future, neither of which

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\* 3, 7.

† So Augustine, *Confessions*, xi, 14, says, "Quid est tempus? Si nemo a me quaerat, scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio."

‡ *Timæus*, 37.

§ 3, 7, 3.

is real. Things that are born yearn to continue in existence, because perpetuity is the symbol and copy of the permanence of Eternity, and the effort to make perpetual progress is the symbol and copy of the perfection of Eternity.\* In the eternal world, on the contrary, there is no future or past. Activity there is; but if it were possible to take a section of eternal life, as we attempt to do for this life when we separate "the present" from the past and the future, the section would exhibit all the perfection of the whole. The form of existence in the world of Time is succession (τὸ ἄλλο μετ' ἄλλο); the stages follow each other. But in Eternity the whole is in each part; all is present together in its realised meaning and achieved perfection. Will is not destroyed, nor activity paralysed; but will and satisfaction, activity and rest, are taken up into a higher unity.

The views of the Stoics and other schools about the nature of Time are found to be erroneous. The Stoics identified Time with motion (κίνησις). But motion is *in* Time.† Besides, motion can stop or be arrested, while the process of Time is constant. Lastly, there is no uniform speed of motion. If Time and motion were identical, there should be many times.

A second theory, that Time is "that which is moved" (τὸ κινούμενον), a view attributed to Eratosthenes and Hestiaeus of Perinthus, is dismissed without comment.

Is Time, then, one kind of motion? It is not "the interval of motion" (κινήσεως διάστημα, Zeno), for there is no uniformity in the "intervals." As before, this theory would produce "many times." Besides, "interval" is a spatial, not a temporal expression. It may be said that motion has a certain "interval" (between the first and last states of its subject), because it is continuous. But this only

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\* This does not mean that each period of Time is better, as containing higher values, than the preceding; but only that upward striving (ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ) is a constant character of existence in Time.

† Cf. Augustine, *Confessions*, xi, 24.

gives us, as it were, the dimensions of the motion, a quantity produced in Time, not Time itself. Movements, and their "intervals," are in Time; they are not to be identified with Time.

Plotinus then considers the Aristotelian definition,\* that Time is "the number and measure of motion." The difficulty caused by the irregularity of motion here comes up again. If a uniform measure of Time (what Bergson calls clock-time) is used to compare swift and slow movements, we have certainly a standard of measurement, but we are no nearer to knowing what Time is in itself. Time is something else than "the number which measures motion according to anteriority and posteriority." Unless these last words are used in a spatial sense, which would be "to confound Time with Space"; they only repeat the notion of Time which they were intended to explain. Moreover, Time existed before it was used to measure with; it is not merely subjective. That Time was created by the Soul is true, but not in the sense in which the words might be used by a subjective idealist. Plotinus suggests that the Aristotelians ought to have said, and probably meant, that Time is *measured by motion*; Time is the measure of motion only accidentally.† While addressing their own school, they have not made it clear to outsiders what they consider Time to be in itself.

Lastly, the Epicurean theory that Time is an accident (σύμπτωμα) or consequence of motion is no explanation at all.

Plotinus now comes to the constructive part of his discussion. Time is natural (φύσει); it had to be. In saying this, Plotinus wishes us to understand that there are some things in philosophy which we have to accept as given facts of experience. The intellectual speculations of the metaphysician belong to the life of Soul, not of Spirit. Things that are real to Soul are part of the atmosphere which the

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\* Aristotle, *Physics*, 4, 12.

† κατὰ συμβεβηκός, 3, 7, 12.

discursive intellect breathes. It is bound to accept them; though the contradictions which become apparent when the intellect treats them as ultimate realities are one of the means by which the soul is forced upward to the intuitive perceptions of the spiritual life. In nothing is this more evident than in speculations about Time. The Spirit and even the Soul transcend it\*; but we are still so much involved in it that we cannot think it away or put ourselves outside it. It is for us a necessary form of thought. Any explanation of time in terms of discursive thought must necessarily be inadequate; but the contradictions which inhere in the notion of Time are not of a kind to condemn it as "contrary to Nature."

Plotinus is so little troubled about the origin of Time that he half banteringly suggests a mythological explanation. "Shall we refer to the Muses?" Then he gives his own view, that "Time, still non-existent, reposed in the bosom of Reality (*ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἀνεπαύετο οὐκ ὄν*) until Nature, wishing to become its own mistress, and to enter into possession of itself, and to enlarge the sphere of its activities, put itself, and Time together with itself, into motion." Thus Time, the image of Eternity, arose through the desire of the Soul of the World to exert its active powers. "For," says Plotinus, "the nature of the Soul is restless; it desires always to translate what it sees in the eternal world into another form." With this motive the Soul of the World took upon her the form of a servant and the likeness of a creature of Time, and made the creation also subject to Time in all things.† Time is the form which the soul creates for itself when it desires to reproduce the eternal ideas as living and creative activities. It is "the life of the soul as it moves from one manifestation of life to another.‡ Our measurements of Time had their origin in the

\* *πρῶτον μὲν ἑαυτὴν ἐχρόνωσεν, ἀντὶ τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτον ποιήσασα· ἔπειτα δὲ, καὶ τῷ γενομένῳ ἔδωκε δουλεύειν χρόνον*, 3, 7, 11.

† *οὐδὲ αἱ ψυχαὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἀλλὰ τὰ πάθη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ποιήματα*, 4, 4, 15.

‡ 3, 7, 11.

observed sequence of day and night, which gave mankind a fixed standard by which to measure duration, and in the seasons of the year. The "movement" which takes place in time is a "copy" of the "first movement" of Spirit, a transcendental form of activity without change which belongs to the eternal world. We are of course not meant to take literally the statement that there was a time when Time was not. In the vulgar sense of "eternity," the time-series, having no beginning and no end, is itself eternal. "Time is the activity of an eternal Soul, not turned towards itself nor within itself, but exercised in creation and generation."\* It is "the span of the life proper to the Soul; its course is composed of equal, uniform, imperceptibly progressing movements, with a continuous activity." Thus the external life of the universal Soul carries with it, not "outside itself," but as its inseparable attendant, what we may call real Time. This is uniform and steady, in correspondence with the unbroken activity of its creator. More limited activities, representing particular ideas in the Spiritual World, are spread out, in the world of Soul, over as much Time as is required for their completion. If they were not subordinate to the one all-embracing life of the Universal Soul, we might have to admit the possibility of many time-systems, determined by particular activities.

This theory of time is interesting in itself, and has obvious points of similarity to Bergson's doctrine of *durée*, which has aroused so much interest among philosophers in our own day. Bergson's enemy is that "false intellectualism which immobilises moving ideas into solidified concepts to play with them as counters." By exposing the fallacy which underlies this method of thinking, he hopes that he has restored the independence of the individual and removed from the freely-aspiring human

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\* 3, 7, 12. In 4, 4, 1, he says that all spiritual perception is timeless—*ἄχρονος πάντα ἡ νόησις*.

will the cold hand of determinism. He proves that the mechanical theory, which is applicable to inorganic matter and its motions, does not account for the phenomena of life, still less for those of spiritual and purposive life. Psychical facts are not measurable in terms of one another. The methods of mathematics (for these are the methods of mechanical science) are not applicable to living beings. We may describe the course of organic evolution, but not explain or predict it. Bergson even denies teleology, as being "mechanism in the reverse order"; he insists on real spontaneity and *newness* in the movements of organic life. But at this point some even of his disciples part company with him. If there is no invariable sequence and no inner teleology, what is left but chance? The "freedom" which he has vindicated turns out to be mere lawlessness. Science is reduced to playing with appearances, which are not even appearances of reality. Reality seems to be wild movement with nothing to move.

For Bergson, according to our President, there is no unique sense in which events at different places are simultaneous. This seems to me to be destructive of the idea of time. Nor can I agree, any more than Plotinus would have agreed, that 'we are within a movement.' If we were, we could not know that we were moving, and for all practical purposes we should not be moving, just as for almost all practical purposes we may think of the earth as stationary. Bergson is also determined to make time a spiritual reality, while spatial dimension is only "material." The body, says Mr. Carr in a striking sentence, is continuous with an infinite present, the mind with an infinite past. But the truth surely is that space is one of the "dimensions" in which the Soul pursues its activities, and time is another.\* I can see no warrant for degrading one and exalting the other. Nor can I see why the mind is continuous

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\* So Münsterberg says: "Things have their space-shape, but are not parts of one space; they have their time-shape, but do not lie in time."

with an infinite past, but apparently not with an infinite future. The future appears to be non-existent for Bergson, though the past exists. He seems to give us an infinite snipped off at one end.

Bergson's most original contribution to philosophy lies in his attempt to connect mechanical and psychical laws with our notions of Space and Time respectively. Our experience of Time he calls *la durée*, a word which has no exact equivalent in English. The characteristic of this experience is that there is no bare repetition, and no summation of discrete moments; but the past flows on into the present, and modifies it. This interpenetration is one-sided; the future does not affect the present; therefore, he says, the process is irreversible, and Time, or *la durée*, must be real. In biology, on the other hand, and in the inorganic sciences, where all so-called changes are explicable in purely quantitative terms, every series is theoretically reversible, since the later stages contain nothing which was not implicit in the earlier. If this were the true character of all changes in the universe, Time would be of no more account in philosophy than it is in mathematics, a science in which duration is wholly disregarded. "Scientific thinking," in Bergson's sense, also eliminates all qualitative estimates and all valuation. The misapplication of "scientific thinking" in this limited sense (it would be better to call it the mechanical theory) to psychical experience is largely due, Bergson thinks, to that "confusion of Space with Time" of which we have found Plotinus complaining. The characteristic of Space is that it can be subdivided indefinitely, while Time, as we experience it (though not as we measure it), cannot be counted or split up. It is like a tune which loses its existence as a tune if the notes are taken out and considered separately.\* Space, for Bergson, is the mere form of homogeneity, and he differs from Plotinus in making Space prior to the objects

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\* Lindsay, *The Philosophy of Bergson*, p. 124.



which it contains. This notion of Space is connected with what we may venture to think a very vulnerable spot in Bergson's philosophy. He sets Space and Time too dualistically over against each other, and forgets that there can be no perception of the purely homogeneous. Qualitative difference is perceived in any spatial perception; and *par revanche*, there can be no experience of pure heterogeneity; the changing is only known, as changing, in relation to an assumed permanent substance. Bergson, like Leibniz, who calls Space "the order of co-existence," impoverishes the content of spatial experience far too much. Space is not merely the form of co-existence, which indeed can be conceived, though not pictured, non-spatially. Space is also essentially the form under which we recognise *near* and *far*, and so infer the reality of the unseen and unexperienced. Time teaches the same lesson under a different form. Space and Time forbid us to shut ourselves up within ourselves. By obstinately refusing to be explained away, they refute subjective idealism. They are real over against the psychical consciousness; real, Plotinus would say, for the individual soul exercising its normal activities. To the universal Soul they are a kind of "Matter," the field of its external activity, and they represent orderly arrangements within a whole; for Space and Time are uniform throughout, and though they may stretch out to infinity, they are essentially measurable, and therefore constituents of a whole. The soul can transcend them, because the true home of the soul is the eternal world. The soul is not really in Space and Time, though these are the field of its activities; they are rather in the soul.

### *Time, Change, and Causality.*

It is, or should be, a commonplace of philosophy, that only the permanent can change, change being a succession of states within a unity. These states together form a system, which may be called the consequence of the nature or ground in

which the unity of the system consists. When these states follow each other in Time, we may speak of change within the system. Where the sequence is only logical, neither time nor change comes in. The ordinary—and the scientific— notion of efficient cause resembles that of logical “ground” only when time and change are involved; but it generally regards events as being determined, not by the whole nature of the system to which they belong, but by the events which precede them in Time. But to assert efficient causation means to distinguish activity and passivity in things, which in physical science seems to be an illegitimate anthropomorphism. Physical science ought to admit no individual things or definite acts. For it the whole is one thing and nature one process. Natural science is an abstract monistic philosophy. If it could overcome its prejudice against teleology, as some naturalists, such as Lamarck, have done, it would be, in Plotinian language, the psychic reflexion of the spiritual world, polarised as a world of will. While it chooses to eliminate soul, which is the only cause of change, it must consistently eliminate efficient causation. Strictly, there is no activity or passivity in things. Ordinary thought would reject as absurd the notion of an event being determined by the future; but if the whole series is one system, there is no reason why the earlier members of the series should have more efficient power than the later. Indeed, the notion of efficient causality is profoundly unsatisfactory. It ascribes activity to mere links in the chain of events, which cannot possess it, and denies activity to the system as a whole, which may possess it. Things are not vehicles of causation. Some scientific writers are aware of this; but they cling to what they call causation as a way of denying intervention of any new factor in evolution; each stage, they say, is wholly conditioned by its temporal antecedents. Thus when they assert causality they mean to deny that there is any such thing. They assert *continuity*, which, as Bradley has argued, seems to be a self-contradictory

notion, if it is intended to reconcile change and permanence. Accordingly, some have given up the philosophical problem, and limit the province of science to the discovery of the manner in which nature usually behaves. They are thus well rid of causality altogether. This is the more welcome to them, as it is plain that if all events are caused by preceding events, there can be no beginning to the series, which stretches back to infinity. But to say that natural science is "merely descriptive" is to confess that it is an abstract science, which can give us no view of reality as a whole. For description is only incomplete interpretation.

For Plotinus, things certainly cannot be causes. The ground of each system is some Idea in the world of Spirit, which has been transmuted by soul into vital law. The only real causes are final causes. So-called efficient causes are parts of the machinery which soul uses. They belong to "nature."

Bergson thinks that by insisting on the "individuality" of conscious life (by individuality he means that interpenetration of present by past states which he finds to be characteristic of psychical experience) he has vindicated the freedom of the will against determinism. In ordinary "scientific thinking," duration is eliminated, as is proved by the fact that if the movement of the whole time-process were greatly accelerated it would make no difference to the calculations. Science, therefore, he urges, commits us to the absurdity of change without Time. But in reality the mechanical theory denies real change, if, with Bergson, we hold that there is no real change without the intervention of some new causative factor. Alternate evolution and involution have been the predestined and predictable lot of material things from the first.\* But this alternation introduces no new element into things, which therefore remain essentially unchanged. To this it may be

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\* So Empedocles taught long ago. φύσις οὐδένης ἐστὶν ἀπάντων |  
 θνητῶν οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτῳ τελευτή, | ἀλλὰ μόνον μῖξις τε διάλλaxis τε  
 μίγντων | ἐστὶ, φύσις τ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

answered that Time may measure the periods of each process of evolution and involution, each of which may be a teleological series. If Bergson had said that the *causation of one thing by another* is excluded by the mechanical hypothesis, he would have been right; and no doubt many scientists who adopt the mechanical theory are open to the charge of talking about causation when they mean only invariable sequence. Others have confused logical consequence with causality. Causation implies creative action; it is a teleological category, and belongs to the processes of nature only as determined once for all by a "First Cause," or as directed by an immanent will. It is a vulgar error to suppose that invariable sequence excludes either a First Cause or an immanent will. Invariable sequence may be a fact of observation, but it explains nothing. Winter is not the "cause" of summer, nor day of night. *Post hoc ergo propter hoc* is an anthropomorphism on the analogy of human purposive action. For an automatist it is absurd. Causation, used in its correct sense, is precisely what Bergson calls "creative evolution," and it does require *la durée*, as he says. But this constant operation of creative force may take place without any "freedom" on the part of that which exhibits its effects. A watch is no more free when we push the hands about than when we leave it to keep its own time. Nor does Bergson even succeed in proving that a psychical series, in "real time," is irreversible. He only makes it discontinuous, whether we read it backwards or forwards, for, whenever a "new" element is admitted, there is a breach of complete continuity. Lastly, he does not prove that it is unpredictable, but only that it is unpredictable by the laws which govern inorganic matter. What he calls creative evolution may be the orderly development of psychical or spiritual law, which a superior being could predict as the astronomer predicts an eclipse. In this case, the argument for free will falls to the ground, if we take free will to mean a real "contingency in the heart of things," to use a phrase of Dr. James Ward's. Bergson rejects teleology, and

therefore finalistic determinism, but he cannot get rid of either. If, with the Neoplatonists, we hold that "Divine necessity coincides with Divine will," we shall infer that we win freedom in proportion as we enter into the life of God, and make His will our will. Our freedom will then be our emancipation from our fancied subjection to the law of sin and death.

It seems more than probable that there is no radical difference between the laws which determine the sequence of events in the organic and in the inorganic worlds;\* but that as we rise to the higher forms of being the laws become more and more complex, and therefore apparently irregular in their working. Human character is the most complex of all, and the most obviously ungeometrical. But only a superhuman intelligence could say whether there is any real indetermination in these manifestations. We have rejected the notion that one event is the cause of another. The cause of any event is the will of a spiritual being, of a mind which has willed it to happen in a certain series. That will is certainly not less free if it acts uniformly, linking events together as stages in a predetermined action. Whether that will is human or superhuman is another question. For Plotinus the will is that of the World-Soul, and individual souls are free in proportion as they understand and obey the laws which the World-Soul has ordained alike for them and their environment. The World-Soul itself is the instrument of Spirit energising through it as the supreme will.

The "idealistic reaction against Science" (Aliotta) has made great play with the irregularities of concrete nature, which only approximates "on the average" to the "diagrams" of science. It is argued that nature "really is" irregular and unaccountable, the "laws of nature" being only convenient methodological assumptions, indispensable for the special work

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\* What we call mechanism is itself psychical. Nothing is given without psychical activity. To ignore this is one of Bergson's chief errors.

of science. Plotinus would say that the laws are certainly the world of Soul, but that nature is so too. Whatever may be the explanation of apparent disorders in nature, no Platonist can observe with glee that the world does not seem to him to be a perfect cosmos. He may need a caution against "mathematicising nature," but not against attempting to find universal law in the natural world. The synthesising labour to which he is always impelled is no mere "symbolism";\* it is the pathway to reality. It is thus that in the psychic world he discovers the truth of teleology, and in the spiritual world the eternal fountains of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. It may be suggested that the real object of that branch of science which deals with inorganic nature is to discover *the inner meaning of what seems to us unconscious activity*. This is a very different thing from drawing diagrams.

Time for Plotinus is *the form of willed change*. Every distinct idea "yonder" becomes a finite purpose "here." Every attribute of God's essence becomes an activity of His existence. The time-process is not the necessary form of the self-evolution of God; it is the product of His free but necessary creative activity. But it is not needful to suppose that in inorganic nature God has wound up the clock and left it to itself, while in living beings new interventions take place. Rather, the same spirit which slumbers in the stone and dreams in the flower awakes in the human soul. The assumption that regularity is a sign of undirected movement is one of the strangest and most obstinate of human prejudices. It is only

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\* Aliotta (p. 438) seems to me very sound on this point. "If we examine any principle, law, or physical concept whatever, we shall find that experience is not simply copied or abbreviated, but is rather completed, perfected, and idealised. In the scientific concept the phenomena given in perception attain to a higher degree of coherence and intelligibility than in the practical world, and hence to a higher degree of truth." The scientific concept is not a symbol; for the symbol is always worth less than the thing symbolised, whereas the scientific concept is of greater value than the series of facts which acted as the starting-point of its formation.

a false idea of causation that makes us think that orderly evolution is not real change. It is the same prejudice that makes men say that "God does nothing," because they cannot distinguish any particular event as an "act of God."

Variation and heredity are both facts, both names for unknown laws. Why should one be more "spiritual" than the other; and why should we confound freedom with the unpredictable? We have no wish to reduce even inorganic evolution to the terms of pure mathematics. In fact, no natural process does exhibit this exactness. Nature always "wobbles" a little, as any table of vital or meteorological statistics shows. Yet irregularity is not a sign of higher or freer life. On the contrary, the precision of the mathematical sciences seemed to Plato and many of his school the very type of the spiritual order. But there is a profound truth in the saying of Proclus that only the highest and lowest things are simple, while all between is complex. Mathematical truth may perhaps be compared to an empty outline of the rich glory of the spiritual world. It is an abstract and colourless presentation of supratemporal reality. With the concrete individual there enters not only "a splitting up" (as Plotinus says) of spiritual truth, but some apparent dislocation of law—of mechanical law in the physical world, of psychical law in the soul-world. This dislocation seems relatively slight in the material world, just because that world has so little life; it is more marked in the region of soul, because it is in this region that life is most fully revealed as a struggle. Still, we do not know what a mechanical psychical life would be; we have no scales to weigh the imponderable.

Time, for Plotinus, is not merely "the measure of the impermanence of the imperfect;"\* it is the measure of a definite finite activity directed to some end beyond itself.†

\* Dr. Schiller.

† οὐκ αὐτὴ τελειοῦται, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα οὗ ἐστοχάζετο, 6, 1, 16.

This remarkable statement proves that Plotinus regards Time as a teleological category. What is real in Time is the potentiality of qualitative change. "Movement by itself does not need Time." There is movement in the spiritual world, but no qualitative change. Continuous regular motion is a form of stability. Time is needed when the superior principle desires to make something "according to the pattern showed in the mount." Because this act of creation is willed, and willed as a process, there must be an interval between the inception and conclusion of the process. This interval is Time.

*Past and Future.*

In what sense are the distinctions of past and future real? Plotinus says that temporal differences "here" are images of differences in order or arrangement (*τάξις*) "yonder." That is to say, what is unreal in past and future is not the relation of anteriority and posteriority, but the envisagement of temporal events from an imaginary point, "the present," within the process. Anterior and posterior events are, in their positions and not out of them, constituent parts of the individual fact to which they belong. Past and future are illusory ideas. Things do not come into being, nor pass out of being; it is we who are moving through Time as the traveller in an express train sees trees and hedges hurrying past his field of vision. But is this a legitimate comparison. It runs counter to a deep-seated instinct, that Time and Space are not like each other. We readily grant that the "not here" is as real as the "here"; but it is difficult for us to think of the past and future as being no less real than the present. What is the ground of this difference? One reason may be that we can move voluntarily in Space, but not in Time. The movement of Time carries us all with it, like the movement of the earth round the sun. There is also a mysterious and deeply important difference between the two tracts that lie behind and before the moment which we call the present. We are absolutely blind on one



side. The apparent contingency and uncertainty of all that lies ahead of us seems to be the source of our ideas of cause, purpose, and freedom. If the future lay open before us, it is difficult to see how we could have these ideas, which could never arise from a contemplation of co-existence. Unless, then, our ideas of cause, purpose, and freedom are illusory, futurity must indicate something more than a blind spot in our mental vision. This ignorance must be a necessary condition of soul life. We must, however, be careful not to exaggerate the difference between our knowledge of the past and our ignorance of the future. Very much of the past is as completely lost to us as the future; and the whole would be lost but for the mysterious faculty of memory. What memory does for us with regard to the past, knowledge of natural law does for us with regard to the future. We do know many things that have not yet happened. Yet, if we are to take Plotinus as our guide, we must remember that the Soul is the creator of the phenomenal world and the time-process, and that this creation is a continuous act, being the activity which constitutes the outgoing life of the Soul. From this, the specifically human point of view, there is a real generic difference between the "not yet" and the "no longer," and we cannot regard them as homogeneous parts of a landscape which we traverse as passive spectators. The will, of which Time is the form, has a wholly different relation to the future from that which it has to the past. In looking back, the will confesses its impotence; in looking forward it finds its scope and *raison d'être*. It is because psychical reality is will, not memory, that we regard the past as "done with." Memory, indeed, proves that our consciousness of the time-process, with its evanescence of the past, is an illusion. It is a partial knowledge, limited by the needs of our activity. Like all else, it indicates that the Soul has "come down" on a temporary adventure. This attitude of the will is not, however, something to be merely left behind when we climb from Soul to Spirit. In the life of Spirit

Time is transcended ; but the Eternity in which Spirit moves and has its being is not an arrested and fixed present moment, truncated of its living relations to past and future ; it is a fuller and richer life in which all meanings are completely expressed, all relations acknowledged. The Soul must take its Time-experience up with it to the threshold of Eternity ; it will leave nothing behind as it crosses the threshold. "All things that are Yonder are also Here."\* The life of the Soul in its higher aspect is a contemplation of Spirit. That is to say, all real psychical ends belong to the spiritual world. Ends are striven for in Time, but there can be no ends in Time, which swallows its own children.

From the point of view of practical religion it makes a great difference whether we regard the phenomenal world as a mere polarisation of a timeless and changeless reality, or whether we hold that its being is radically teleological. The former doctrine deprives Time of all existence and all value. Philosophers of this school care nothing for history. The general tendency of Indian thought has been in this direction, in strong contrast with the Iranian and Hebrew religions, in which the revelation of God is sought from history, with which accordingly the sacred books of the Jewish people are largely occupied. It makes a great difference whether we make it our aim to understand reality or to help in making it. The religious genius, it is true, soon learns both that the truths of life can only be learned by practising them, and that, on the other hand, "good works" without "faith" are dead. But the caricatures of the two doctrines are very different. On one side, we have the pushing, hustling European or American man of business, immersed in irrational activities which make him no wiser and the world no better ; and, on the other, the vacuous Indian contemplative, whose existence is a living death, steeped in dull torpor. Christianity has combined,

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\* 5, 9, 13.

without fully reconciling, the two views about Time. Yet in the countries of the West it has lost much of its idealistic element, through the vulgar conception of heaven as a fairy land existence in Time and Place. To this error, and not to any essential part of Christian doctrine, is to be attributed the spurious "otherworldliness" which disparages or denies the values of the world in which we live. To a similar error is also due the secularist apocalyptic which seeks encouragement and inspiration by "making heavy drafts upon the future,"\* a method fatal to real insight and just appreciation of values. In sociology, as formerly in religion, "reliance on the future has become an actual disease." The final satisfaction of human hopes within the temporal series is for ever impossible.

The Platonic tradition leaned to the Indian view of existence rather than to the Hebraic. Plato was consciously leading a reaction against the disintegrating tendencies of his age. His thought was decidedly more Oriental than that of Plotinus, who had Aristotle and the Stoics to keep him a good European. The view of Time as the form of the Will is certainly to be found in the *Enneads*, though it is less insisted on than a modern reader would desire. Metaphysically, his doctrine of Time anticipates some of the best thought of our own age, and is still highly instructive.

#### *The Soul and Consciousness.*

Self-consciousness belongs to the reasoning faculty. The Soul "turns to itself and knows itself and the things that belong to it." Consciousness is not primitive; it accrues (*γίνεται*). The psychic principle of life is reflected as in a mirror, in which "we see ourselves as another."† The soul knows itself truly only when it knows itself as Spirit. But the highest activity of the soul is not self-conscious‡ in the

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\* Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 291.

† 1, 4, 10.

‡ 5, 3, 14; 5, 8, 11.

ordinary sense, though in another sense we may say that Spirit alone is self-conscious. What we commonly mean by self-consciousness is awareness of oneself as an object different from the perceiving subject. This, however, is a sign that we have not yet reached our goal, which is that the seer and the seen shall be as one. Consciousness is aroused most sharply by what is alien and hostile, just as when the body is in health it is not conscious of its organs: "We do not feel ourselves nor what belongs to us." "We cannot get outside ourselves." Plotinus observes also that we do things best when we are not thinking of ourselves as doing them.\*

Thus, what we usually call self-consciousness is for Plotinus consciousness of externality. When we "lose our soul and find it" in Spirit, we are what we contemplate, and can no longer objectify it as something other than the perceiving mind. So R. L. Nettleship says, "I am getting more and more convinced that being conscious of something is just *not* the idea or consciousness of what we say it is, but of something else. It means that we are *not* ourselves fully." This seems to me perfectly sound. Consciousness of self is in truth consciousness of a contrasted not-self, with which notwithstanding we claim kinship. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as self-consciousness. "We cannot too strongly insist," says Professor Taylor, "that if by self-consciousness we mean a cognitive state which is its own object, there is no such thing, and it is a psychological impossibility that there should be any such thing as self-consciousness. No cognitive state ever has itself for its own object. Every cognitive state

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\* So Raphael is said to have observed to Leonardo da Vinci: "I have noticed that when one paints one should think of nothing; everything then comes better." In some arts the automatism of the expert performer is obvious. The thoughts of the professional bowler at the moment of delivering the ball cannot be of a very complex nature. Sir James Paget "remembered once hearing Mdlle. Janotha play a presto by Mendelssohn, and he counted the notes and the time occupied. She played 5,595 notes in four minutes three seconds."

has for its object something other than itself.”\* What we call self-consciousness is an experience which has its place in mental growth; it is useful for certain purposes; but it is not an ultimate state of the human spirit. In our best and most effective moments, when we really “enter into” our work, we leave it behind. But there is an experience of living—a “waking state,” as Plotinus calls it—which becomes ours when we are identified with the object of our knowledge. This is the experience of pure Spirit, especially when it “turns towards the One.” When we reach this state, we often doubt whether the experience is real, because the senses “protest that they have seen nothing.” Of course they have not, because we are then concerned with the supersensible. Hence there is a kind of unconsciousness in the highest experiences of the soul, though we can no more doubt them than our own existence.†

Plotinus distinguishes two forms of consciousness: (1) *συναίσθησις*, which is sometimes called *αἴσθησις* and *παρακολούθησις*—the knowledge which a being has of the unity of its parts;‡ (2) *ἀντίληψις*—the consciousness of the opposition of subject and object in self-consciousness. It is the prerogative of Spirit to know itself as itself;§ Soul knows itself “as another’s.”|| The soul, in knowing itself, knows “that there is something better than itself.”¶ Discursive thought, the characteristic activity of the soul, contains within itself neither the material nor the formal nor the final conditions of its own thinking. It reasons about data supplied by sense, in order to gain knowledge. Its powers are directed to transcending the conditions of their own activities. It is not the presence of the subject-object relation which for Plotinus

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\* A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 79.

† 5, 8, 11.

‡ It knows τὰ ἐνδον γινόμενα, 5, 3, 1.

§ 5, 3, 4.

|| 5, 3, 6.

¶ 5, 3, 4.

is the sign of inherent limitations in discursive thought, but the conscious *opposition* of the self and the not-self. When the level of spiritual perception is gained, the externality of the object has wholly disappeared, though the duality which is the condition of thought remains. Discursive thought is the polarised "copy" of *νόησις*, which is at once creative and immanent activity. Discursive thought "of itself moves nothing," as Aristotle says; but *διάνοια* is, in fact, never separated from *νόησις* at one end, and creativeness (*ποίησις*) at the other. Plotinus intentionally makes *νοῦς* and *διάνοια* overlap. He speaks of "reasoning Spirit, Spirit in differentiation and motion."\* Soul, on the other hand, is "the matter of Spirit, being of spiritual form."† Soul is itself within the world of Spirit, and must of necessity be unified with it.‡ Soul is *οὐσία*; there is no line between it and Spirit. The realm of Soul is the "world of life";§ it is in this world that individuals live and move; Spirit is "above us."|| That part of the Soul which remains when we have separated from it the body and its passions is "the image of Spirit."¶ And yet Plotinus reminds us that even "the Soul here below," which is not the Soul in its full potency, possesses true being (*οὐσία*), and hence the wisdom, justice, and knowledge which it possesses are not mere shadows—they too are real. Indeed, if we include in "the sensible world" the Soul and all that belongs to it, there is nothing "yonder" that is not also "here below."\*\* But the world of Soul, as we know it, is only real when it is taken as a whole. It is split up among individual

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\* *νοῦς λογιζόμενος, νοῦς ἐν διαστάσει καὶ κινήσει, νοῦς μεθεκτός.* 4, 9, 5.

† *νοῦ ὕλη, νοοειδὴς οὐσα.* 5, 1, 3.

‡ *ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ οὐσα . . . εἰς ἔνωσιν ἔλθειν τῷ νῷ ἀνάγκη.* 4, 4, 2.

§ *κόσμος ζωτικὸς* is identified by Proclus with *ψυχή*. Plotinus too calls *ψυχὴ ὁ τῆς ζωῆς κόσμος.* 6, 4, 12.

|| 1, 1, 8.

¶ 5, 3, 9. Bouillet well compares a passage from the *Fons Vitæ* of Ibn Gebirol.

\*\* 5, 9, 13.

*foci* of consciousness, and in time. The soul-world, as we know it in experience, is a world of claims and counter-claims, in which *things* are known as *instruments* for the striving individual. This is not the highest truth about the contents of this world. The pity of it is that language, which was made for the fireside and the market-place, helps to stamp this view of life on our minds, since it cannot easily express any other. Wordsworth, and other poets and prophets too, have lamented this incurable imperfection in human speech. Yet the world of souls, and of soul-making, is after all the world in which we have to live. There are "other heights in other worlds, God willing," and these are not wholly out of sight; but the world in which we profess ourselves to be only strangers and sojourners is, for the time being, our home.

What has been said will make it plain that consciousness, for Greek thought, is continuous with the infra-conscious on one side and with the supra-conscious on the other. The Greeks were less interested in the gradual emergence of consciousness out of the unconscious than with the gradual emergence of order and purpose out of inertia and meaninglessness. Soul is the immediate experience of an organic individual, from the moment when he begins to be an organic individual. This experience is conscious and self-conscious in various degrees. Its ideal perfection is such an all-embracing experience as will break down all barriers between the individual soul and universal soul-life. "The soul is potentially all things. "We are a spiritual world."

This refusal to ascribe a primary importance to human consciousness, which we have found in Plotinus, is characteristic of almost all philosophy which is in sympathy with mysticism, and can claim much outside support. Campanella follows the Neoplatonists in holding that there is a dim knowledge in plants and even in minerals. Leibniz uses similar language; each of his monads, though impenetrable, was supposed to be a kind of microcosm, sleeping, dreaming, or

awake. He insists that there are unconscious perceptions in man. Ferrier\* writes: "What do we mean by the word consciousness, and upon what ground do we refuse to attribute consciousness to the animal creation? In the first place, we mean by consciousness the notion of self, which in man generally, but by no means invariably, accompanies his sensations, passions, emotions, play of reason, or state of mind whatsoever. Man might easily have been endowed with reason without at the same time becoming aware of his endowment, or blending it with the notion of himself." So Bain says "consciousness is inseparable from feeling, but not, as it appears to me, from action and thought." Lewes holds that "we often think as unconsciously as we breathe," and Maudsley that consciousness is "an incidental accompaniment of mind."†

An elaborate attempt has lately been made, by Arthur Drews, to connect the philosophy of Plotinus with that of Hartmann, the author of *The Philosophy of the Unconscious*. This attempt seems to me to have failed completely, for the simple reason that Hartmann's system is vitiated by fundamental inconsistencies which are certainly not to be found in Plotinus. Hartmann tries to combine the pantheism and pessimism, which he learned from Schopenhauer, with an evolutionary optimism, which his own character prompted him to accept. But the pessimism of Schopenhauer was the direct consequence of disillusionised egoism and hedonism. No one is likely to despair of the world who has not tried to exploit it for anti-social aims. This kind of pessimism is almost as foreign to Neoplatonism as it is to Christianity. And how is it possible to reconcile it with the optimistic teleology which finds the principle of the world in an "over-conscious clear-seeing intelligence," which is transcendent as well as

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\* Quoted by Rickaby, *First Principles*, p. 344.

† Rickaby, *loc. cit.*



immanent, and the beneficent designs of which are opposed only by the "blind irrational will" of conscious creatures? Hartmann's attempts to bring together the discrepant sides of his theory seem to me only to demonstrate their incompatibility. At the same time, there are many of his utterances which agree with and illustrate Plotinus very well; as when he says "to know oneself as of divine nature does away with all divergence between self-will and the universal will, and with all alienation between man and God; to regard the life of one's spirit as a spark of the divine flame engenders a resolution to lead a truly divine life; . . . we acquire the will and power to think, feel, and act as if God were in us, and to transfigure each finite task in the divine light." Such utterances belong not to a disciple of Schopenhauer, but to a moralist who wished to substitute for traditional Christianity a spiritual religion which should include the discoveries of modern science, and especially the doctrine of evolution.

Bergson has lately been studying and lecturing upon Plotinus, and there are indications that the great Neoplatonist has had some influence upon his thought. In his Huxley Lecture (1911) he identifies mind with consciousness, and almost identifies consciousness with memory. "A consciousness that retained nothing of the past would be a consciousness that died and was re-born every instant—it would be no longer consciousness. Such is just the condition of matter, or at least it is just the way we represent matter when we wish to oppose it to consciousness. Leibniz defined matter—that is to say, what is not consciousness—by calling it momentary mind, an instantaneous consciousness. And, in fact, an instantaneous consciousness is just what we call unconsciousness. All consciousness, then, is memory; all consciousness is a preservation and accumulation of the past in the present." But, he adds, consciousness is not only memory of the past; it is also anticipation of the future; it is a hyphen between past and future. How far, he proceeds to ask, is consciousness traceable in

nature? It seems to us to be dependent on the possession of a brain. Yet, just as low organisms are able to digest without a stomach, so, when the nervous substance is merged in the rest of living matter, consciousness may be diffused in an attenuated form, and may exist feebly wherever there is life. The truth, however, seems to be that while consciousness—which means the capacity of *choice*—is in principle present in all living matter, many organisms, such as parasites and nearly all vegetables, do not use it, so that it has become dormant and atrophied. As action becomes automatic, consciousness is withdrawn from it. “Two courses are open to a simple mass of protoplasmic jelly.” It may follow the path towards movement and action, which requires an increasing exercise of consciousness, or it may prefer the humdrum existence of a placid vegetable soul. Life is something that encroaches upon inert matter, over which necessity sits enthroned. Life means indetermination—freedom. There is “a slight elasticity in matter,” which gives liberty its chance. The dynamic is an “explosive,” a portion of solar energy absorbed in food. Thus consciousness “takes possession of matter,” and directs energy in a chosen way. So we have on one side an immense machine, subject to necessity, and on the other free consciousness. Behind this activity of consciousness there is a climbing impulse, driving organic beings “to run greater and greater risks in order to arrive at greater efficiency.” Nevertheless, consciousness, which enters matter with the objects just stated, is sometimes ensnared by it. Liberty is dogged by automatism, and, except in man, is stifled by it. Matter, however, is necessary; it plays at once the *rôle* of obstacle and of stimulus, and without it no effort would be put forth.

The view thus briefly sketched has some obvious affinities to the philosophy of Plotinus. But it is at bottom irreconcilable with it. It is based on the assumption—which underlies all Bergson’s philosophy—that caprice and eccentricity are the marks of freedom and spiritual activity. The spontaneity of life is supposed to show itself in motiveless diversity,

while regularity—all that can be predicted—is a proof of thralldom to blind necessity and mechanism. It is no wonder that superstitious supernaturalism holds out both hands to this philosophy. Such a view is abhorrent to Platonism, since it hands over nature, not indeed to a malignant power, but to purposeless machinery, and the formative and directive agency which interferes with the regularity of its working is not the universal Soul, which for Plotinus is responsible for the whole visible universe, including those parts of it which seem to us devoid of life, but a plurality of finite spirits, who act upon the world from outside, as it were, and triumph in proportion as they can introduce the unpredictable into the predetermined. All this is contrary to the genius of Greek philosophy, and especially of Platonism. For Plotinus, the purposefulness and relevance of the world “here below,” across which no hard lines are drawn, are the image of the complete harmony which prevails in the eternal world. We are not driven to assign some phenomena to mechanism and others to miracle; Soul and, behind Soul, Spirit are at work everywhere. It follows that the teleology of the world does not depend upon the interference of finite consciousness with mechanical movements. The great dramas of organic evolution and of human history are in no sense the life-story of any individual; the actors for the most part are quite unconscious of the larger aspects of their lives. Yet these larger purposes certainly exist, and they are prior to and independent of the consciousness of the actors.\* The *foci* which we call ourselves exist as separate *foci* only for soul-consciousness; Spirit enjoys an enriched form of consciousness not tethered to any *foci*, in which the contrast between externality and internality is transcended. This is like what Bergson calls cosmic consciousness. Plotinus is not, however, fond of the word consciousness in relation to Spirit. “Does the soul yonder remember itself?”

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\* Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 195.

he asks.\* "It is not probable. He who contemplates the spiritual world does not recall who he is, or reflect whether he is Soul or Spirit. Giving himself entirely to the contemplation of the spiritual world, he does not return upon himself in thought; he possesses himself, but he applies himself to the spiritual and becomes the spiritual, towards which he plays the part of Matter." Self-consciousness, in a word, is another name for inattention.

The suggestion may be hazarded that the chief function of self-consciousness is the formation of new habits. It seems clear that it belongs to beings who are in course of change and development, and to times when they are not acting from habit. It appertains to psychic life as we know it, and in the eternal world it must be raised to a higher form, widely different from our present experience.† "Spirit is what it possesses," says Plotinus.‡

### *The Soul and the Ego.*

The abstract ego is a different conception from that of the Soul. It seems to imply three assumptions, all of which are disputable. The first is that there is a sharp line separating subject and object, corresponding to the uncompromising antithesis of ego and non-ego. The second is that the subject, thus sundered from the object, remains identical through time. The third is that this indiscerptible entity is in some mysterious way both myself and my property. Just as Lucretius says that men fear death because they unconsciously duplicate themselves, and stand by, in imagination, at their own cremation, so we are seriously concerned to know whether that

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\* 4, 4, 21.

† Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. 2, pp. 260-265, has the interesting thought that self-consciousness (= consciousness of self) depends on a series of "contrast-effects" which arise from our social life. "Never do I observe myself as a single and unambiguous fact of consciousness."

‡ 4, 4, 4.

precious part of our possessions, our "personality," will survive death. Plotinus will have nothing to say to the first of these assumptions. Not only do subject and object freely flow into each other on the psychic level, but on the spiritual level there are no barriers at all. To the second he would answer that the empirical self is by no means identical throughout, and that the spiritual "idea," the "Spirit in Soul," which we are to strive to realise, is only "ours" potentially. To the third he would reply that no doubt individuality is a fact (*δεῖ ἕκαστον ἕκαστον εἶναι*), but that the question whether it is *my* self that has its distinct place "yonder" is simply meaningless.\*

We have to admit that in Plotinus there are traces of a real conflict between the Orphic doctrine of individual immortality, and the Heracleitean doctrine that there is only one life, which animates every creature during its transit from birth to death. The doctrine of rebirth, which rests on the idea of souls as *substantiae*, does not agree well with the idea of the World-Soul. I am inclined to think that Plotinus did not take the doctrine of successive reincarnations very seriously; it was for him a Platonic myth. The doctrine is important for those who hold that the soul must never cease from its creative activity in the world of space and time; but this was not the view of Plotinus. On the other hand, the World-Soul is an essential part of his philosophy, and it is impossible to believe in a World-Soul without abating considerably the claims of the independent ego.

A statement which throws much light on Plotinus' view of personality is in the form of an answer to the question, how the higher parts of the soul can possess sensation.\* The

\* Eckhart says, "It is not *my* soul which is transformed after the likeness of God."

† 6, 7, 6. This important section is unfortunately corrupt. In the second line the Medicean manuscript reads *ἡ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῶν ἐκεί ἀνασθῆρῶν*, with dots under the first two letters of the last word, indicating that the true reading is *αἰσθῆρῶν*. Ficinus translates "*quæ illic dicuntur sensibilia*." Kirchhoff reads *ἀνασθῆρῶν*, which Müller

answer is that the objects of sensation exist in the spiritual world, and are there apprehended by a faculty analogous to what we call sensation. The soul here below combines and systematises the *data* of sensation, and thereby assimilates them to the harmony which exists in the spiritual world. "If the bodies which are here below existed also yonder, the higher Soul would perceive and apprehend them. The man of the spiritual world (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἐκεῖ), the soul adapted to life there, can apprehend these things; whence also the lower man, the copy of the spiritual man, has powers (λόγους) which are copies of spiritual powers; and the man in the Spirit (ὁ ἐν νῷ ἄνθρωπος) constitutes the man who is above all men. This highest man illuminates the second man, and the second the third. The lowest man in a sense possesses the others, not that he becomes what they are, but that he is in contact with them. The man that constitutes our self is active in the third and lowest rank, but receives also something from the second, and the second receives activity from the first.\* Each man's self is determined by the principle of his activity (ἔστιν ἕκαστος καθ' ὃν ἐνεργεῖ), though each individual possesses all the three ranks, and possesses them not." The meaning of this cryptic passage is that there are three planes on which a man may live, and that his rank in the scale of existence depends on the choice which he makes. He may live a purely external life, obeying his natural instincts and not reflecting. Or

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translates. I am convinced that αἰσθητῶν is right, and that Volkmann need not have despaired of the passage. Plotinus answers the question, how the higher soul can possess αἰσθηταί, by saying that "it perceives those things which are objects of perception in the spiritual world, and as objects of perception exist in the spiritual world." He insists that πάντα ἐνταῦθα ὅσα καὶ ἐκεῖ. The objects which the senses perceive and identify "here below" are discerned in their true nature "yonder."

In the sixteenth line of this section (Volkmann's edition), I should read οὐ γινόμενος ἐκείνοι (for ἐκείνους), ἀλλὰ παρακείμενος ἐκείνους.

\* Plotinus says "the third," i.e. in the ascending scale, although in the preceding sentence "the third" means the lowest of the "three men."

he may live in accordance with his discursive reason, the life of an intelligent but unspiritual man. Or, lastly, he may live on what is really a superhuman plane—"that of the gods and god-like men," the life of Spirit. The soul, as a microcosm, has within it the potentiality of all three lives, but it chooses which of its faculties it shall develop, and which shall remain latent. If we have to choose one kind of activity as characteristically *human*, and to say that our personality as individuals resides in that sphere of activity, we must select the second grade, that of the discursive intellect;\* because the merely sensuous life is infra-human, and since in the life of the Spirit we are really raised above the conditions and limitations of earthly existence, no man, while in the body, can live permanently on this level. Yet we cannot remind ourselves too often that Plotinus allows us no fixed fulcrum of self-consciousness as the centre of our world and our activities. *We* are potentially all things;† our personality is what we are able to realise of the infinite wealth which our divine-human nature contains hidden in its depths. This being so, we must not lay much stress on the tripartite division of soul-life which we have just been considering. It represents three stages in the ladder of existence and value, but these shade off into each other. Elsewhere he tells us that "every man is double;"‡ and that even the universal Soul has its higher and lower sphere of activity. Every living thing has a vital connexion with what

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\* See 4, 8, 18; 2, 1, 5; 5, 3, 3. For the soul, when living its own life, Sensation is its servant, Spirit is its King. But he is able to speak of *Noûs* as μέγας ἡμῶν, 1, 1, 13. This is the doctrine of the Christian mystics. Cf. (e.g.) *The Cloud of Unknowing*, ch. 8. "In the lower part of active life a man is without himself and beneath himself. In the higher part of active life and the lower part of contemplative life a man is within himself and even with himself. But in the higher part of contemplative life a man is above himself and under his God."

† So Keyserling says: "Das Ich ist eine Kraft, die als solche keinen Grenzen kennt."

‡ διττὸς ἕκαστος, 2, 3, 9; 1, 1, 10.

is above and with what is below itself, and the choice between the better and the worse is continually offered. But neither the "double" nor the "threefold" man must be interpreted as a hard and strict classification. "A man must be *one*," as he says himself; and "the soul cannot be divided quantitatively." Even here below Soul is "undivided" (*ἀμέριστος*) as well as "divided," and "sees with that part by which it keeps the nature of the whole."\*

The whole trend of Neoplatonism is towards those philosophies which teach that the ego or self is not *given* to start with. Our nature, our personality, is in process of being communicated to us. The individual is a microcosm striving after unity and universality. We do not yet know ourselves; the soul feels itself to be an exile and a wanderer from God (*φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀληθείας*). It is impelled by home-sickness to struggle up towards the world of Spirit, in the travail-pangs (*ὠδίνειν*) through which the new birth is effected. The great saying of Christ about losing one's soul in order to find it unto life eternal would have been quite acceptable to Plotinus, who would, indeed, have understood it better than most modern Christians. For the repudiation of the "me" and "mine" which follow from it has seldom been accepted without qualification by Christian moralists. It occupies the centre of the teaching of the *Theologia Germanica* and other mystical books; but outside this school it is rare to hear divine justice (for example) treated from this point of view. Individualistic justice belongs to the "world of claims and counter-claims" which the soul must learn to leave behind. Neither God nor Nature allows such claims, and the good man does not make them for himself. It is just here that the modern exaggeration of human individuality is proving a disintegrating influence in social and national life. The ethics of militarism are as much superior to those of industrial democracy on this side as they are inferior to them in other respects.

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\* 4, 1, 1.



Does this view of the self lead logically to Nirvana? If we hold that every enhancement and expansion of the personal life makes it less personal, by spreading our experience over what was before external, and bringing the outside world into ourselves, would not the theoretical consummation of this process be complete absorption in the Absolute? And if finite selfhood is an illusion, how are we to explain the persistence of the illusion, which indeed seems to most of us a very solid fact indeed? And further, is it true that we are only divided from each other, by differences in our interests? If two hearts could really "beat as one," would they lose their individuality, and perhaps therewith the possibility of love—since we do not love ourselves? These are difficult questions, which involve the whole problem of personality, divine as well as human. Lotze held that "we have little ground for speaking of the personality of finite beings; personality is an ideal, which like all ideals is proper only to the infinite in its unconditioned nature, but to us is, like every other good thing, only vouchsafed under conditions, and therefore imperfectly." On the other hand, it may be urged that personality is no ideal, but only the name for our delimitation of individual existence. "Personality only exists because we are not pure spirits, but have a visible and sensible basis to our existence, in passions, limbs, and material conditions.\* Personality can only belong to one who is not everything, but stands in relation to others outside himself. Such conditions cannot apply to the Deity. This contradiction illustrates very strongly the fact that personality, like morality, always strives to subvert the conditions of its own existence. It aspires to be all-embracing, and is potentially all-embracing; but if it could realise this aspiration, it would disappear. For a person only exists as such in relation to other persons; and yet we are not fully personal (as Lotze argues) while there are other persons over against ourselves. Plotinus says that the soul does attain

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\* Wallace, *Lectures and Essays*, p. 278.

complete personality "yonder," in the spiritual world, where individual *foci* are not abolished, but are each the centre of an infinite circle. And having attained this perfection, the glorified soul does not rest in its fruition, but in complete self-forgetfulness looks up with yearning eyes to the Absolute One, in whom there are no more persons. And while thus looking, it creates unceasingly in the world of Soul.

The analogy between personality and morality is not accidental. Personality is above all things a quality which expresses the moral nature of man.\* Or we might say that it expresses the social nature of man. We recognise ourselves as persons very largely by contrast with the other persons whom we meet in friendship or rivalry. Thus thought first increases the illusions of separate individuality, and at last transcends them.† We begin to know ourselves by realising the stubborn externality of the not-self, and then by degrees these barriers are broken down, and we find a larger self in the extension of our knowledge and sympathy. But the truest way to regard personality is as the expression and the vehicle of a unitary purpose. The self is a teleological category. Here I may refer to Royce‡ who has stated this view most excellently.

Finally, we may say that the particularism of our experience is the cross which we have to bear, and that in the overcoming of it is the sole realisation of human happiness. Almost all unhappiness is rooted in a feeling of isolation.

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\* Leibniz's definition is : 'Persona est cuius aliqua voluntas est, seu cuius datur cogitatio, affectus, voluptas, dolor.' This is perhaps to identify personality too closely with consciousness.

† This point is argued admirably by Carveth Read, *Natural and Social Morals*, p. xvii sq.

‡ Royce, *The World and the Individual*, vol. 2 p. 286.

## XIII.—THE CONCEPTION OF A COSMOS.

*By J. S. MACKENZIE.*

I UNDERSTAND by a cosmos the universe regarded as a completely ordered and self-explanatory whole.] That it is to be regarded as such a whole is maintained or implied in the work of many philosophers, and I think it convenient to describe such philosophers as cosmists. Some of them have often been characterised as idealists or monists, or even singularists; but all these terms appear to me to be highly misleading. A few words on each of them may serve as a convenient introduction to what follows.

The term idealism has been used to characterise the views of Plato on the one hand, and of Berkeley on the other, as well as a variety of other positions more or less distinct from both. In recent times it has, perhaps, been most commonly used with reference to views that are in some degree akin to that of Berkeley—*i.e.* to those that, in some form or other, emphasize the dependence of the objects that we apprehend on the mind that apprehends them, or the priority or immediacy or certainty of our knowledge of our own conscious states as compared with that of an objective system. For such views, the term mentalism, which was introduced by Sidgwick, and which has recently been adopted by some other writers, would seem to be the most appropriate, though Sidgwick extended the scope of its application rather too widely. It may be applied, with some qualifications, to the whole line of thought from Locke to Hume and their followers; but it cannot rightly be applied to Plato nor, I think, to Hegel and his followers; and it is only with very great qualifications that it can be applied to Descartes or Leibniz or Kant. But it is only in this sense

that there appears to be any point in the common antithesis between idealism and realism. Certainly, idealism of the Platonic type appears to be as realistic as any other philosophical doctrine, unless realism is understood as implying pluralism.

The term monism seems to be best used in antithesis to dualism. It serves to distinguish Spinoza from Descartes, the Eleatics from the Pythagoreans, Berkeley from Reid, and, in general, those who are either mentalists or materialists from those who recognise two or more fundamentally distinct principles in the structure of the universe. But it cannot very well be applied to those who recognise that the universe is to be explained by a single fundamental principle, but believe that that principle is revealed in many distinguishable modes; and this I conceive to be the view of those who are most properly described as cosmists.

The term singularism is opposed to pluralism. Both rest, in general, on the conception of substance. Singularists hold that there is only one substance, while pluralists believe that there are many. Most materialists are singularists, and most mentalists are pluralists. The position of Descartes is a peculiar one. He is a dualist in his general view of the universe. His view of the material system is singularistic; his view of the spiritual system is pluralistic; but, in so far as he regards God as the only substance, he becomes again singularistic, and perhaps even monistic. But the terms singularism and pluralism have hardly any application to those whom I characterise as cosmists, since a cosmos can hardly be thought of otherwise than as a many in one, and neither of these aspects can well be supposed to be merged in the other.

With these preliminary explanations, I now pass to the consideration of the way in which a cosmos may be conceived. The conceptions that it seems most important to notice in this connection are those of order and of a self-explanatory whole.

These are very closely connected with one another. It is evident, as M. Bergson has urged, that there is a sense in which order must be recognised as being present even in things that are the most chaotic and unintelligible. A pure chaos is as difficult to conceive as pure non-being. It would seem that we can only mean by it an order that is casual—*i.e.* which neither explains itself nor is susceptible of any other explanation. Now, what is meant by saying that a particular arrangement is explained by something else seems clear enough. The arrangement of a house is partly explained by the design of the architect and, more definitely, by the purposes of the original owner. These, however, may themselves call for explanations, which might have to be sought in his social position, the customs of his community, his peculiarities of character and education, the wishes of his family and friends, and in a variety of other circumstances that might carry us out indefinitely into the consideration of the general structure of human life and of the universe as a whole.

There are two kinds of system that have appealed to philosophical thinkers in almost all ages as types of a self-explanatory whole, mathematical systems and systems of human purposes. The former type was specially emphasized by the Pythagoreans and, in a somewhat more limited sense, by the Cartesians; the latter by Plato, Leibniz, and many others. The sense in which they can be regarded as self-explanatory may help us to see what is meant by that conception.

Mathematical science would seem to be self-explanatory in the sense that, so long as we confine ourselves strictly to the conceptions of number and extensive magnitude, everything that can be discovered about them is discovered simply by the consideration of what is implied in the systems with which we are concerned. Yet it seems possible to go on making an unlimited number of fresh discoveries by reflection on these implications; and this method of acquiring knowledge is so fascinating from its inevitableness and complete cogency that

men have naturally been led to try to extend its application beyond the limits of number and magnitude, and to use it for the interpretation of the universe as a whole. It seems clear, however, that such attempts are necessarily doomed to failure, so long as they confine themselves to methods of a purely mathematical type; for methods of this type, though self-explanatory within their limits, are not completely self-explanatory, and are not capable, by themselves, of carrying us beyond the limits within which they work. In the first place, while mathematical systems may be said to be self-explanatory within the orders that are constituted by their fundamental conceptions, these conceptions call for interpretation by reference to their place in relation to other fundamental conceptions. Thus they have to be explained by means of a complete system of categories, such as Hegel attempted to develop in his *Logic*. In the second place, however self-explanatory the systems of pure mathematics may be, they do not contain the explanation of anything outside of themselves; and no method that is thus limited can supply us with an interpretation of the existent universe.

In human life, again, we find something that may be described as a self-explanatory system. The guiding conception in human life is that of value. Much of human action no doubt has to be accounted for by inherited instincts and traditions which have to be interpreted by means of biology and history, but rational choice seems to find its ultimate explanation in the effort after the realisation of that which has supreme value or worth. It does not fall within my present province to inquire whether this is most appropriately characterised as the Good, the Beautiful, or the Perfect; but at least it seems true to say that when we see, or think we see, that a human being has acted simply and solely with a view to the achievement of what seemed to him to be best, we do not feel that we stand in need of any further explanation. Hence it seems natural to suppose that if the universe as a whole could

be regarded as realising what is best or most perfect, this might be accepted as a complete explanation of its existence and structure. This was the contention of the Platonic Socrates in the *Phædo*;] it was essentially repeated by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz; and it seems to lie at the foundation of most of the more recent constructive systems. But there are difficulties in the way of its application, and some of the most important of these must now be considered.

It is evident that, as applied to human life, the principle does not supply us with any complete explanation. We can seldom be sure that any persons, even when these persons are ourselves, have been guided simply by the thought of what seemed to us best; much less can we be sure that what seemed to us best really was the best. It may be true, as Socrates urged, that no one is willingly deprived of the good; but a large part of human life is guided by instinct or impulse or by custom or tradition, rather than by rational choice; and, even when reason enters in, it is too often turned into a "slave of the passions," and used, in the language of Mephistopheles, only to enable us to become "more beastly than any beast." If the conception of the Good is to be used for the interpretation of the universe as a whole, it must be supposed to be operative in the universe in a very different way from that in which it is operative in human life. The most, it would seem, that can be said for human life is that, as it develops in the direction of insight and self-mastery, it tends to be guided more and more by the conception of the best, and that conception itself tends to become more and more clear. We are not guided by it throughout, and so our actions have to be very largely explained by other principles or else left unexplained.

Moreover, even when our actions are explained by this principle, they are explained by it as an end that is aimed at, rather than as anything that is actually achieved in them. Most of what we do, even when we are definitely aiming at

what is best, is done as a means to it, rather than as being of supreme worth in itself. A few heroic deeds, a few artistic masterpieces, a few illuminating thoughts, a few fine feelings, may seem to have intrinsic value ; but even these can hardly be regarded as containing any complete realisation of what we aim at when we think of what is supremely good ; and most of our achievements, whether in thought, in feeling, or in overt action, are far removed from it. Now, if the universe is to be explained by the principle of perfection, it seems clear that this perfection must not be simply thought of as some "far-off divine event", it must rather be supposed to be, in some way, present throughout. In this sense, Spinoza, M. Bergson, and others would appear to be justified in their rejection of final causes in the interpretation of the cosmic process. If we are to have finality at all, it must be "immanent finality."

Reflection on these difficulties may lead us to see that the conception of a cosmos must include the kind of self-explanatory principle that is represented by mathematics as well as that which is represented by the rational pursuit of an end. Spinoza tried to combine the two principles in his interpretation of *causa sui*, but the combination is much more perfectly shown in the philosophy of Hegel. Hegel's Logic, if I understand it rightly, is an attempt to show that the fundamental conceptions which are used in the interpretation of our universe form an interconnected system, in which by a series of mutual implications the simplest can be seen to lead us up to the most complex—the simplest being that of mere Being and the most complex that of Spiritual Unity. Number and Magnitude and End are included among these conceptions, and are thus regarded as having definite places in the interpretation of the whole. Whether Hegel was successful in this attempt is a question that we cannot here consider, but it would seem, at least, that any conception of a self-explanatory cosmos must involve some such scheme as that which he tried to work out.

Now, apart from difficulties in detail—of which there are



plenty—the chief objections to such an interpretation of the universe are found in the problems of finitude, contingency, change, and evil; and it is to these that I now wish to refer, with more particular reference to the problem that is raised by change.

The problem of finitude I must pass over very lightly, though it lies at the root of all the others. By finitude I do not here understand the absence of endlessness. When the infinite is taken to mean the endless or boundless, it raises more difficulties than are raised by the finite. In Greek philosophy the boundless is nearly always associated with the chaotic, and in that sense it is pretty definitely opposed to the conception of a cosmos. Yet it is seldom in that sense that the infinite is now understood; and, though I believe that there are still considerable difficulties connected with the conception of infinity, and though I am doubtful whether they have been wholly removed (at least as applied to existing things, as distinguished from pure numbers) by recent mathematical speculations, it does not seem necessary to deal with them here. It seems clear that a perfect whole would have to be thought of as being, in a certain sense, infinite; but in what sense, we need not at present inquire. The sense in which finitude seems to present a difficulty is that of positive defect, not simply that of limitation, and it is this difficulty that underlies the conceptions of contingency, change, and evil. If the relation of whole and part is applicable to the cosmos at all—and it can hardly be doubted that, in some sense, it is—it seems inevitable that the parts of a perfect whole must be, in some respect, incomplete in themselves. There is no particular difficulty about this. But it is at least natural to suppose that the parts of a perfect whole, though limited, should have a certain perfection within their limits. We expect the parts of a well-constructed machine, or a good picture, or a beautiful piece of music, to be perfect of their kind, and to be completely fitted for their place within the whole. Now, on the face of it, this.

does not appear to be the case with the parts of the universe; and I suppose not many are now satisfied with the explanations that were offered by Aquinas or Descartes, or by many others who have dealt with the problem. This, I believe, is the general difficulty in the way of thinking of our universe as a perfect cosmos. It is well to break it up into the three distinguishable problems of contingency, change, and evil; and it is only by considering them separately that we can hope to find any solution of the difficulty.

1. *The Problem of Contingency.* — Notwithstanding the apparent universality of causal connections in detail, the general structure of our universe is apt to convey an impression of haphazard arrangement; and, though this impression might be modified by fuller knowledge, it is not easy to believe that it could ever be wholly removed. It is chiefly this difficulty that has led certain writers—of whom Professor Höffding is perhaps the most conspicuous—to describe themselves as “critical monists.” I should prefer to call them tentative cosmists. They incline to the belief that the universe is to be regarded, if not as a perfect whole, at least as a real unity, but they feel themselves checked by the apparent lawlessness of some of its phases. We discover an orderly way in which certain things occur; but the things that occur seem, in themselves, somewhat chaotic. Why, we are apt to ask, should life appear at a particular stage in the history of a small planet in one of the great stellar systems? And why in forms that are so comparatively ill-adapted to maintain and develop themselves? Difficulties of this kind have always presented themselves to the minds of those who have tried most definitely to think of the universe as an orderly whole; and they have generally been led to recognise that, in some sense or other, an element of contingency has to be recognised in its structure. Plato, for instance, while maintaining that reality has to be interpreted as determined by the Idea of Good, yet seems to be forced to acknowledge that the world as we know it can only

be partly understood by the supposition that the effort after order is somehow thwarted by a limiting material. Aristotle, in a somewhat similar fashion, was led to compare the life of nature to that of a slave, to whom, on account of the inferiority of his character and position, a certain licence has to be conceded. Leibniz, holding that our universe is the best that is possible, has yet to admit that, on account of its finitude, it cannot be absolutely perfect. Even Hegel, the most thorough of all the cosmists, admitted that nature has to be regarded as a sort of Bacchantic dance, in which no perfect order is discoverable.

Some of the difficulties that were felt by the earlier thinkers have no doubt been removed or minimised by the advance of science. Things that once seemed lawless have been found to exhibit at least a definite order of causal connection. The portents of an earlier time are the predictable commonplaces of our own. Yet it is still not easy to see how any amount of causal explanation could eliminate altogether the element of apparent contingency, and several eminent writers in our own time have not only admitted it, but even emphasised it. The view of Laplace has often been referred to, that any future state of the universe could be predicted by an ideally equipped calculator from his knowledge of the existing state. The past could presumably be reconstructed in the same fashion. But how the whole system came to be what it is, would remain as unintelligible as before. Moreover, the whole conception of such prediction and reconstruction seems to depend on the elimination of qualitative differences. It seems clear that the appearance of colour in our universe could not be predicted by any race of beings that was entirely blind, however much they might be able to foretell of the physical conditions in connection with which colour experiences arise. However little we may agree with the philosophy of M. Bergson, his conception of creative evolution seems at least to be true to this extent, that the qualitative differences

that emerge in the process of growth could not be anticipated from the consideration of any condition in which these qualities were not present. Now, the particular qualities that present themselves in our universe appear quite arbitrary, and it does not seem to be possible to conceive of any kind of explanation that would make them cease to be arbitrary. It is only by actual experience that we learn what they are, and in what circumstances they may be expected to appear. This was admitted by Kant, quite as unreservedly as it was by Hume. Again, if the system of our universe is finite, there is a certain number of things of each specific kind in it, and it is hard to see how there can be any ultimate explanation of the existence of that particular number, rather than of any other. From the number of existing things at any one time, we may be able to deduce the number that will exist, or that have existed, at any other time; but the existence of the key number from which we set out in such calculations does not seem to be capable of explanation. However perfect the ordering of particular things may be, once their existence has been granted, there seems always to remain an irreducible surd of particularity which is unsolved by any method of explanation, and of which no solution seems, on the face of it, to be even conceivable.

It is perhaps conceivable that difficulties of this kind might be met by denying the finitude of our universe.\* If the universe is infinite, it may be held that there is room in it for every conceivable quality and for every conceivable number of qualities, and it may be urged that the apparent arbitrariness of the world as we know it is due simply to the limitation of our outlook. If, for instance, it is allowable to suppose that the energy of the material system need not be permanently

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\* I mean by our universe here the totality of objects that might be apprehended by the extension of our ordinary human experience. It is possible that the cosmos may have to be understood as including more than this.

degraded, there might be an endless series of cycles in our universe, and it need not be assumed that these cycles would simply repeat one another. And this might be supposed to apply to spiritual existences and to qualitative differences, as well as to the purely material system. A view of this kind, however, is only tenable on the supposition that the difficulties about infinity, as applied to existing things, have been completely removed by modern mathematics, and this, I fear, is still somewhat doubtful. I believe also that, with regard to the material system, some difficulties of a physical kind might be raised. I understand that there are grounds for regarding the amount of physical energy as limited, and for doubting the possibility of its recovery when it is dissipated. Of the weight that is to be attached to such considerations, I am not competent to form any judgment. Recent discoveries in physics would seem to have modified considerably the estimates that were made by Lord Kelvin and others, and may have vitiated their whole line of argument. But, in any case, it seems better to attempt a different method of meeting the difficulties that have been referred to. The general problem of infinity would require a fuller discussion than can be here attempted.

It has been contended by some that the appearance of contingency in our universe, though fatal to the recognition of one kind of order, may furnish us with a basis for the recognition of a different kind of order, which is more truly explanatory. If it is fatal to a mechanical interpretation, like that which is suggested by Laplace, it may be quite compatible with a teleological explanation. It may give scope for the exercise of choice, and this may be a necessary element in the conception of what is best. There is some difficulty in this solution, owing to the fact that a rational choice can hardly be supposed to be without some sufficient ground. But we might try to meet this difficulty. When it is urged that any choice which is ultimately explanatory must be the choice of the best,

it is assumed that possible objects can be arranged in a definite scale of values, in such a way that one of them stands absolutely above all others. This was the supposition of Leibniz. He thought of all the possible worlds as forming a pyramid, of which the one at the apex was the best, and was consequently chosen. Here there would be no contingency. It seems conceivable, however, that a number of possible worlds might all be of equal value, and then there would be an element of arbitrariness or contingency in the choice of one. The famous ass of Buridan was supposed to be in a position of this kind between its two bundles of hay, and there are circumstances in which human choice has a similarly arbitrary character. We have seldom any definite ground for selecting one penny rather than another, and sometimes very little for walking along one road rather than another. Even magistrates have sometimes been chosen by lot, on the ground that all men, or all men of a certain class, are essentially equal. Now, it can hardly be supposed that the Demiurge (to use Plato's image) selected the universe that was to be brought into being in quite such an arbitrary way, but the grounds for choosing one, rather than another, might be supposed at least to be so slight as to be hardly discoverable; and, at any rate, it might be supposed that the one which was chosen had a certain appearance of arbitrariness, so as to give scope for acts of choice on the part of conscious beings. Stated in this way, the view is not a very convincing one, but it may serve to introduce us to a different mode of statement.

Hegel has been a good deal blamed by more than one critic for his representation of nature as a sort of disorderly dance. It has been held to be inconsistent with his doctrine that the actual is the rational, and to involve an unintelligible leap from the coherent system of his logical conceptions into a kind of chaos. Such a charge might, I think, be made with much more reason against both Plato and Aristotle. In the case of Hegel, it seems to me that the objections can be satisfactorily met. The

actual which he declares to be the rational does not mean any existent thing, but only those things (such as the State) which have become actual through a process of development. In this sense nature is not actual, it is only undergoing development. Hence it is not rational, but only a step in the process that leads to the realisation of what is rational. Nor is there any unintelligible leap in the transition from Hegel's logical conceptions to the postulation of the relatively chaotic realm of nature. Hegel's transitions take place through negation or antagonism. The opposite of the completely intelligible conception of spiritual unity is the existence of the relatively unintelligible or chaotic. Order implies disorder. There is an aspect of pluralism in the universe, as well as of ultimate unity, or, in Spencer's phraseology, of differentiation as well as integration. Strife, or opposition, remains for us, as for Heraclitus, an essential aspect of reality. But this opposition, like others in the Hegelian system, must not be regarded as absolute. Pure chaos or disorder is meaningless; and, indeed, there is no appearance in nature of any such absolute disorder. There is only the kind of relative disorder that exists in a collection of stones, wood, and other materials before a house has been built. Hegel's view, as I understand it, is that the universe is to be interpreted by the conception of spiritual unity; but that this necessarily presents itself as growing out of a material that is opposed to it. It is opposed to spiritual unity, however, only as the undeveloped is opposed to the developed, and the opposition is removed by the process of growth.

Now, I do not hold any brief for the philosophy of Hegel. His interpretation of nature is, I think, almost as fantastic as that of Plato; his interpretation of spirit is open to criticism at a good many points; and I doubt whether even his Logic is always convincing, but I think the view that I have briefly indicated offers a possible solution of the apparent contingency of nature. If that contingency means only that the order of

nature is not self-explanatory, but finds its explanation as the presupposition of the life of spirit, the contingency is only apparent, and it ceases to present any real difficulty. The removal of this difficulty, however, involves the recognition of a time-process, and thus leads us straight to our second difficulty. After we have considered this difficulty, we may be in a better position to return to the general problem.

2. *The Problem of Change*.—The fact of change has always presented a serious problem to constructive philosophers since the time of the Eleatics, if not even from an earlier date. Parmenides, at least, was convinced that what really exists must be supposed to exist always. There appear to be two main ways in which we may think of the transience of existing things; and they both present serious difficulties in the way of regarding the universe as a perfect whole. We may think, as Descartes did, of each moment of temporal existence as being separate from every other, so that what exists at any moment is strictly to be regarded as a fresh creation; or we may think of each moment, as Heraclitus did, as a transition from one mode of existence to another, so as to constitute a perpetual flux. According to the one view, what exists at any one moment has no real connection with what exists before or after, but has to be separately explained; according to the other view, there never is any existent reality, but only a state of transition from one unreality to another. Plato sought to distinguish between the kind of reality that belongs to the world of becoming and that which exists eternally and this doctrine is substantially reproduced in the Kantian antithesis between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds; and, indeed, the same distinction appears in the Oriental conception of the universe of our ordinary experience as a sort of dream-world—the realm of *Māya* or Illusion. But even an illusion has to be accounted for and made intelligible. The opposition between what is illusory and what is ultimately real is somewhat softened by the conception of degrees of reality, which also



appears pretty definitely in Oriental speculation, and has been much emphasized in recent times. Yet the value of such a conception depends altogether on the way in which it is to be interpreted. It is not easy to give it any other interpretation than that which is involved in the recognition that the changing world of our experience is only a partial aspect of a more complete whole; and it remains to be considered how it can be so regarded.

There are three considerations that have been specially urged by different writers in modern times, to which it may be well to call attention as helping to suggest a possible solution of this difficulty. One is the contention of Kant that only that which persists can be regarded as changing. Change, without persistence, could only mean the substitution of one thing for another. But it seems equally true to say that only that which changes can be regarded as persisting. If we try to think of persistence without change, we can only represent it to ourselves as an eternal now, *i.e.* as an existence which is essentially momentary. This is the first point, and the most fundamental. Its significance, however, is more definitely brought out by the conception of "real duration," which has been specially emphasized by Dr. Ward, and more fully by Professor Bergson. In close connection with this, we may notice the recent contention of Dr. McTaggart, that the time-process may be regarded as leading up to eternity. It is not my intention to discuss any of these views in detail; but I may try to sum up in my own way what appears to me to be their essential significance.

The injunction contained in Goethe's Masonic Hymn—"Choose well: your choice is brief and yet endless"—may serve to remind us of the sense in which our ordinary experience is at once momentary and eternal. An act of choice is momentary; but, in making it, we have behind us the whole development of our characters and purposes, and we carry it with us, for good or for evil, throughout the rest of our lives.

The extent to which this is true, however, depends on the extent to which there is continuity of memory and purpose throughout our experience. Animals are generally believed to live almost entirely in the moment, with no definite recollection of their past experiences and no distinct forward-looking choice; and it is pretty evident that there are considerable differences in these respects among human beings. Children, in general, live to a large extent in the future, anticipating both in their play and in their more serious activities the interests that come to maturity in later years. In old age, on the other hand, people are apt to live almost entirely in the past, ignoring and tending to forget what is present or recent, and vividly recalling the experiences of an earlier time. In the childhood of the race, also, though men are, perhaps, more dominated than those of a later age by the customs and traditions of the past, yet it is probably true to say that their interests are more in the present and in the immediate future; whereas, the more civilised peoples take an increasing interest in the past history of the world and in inquiries into the causes that have led up to their present conditions and surroundings. In this sense, at least, it seems true to say that the development of conscious life involves a constantly increasing transcendence of the moment of experience, especially with reference to what has gone before. It becomes increasingly untrue to regard the past as simply past and done with. If we could suppose human beings to attain a state like that which is commonly described in the East as *Nirvâna*—a state in which desire is extinguished or completely satiated—we might suppose that, unless all their interests died out or were concentrated on objects that are timeless, they would find their chief satisfaction in the study and interpretation of the past.

Now, such considerations may help us to a view of the place of the time-process in the structure of the universe in general. The view which they suggest is that the process is a

real one, but that its transitoriness is somewhat illusory. In dealing with this subject on several previous occasions, I have taken as an illustration of what is meant the process that is contained in the working out of a drama. I find that this illustration has also been used by Dr. F. B. Jevons, and it has recently been adopted by Professor Pringle-Pattison in his book on *The Idea of God*. There is a time-process in the drama, but the drama itself may be said to exist eternally. The same is, of course, true of many other things, especially works of art, such as a piece of music. When a house has been built, the process of building it tends to lose its interest and to be forgotten. A piece of music, on the other hand, contains a process of construction which is an essential part of its significance. As Tennyson said, it is "never built at all, and therefore built for ever." What is suggested is that the time-process in the universe may be a somewhat similar construction, building itself up by successive stages, and yet having an eternal place within the whole—a place which we gradually come to realise as we approach more and more to the attitude described by Plato as that of being "spectators of all time and all existence." The process from nature to spirit and through the various stages of spiritual development might thus come to be seen as a process that exists eternally, and that has an eternal significance. Thus conceived, it would have to be regarded as a limited process, having a definite beginning and end, but of such a kind that the end means the apprehension of the whole.

3. *The Problem of Evil*.—The problem of evil, I believe, impresses most people more than those of contingency and change, but I think it is, in reality, rather easier to deal with. At any rate, so much has been written about it in recent years that it is hardly necessary to add any more. It was vigorously dealt with by Sir Henry Jones in his book on Browning, and, more recently, impressive statements have been made on the subject in the Gifford Lectures by Drs. Ward, Bosanquet, and

Pringle-Pattison. There are just one or two considerations that it may be worth while to put forward here.

It is to be noted, to begin with, that, in a wide sense of the term, it may be held to cover the other two problems to which we have referred. Contingency and change are felt to present problems because they appear to be evil, in the sense that they imply some imperfection in the universe. If these problems admit of solution, the problem of evil is to that extent removed. But we usually understand by evil something rather more positive than such imperfections. We mean pain, death, decay, loss, and actions, feelings and purposes of which we disapprove.

Now, with regard to pain and various forms of loss, the solution that is commonly given is that it is the condition of moral growth. Some of the writers to whom I have referred have illustrated this at considerable length and in a way that carries conviction. There is, however, an objection which may be raised, and which has perhaps not been adequately dealt with. It may be admitted that pain and loss are, as a matter of fact, instruments of moral development. It can hardly be doubted that they are. It may, however, be urged that the fact that moral development stands in need of such instruments is in itself a mark of imperfection in the universe. Why, it may be asked, should not our development take place in a direct and straightforward way, without the need of obstacles? This question naturally occurs when the obstacles are represented as the *means* of moral development; and I think it is at least partly met by pointing out that, in many cases, they are not *means*, but rather *implications*. When it is urged, for instance, that pain or loss are necessary for the development of fortitude or sympathy, the main point is that the former are necessarily implied in the latter. It may be contended, however, that we might very well dispense with those virtues which imply pain or loss, if only we might retain those which have no such implication, such as love, truthfulness, justice, and wisdom. But would not even these virtues be somewhat thin in their

texture if they had no difficulties to overcome in their exercise? At any rate, it seems to me convincing to say that, if we try to think of a universe which contains no obstacles, and none of the qualities which imply the existence of obstacles, and set it side by side with a universe in which they are contained, we cannot resist the conclusion that the latter has a richer and more subtle beauty; and I think this is explained by the Hegelian principle that the full significance of a positive cannot be seen without the presence of its opposite.

It may be added that the conception of time that I have tried to explain seems to help, in some measure, to reconcile us to the existence of pain and loss. It is at the moment of their occurrence that these things weigh with us most. In retrospect, when we view them in relation to their surrounding circumstances, and to all that they have meant for ourselves and others, our most painful experiences are often far from being the least pleasant to remember; and, when Dogberry boasts that he is "a fellow that hath had losses," there are few who cannot share his feeling. It is, in general, not our pains and losses that hang heavily upon us, but rather our follies and misdemeanours. And thus we are led to notice what is called, more specifically, moral evil.

A considerable aspect of moral evil, however, is covered by what has been already stated. When we think of the things that are regarded with the most violent abhorrence, if not with the deepest disapproval, we find that the evil in them lies primarily in the pain or loss that results from them. This applies to murder, robbery, and all the more obvious forms of wrongdoing; and this aspect of the evil that is contained in them is on the same footing as pains and losses that arise in any other way. The only additional aspect is the element of malevolence, or it may be merely the absence of benevolence where there is an opportunity for its exercise.

Now, with regard to malevolence, I think it is at least pretty safe to go with Butler in contending that there is no such

thing as *pure* malevolence; even if we may hesitate to accept the Socratic doctrine, that no one is willingly deprived of the good, which certainly calls for a good deal of interpretation. There is, of course, a good deal of anger and hatred and envy and jealousy and injustice among men; but I believe that it is never evil, simply as evil; which is pursued in any of these attitudes. I do not mean that when a man voluntarily inflicts some evil on another, or desires that some evil may befall him, or rejoices at the sight of such an evil, he values the evil because he thinks it will lead to good. I think he does so more often than is commonly supposed, but I do not venture to contend that he always does so. Sometimes, I am afraid, the good that he values is only some private satisfaction of his own; and occasionally it may only be the satisfaction of a combative or destructive impulse. What is true, I think, is that even such impulses as these have some value in their proper place; and that it is only a certain limitation of outlook which prevents men from seeing what their proper place is. The most common form of limitation is that which is connected with the ego-centric attitude; but the limitation of men's outlook to their class or nation is, perhaps, hardly less pernicious. Now, these limitations do not present any special problem to us, once we have recognised the general fact of human development, as starting from individual centres and only gaining a larger outlook through the discipline of pain and opposition.

It appears from such considerations that the special problem of evil is essentially bound up with those of contingency and change; and that they may all be regarded as particular aspects of the general problem of finitude as involving imperfection. It may be worth while to add a few more words here on this general problem. It has already been noted that the conception of a perfect whole appears to imply that its parts are imperfect. Yet it seems, also, to be necessary to the conception of a perfect whole that it should be a real unity, and, consequently, that its parts should not exist separately.

There is an apparent contradiction in this; and I think it may be maintained that it is this contradiction that is solved by change and pain. If the parts did not change, they would be rigidly separated from the whole to which they belong. If change can be interpreted as meaning development, it might be held to be the process by which the parts recover their identity with the whole. And the final significance of pain—especially as it appears in the discontent of the human consciousness—might be regarded as an indication that the part cannot rest in isolation from the whole. According to Hobbes, man in a state of nature has the right to everything. This can hardly be maintained. The sense in which it has an element of truth is, perhaps, better expressed in Carlyle's statement, that the "infinite Shoeblack" cannot be satisfied with anything less than the whole universe; or, in the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that *νοῦς* seeks to "master" everything—*i.e.* to know it. Certainly we seem to aim ultimately at the contemplation and enjoyment of the whole. And, perhaps, this may be the secret of the time-process in general. It may be essentially the longing of the part to realise its unity with the whole. I take this to be the significance of Aristotle's characterisation of the moving principle in the universe—*κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*.

Yet, if we are to interpret it in this way, we must recognise that there is a real advance in the cosmic process. Mr. Bradley speaks of the deeper religions as involving the conviction "that all evil is really overcome"; and Caird, even more emphatically, referred to the religious attitude, in its most developed phase, as implying the "certainty of ultimate triumph." Dr. Bosanquet, commenting on the latter passage, observes that, from his point of view, "the triumph is in the Absolute, and the total expression of it within the temporal series is inconceivable. Nor can we suppose that all which is to come within that series is nearer to perfection than anything which has gone before. . . . It remains solid ground that the security of the finite is fully to recognise its own nature, and that in this

recognition a given self-conscious race must naturally tend to advance." But can the finite have any "security" in itself? Is it not rather true that it finds its only security in the effort to rise above itself? It is, of course, the case that human progress is not a continuous advance, and it seems to be the case also, in general, that progress is achieved by understanding and absorbing what is best in the past. Yet any real conception of the universe as a perfect whole seems to involve the conviction that the isolation of the finite is gradually broken down. To consider further what is implied in this, would, however, carry us too far afield. It involves the Hegelian conception of the universe as going out of self and returning into self; or, in Caird's phrase, as being a self-differentiating, self-integrating system. Such a view requires a good deal of explanation; and it is doubtful whether it can be made altogether clear. Perhaps the utmost that can be said about such a conception is that we are inevitably led up to it, and that it does not appear to be either self-contradictory or inconsistent with any of the facts that are known to us. Still, it will probably always remain true that the cosmos contains an element of mystery. Indeed, this seems to be necessarily involved in the recognition that we are developing beings, advancing by degrees to the apprehension and understanding of the system within which we live.

My object in this paper has been to show, in general terms, what is involved in the conception of a self-explanatory system; and to give grounds for thinking that the chief difficulties in the way of regarding the universe as such a system are not insuperable. Of course, I do not maintain that such considerations are enough to entitle us to believe that the universe actually is such a system. It is always possible to suppose that the universe is essentially pluralistic, not capable of being interpreted as a real unity at all. It may even be essentially chaotic, with only the semblance of order in some of its parts, though this at least is difficult to regard as credible, or even as intelligible. All that I venture to urge is that we are



inevitably led to try to view our universe as an intelligible whole; and that there seems to be no insuperable difficulty or ultimate contradiction in the hypothesis that it is so. If this is not enough to entitle us to believe that it is so, it is at least enough to entitle us to hope. It is enough to justify us in describing ourselves, like Professor Höffding, as "critical monists," or tentative cosmists. Hope and effort would seem to be the characteristically human attitudes, rather than knowledge or attainment. But even hope and effort call for some justification.

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#### XIV.—SYMPOSIUM: ARE THE MATERIALS OF SENSE AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND?

*By* G. E. MOORE, W. E. JOHNSON, G. DAWES HICKS,  
J. A. SMITH, and JAMES WARD.

##### I.—*By* G. E. MOORE.

I THINK that, on the whole, the clearest way of naming shortly the class of entities, with regard to which I propose to discuss whether they are "affections of the mind," is to call them "presented sensations." I propose to call them so, and to trust to luck that people will understand what the entities are to which I am giving this name. Presented sensations are, of course, by no means the only class of entities which some people would be inclined to call "materials of sense." It may be, for instance, that we have sensations which are not presented at any time to anybody, although they are sensations in the same sense in which the presented entities of which I am going to speak are so; and some people might say that such unpresented sensations are just as much "materials of sense" as those which are presented. Then again, some people might be inclined to say that presented images ought also to be reckoned among "the materials of sense": those who, use the term "sense-data" seem in fact, so far as I can make out, generally to use it to include presented images as well as the entities which I am calling presented sensations; and the term "sense-data" ought, of course, to be so used, that everything which is a sense-datum could also be called a "material of sense." Then again, some people might be inclined to include under "materials of sense" not only presented sensations and presented images, but perceived facts of a certain sort—such, for

instance, as the fact which we perceive when we perceive that two presented sensations have a certain spatial relation to one another. And others again might be inclined to treat as "materials of sense" not only entities of all those kinds, but also certain universals or concepts, which might be called "sense-qualities," since they are qualities which belong to sensations—such, for instance, as the qualities for which the words "red" and "blue" stand, when these words are used in their most fundamental sense. The words: "Are the materials of sense affections of the mind?" might, therefore, be understood in such a sense that they would stand for a much wider question than that which I propose to discuss. And, just as some people might think that they ought to stand for a wider question, so others, I think it is possible, may think that they ought to stand for a narrower one. For when I talk of "presented sensations" I mean to include under that term sensations which are not only presented, but also "localised" and "referred to some physical object"—these being, in fact, the class of presented sensations with which I am most familiar and with regard to which I am most anxious to know whether they are "affections of the mind"; and I think it is possible some people might say that such sensations, just because they are "localised" and "referred to some physical object," have been "worked up" by the mind and are not, therefore, materials given by sense. It might, therefore, be held that the phrase "the materials of sense" ought properly to stand for a class much narrower than that with which I propose to deal—for a class which will include only those among presented sensations, which are neither localised nor referred to any physical object, and perhaps not all even of these. And I do not for a moment wish to deny that the phrase might be legitimately used in any one of these different senses, either wider or narrower. But it seems to me that the question whether the entities which I am calling "presented sensations" are affections of the mind is the most interesting and important of all the different questions

which might be meant by the words "are the materials of sense affections of the mind?" and that it is also *the* question which these words would first suggest to the minds of most people.

I propose, therefore, to confine myself to the question: "Are presented sensations affections of the mind?" But the assertion that they are, might have two very different meanings which it is, I think, important to distinguish. It might mean only that all presented sensations are affections of *some* mind; or it might mean that every presented sensation is an affection of the mind of *any individual to whom it is presented*—every sensation presented to *me* an affection of *my* mind; every sensation presented to A an affection of A's mind; and so on. Of these two assertions it will be seen that the latter asserts much more than the former: if the latter is true, the former must be; but the former might, conceivably, be true, even if the latter were not. The latter is, I think, the sense in which the words would be most naturally understood; and I propose to confine myself to discussing whether *it* is true. There may, for all I know, be people, who, while not venturing to assert this latter proposition or even being prepared to deny it, would yet assert that every presented sensation is an affection of *some* mind; just as Berkeley, in an analogous case, though not venturing to assert that every sensation presented to me exists only while it is presented to me, yet thought himself entitled to assert that every such sensation exists only while it is presented to *someone*. Still, I think there are probably few people who would take this line; and, for my part, if I cannot be sure that all the sensations presented to me are affections of *my* mind, I do not see how I could possibly be sure that they are all affections of *some* mind.

I am, therefore, going to confine myself to the question: Are all the sensations presented to *me* affections of *my* mind? And with regard even to this question, I am not sure that what I am going to discuss constitutes the *whole* of what it

means. I am, in fact, only going to discuss a proposition which seems to me to be always *implied* by the assertion that they are affections of my mind, and to be the most important and interesting part of what is implied by this assertion, but with regard to which I do not feel at all sure that it is the *whole* of what would naturally be meant by this assertion. The proposition in question seems to me to be also implied by the assertion that all the sensations presented to me are "modifications" of my mind, and to be the most important and interesting part of what is implied by that assertion also; but, for all I know, the assertion that they are "modifications" of my mind may mean something slightly different from the assertion that they are "affections" of it, and possibly the meaning of neither expression is simply identical with this proposition, which I take to be implied by both. The same proposition seems to me to be also implied by the view which Stout, in the third edition of his *Manual of Psychology*, means to express, by saying that all the sensations presented to me are "immediate experiences" of mine. It seems to me, indeed, that from the mere phrase "immediate experiences" of mine, we could not safely infer that what he means implies any such thing. For the expression " $x$  is an immediate experience of mine" might, I think, be quite naturally used as identical in meaning with " $x$  is immediately apprehended by me," and this again might be used as identical in meaning with " $x$  is presented to me," so that the expression "All the sensations presented to me are immediate experiences of mine" might simply stand for the pure tautology, "All the sensations presented to me are presented to me." Indeed, unless the verb "to experience" is used in some sense in which (as is often the case) it stands for some form of apprehension, the addition to it of the adverb "immediately" seems to me to be quite meaningless. It is quite certain that there is some sense in which we can be said to apprehend some things immediately and others only mediately. But if by " $x$  is

experienced" you mean (as you very well may, for this highly ambiguous word *is* used in such a sense) something which does not imply that *x* is apprehended at all, then, it seems to me, there are no two ways in which a thing can be "experienced," such that the one could be called "immediate" and the other "mediate." Nevertheless, I cannot help thinking that Stout is *not* using the phrase "*x* is an immediate experience of mine" in such a sense that the proposition "All the sensations presented to me are immediate experiences of mine" would be a pure tautology, and that he *is* using it in such a sense that "*x* is an immediate experience of mine" does *not* imply that *x* is apprehended by me in any way whatever. For he explains what he does mean by the phrase, by telling us that it is identical in meaning with each of the two phrases "*x* is *lived through* by me" (p. 3) and "*x* forms part of the life-history of my mind" (p. 7). And he makes clearer the sense in which he is using the phrase "*x* is lived through by me" by telling us that he is using it in such a sense (and this, I think, is obviously the natural sense of the phrase) that whenever I attend to anything, or make any judgment, or desire anything, or feel pleased or pained, then my act of attention, my act of judgment, my desire or my feeling, are "lived through" by me. Now, that there is a most important sense in which any act of attention or judgment, or any feeling, which is an act or a feeling of *mine*, is "lived through" by me, just because it is so; is, I think, plain; and also that exactly the same meaning can be expressed by saying that it is "experienced" by me or is "an experience of mine." *This* meaning of "experienced" or "lived through" is of such a nature that from the assertion that an act of attention is an act of *mine*, it logically follows that it is "lived through" by me or "experienced" by me. What, therefore, I take Stout to be asserting of all the sensations presented to me is that they are "lived through" by me in just this same sense in which all my "subjective" states or acts certainly

are "lived through" by me, just because they are "subjective" states or acts of mine. And this proposition is one which nobody, I think, could maintain to be a pure tautology. It seems to me to be obviously, if true, a very important and interesting proposition, and that mainly because it again implies the very same proposition which I take to be the most important and interesting part of what is implied by the assertions that all the sensations presented to me are "affections" or "modifications" of my mind.

What, then, is this important and interesting proposition which is implied in common by all these three different assertions with regard to the sensations that are presented to me—*both* by the assertion that they are "affections" of my mind, *and* by the assertion that they are "modifications" of my mind, *and* by the assertion that they are "lived through" by me, however much these three assertions may differ from one another in meaning?

It seems to me that what is implied can be best got at by considering what is implied with regard to my acts of attention or judgment, by saying that they are all "lived through" by me, in just that sense in which that they are lived through by me is something which follows from the fact that they are acts of judgment or attention of mine. This sense of "lived through" is certainly such that there is some important sense in which it can be said of a given act of attention of mine that it was "lived through" by me at a certain time, and that there were other times, before and after, at which it had not yet begun, or had ceased, to be lived through by me. To say that at  $t_2$  I was attending to a given object  $O$  implies that there was being "lived through" by me at  $t_2$  an act of attention, which was an attending to  $O$ ; and to say that at  $t_1$  I was not yet attending to  $O$ , and that at  $t_3$  I had ceased to attend to  $O$ , implies that the act of attention to  $O$ , which I was "living through" at  $t_2$ , was, at  $t_1$ , not yet being lived through by me, and was, at  $t_3$ , no longer being lived through by me. But to

say of this act of attention to O that at  $t_2$  it was being lived through by me, whereas at  $t_1$  and  $t_3$  it was *not* being lived through by me, certainly implies that, in some sense or other, it had to me at  $t_2$  a relation which at  $t_1$  it had not yet got to me, and which at  $t_3$  it had ceased to have to me. And what I want to concentrate attention upon is the nature of this relation. It seems to me to have a very important and interesting property, which is by no means shared by all relations. The important and interesting property is this. It seems to me that this relation expressed by "lived through" by me is such that to say of anything that at one time it *was* being lived through by me, and that at another it was *not*, implies that at the second time the thing in question did not exist at all. It is, in other words, a relation such that anything which has it to me *can only exist* so long as it has it to me: such that, from the assertion that a given thing has ceased to have it to me, it *follows* that the thing in question has ceased to exist. To say this is, of course, to say no more than that the assertion that I have ceased to attend to O implies with regard to the act of attention of mine, which existed while I was attending to O, not merely that it has ceased to be mine, but that it has ceased to exist. And similarly in other cases. It says no more than that the assertion that I have ceased to make the judgment  $p$  implies with regard to the act of judgment of mine, which did exist while I was judging  $p$ , not merely that it has ceased to be mine, but that it has ceased to exist; or that the assertion that I have ceased to feel a certain emotion implies with regard to the feeling of mine, which did exist while I felt that emotion, not merely that it has ceased to be mine, but that it has ceased to exist. And all these are propositions which it seems to me everybody constantly assumes to be true. Whether they are true is another question. They seem to me to be so; and that is why I say that the relation expressed by saying that a given thing is "lived through" by me seems to me to have the peculiar property that it is a relation such that



anything which has it to me *can* only exist so long as it has it. But it may, of course, be said that I cannot really know *any* such thing. That, when I know that I have ceased to attend to O, all that I really know, with regard to the act of attention of mine, which did exist while I was attending, is that it has ceased to be mine, and *not* that it has ceased to exist: that, for all I can tell, the very same act of attention may still go on existing, and that the only certain fact is that it has ceased to have to me the relation which I express by saying that it was an act of mine. This is a view which I do not know how to refute. But it seems to me to be a false one; and the fact that it is false seems to me to have a very important bearing on the vexed question as to what is meant by saying of my different mental acts or states that all of them are *mine*. I think I do know, in such a case, with regard to the act of attention of mine, which did exist, not merely that it has ceased to be mine, but that it has ceased to exist; and that from the assertion that it has ceased to be mine it actually follows that it has ceased to exist. Whether this is so or not, it seems to me to be always assumed that it is so. It is, I think, almost universally assumed that this relation expressed by "lived through" by me is such that to assert of anything that it has ceased to have it to me implies that the thing in question has ceased to exist. And the most important and interesting proposition implied by the assertion that all the sensations presented to me are "affections" of my mind, or are "modifications" of it, or are "lived through" by me, seems to me to be just this: that they all have to me *some* relation having this peculiar property that they *can* only exist while they have it—that the assertion that they have ceased to have it implies that they have ceased to exist.

The question, therefore, which I wish to raise with regard to the sensations presented to me is merely this: whether they have to me *any* relation which is of such a nature that the assertion that at a given time they have ceased to have to me that

relation implies that at the time in question they have ceased to exist. It seems to me that the view that they all have to me *some* such relation is still strongly held by many people, and is, in fact, implied by anyone who says that they are "affections" of my mind, or "modifications" of it, or "lived through" by me. And I want to say at once that it seems to me quite possible that they have to me *some* such relation. I have an open mind with regard to the question whether they have or not. But it does seem to me extremely doubtful whether they have; and what I should like to do is to elicit, from somebody who is convinced that they have, some more convincing reason for this view than any that I am able to discover. With this object I shall try to state, as clearly as possible, the main reasons which, so far as I can discover, make the view that they have seem doubtful to me, in the hope that somebody will be able to show me that these reasons are mistaken.

I think, then, that my main reasons for doubting whether all the sensations presented to me have to me any such relation can be put in the following form. They consist in two steps. In the first place, I am unable to discover that they all have to me any relation at all except that which is constituted by their being presented to me. And, in the second place, I seem to myself to see pretty clearly that *this* relation is *not* a relation which has the peculiar property in question: the assertion that a given sensation has ceased to be presented to me seems to me, pretty clearly, *not* to imply that the sensation in question has ceased to exist. If these two propositions are both true, then it seems to me to follow absolutely that the sensations presented to me are *not* all of them "affections" of my mind. For, if the relation of being presented is the only relation which they all have to me, and if this relation is *not* such that anything which has it to me at any time can only exist so long as it has it to me, then it follows that there is *no* relation of which it is true, both that they all have it to me, and that it is

such that the assertion that one of them has ceased to have it to me implies that the sensation in question has ceased to exist. It seems to me, then, that in order to show that they all are affections of my mind, it is absolutely necessary to show either that the relation of presentation is *not* the only relation which they all have to me, or that this relation *has* got the peculiar property of which I have spoken. And it is some convincing argument in favour of one or other of these two propositions that I should like, in the first place, to elicit. A convincing argument in favour of the second would, of course, be sufficient by itself to prove the required point; for there is no doubt that all the sensations presented to me *are* presented to me, and if *this* relation has the required property, then it will at once follow that they all have to me *some* relation having this property. But a convincing argument in favour of the first would, of course, not by itself be sufficient to prove the required point; it would be required to prove, not only that they all have to me *some* relation other than that of presentation, but also the further point that *some* such other relation which they all have to me has the required property.

As regards the first point, whether there is any relation other than that of presentation, which they all have to me, I have not much to say. It is evident to me that they all are presented to me, but that they all have to me any other relation is not evident at all. I suppose those who hold that it is evident that they have would say some such thing as that it is evident that they are all "lived through" by me in the sense in which my acts of judgment and attention most certainly are. And if they all really do have to me this relation, I should, of course admit both that they have to me a relation other than that of presentation, and that this relation has the required property. For it seems to me evident that this relation that is meant by being "lived through" is not identical with the relation of presentation; both because it seems clear to me that many of my acts of judgment and

attention are not presented to me at all, although, *ex hypothesi* they all are "lived through" by me; and because, as I shall go on to urge, the relation of presentation does *not* seem to me to have the required property, whereas the relation of being "lived through" has. If, then, all the sensations presented to me really are "lived through" by me in this sense, the required conclusion would follow. And I cannot pretend to see clearly that they are not. What I am unable to imagine is how anybody can see clearly that they *are*. If it really is evident that they are, there must, I think, be some way of putting the matter which would make it evident to me. And this is what I hope somebody may be able to do.

As regards the second point, whether the relation of presentation itself has the required property, I have two things to say. The point to be discussed is a very simple one; namely, whether, from the mere fact that a given sensation has ceased to be presented to me, I can infer with certainty that it has ceased to exist. And my first reason for doubting whether I can is simply that it seems to me quite plainly conceivable with regard to many sensations which are no longer presented to me, that they do nevertheless still exist. I am not, of course, asserting that any of them *do*, I am only asserting that it is conceivable that they do. It seems to me quite evident that this is conceivable; and I cannot find any way of diminishing the apparent evidence of the proposition that it is so. And my second reason for doubting whether I can infer with certainty, from the mere fact that a given sensation has ceased to be presented to me, that it has ceased to exist, is that there seems to me to be a clear distinction between cases in which I do know with regard to a given sensation, which has been presented to me, not only that it has ceased to be presented to me, but also that it has ceased to exist, and cases in which I do know the former but do *not* know the latter. This distinction seems to me to be of the utmost importance, though I do not know exactly what it shows. If

I am watching a firework display I can actually see a given localised visual sensation—the sensation of a spark from a bomb, for instance—come into existence and then cease to exist; and in such cases I know by observation not only that the sensation in question has ceased to be presented to me, but also that it has ceased to exist. But where the fact that a given visual sensation ceases to be presented to me is due to my turning away my head or shutting my eyes, the case is certainly very different. In this case, as in the former, I can know by direct observation that the sensation in question has ceased to be presented to me, but the most important respect in which this case differs from the former one seems to me just to be that in this case I do *not*, as in the former case I did, *also* directly observe that the sensation in question has ceased to exist. If this is so, then I think nothing could serve to bring out more clearly the difference between the relation of presentation and the relation of being “lived through.” When I observe that a given mental act or state of mine, an act of judgment or an emotion, has ceased to be lived through by me, I am, I think, always at the same time observing that the act or state in question has ceased to exist; that it has ceased to exist is, I think, a part of what I observe in observing that it has ceased to be lived through by me. But in the case of presentation, while there are cases in which I do observe *both* that a given sensation has ceased to be presented to me *and* that it has ceased to exist, there seem to be others which differ from these just in respect of the fact that, though I do observe that a given sensation has ceased to be presented to me, I do *not* also observe that it has ceased to exist. And how, in spite of this difference, it can nevertheless be evident that the relation of presentation is like the relation of being “lived through,” in respect of the important property that from the fact that a given sensation has ceased to be presented to me it follows that it has ceased to exist, I do find it difficult to imagine.

## II.—By W. E. JOHNSON.

If Dr. Moore's account of the question under discussion is to be accepted, I unreservedly take the view that "the materials of sense *are* affections of the mind." The problem hinges upon the notion of the so-called *relation* of presentation. Dr. Moore maintains that in some cases, when a sensation ceases to be *presented*, the sensation continues to exist, and in other cases the sensation ceases to exist. The former case is that which is disputable. Yet, both cases must be considered together, because those who (like myself) deny that a sensation can continue to exist when it has ceased to be presented hold that there is no *distinction* between the cessation of the presentation of a sensation and the cessation of the existence of the sensation. Similarly, with an emotion which I have ceased to feel. I do not agree with Dr. Moore in saying that, when an emotion has ceased to be mine, *it ceases to exist*, in any sense in which such a statement could be questionably true or false. I cannot distinguish between an emotion ceasing to be mine, and *my* emotion ceasing to exist. If the emotion were *mine*, in the same sense as a book might be mine, of course the book might cease to be mine without its ceasing to exist. But if we hold that an emotion belongs to me in the same sense as a temperature of 29° *belongs* to a bar of iron, then the fact that this temperature ceases to belong to the bar of iron is indistinguishable from the fact that the temperature that belonged to the bar of iron has ceased to exist. In short, if sensations, emotions, desires, acts of attention, etc., are "modes of consciousness," then their ceasing to be *mine* simply means that *my* consciousness has changed as regards one or other of these modes. We do not *add* anything that could be disputed when we say that *the* emotion which has ceased to be felt has also ceased to exist, because there could be no substantival identity between an emotion of mine and an emotion of yours, and no such entity as an unappropriated emotion.

There is (in my opinion) an equivocation in the use of the words "existing" and "ceasing to exist." For example, if a movement from A to B is *followed* by a movement from B to C, the former movement must be said to "cease existing" when the latter "begins to exist." In this case we are thinking of a body X which *continues to exist* (and which may therefore be called a continuant), while the movement from A to B, as also from B to C, is occurring. Furthermore, let the movement from A to B occur in the period of time from  $t_1$  to  $t_2$ , and that from B to C in the period  $t_2$  to  $t_3$ . Now the particular movement that is (partially) defined as occurring within the period  $t_1$  to  $t_2$  must *by definition* cease to exist when the instant  $t_2$  has arrived. To ask whether this movement ceases to exist when it ceases to belong to the body X is absurd, because the particular movement in question is *identified* solely by its being the movement of the body X within the time  $t_1$  to  $t_2$ . There are, of course, two other questions of identification. Thus, the *character* of the movement, as defined by its velocity and direction, may be the same or not the same for the preceding as for the subsequent of the two distinguished movements. And, again, the *body* whose movement is defined for the earlier period may be the same or not the same as that for the later period. Of course, if we deny that there is such an entity as a continuant, this last question of identification could not arise. There would, on this supposition, be only the *qualitative* identity (direction and velocity) to be considered, since, *ex hypothesi*, there cannot be *substantial* identity between a movement defined as occurring within one period of time and a movement defined as occurring within another period of time.

In short, we cannot put the alternative whether a particular sensation ceases or does not cease to exist when it ceases to be presented (*i.e.*, ceases to be mine) unless we regard the particular sensation as being a continuant. This seems to me obvious from Dr. Moore's way of talking of the

*relation of presentation.* If A ceases to love B, it may be, of course, that B has or has not ceased to exist. Or, more generally, if the fact that "A loves B" ceases to be a fact, it may or may not be that A or that B has ceased to exist. Or, if the fact that "this book belongs to A" ceases to be a fact, it may or may not be that A or that the book has ceased to exist. In the same way, Dr. Moore maintains that when the fact that "a particular person A is presented with a particular sensation X" has ceased to be a fact, then—just as the particular person A might or might not have ceased to exist—so the particular sensation X might or might not have ceased to exist. Thus it is obvious to me that Dr. Moore could not have put the case as he does unless he had implicitly taken a sensation to be an entity of the nature of a *continuant* like a material body or a conscious experient.

What then about the so-called *relation of presentation*? Incidentally Dr. Moore refers to *unpresented* sensations in the following passage: "We may have sensations which are not presented to anybody," *i.e.*, "Sensations may be mine without being presented to me." But this question is not further discussed by him. He wishes (if I understand him) to restrict the discussion to sensations, which, if they are *mine*, they are presented to me; or *when* they are mine, they are presented to me. The question then arises whether there is any distinction in *meaning* between the sensation being mine (for the time being), and being presented to me (during that time). I cannot discover, from what Dr. Moore says, in what sense a sensation which is mine can be said *also* to be "presented to me." A temperature may (for a given period) be said to *belong* to a bar of iron; but we should not say that the temperature was *presented* to the bar of iron. I, therefore, infer that "*being presented to*" means for Dr. Moore some kind of "*being cognised by*." This may not give the *whole* of the meaning; but I suppose that in his view it is part of the *meaning* of the term presentation and not merely a fact



generally or invariably accompanying presentation. If, however, Dr. Moore is to be understood to *mean* by "presentation to me" something *more* than being "*mine*" and something *less* than "*being aware of*" (although it may always be accompanied by "*being aware of*"), what is it that Dr. Moore *does* mean by "presentation"? My own view is that presentation is a necessary *condition* in order that an object may be *directly* cognised. This introduces a question of fact, viz., Are all sensations, which are mine during a certain period, such that they *could be* directly cognised by me during that period? This is not the same question as: Are they *actually* being directly cognised by me during the period at which they are mine? For "being presented to me" is the prior condition that renders my direct cognition of the object possible; and when this condition is fulfilled the actual occurrence of a cognition would depend further only upon the subjective factor of interest. If the subject has no interest aroused by the presentation of an object, then he will not cognise it. On this view, an actual cognition would occur and would develop in this or that direction and up to this or that degree of determinateness and complication according as the motives of interest varied. On this point Dr. Moore remarks: "When I talk of *presented* sensations, I mean to include those which are localised and referred to some physical object." Does this mean localised and referred *by me* (the person to whom they are said to be presented)? Or, contrarily, does Dr. Moore mean that any localised or referred sensation would be other than any unlocalised or unreferred sensation? In other words, are "localisation" and "reference" to be included in the *relation* of presentation, so that the *same* sensation may be sometimes localised or referred by the sentient and at other times be unlocalised or unreferred; *or*, do "localised" and "referred" sensations belong to a different class of sensations from "unlocalised" and "unreferred," so that no localised sensation could be *identified* with an unlocalised sensation, and no

referred sensation could be identified with an unreferred sensation? In my view "localisation" and "reference to a physical object" are some of the forms into which the *cognition* of a sensation may be developed; and are not involved in the relation of presentation, which is only a precondition for such cognitive development. When a sensation is *cognised* as having a certain character or as being in a certain temporal, spatial or causal connexion, the character and connexion of the sensation are not thereby altered. What is altered is our *cognitive relation* to the sensation.

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### III.—By G. DAWES HICKS.

There is a well-known chapter of the *Medicinische Psychologie* in which Lotze traces the successive steps by which, as he conceives, the occurrence of the "simple sensations" is to be accounted for. He discusses in detail each link of the chain of processes until ultimately the sequence of events passes from the physical to the psychical sphere, and we are brought to the impression (*dem Eindrücke*) which the excitation of the nervous system calls forth in the soul. This "reaction of the soul" upon stimulation may be said to be in itself, he avers, an unconscious mental state (*ein unbewusster Seelenzustand*), and we have got to think of it as being transformed under certain supplementary conditions, such as those involved in the direction upon it of an act of attention, into a conscious experiencing of a simple sense-quality—*e.g.* a tone or a colour.

The view which Lotze works out in detail is, in one form or another, widely prevalent; and, when it is asked whether the materials of sense are affections of the mind, I should certainly have taken the question to refer to some such account of them. Lotze, at any rate, leaves us in no doubt of what he considers the implication of the position to be. The utter disparity of sense-presentations and external stimuli or nerve-processes

disposes at once, he maintains, of the thought that sensibility can be a means of apprehending the true qualities of outer objects. "The entire flow (of sense-presentations) is an inner occurrence in our mind, and all sound and brightness are forms of the appearance under which we are conscious of the effects of stimuli quite otherwise constituted."

Dr. Moore would probably refuse to admit that what Lotze takes to be implied in the proposition that the materials of sense are affections of the mind is implied in it. But there is, he maintains, something else implied in it, and his point, so I gather, is that if what he conceives to be implied in it can be shown to be contrary to fact, a good reason will have been given for replying to the question we are discussing in the negative. The proposition implies, he contends, that sensations presented to me have to me *some* relation which is of such a nature that they *can* only exist while they have it.

What precisely does Dr. Moore mean by "presented sensations"? Recur, for a moment, to Stout's familiar distinction between "sensations" and "sensible qualities," a distinction which, although not repeated in so many words in the third edition of the *Manual*, has not, I imagine, been discarded. When I am looking at a green field sprinkled with yellow buttercups, says Stout, the qualitative difference between green and yellow then present to my mind is taken by me to be a difference between colour qualities inherent respectively in the buttercups and in the grass, as they exist independently of my awareness of them, and independently of any relation to sentient minds. For reasons I need not go into, Stout is satisfied that this common-sense belief is justified to the extent that grass has the property of being green and buttercups the property of being yellow, whether apprehended by finite minds or no. And he proposes to call the green and the yellow, thus "inherent" in the grass and in the buttercups, "sensible qualities." On the other hand, the green that is actually sensed in looking at the green grass, or the yellow that is

actually sensed in looking at the yellow buttercups, is not identical with the green and the yellow "inherent" in the grass and the buttercups respectively. Each of the former is "existentially present to consciousness" in a way in which the latter are not. And the "qualities" existentially present to consciousness may vary while the "qualities" which the "things" possess remain unaltered. "If a buttercup is seen by the margin instead of the centre of the retina, or if it is seen by a colour-blind instead of by a normal person, or if it is seen by twilight instead of by daylight, or if contrast come into play, the quality immediately presented in viewing it is changed; but, none the less, the buttercup remains a yellow buttercup." The quality, then, thus immediately presented, Stout proposes to call a "sensation." Now, in respect particularly to "sensations," Dr. Moore, I think I am not wrong in saying, is largely in agreement with Stout. He would assert, if I correctly understand, of what he calls "presented sensations" that they are "entities" certainly different from "qualities of things"; that they are apprehended in a way which the latter are not; and that presentation is a mode of apprehension differing fundamentally from that mode of apprehension called thinking or judging.

But Stout goes on to maintain that "presented sensations" are "immediately experienced," or "lived through" (*erlebt*), by the conscious subject in a way similar to the way in which his acts of attention or of judging are "lived through" by the conscious subject, that they are not merely *before* the mind but *in* the mind; and it is this alleged further characteristic about which Dr. Moore is doubtful, and which seems to him, if it is a true characteristic, to carry with it the consequence that "presented sensations" *are* affections of the mind. Here, however, an important consideration requires to be emphasised. When Stout insists that "sensations" are "immediately experienced," or "lived through," he means, I take it, that no distinction is to be drawn between the "sensations" and the

experiencing of them; they are as "immediately experienced"; the experiencing is not one thing and the "sensation" another. They may, it is true, and, in his view, usually do, "enter into" the constitution of objects apprehended, but then a further activity of the mind is called into requisition—the activity, namely, of thought. When, on the other hand, Dr. Moore speaks of a "presented sensation," he means, I take it, an entity distinct and separate from the act by which it is experienced, or directly apprehended, which act, again, is different from an act of thinking or judging. And this *act* of direct apprehension Dr. Moore would admit is "immediately experienced" or "lived through," in a way in which, it seems to him, the "presented sensation" is not. Both, that is to say, are at one in holding that there is, in this connexion, something which is "immediately experienced" or "lived through"—they differ in respect to what this "something" is.

Dr. Moore challenges those who contend that "presented sensations" are "immediately experienced" to give some convincing reason for thinking the assertion that a given sensation has ceased to be presented to me implies that the sensation in question has ceased to exist. And Mr. Johnson replies that for those who (like himself) hold sensations to be "modes of consciousness," there is no distinction to be drawn between the "presentation of a sensation" and the "existence of a sensation." Just as an emotion exists in being felt, so a "sensation" exists in being presented. In other words, what the discussion has brought out, as between Dr. Moore and Mr. Johnson, is that the relation of presentation means for them, in this reference, two very different things. And the difference corresponds, I take it, to the difference which I have just indicated as coming to light in respect to that which is "immediately experienced."

"Sensations," as "modes of consciousness," Mr. Johnson puts in the same category as "emotions, desires, and acts of attention." We are on the verge here of a well-worn

controversy, from which, however, I am going to steer clear. I content myself with simply saying that if by "sensations" be meant *sensa* or sense-data, or whatever you choose to call them, —colours, sounds, odours, etc.—then I agree with Dr. Moore that these are not "modes of consciousness" in the sense in which acts of attention or of desire undoubtedly are. They stand, it seems to me, to acts of mind in a relation similar in this respect to the relation in which what is attended to stands to the act of attending. If, however, one recognises, as I do recognise, the distinction between *sensum* and *sentire*, then, it seems to me, one is not justified in constituting a distinction of existence between *sensa* and "sensible qualities," using the latter term in Stout's sense. Just because I see no reason for thinking that *sensa* are "affections of the mind," I likewise see no reason for thinking that *sensa*, as distinguished from "sensible qualities" are independent existents. I am only too conscious of the risk of subtle dispute to which this way of putting the matter is open. But what I ask Dr. Moore to do is to give some convincing reason for thinking that in the sense in which he uses the term "existence," in saying that a "sensation" may continue to exist when it has ceased to be presented, the "sensation" *ever has existed*, or ever has been of the nature of what Mr. Johnson calls a "continuant." "Sensible qualities" exist, acts or modes of apprehending them exist; but where, I ask, is the warrant for assuming the independent existence of this third thing, called "a presented sensation"? And, as my main point of disagreement with Dr. Moore lies here, I had better try to make my position clear.

Very briefly, what I should say is this. My act of perceiving, or my state of consciousness that will become an act of perceiving, is occasioned or called forth by the stimulation of the sense-organs and the excitation of the nervous system. That act, or state of consciousness, thus occasioned, is forthwith, as Meinong puts it, "directed upon something," the "something" being a physical object, and probably *the* physical

object from which the stimulation has proceeded. If the act in question be an act of visual apprehension, and the object be (say) a red rose, the direction of the act upon this object implies that I shall gradually discriminate a multiplicity of features. And by degrees my state of mind will become a state in which I may be said to be aware of the red rose. *Awareness of the red rose* will become what I should call the content, or part of the content, of the said visual act. Or, I may proceed to "concentrate attention" upon the particular red of the rose, omitting more or less its other characteristics, and then the content, or part of the content, of the act in question will, if I be a person of normal vision, be *awareness of a specific red*. I am asserting here, what has, indeed, been disputed, that cognitive acts do exhibit qualitative differences as acts. Every state of consciousness seems to me to be a definite concrete state, and its specific character to be largely definable by what it is awareness of. This does not mean, however, that what it is aware of is "existentially present" in the conscious state. The awareness of red is different from the awareness of green, but the first is not a complex made up of awareness+red, nor the second a complex made up of awareness+green. If you could, so to speak, look at the former, and perceive it as you perceive red, it would not look red. Strictly speaking, of course, it would not *look* at all; it would not itself be visible; it would be as disparate from red as the molecular changes in the nervous system are disparate from red. Now, it is this content of the visual act that I should say is *erlebt*, or "lived through"—not the red, but the awareness of red. And this means, as I conceive it, that the awareness of red is an indivisible whole, and of such a character that it can *never* be the object of the act of which it is the content.\* On the other hand, the object has also its content—red of a definite hue and shade, a definite intensity,

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\* Cf. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 2te Theil, p. 164.—"Das blosser Erlebtsein eines Inhalts als dessen Vorgestelltsein zu definieren,

occupying a definite area, etc. How much of *this* content will exhibit itself to the act directed upon it, or will be cognised by that act, will depend largely upon the particular nature of the act itself—upon the extent to which it is fitted to discriminate the variety of distinctions presented to it, upon the stage of development it represents, and so forth. There must, that is to say, inevitably arise the contrast between the content of the object as it is in all its concrete fulness and the fragment, so to speak, of such content, which is there and then apprehended, and which, moreover, may involve, for reasons not difficult to discover, distortion and error. And if we describe the latter as the content apprehended, then I contend that, since it, as distinguishable from the content of the object, has made its appearance in and through the act of apprehending itself, we should avoid attributing to it a mode of independent existence; we should avoid supposing it to be there prior to the act of apprehension and as being that upon which that act is directed. For its being, such as it is, arises solely in and in virtue of the concrete situation—the direction, namely, of the act of apprehension upon the actual content of the object; apart from that situation, the “content apprehended” would not “be.”

Let me have recourse once more to a concrete illustration. A red rose is the common object presented to A, B, and C respectively. Their respective acts of apprehension, each directed upon this one object, will gradually discriminate its various features. They bring to the task minds and bodily organs variously equipped for it. In each of these persons, the factors of retention, association, and assimilation will be largely instrumental in determining the manner in which the discriminative act will be effected. A, let us say, is an artist, B a botanist, and C is colour-blind. The red colour of the

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und in Uebertragung alle erlebten Inhalte überhaupt Vorstellungen zu nennen, das ist eine Begriffsverfälschung, welche in der Philosophie kaum noch ihres gleichen hat.



rose, let us call it R, will seem different to each of them—slightly different to A and B, while to C it may seem hardly distinguishable from the hue of the leaves. It will seem, we will say, as  $r_1$  to A, as  $r_2$  to B, as  $r_n$  to C. First of all, then, I am urging that we are not entitled to assume that  $r_1, r_2, r_n$  are existing entities, in the sense that R is an existing entity. These “entities”— $r_1, r_2, r_n$ —are ways in which R is appearing to A, B, and C under the varying conditions specified. If you call  $r_1, r_2, r_n$  “appearances” of R, you must not proceed to convert these “appearances” into entities of the nature that Mr. Johnson calls “continuants.” You can only do that either by assuming that  $r_1, r_2, r_n$  are “affections of the mind,” in Lotze’s sense, and may persist as such, or by assuming that they have been produced, in an admittedly inexplicable manner, by the operation of R, or of some unknown X, upon the bodily organism, and may go on existing after the operation has ceased, or by substituting them for R as the sole existents here in question. I am not saying it is impossible to take one’s stand on either of these alternatives, or upon the position that any one of them is conceivable and a decision between them difficult to pronounce. What I am saying is that he who does so is not entitled to turn round upon the view I am defending and retort: “Well, at any rate, the entities  $r_1, r_2, r_n$  most indubitably exist; there is, *of course*, no question whether there *are* such entities.” In *some* sense, no doubt, these entities “are.” But, under cover of an ambiguous statement, you are assuming that they *are* in the very sense which is being disputed, and so are begging the point at issue. You are assuming, namely, that they “are” in the sense that A, B, and C’s acts of apprehension can be directed upon them after the manner in which, according to the view you are opposing, R “is” and A, B, and C’s acts of apprehension can be directed upon it. Whereas the question that is being pressed is whether  $r_1, r_2, r_n$  “are” in any other sense than as ways in which R appears to A, B, and C respectively in and through their respective acts of perception. Again, it

will not do, in this connexion, to argue that "a colour which appears different *is* a different colour and there is an end of the matter." That, too, is begging the point at issue. The very contention against which this objection is urged is that R, apprehended under varying conditions, *may* appear differently, and yet remain one and the same colour. Once more, it is irrelevant to insist that we have no means of determining under which, if under any, of these ways of appearing the exact nature of R is cognised. We may not have, but that is no reason for refusing to recognise the existence of R, and for putting  $r_1, r_2, r_n$ , etc., in its place.

It is worth noticing that, although Stout insists so strenuously upon the "*existential* presence to consciousness" of sensations, it is not so certain whether, after all, he is really meaning anything that is essentially different from what I have been trying to bring out. For we find him saying more than once in the third edition of the *Manual* (e.g. on p. 209), and elsewhere, that a sensation "exists only as an apparition in consciousness." Now, he would certainly not, I take it, maintain that acts of attention or of judging or of desiring "exist only as apparitions in consciousness." Consequently, it is evident that, even according to his view, sensations do *not* exist in consciousness, as acts of attention or of judging or of desiring exist in consciousness, and it becomes merely a question whether the term "existence" is properly applicable in the former of the two cases.

The answer I should give to the two questions raised by Dr. Moore at the conclusion of his paper will now be sufficiently obvious. I keep to the symbols I have been using for the sake of brevity. ( $\alpha$ ) While R certainly has, I should say, to A, B and C the relation of presentation, I see no reason to think that  $r_1, r_2, r_n$ , are "presented to" A, B and C respectively—not, at any rate, in the sense in which R is "presented to" them. They may be said, if you like, to be presentations of R, but it is, it seems to me, a mistake to speak of *both* R *and*

presentations of R being "presented to" percipients.\* If I am asked, What relation, then, have  $r_1$ ,  $r_2$ ,  $r_n$  to A, B and C respectively? I reply—the relation expressed by saying that they are ways in which R is apprehended by A, B and C respectively, ways in which R appears to these percipients. (b) If  $r_1$  comes to be only in and through A's act of perceiving R, then I should say it *is* inconceivable that it should continue to be when that act has ceased—inconceivable because its "coming to be" does not mean "coming to be as an independent existent." And I can only surmise that, when Dr. Moore finds it conceivable that  $r_1$  is a "continuant" of this kind, it is because he is doubtful whether there is any such "continuant" as R, and is, therefore, constrained to ascribe to  $r_1$  characteristics which ordinary people do ascribe to R. In other words, I suspect that one reason why it seems to him that a given sensation which has "ceased to be presented to me" may not "cease to exist" is that he is convinced the given sensation did exist *before* it was "presented to me." And that surmise is confirmed by the illustration he uses in enforcing his second point in this context. If he is watching a fire-work display, he can, he says, "actually see a given localised visual sensation—the sensation of a spark from

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\* I find it difficult, on this account, to discover from his statement, what exactly Mr. Johnson means by "presentation." The relation of presentation is, he tells us, "a necessary *condition* in order that an object may be *directly* cognised," but he does not tell us what he takes the nature of the relation to be. His example of the temperature belonging to a bar of iron no longer serves him, because admittedly the temperature cannot be said to be "presented to" the bar of iron. If my sensations belong to me in the sense that the temperature belongs to the bar of iron, in *what* sense is it asserted that they are also "presented" to me? And in the sequel Mr. Johnson speaks indifferently of the presentation of a sensation and the presentation of an object: of the sensation being "directly cognised," and of the object being "directly cognised." Is it the presentation of the sensation or the presentation of the object that is the necessary condition of the object being directly cognised; and if the former, in what sense can cognition of the object be called "direct"?

a bomb, for instance—come into existence and then cease to exist”; while, where “the fact that a given visual sensation ceases to be presented” to him is due to his turning away his head or shutting his eyes, the case is very different. Nothing, I think, could bring out more clearly than is here done the ground on which one hesitates to speak of “sensations” as “presented to” a percipient. Ordinary people do not, and it seems to me with good reason, talk about seeing “the sensation of a spark,” but of seeing a spark, just as Dr. Moore himself, at the beginning of the sentence, talks about “watching a firework display,” and not about watching the sensations of one. The term “visual sensation” is, surely, not equivalent to the term “visible sensation.” What is visible, in this instance, is ordinarily taken to be an incandescent portion of matter projected from the bomb, not a series of incandescent sensations. And, when that portion of matter gradually ceases to be incandescent, it ceases, it would ordinarily be said, to be visible, and Dr. Moore ceases to see it, it ceases to appear to him; just as a thousand other people looking at it will cease to see it, and it will cease to appear to them, at approximately the same moment. On the other hand, if before that happens Dr. Moore turns away his head, or shuts his eyes, he would have no reason for saying the spark had ceased to exist when he did so, but, according to the ordinary view, every reason for saying that the “sensation”—“the apparition in consciousness,” to use Stout’s phrase—had ceased to be. This is a common-place explanation enough, and Dr. Moore will have none of it. Very good; but he has first of all, at least, to show that it is an impossible explanation, before he can make use of the difference he thinks so important for the purpose of supporting his contention that my sensations when they “cease to be presented to me” may not cease to “exist,” and that their alleged character of “being immediately experienced” by me is *thereby* rendered dubious. So far as I can see, the ordinary common-sense view of the

matter, when carefully re-interpreted, is not exposed to the insuperable difficulties frequently pressed against it. In short, my case against Dr. Moore is that he has no right to take the "sensation of a spark" to be a "presented sensation"; but that, on the contrary, the "sensation of a spark" is psychologically inexplicable, unless there be a spark which is not a sensation, upon which the act of apprehension is directed.

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#### IV.—By J. A. SMITH.

As the introducer of the problem proposed for our present discussion, Dr. Moore is well within his right in attempting to make its terms as precise as possible. That the form in which it was originally propounded admits of more than one interpretation is unfortunately true, though whether the question which Dr. Moore has in mind is "the most interesting and important of all that might be meant by the original words," and, still more, whether "it is *the* question which these words would first suggest to the minds of most people," appear to me more than doubtful. So far as I count myself to have apprehended the limits within which Dr. Moore would have our debate restricted, I find myself bidden to enter a "universe of discourse" widely remote from the actual world of experience and highly unfamiliar to me, where I am expected to play a sort of game with the "entities," which are its chief inhabitants, in accordance with somewhat arbitrary rules. I must confess that to me this tends to give to our discussion a somewhat phantasmal, if not phantastic, air, but I will do my best not to expatiate far beyond the limits prescribed.

For both the subject and predicate of our question Dr. Moore proposes substitutes, which may or may not be equivalents, but which to him better define the problem which interests him. In the first place he replaces the words "materials of sense" by "presented sensations," trusting to luck that what he means

will be understood. But he goes on to furnish some further clues to his meaning, first by enumerating various things which he excludes, and secondly (and more importantly) by giving a list of the qualifications, the possession of which admits to membership of the class of entities with regard to which he proposes to discuss whether they are or are not "affections of the mind." I regret that in my case his—or rather my—luck has failed, for I cannot convince myself that I have succeeded either in apprehending the nature of this class of entities or in identifying its members with any existents with which I am acquainted. In the latter respect, at least, Dr. Dawes Hicks is, I take it, in the same difficulty with myself, and perhaps we might all have been assisted if Dr. Moore had adduced instances of what he had in mind. Anyway, to be a member of the class in question, and so an instance of our subject, an "entity" must be (a) a sensation, (b) presented, (c) localised, and (d) referred to a physical object. This list suggests a successive addition of determining or defining marks to a central core of indeterminate being or a successive clothing of a *mannequin* with raiment upon raiment, and I gather that the accretions of at least the later items in the list are in time or are steps in an actual or possible historical process. At any rate, somewhere the original "entity" becomes an actual and historical existent. It seems to me that here there is some confusion, for Dr. Moore appears to argue that because "sensations" can be conceived or thought about by us without our thinking of them as presented or localised, etc., it follows that they may exist both before and after being presented ("at any time to anybody.") If by the words "presented," "localised," "related," events or acts are not meant, but characteristics, surely it would be better to say "present," "at a definite place," "related to a definite physical body." I do not, however, press this point, though the ambiguity between the logical order of specifying characterisation and the time order is very puzzling to me. What,

however, completely baffles me is to discover what Dr. Moore means by "sensation." It cannot be merely a meaningless pronoun, or a peg to hang characters and relations on to. The name obviously to him means more than "entity" or "term." On the other hand, it does not mean "sense-datum" or "presentation," for what is so-called may be a sensation and not be present to any mind, and it does not mean "part of the life history of any mind." Not that it may not be or become any of these, but that it need not, so that none of these are its meaning or any part of its meaning. What, then, distinguishes the genus of which Dr. Moore's proposed subject is a species from the other genera or classes of entities? This, I repeat, I have failed to discover. The only clue to their peculiarity or particularity which Dr. Moore's words suggest to me is that "sensations" differ from other entities in being, before, after, and apart from being presented, part at least of the "belongings" of some mind, or, as perhaps Dr. Moore would say, related to some individual mind otherwise than as presented to or lived through by it. The only question which could then arise would be whether "being an affection of" was a good or a bad name for this relation to a mind. (I can scarcely suppose that Dr. Moore would defend the literal accuracy of his words that he "actually sees a given localised visual sensation . . . . come into existence and then cease to exist," etc., but his language here is very alien to me).

Almost in despair of understanding what the entities are to which Dr. Moore refers, I venture to identify the range of their class with that of what I should call simply "what I perceive" when I distinguish what I perceive both from what I imagine and what I conceive or understand. I do not offer this phrase as an equivalent of "the materials of sense" or as in itself devoid of ambiguity. But the meaning I attach to it, in my own mind, is as near as I can get to what I take Dr. Moore to signify by his phrase. Of course, I mean what we *really* perceive or, as some would say, what is given to

perception. It is at least a familiar (perhaps a too familiar) problem, whether, when we strip away from what may be called the *prima facie* objects of perception everything that may conceivably have been added by the mind, what we in thought or imagination reach is or is not to be accounted an "affection of (that) mind." Whether I am right or not in my identification of this subject with Dr. Moore's, the question he asks about it is not whether it is or is not an affection of the mind. For once more he proposes a substitution, this time for the predicate of our original question, and asks whether it is true of his subject (whatever it is) that it ceases to exist after being presented or perceived, viz., whether its being perceived is necessary to its existence. He professes himself unable to answer this question one way or another, though it appears to me that as long as he finds it "quite plainly conceivable with regard to many sensations which are no longer presented to him, that they do nevertheless still exist," the answer is for him decided beyond the reach of argument, for what would argument consist in except an attempt to convince him that such further existence of them was unthinkable? How could it be shown that none of them *do* survive their ceasing to be present to me otherwise than by showing that they cannot?

I am therefore reluctantly obliged to resign any endeavour to deal with Dr. Moore's question, and I must leave his difficulties to be handled by others. Returning to the original form of our question I wish to make a few remarks upon it. The "materials of sense" suggests an antithesis to something formed or transformed—a formed matter or completed product: what it means we are to get before our minds by starting with the finished article and undoing the process of its elaboration. What is meant is, therefore, not so much what we in the end perceive as that out of which what we perceive is made. The finished or formed product is called "sense," and I venture to think that what this naturally means in the present



connection is the *objects* of sense or, as I have said, "what I perceive"—the world of and for perception. Is this, then, this world and the objects which make it up, made out of "affections of (my) mind" or (to supply the suppressed alternative) out of "passions of body"? I think I might say "of my body" (for that answer has been put forward); in any case my body must, if the second alternative be adopted, play a part, at least, as intermediary in the matter. Now, the choice between these alternatives could only present itself to one who at least provisionally accepted the doctrine of the heterogeneity of Mind and Body and their respective worlds, and this, though I know better, I am here λόγου χάριν willing to do. I do so, not holding it to be error, but because it is a highly convenient assumption in making which we find our account to be a supposition necessary to science and of great value in the ordering of our actions. Strictly, upon that assumption, and having regard to the interests of the sciences, I feel sure that concerning "the materials of sense" it is the better opinion that they are "passions of body" than "affections of mind," or, to put the opinion in more accurate terms, that they once *were* that. No doubt, this account of them is not true; it belongs to the region of imagination or fiction, and the history which represents these materials as having pre-existed, and as having been subsequently worked up into objects of perception, is but a myth or legend. But the fiction "works," and the history figuratively adumbrates a truth which it cannot express. It would, indeed, be foolish to throw away devices of so much importance to our thinking and our acting. These, once accepted, conduct us to inquiries of great profit, as, *e.g.*, to the determination of the external and internal bodily conditions most favourable to the genesis of clear, distinct or beautiful objects of perception. I see no corresponding advantages in the rival assumption or opinion that they are or were, as Mr. Johnson is sure they are, "affections of the mind." Not that that opinion is wrong;

it is on my view simply the worse opinion because it leads, or has as yet led, nowhere. If it has led to any discovery of human moment I desire to see it produced.

The facts appear to me to be these. Always when we reflect we find ourselves perceiving and so with something before us which we perceive; with this our reflection must begin. We may—and it is well that we should—ask ourselves, how all this came to be, and in answering ourselves we have no aid but imagination, which gradually as we pursue its history back into the archæological stage becomes first conjecture and then guesswork or fancy, until at last all light forsakes us in “the dark backward and abysm of time”—I say deliberately imagination, for memory at once deserts us. The result is not real history, but myth or legend. Of this, what Dr. Dawes Hicks quotes from Lotze is a fair or perhaps favourable specimen. Against philosophical criticism it cannot stand, but soberly and seriously compared it fulfils a useful and, indeed, indispensable function in the economy of our lives. Under this condition it seems to me possible to improve upon it or to restate it in a way that may perhaps open up a *via media* in our debate. Of the “materials of sense” (and therefore “sense” itself) I would say that they were once, all of them, “passions of body,” and then were changed, transmuted, or transubstantiated into “affections of the mind,” and only then were fit materials for future elaboration into “sense” or “what we perceive.” *How* these momentous changes took place I cannot say nor expect ever to discover, and the more minute analysis of the whole process into further stages is a perilous and perhaps idle adventure. The answer I would suggest to our question is that the proximate materials of sense are mental or psychic affections, their more remote materials bodily passions, states or happenings. Of course, the words “affections” and “passions” are ridiculously precise; all that we have a right to say is that, from being bodily,

what eventually exists as "sense" must on the way have become "mentalised" and so mental, nor need we hesitate to read its history forward and say that as it lapses from being "sense" it returns to being bodily through a stage of being mental but unperceived or unrepresented; into the limbo from which it emerged thither it returns, re-entering by the same portal by which it quitted it. But, I repeat, the whole account moves in a region of fiction and fable; it can never be verified, it can never be known. It is not our ill-luck or our carelessness that we did not observe the process unroll itself before our eyes; it never was there to observe. It stands and falls with the fate of that greater fiction of a nature which is other than and alien to mind—a fiction inevitable and potently useful to us but dislinned and dissolved like the baseless fabric of a vision by philosophical criticism. In philosophy our question has another answer, viz., that what the mind perceives is and cannot but be made out of its own substance, and that everything in or before belonging to it is self-engendered and self-created. From this point of view its own body and the whole world of bodies are but its creatures which it feigns or devises to satisfy its own needs; they have no separate existence or private properties, but hold all, even their existence, by its grant and subject to its *dominium eminens*. In the tribunal of philosophy a dispute between Mind and Body as to which supplies the materials of sense is at once non-suited. This, however, is perhaps not the time or the place for even the avowal of such absolute Idealism, and I only mention it lest it should be thought that in indulging myself with an excursion into the field of scientific imagination, I believed myself to be contributing to the enlargement of knowledge. My aim was the more modest one of commending the wisdom of the man of science and the man in the street in cleaving, as I think they do, to the opinion that sense and the things of sense are made out of bodily rather than out of psychical stuffs or

additions. If to that opinion they adhere, they are on my view most likely to carry on, to their own and the common profit, their useful business. Perhaps, it would be still wiser of them not to dip into works which insinuate the other opinion, and so to retain undisturbed the natural prejudice that whatever they do or can perceive is of (or relative to) the world of moving bodies, as experience has suggested and science articulated that world. Such self-restraint would, I believe, continue to meet with its reward, and the fruits of a disciplined imagination preserve and enhance the stock of scientific value. If they, or we, allow ourselves to be tempted by the attractions of the counter hypothesis, we drift into a twilight region where

Entities and quiddities,  
The ghosts of extinct bodies fly,

and where there flit and waver before us shapes of ambiguous and uncertain nature which seduce our unbridled fancy into a capricious "game with our ideas." I can only, for myself, ask that if there has been any gain the winning of which depended upon the view that what we perceive is, or is made out of, "affections of the mind," it be exhibited and justified as an entry on the balance-sheet of human profit.

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V.—*By* JAMES WARD.

I am but the superfluous fifth wheel of this omnibus. I have had nothing to do with the title that it bears, nor am I by any means clear as to the destination for which it is bound. Is it to be psychological or epistemological? The first two wheels seem to revolve on psychological axles, but the last two, with their references to appearance and reality and to absolute idealism, are surely circling rather in the epistemological domain.

The question, it seems to me, is unhappily worded; and so it takes Dr. Moore—even though he trusts to luck—three pages out of twelve to get under weigh. “Materials of sense” and “affections of the mind” seem anything but cognate concepts, and one would have supposed that at this time of day it was generally conceded that nothing denoted by the one could either be included under, or could include, the other. However, Dr. Moore takes his courage in his hands and boldly substitutes for “materials of sense” the phrase “presented sensations”—a pleonasm that I confess is new to me. Then, too, he calls them “entities”; and I have to confess again that this usage is, so far as I know, an innovation and a very confusing one.

For psychology, sensations and affections of the mind are both alike events, but events of a very different kind. In fact this difference is, in my opinion, the fundamental fact for psychology, and in maintaining, till convinced to the contrary, that sensations are not affections of the minds, Dr. Moore is, I am satisfied, on safe ground. The question so far is a question of fact: affections of the mind are subjective, sensations are objective, for psychology at least. But may not sensations be modes of consciousness? Mr. Johnson thinks they are. Well, what does consciousness mean? Provided it be allowed that sensations are objective and feelings and conations subjective, and this I take it Mr. Johnson does allow, we need not trouble about defining consciousness—all the less as life, *erleben*, or experience is nowadays commonly allowed to take its place.

But can we say that we have lived through or experienced a sensation precisely as we say we have lived through a sorrow or lived through a struggle? Dr. Moore thinks not. Here again, it seems to me, he is right, and his strictures on Professor Stout's doctrine of two forms of immediate experience perfectly justified. The events we speak of as sensations—or more generally as presentations—and the events we speak of as affections or acts do not form a single linear series,

but a dual series in which, though inseparable, because correlative, they are yet, because correlative, perfectly distinct. In a word, experience implies the duality of the psychical correlatives, subject and object. At this point Dr. Dawes Hicks intervenes, suggesting that Professor Stout's meaning is "that no *distinction* is to be drawn between the 'sensations' and the experiencing of them . . . the experiencing is not one thing and the 'sensation' another"; for sensations, according to Stout, "are not merely *before* the mind but *in* the mind." But *mind*, like consciousness, is an outworn coin of current speech no longer accepted as psychological tender. Personally, I doubt if Professor Stout meant to deny the distinction between presentations as objective and subjective states or acts; and in the end I note that Dr. Hicks admits that, on this point, he himself is "not so certain, after all." Anyhow I will venture, without arguing the point, to side with Dr. Moore—till the contrary is proved—in maintaining the complete distinctness between presentations and the acts whereby they are apprehended and appropriated or the feeling which they occasion. This much the duality of experience implies.

When, however, Dr. Moore contends for the possible separate existence of presentations, then, so far as I can see, the duality of experience is as decisively against him. This point, I think, Mr. Johnson has made perfectly clear. It is as obvious to me as it is to Mr. Johnson that Dr. Moore could never have entertained the supposition that sensations themselves are entities independent of the relation of presentation if he had not started with assumptions that implicitly beg the question. It strikes me as strange that a man so justly renowned for critical acumen should have trusted to luck at the most vital point in his argument; but *allzuscharf macht schartig*.

Let us probe this gap in Dr. Moore's panoply. What exactly do we understand by *the relation of presentation*? Is this relation such that we can talk of an unrepresented sensation

or even of a presented sensation? If Baldwin's Dictionary is to be trusted, it seems that I "have done much to make it (presentation) a familiar term in English psychology." But Professor Stout, who wrote the article from which I quote, has, in the last edition of his *Manual*, rejected what he calls my comprehensive use of the word, and proposed instead of it the following:—"The term *presentation* has a two-fold implication. It implies that the presentation itself is an immediately experienced object; it implies also that this objective experience specifies and determines the direction of the thought to what is not immediately experienced. The presentation has a presentative function in virtue of which it *presents objects that are not themselves presented*" (p. 210).

As I may be able to show presently, this interpretation of presentation is a very unusual and, I think, a very confusing one; but it reminds one of Dr. Moore's language: "When I talk of presented sensations," he says, "I mean to include under that term sensations which are not only presented, but also 'localised' and *referred to some physical object*." He allows, however, that the phrase "the materials of sense," i.e. what he calls presented sensations, might be used in a much narrower sense, in fact, so as to exclude localisation and reference to an object. There is a serious ambiguity here to which Mr. Johnson and Professor Smith have already referred. Perhaps Dr. Moore will tell us whether even when a sensation is only presented and neither localised nor referred to a physical object, it could conceivably exist if its presentation ceased. If it could not, it would correspond pretty much to Professor Stout's first implication of the term presentation. Then one might perhaps surmise that what Stout calls the presentative function or second implication and Dr. Moore calls localisation and reference to an object also correspond. Then, if it were admissible to talk both of presented and of unpresented sensations, it might be maintained that the sensation retained its presentative function even though it ceased to be itself

presented, much as Stout allows himself to talk of objects that are not themselves presentations being nevertheless presented. All this, no doubt, would imply the confusion to which Professor Smith refers between thought about the epistemological significance of presentations and the psychological nature of presentations themselves as actual facts. I confess I can hardly regard such confusion—for such it seems to be—as very probable, and yet Dr. Moore, I believe, has enounced opinions about entities and relations that lend it some countenance.

I must now return to the question—from which for the moment I have digressed somewhat. What is commonly meant by the relation of presentation? The meaning I have given to presentation is that given by Locke to *idea*, by Kant, Herbart, and Schopenhauer to *Vorstellung*, by Avenarius to *das Vorgefundene*; it is, in other words, what in individual experience we mean by object or *Gegenstand*, and the prepositions *vor*, *ob*, *gegen* disclose our endeavour to figure out the relation that the term implies by the only relations that we can distinctly intuit. We talk of the relation of presentation, but really presentation is itself for experience the ultimate relation—that correlation of subject and object which is the real and sufficient condition of experience at all. It is not, I hold, in itself and as such a causal relation, though causal relations immediately ensue. Nor is it a static relation, for, as a matter of fact, it implies change, which again implies permanence as well as continuity. The subject persists and changes; the object likewise persists and changes—this is the meaning of experience. The two together, acting and reacting, constitute a whole for every experient. Subject and object, ego and non-ego, are all there is for it. When, then, we talk of a sensation, we mean, I think, primarily and properly, a change in the objective whole or *continuum objectivum*, as I have ventured to call it. We might inquire whether in this continuum a change would be possible that made no difference to the subject;



to seek the limit here is, however, an idle pursuit. Like many limits, it would verge on the contradictory; as a change in the presentational continuum, it would be a presentation,—in the simplest case, a sensation; as having no appreciable relation to the subject, it would be an unrepresented presentation. All we need to note is that when the subject *is* definitely aware of a sensation his attitude implies an existential judgment. It rains, it warms, it chills, etc. What is asserted is here an event, not a subjective affection, but an objective change. Yet, thanks to the persistence and continuity of experience, changes never leave it quite what it was; in a word, we come here upon what we call plasticity, subconsciousness, memory, etc. If facts of this order had been what Dr. Moore means by “unrepresented sensation,” we should not be puzzled; but his reference to the sensation that ceases to be presented when the stimulating spark expires hardly favours such an interpretation. Further, if we take account of subconsciousness, we might talk of a presented sensation, meaning something different from a mere sensation, viz., a revived or reproduced sensation, but, for reasons well known to us all, we should call it no longer a sensation but an image or representation. All the sensations we now have—and taking account of heredity, it may be said, all the sensations we ever had—imply some previous presentational events. But, again, it is doubtful if facts of this sort were in Dr. Moore’s mind; and I question, therefore, Dr. Dawes Hicks’ conjecture that Dr. Moore “is convinced the given sensation did exist before it was ‘presented to me.’” Anyhow, otherwise such terms as presented sensation, presented image, if they are not pleonastic, only leave me, like Professor Smith, utterly mystified as to what precisely Dr. Moore intends by presentation.

In Dr. Dawes Hicks’ contribution, with most of which I agree, I find one difficulty. To refute Dr. Moore, he works back from what might be called an epistemological standpoint. A rose is supposed to be “presented” to three percipients,

A, B, C, and to appear to them as respectively  $r_1$ ,  $r_2$ ,  $r_n$ , and then to the question, "what relation have  $r_1$ ,  $r_2$ ,  $r_n$ , to A, B, C, respectively?" he replies that  $r_1$  is the way in which R appears to A,  $r_2$  the way in which R appears to B, and so on. He then continues, and herein consists his refutation of Dr. Moore:—"If  $r_1$  comes to be only in and through A's act of perceiving R, then . . . it is inconceivable that it should continue to be when that act has ceased." But is it the case that the appearance of R came to be only in and through the act of perceiving? Can  $r_1$  be at once the way in which A *apprehends* R and also the way in which R *appears* to A? A long chapter in psychology is here passed over in a sentence, and till that is concluded, I do not see how we can talk, either of the presentation of R or of its appearance to A. The difficulties Dr. Hicks finds in Mr. Johnson's account of "presentation" are largely, I fancy, the consequence of neglecting this chapter. Object for psychology is one thing, object for epistemology quite another. In the case of the one object the subject is purely receptive, in the case of the other it is largely constructive, and the task implied is beyond the power of the individual percipient.

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## XV.—RELATION AND COHERENCE.

By L. S. STEBBING.

## I.

I THINK it was James who said that "relation is a very slippery word," owing to the fact that it has so many different concrete meanings, and certainly it must be admitted that it is a very vague term, since it may be used for *any* connexion between terms, and, while the terms may be defined, the relation is taken for granted. Yet, the question of relations is of the utmost importance for philosophy, since the decision between a monistic and a pluralistic interpretation of reality turns mainly upon the question as to the nature and reality of relations. What is meant by relatedness, and can it be said that there is a *Universe*, *i.e.*, that reality is an interrelated whole? The examination of this problem will afford the basis either of monism or of pluralism.

Clearly relations imply entities, or terms which are related (*i.e.*, *referent* and *relatum*). Thus "motherhood" implies "mother" and "child," "greater than" implies two magnitudes, "different from" implies two perceivable entities, and so on. Conversely, there can be no entity without relation, *i.e.*, absolute being without *any* relation is inconceivable.

Mr. Bradley, by his attack on the *reality* of relations, began a controversy which has now passed into at least its second stage. The argument with which Mr. Bradley attempted to disprove the reality of relation has aroused various replies, and it is unnecessary to repeat the substance of these replies, for, although some of them show no indication of an understanding of the problem,

some have shown clearly enough that Mr. Bradley's position is untenable. The rejoinder which Professor Bosanquet has made to some of these contentions, notably to Mr. Russell's, in the second edition of his *Logic*, seems to me unconvincing, chiefly because Professor Bosanquet insists so much upon *ultimate* reality. But this whole conception of an *ultimate* reality which has to be contrasted with a *not-ultimate* reality seems vicious, and it is likely to raise problems which, by the nature of the case, it cannot solve, and problems, moreover, which are wholly gratuitous. The point, however, which I wish to emphasize here is that I do not deny the *reality* of relations, and this is common ground with James and with the new realists. Also, I hope to show that Professor Bosanquet is able to deny relations only of an *ultimate* reality which would be the negation of all that seems to me important and fruitful in the conception of a concrete unity. The question, then, is not as to the *reality* of relations but as to their nature.

## II.

In his *Principles of Mathematics* Mr. Russell came to the conclusion that "asymmetrical relations are unintelligible on both the usual theories of relations." These theories are that relations are *either* mental *or* internal. The first theory needs no discussion, for it seems to me that Mr. Russell and others have conclusively shown that relations are *not* mental, and that they are real, as real as their terms. To deny this is to confuse reality with existence. But from the denial that relations are *internal*, Mr. Russell draws the conclusion that "*no relation ever modifies either of its terms.*"\* To this theory he has since given the name of "*the doctrine or axiom of external relations.*"

Mr. Russell has himself summed up the opposition between the two theories, and it may be as well to begin by quoting his exposition. In discussing Mr. Joachim's monistic theory of

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\* *Op. cit.*, § 426.

truth, Mr. Russell says: "If this axiom holds (*i.e.*, the axiom of internal relations), the fact that two objects have a certain relation implies complexity in each of the two objects, *i.e.*, it implies something in the "natures" of the two objects, in virtue of which they have the relation in question. According to the opposite view, which is the one that I (Mr. Russell) advocate, there are such facts as that one object has a certain relation to another, and such facts cannot in general be reduced to, or inferred from, a fact about the one object only, together with a fact about the other object only; they do not imply that the two objects have any complexity, or any *intrinsic* property distinguishing them from the two objects which do not have the relation in question."\* The two theories are generally taken to be diametrical opposites, and it will be necessary to examine each of them carefully. Before doing so, however, I want to point out that, as thus stated, the antithesis is misleading, that is to say the whole question is badly framed; it is a mistake to ask, are relations external or internal, for, once the question is asked in these terms, we are forced to answer it in terms which *assume* externality.† The point is that *relations are continuous with their terms*, and it is just this continuity which has been overlooked, and which has led, on the one hand, to Mr. Bradley's assertion that relations are unreal, and, on the other, to Mr. Russell's assertion that relations are *external to their terms*. There is, moreover, a very frequent confusion in the statement of the problem. Even James, whose discussion of Mr. Bradley's work is generally so fair, falsifies the whole problem when he says, "it really seems weird to have to argue

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\* *Philosophical Essays*, p. 161.

† Compare the similar mistake that is made in raising the question: Is the will free or not? As Bergson pointed out, once that question is raised, the deterministic answer seems to be implied. I should myself say that "freedom" and "determination" are alike categories that are meaningless in reference to will, for they have meaning only in the region of external *compulsion*. Similarly, the conceptions of *externality* and *internality* (*sic*) are inapplicable to relations.

(as I am forced now to do) for the notion that it is one sheet of paper (with its two surfaces and all that lies between) which is both under my pen and on the table while I write, the 'claim' that it is *two* sheets seems so brazen."\* But to assume that there are *two* sheets is just to assume that the relation is external to *each* of the sheets.

To begin with, I will quote Mr. Russell's own account of what he understands by the phrase "external relation," and then I will give some examples of what I mean by an "internal relation."

Mr. Russell, in defining the theory of external relations, writes: "The doctrine may be expressed by saying that (1) relatedness does not imply any corresponding complexity in the relata; (2) any given entity is a constituent of many different complexes."†

In dealing with the question of *internal* relations, I should like to say, at the outset, that the word "internal" seems to me badly chosen, even for the purposes of discussion, for it suggests an element of spatiality. The word "relevant," which Professor Bosanquet now suggests, does not seem wholly suitable, as it is not precise enough, and it is complicated with pragmatic associations. The word "*interpenetrating*" seems to me much the most suitable, because it suggests qualitative continuity, and it implies the opposite of discreteness. Some terms obviously come before us interpenetrated with their relations. The use of words in a significant sentence is an obvious example. Thus, "home" acquires a different meaning from its different contexts, and the term itself is modified by the relations into which it enters. Then again, as Descartes pointed out, the behaviour of wax is very different under different circumstances, *i.e.*, change in relation implies modification of the term—it is the essential nature of the wax which deter-

\* *Radical Empiricism*, p. 105.

† *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, VIII, No. 6, p. 158.

mines its behaviour. So, too, psychical states are qualitatively modified by the context to which they belong. Once more, a melody has interpenetrating relations. Again, the distance between two given masses and the attraction between them is a relation which is grounded in the nature of the terms, and change in the relation involves, *ipso facto*, change in the term. Finally, we may adduce the parts of a philosophical theory. It is the hope of every philosopher that his own system is so nicely adjusted that the removal of any one part will affect the whole. This, for instance, in Mr. Russell's opinion, is the case with the monistic theory of truth, which, he says, collapses like an opera hat when the axiom of internal relations is removed.

Some relations, then, are certainly internal—or, as I should prefer to say, interpenetrating. Mr. Russell, however, clearly intends to deny that any relation can be internal; in fact, he implies that the notion is absurd. There are, however, some philosophers who admit that *some* relations are internal, although they assert that most relations are external. We shall have to consider later whether there is any principle which will enable us to determine whether a given relation is internal or external, or whether this is a matter of fact to be determined empirically in each case. What is important for us now is that the admission that it is possible to conceive of an internal relation shows that the nature of a relation does not necessarily *imply* externality.

I have already pointed out that the question is badly framed, and the whole problem is thereby vitiated, for to ask the question is virtually to assume external relations which can be hooked on to terms, relations which, presumably, are as independent of their terms as are the terms of the relation. We have not terms *and* their relations, but we have terms *in* their relations; the relation is continuous with its terms, and with them forms an integral whole, or complex, or system, *i.e.*, a continuous situation. The opposite theory, however, implies discontinuity between "terms" *and* "relations," *i.e.*, it implies

discrete, independent entities, and hence is rightly considered to involve a radical pluralism—or logical atomism.

But this same error is to be found in Mr. Bradley's own discussion of the problem, for, so it seems to me, in his famous argument against the reality of relations—he treats the relations as *external* throughout. "If,"\* he says, " (the relation) is external to its terms, how can it possibly be true *of* them?" The emphasis here lies, in so far as there is a difficulty, upon "*of*." For the fact seems to be that we have not a term *and* a relation, *and* another term, but we have *two terms in relation*, two terms *interpenetrated by their relation*. Hence, there is no need of an infinite regress in which one term is related to another term, and so on. It seems to me that the way in which Mr. Bradley has stated his objection implies the very view that he is opposing, and that it is only this which has led him to deny the reality of relations, viz., that all the time he is conceiving of them as *external*.

Mr. Russell follows the same procedure, and uses the same argument to show that relations *are* external, but the argument is valid *only if* it be *assumed* that no relation can be interpenetrating. In discussing the subject-predicate theory, he argues:—

"Thus, the very proposition which was to be non-relational turns out to be, after all, relational, and to express a relation which current philosophical language would describe as purely external. For both subject and predicate are simply what they are—neither is modified by its relation to the other. To be modified by the relation could only be to have some other predicate, and hence we should be led into an endless regress. *In short, no relation ever modifies either of its terms. For if it holds between A and B, then it is between A and B that it holds, and to say that it modifies A and B is to say that it really holds between different terms C and D. To say that two terms which*

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\* *Appearance and Reality*, p. 575.



*are related would be different if they were not related is to say something perfectly barren; for if they were different they would be other, and it would not be the terms in question, but a different pair, that would be unrelated.* The notion that a term can be modified arises from neglect to observe the eternal self-identity of all terms, and all logical concepts, which alone form the constituents of propositions. What is called modification consists merely in having at one time, but not at another, some specific relation to some specific term; but the term which sometimes has and sometimes has not the relation in question must be unchanged, otherwise it would not be that term which had ceased to have the relation.”\*

Now, this argument assumes the point at issue, for the statements which I have italicised are true only if no term can be interpenetrated by its relation, *i.e.*, only if all the terms are self-identical units (bare identities). Certainly logical symbols are such, and the terms used by mathematicians. Thus, 7 may be self-identical, and may be precisely the same whether it appear as  $(7-5)$  or as  $(7+8-9)$ , and so on. But it is a sheer assumption that *all* terms are of this sort, and it is an even more extreme assumption that all the entities in the universe are logical *terms*. Nowhere does Mr. Russell justify this assumption.†

If, then, we have terms in relation, these terms will be capable of changing their relations, and of assuming other relations, some of which are very superficial, and some of which are essential. Now, a relation that is essential to a term is a relation which is “grounded in the nature of the term,” whereas a superficial relation may well appear to be an external relation. It is obvious that it here becomes important to explain what is meant by “*essential* to a term.” By *essential* we may mean merely what is relevant to the purpose, but this

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\* *Op. cit.*, § 426. Italics mine.

† See below, p. 474.

pragmatic meaning I do not wish to discuss, for it is clearly irrelevant to our present purpose. What is essential to a term is what is involved in the meaning of the term, so that alteration in essence is *ipso facto* alteration in the term itself. This is not merely a question of *names*, for, provided that we had complete and satisfactory knowledge, then *names* (or *concepts*) would express essential reality. But Mr. Russell, as we have seen, regards any modification whatsoever of a term as a substitution of one term for another, and this is to assume a plurality of absolute and self-identical terms which *can* be related only externally if at all.

But if it be admitted that *some* relations are internal, then this part, at least, of Mr. Russell's argument breaks down. Consequently, the second part of Mr. Russell's axiom would also break down—(viz., "any given entity is a constituent of many different complexes"). From this breakdown, I believe, important philosophical consequences would follow.

### III.

Before I go on to these consequences, however, I should like to discuss Mr. Russell's criticism of the axiom he rejects:—

(1) He begins by deducing from the axiom the consequence that, if the theory of internal relations be true, then there are not many things, but only one thing. I should certainly accept this, if it mean that there are not many independent simples, but one inter-related whole. But it is necessary to point out here that Mr. Russell's implication that the theory implies that a relation can "be inferred from, or reduced to, a fact about the one object only, together with a fact about the other object only," is not justifiable, for this is *not* asserted. Even if the nature of reality were such that *complete* knowledge of any object implied complete knowledge of the whole, it would *not* follow that from a knowledge of *one* fact *all* knowledge could be inferred.

(2) Mr. Russell's two main objections are: (a) Relations cannot be reduced to adjectives. This is true, but it does not prove what Mr. Russell claims, for the relation is not to be regarded as a quality of its terms, but as their inter-relatedness. The point is that we have not abstract particulars related to abstract universals; we have terms which, entering into new and unfamiliar relations, are modified. Nor would it follow that every relation is bound up with every quality, but, on the other hand, it is by no means proved that a change in a given relation of any concrete object might take place without affecting any of its qualities, or its other relations. Of course, a superficial relation would involve only a superficial change, and one which might well be imperceivable. Nor is it always easy to draw the line between a quality and a relation. Thus *yellowness* is a quality, and *distance* is a relation, but what is *weight*? Nevertheless, I do not wish to assert that relations are qualities, or adjectives, of their terms, either taken separately or together. Rather, indeed, the real existence of the terms independently of the relation is necessary if they are to enter into the relation. It is, I think, from looking at the terms *before* they enter into the relation, that the impression of their externality arises. Thus, to take the relation of fatherhood, the relation is external to a man before he becomes a father, but it is in no sense external to the father; the complex can, indeed, only be understood in virtue of the context in which both terms appear.\* (b) Secondly, Mr. Russell asserts that the theory of internal relations is "incompatible with all complexity." This, however, is only true if it be *assumed* that the conception of identity-in-difference is meaningless, and that is just the point at issue. I shall return to this later.

In his *Lowell Lectures* Mr. Russell presses the same objection under the form that the denial of external relation

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\* Cf. Bosanquet, *Logic*, II, p. 278.

involves the statement that "*there can never be two facts concerning the same thing*," and he goes on to say: "A fact concerning a thing always is or involves a relation to one or more entities; thus, two facts concerning the same thing would involve two relations of the same thing. But the doctrine in question holds that a thing is so modified by its relations that it cannot be the same in one relation as in another. Hence, if this doctrine is true, there can never be more than one fact concerning any one thing. I do not think the philosophers in question have realised that this is the precise statement of the view they advocate."\* Certainly they do not! First we may ask—What is a *fact*? and what is a *thing*? Mr. Russell takes the relation of fatherhood and argues that, according to our theory—"when a man becomes a father his nature is altered by the relation in which he finds himself, so that he is not strictly identical with the man who was previously not a father." What does Mr. Russell mean here by "strictly identical"? Certainly the man—a concrete human being—is continuously identical, but the relation of fatherhood is not external to the *father*; it is external to the *man before* he is a father, as I have already pointed out. A relation is external only if, and in so far as, terms can be considered *out* of relation. Terms in relation are, however, interpenetrated by their relations, and are capable of entering into a given relation only by virtue of some positive nature. Thus, as Bosanquet points out, we cannot ask the distance between London Bridge and one o'clock. When, again, Mr. Russell argues that our doctrine "would require that a man who is a father cannot be strictly identical with a man who is a son, because he is modified in one way by the relation of fatherhood and in another by that of sonship," he is simply assuming once more that we assert *both* (1) that no term can be in two relations, *and* (2) that this is so *because* the

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\* Pp. 150-151.

relations are external. Of course, "a man who is a father" is not *strictly identical* with "a man who is a son," but in what sense would Mr. Russell assert that he is? A concrete individual, capable of being characterised both by "fatherhood" and "sonship," is in some sense an identical individual, but he is not an abstract identical entity such as Mr. Russell seems to require. It is the regarding of the relations as abstract that gives rise to the difficulty. If X is father of Y, then X and Y are related by the relation of fatherhood, but to suppose that X is in turn related to X's fatherhood of Y is to insert a new relation, and thereby to make the relation itself one of the terms of a relation, and so on, endlessly. This is what Mr. Bradley does, and thus he reaches an infinite regress. And Mr. Russell makes the same mistake. If, then, we do not assert that relations are properly to be called either *internal* or *external*, it is because we have to realise that we have not terms *and* relations but terms *in* relations, *i.e.*, terms interpenetrated by their relations, which are continuous with their terms.

#### IV.

Anyone who accepts Mr. Russell's account of a *term*, to which reference has already been made, will think that it is sheer nonsense to speak of a "*term interpenetrated by relations*," and, of course, *if* Mr. Russell is correct, it would obviously be absurd. Yet, it is impossible to rule out interpenetration *ab initio* by a definition of logical terms. The conception of internal or interpenetrating relations implies the conception of what has been variously termed "identity-in-difference," "unity-in-difference," "concrete universal," or concrete unity. I should myself prefer to use the fourth of these expressions. But the phrases are apt to arouse ridicule and contempt, and Mr. Russell, for instance, has treated the Hegelian conception of "identity-in-difference" as virtually dependent upon a pun, *viz.*, "upon confusing the 'is' of predication, as in 'Socrates

is mortal,' with the 'is' of identity, as in 'Socrates is the philosopher who drank the hemlock.'"<sup>\*</sup> Certainly it is clear that if no relation can be other than external, then such a conception as identity-in-diversity, or, as I should prefer to say, concrete unity, is meaningless; on the other hand, the conception of an interpenetrating relation would appear to be invalid if there be nothing but simple entities (or bare identities) externally related.

Now, in his discussion of this problem, Professor Bosanquet seems to me to make a most damaging and quite unnecessary admission, and one, moreover, which is, I think, quite inconsistent with his own view. The admission is that "'in the end,' that is to say, in any experience for which objects are self-contained, and cease to transcend themselves," identity-in-difference "must go," and he adds: "What our pluralist realists are grasping at is therefore justly anticipated. Undoubtedly the Real is self-complete and self-contained. But I insist on the words 'in the end' because it is their repudiation of them that I take to be the root of their failure. They are the extreme Absolutists. They are not content to have the Absolute 'in the end,' as we more modestly claim it, not meaning after a lapse of time, but in so far as what are fragments for us point out to us a completion beyond them. And there is surely a difference of completeness in different experiences. But they will have the Absolute here and now; and to make it handy and adaptable for everyday use they split it into little bits. A universe of tiny Absolutes; that is really what they offer us. But if any of these Absolutes imply any term beyond themselves their absolutism breaks down."<sup>†</sup>

One wonders, on reading this, how a "bare identity"—an identity excluding difference, can be *self-complete* and *self-con-*

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<sup>\*</sup> *Lowell Lectures*, p. 39 n. Mr. Russell clearly means by the "is" of identity bare numerical identity, a notion that is taken to exclude any diversity.

<sup>†</sup> *Logic*, II, p. 279.

*tained*. Apparently, Professor Bosanquet's reason for denying that completed experience is an identity-in-difference is that such an identity requires terms which imply something beyond themselves. But it is obvious that self-contained terms and *relations between them* can never yield anything which could be described as a concrete identity. Rather, I should say, reality is self-contained and self-complete, because it *is* a completed system which has nothing outside itself to which it can stand in relations.\* Now, a self-determining system is just what is meant by an identity-in-difference, and as such it cannot be the distinctionless unity in which Professor Bosanquet ends. And surely it is odd to suppose that at the beginning we are in possession of a richly diversified whole, which "in the end," and as we progressively advance, loses its unity and its diversity and becomes a bare, distinctionless, undiversified Absolute. Yet, this supposition seems to be the common property of idealist monistic writers. Mr. Bradley also seems to want absolute identity without any difference, without "a shade of diversity."

This same erroneous supposition works havoc of Mr. Joachim's theory of truth, and hence brings his whole monistic universe to shipwreck, for he applies it to the distinction between the knowing mind and what is known, and concludes that this distinction cannot survive in completed experience, in which the duality of subject and object is transcended. But such a duality is, I am convinced, essential to the knowledge relation; that is to say, *knowledge as such* is relational. Yet Mr. Joachim speaks of "abolishing" the differences between the object and the knowing mind, and of "reducing" *what is experienced* to a *form of experiencing*, and he is thus led to suppose that the ideal of knowledge is some

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\* I think this implies that the universe is in some vital sense *monistic*, but I do not think that it necessarily implies that change *anywhere* implies change *everywhere*.

supra-logical form of experience in which the distinction between subject and object, knowing mind and object known, will be "overcome," and, of course, in the process, knowledge itself will be abolished. All this, however, seems to me most misleading; it is, moreover, due to an ideal of abstract identity which becomes, finally, uncommonly like the notion of identity which is defended by the pluralists. And the supposition itself is quite uncalled for. Knowledge is throughout a development of the objective, a development which implies the thoroughgoing interdependence of subject and object, of knowing mind and what it knows, and such a development not only *need* not, but *cannot*, end in an abstract distinctionless unity.

The admission, however, of this duality does not imply that there is no identity between subject and object. Rather, I should say that it is from this point of view alone that their identity can be maintained. The knowledge relation, indeed, appears to me an excellent example of an interpenetrating relation. Those who assert that the relation between the mind and its object is an external relation generally end either by introducing a *tertium quid* between the mind and what it is supposed to know, or in eliminating knowing as a *process* altogether. Hence, some of the American realists have raised the question whether the real object and its idea are numerically identical. Such a question is absurd, for there can be numerical identity only between two things of the same status. The process of knowing is not an *object* at all, and the content of an act of knowing is not an *existent*.

The cognitive relation is, indeed, unique; it is of the essence of the relation that one of its terms should be modified by entering into the relation, whereas the other should remain unaltered. For example, when I know the multiplication table, then my mind is in a cognitive relation to the multiplication table. In entering into this relation my mind is altered; how otherwise could I *know* the multiplication table? But the multiplication table—the other term of the relation—remains



unaltered; how otherwise could I know *the multiplication table*?\*

Thus, it seems to me, the attempt to regard the identity involved in the knowledge relation as an exact numerical identity excluding difference leads to the denial that the real object can be known. And yet it is surely the central assertion of realism—what it chiefly stands for—that in knowing the mind is in direct contact with the real. The contention that the object of the knowing act, *i.e.*, the real object, is independent of the knowing of it, so that, in some sense, “experience makes no difference to the facts,” seems to me indisputable, if by that be meant only that the function of knowledge is to reveal the nature of objects, not to constitute them. But this revelation would be impossible were the relation of the knower to what he knows purely external. The conception of identity-in-difference, then, finds an example in the concrete unity of *mind-knowing-object*, in which neither term is reduced to the other; together they form a concrete unity.

## V.

If, then, the conception of concrete unity is not intrinsically absurd it becomes important to consider its bearing upon the allied problems of monism *versus* pluralism, and the coherence theory of truth. The question I want to put is, whether systematic coherence or logical atomism affords a more adequate interpretation of reality. James thought that monism or pluralism was a matter of temperament, and this may be so. I have no wish to deny it, but one always has a hope that it is one's own temperament that is rational and one's opponent's that is not!

We have seen that Mr. Russell defines “term” and “relation” in such a way as to imply that all relations are external.† But if it be admitted that some relations may be “internal,”

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\* I owe this example to Professor G. Dawes Hicks.

† See p. 465.

then much of Mr. Russell's argument breaks down, and we can no longer speak of the "*axiom* of external relations." If this be true, then we are certainly not entitled to assume that Mr. Russell's definition of a "term" is adequate, nor that it would apply to all the entities in the universe. The eternal self-identity, the absolute imperviousness of one term to any other, may be necessary for mathematical logic, but is it not a pure assumption that all entities are of the nature of these logical terms which can be simply juxtaposed? That mathematical terms are obviously of this nature is probably one cause of the prevalence of the "*axiom*" among those philosophers who are primarily mathematicians. It is not at all evident, for instance, that *blue* and *red* are logically incompatible; rather, I should say that *logically* they are not incompatible although *physically* they may be. That is to say, we cannot tell what sense-qualities will combine except through an empirical investigation, and apart from this we do not know what modification of an entity is possible.

For instance, when we say, to quote James, that *book-on-table* is not the same book as *book-on-floor* (from the logical point of view\*), we are really entering a protest against abstracting the book *quâ spatial unit*, and then saying that its spatial nature is unaffected by the relations into which it enters. But the book may now, as Professor Bosanquet points out, form a new pattern.† This defence seems trivial merely because the change of relation is trivial, and hence the change in the term is trivial. This, however, is only to repeat that some relations are extremely superficial, and hence the changes which they introduce are superficial. Yet I submit that the *logical*

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\* James rightly warns us against confusing the logical with the physical argument, but surely, *physically*, the book on the floor never is the same book as that on the table. See *Radical Empiricism* (*loc. cit.*).

† Unfortunately for the satisfactory working of the external theory, some of the immediate data of sense do not appear to have the characteristics of logical terms. Thus, two slightly different colours may appear (*i.e.*, may be apprehended as being) precisely similar, but when

position is not proved, and that for the rest the proof can be only empirical. Now, take the book in another set of relations, for example, Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* in relation to an idealist of Bradley's school of thought, and then Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* in relation to a pluralist realist of Mr. Russell's school. Surely, here, the *book as an intelligible whole* literally is *not* the same to the one philosopher as it is to the other. This is shown, for instance, by the fact that the one finds it to be intelligible and important, whereas the other finds it "nonsense"; while a third reader, say myself, finds it not absurd but largely wrong! It is no answer to this to urge that I am confusing (my-whole-reaction-to-the-book) with the (book-itself), for my point is that there is not a *book itself* apart from how it is understood, where it is placed, and so on. The denial of this cannot be established merely by an *ex cathedra* application of an axiom of external relations.

It is, I repeat, simply an assumption that *no* change of quality follows a change of relation. Of course, in so far as abstraction is legitimate, then certain changes in relations need not necessarily involve change in all the qualities of the thing; whether it is so, or not, must be decided empirically in each case. This contention may be applied to the relation between mind and the world, or rather to the relation between existing minds and the world that is known. I have endeavoured to maintain that the mind knows objects which are independent of their being known. Nevertheless, this independence does not, I think, involve such a complete severance of mind from its objects that change in the relation would involve no corresponding change in the objects. For it is

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the first is compared with the third, which is again so little different from the second as to be indistinguishable from it, nevertheless the first may be distinguishable from the third. But if this is the case, then is it not reasonable to suppose that some entities have not the characteristics of logical terms? This point is well worked out by Mrs. Adrian Stephen, *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., vol. 5, pp. 277-282,

certainly not evident that the removal of mind from the realm of existence would leave these objects unaffected. Is it not possible that the universe may be a concrete unity such that the removal of a constituent so important as mind would involve change in the remainder of the universe? Such a concrete unity would be a rational system, in which there was reciprocal interpenetration and independence.

## VI.

Now, this conception of concrete unity is much more important than even Professor Bosanquet and Mr. Joachim realise. For, though the conception is vital to their theory of truth as coherence, yet neither of them maintains it to the end. As we have seen, Professor Bosanquet abandons it and gives freely to the pluralists all that they demand—with the saving phrase “in the end.” Mr. Bradley and Mr. Joachim also sigh for an unknowable and inconceivable blank identity, since they too conceive of unity as the annulling of differences.

Against their procedure two criticisms must be urged, the first of which I have already touched upon. What is the meaning of, and where is the warrant for, a distinction between “reality” and “ultimate reality?” What is meant by the assertion that coherence is an adequate account of the nature of truth “here and now” but not “in the end”? This way of looking at the matter seems to me radically mistaken. I can myself attribute no significance to the phrase “ultimate reality” unless it be taken to mean a “more complete and, therefore, later knowledge of reality.” Yet this is obviously not the sense required by the theory we are discussing. If, however, this conception of ultimate reality

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\* This will certainly be true if there is any meaning whatever in the conception of reality, as a connected whole, within which rational system is exhibited, and I do not see that any argument brought forward by pluralists has disproved this.

be illegitimate, then we cannot say that there are *degrees of reality*, although there may be degrees of truth. Even in the latter case I think the phrase is unhappily chosen. Still there are clearly two different points here and I will take each separately. Reality cannot have degrees; what is real cannot be more or less real. The reason why Mr. Bradley and Professor Bosanquet, for instance, assert the contrary seems to be that they assume that "real" is the same as "important."\* Secondly, truth is not existent and is not equivalent to existence. I think that all the idealist writers whom I have been considering err by attributing an existential character to truth, and by supposing that elements of truth and elements of existing reality are fused together, in some such way as existing elements might be fused. Yet, it is just the characteristic of truth that, being neither mental nor physical, it does not exist, and consequently the characteristics of existing reality cannot be predicated of it.† Truth, if by that we mean all that is true, is whole and complete, and what is true cannot be more or less true. But our apprehension of the real may be more or less adequate, hence more or less true, and in this sense, and in this sense only, truth can have degrees. In fact, every judgment that we make may need correction, almost certainly will, in the light of further knowledge. It is undoubtedly in the region of mathematical truths that we get the "truest" statements, and hence it is to be regretted that Mr. Joachim selected as his test case the trite judgment " $2 + 2 = 4$ ." Yet, even Mr. Russell's sarcastic comments with reference to Mr. Joachim's theory have some element of truth, for the same form of words may

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\* Thus, Professor Bosanquet says, "importance and reality are sides of the same characteristics." *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 5.

† I am aware that the meaning of "existence" needs to be carefully explained if this statement is to be clear. Provisionally, I should accept Mr. Russell's distinction between "existent" and "subsistent." The point is, that the nature of the being which truth has is quite different from that of "minds," and from that of "reality" as a whole. I hope to return some day to this point.

express judgments of different value. Thus, if I make a historical judgment under reservation, then it is more likely to be true than if it were stated unconditionally. Of course the reservation is not going to give you knowledge as to *which part* or *how much* of your judgment is true.\* It would certainly be better to say, not that there are degrees of truth, but more precisely that there are degrees in which a judgment may be true.

Moreover, if truth is not an existent, and if reality is a connected whole, or concrete unity, then where is the need for the subject and the predicate to coalesce? There is nothing in the nature of knowledge—which is always about entities that are not constituents of the judgment—that prevents it from being complete, *i.e.* completely true. If, again, it is the nature of truth to be coherent, then reality is either coherent or unknowable. But, if reality is unknowable, it cannot interest us, and neither the philosopher nor the scientist could, in that case, treat it as other than *unreal*. Hence we may assume that reality is coherent, that is, it is a systematic or connected whole. This is undoubtedly the assumption upon which the scientist works; if the “facts” will not “fit in,” then new principles are devised, so strong is the scientist’s conviction that the physical world is a connected whole to which the term “physical *universe*” can be applied. Mr. Russell recognises the success of physical theory, but he seems to me to fail to draw out its implications.†

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\* See *Philosophical Essays*, p. 155. “If I affirm, with a ‘confident belief in the truth of my knowledge,’ that Bishop Stubbs used to wear episcopal gaiters, that is an error; if a monistic philosopher, remembering that all finite truth is only partially true, affirms that Bishop Stubbs was hanged for murder, that is not an error.” Certainly I should say that if we were to say, “We can’t accept all the stories about German callousness, since they have only an element of truth in them,” we are in a better *cognitive attitude* than if we swallowed them all wholesale and unconditionally.

† See *Lowell Lectures*, p. 218, and *cf.* the *Spencer Lecture*.

With regard, then, to the problem of the coherence theory I should assert all of the following propositions:—

- (1) Reality is such that it can be known.
- (2) This knowledge of reality is what is meant by truth.
- (3) Truth, then, is not identical with reality, nor does it exist.
- (4) The adjective *logical* cannot be predicated of reality as a whole, but only of truth.
- (5) Reality is a concrete unity within which is truth or knowledge, which is an interconnected system in which the whole affects every part, although a part *quid* part can be true.

It would follow from the last of these propositions that truth is a whole, in the sense that there is no test of truth but "the fuller truth." This is what is true and important in Professor Bosanquet's theory of the "truth as the whole"; his difficulties arise, I think, entirely from his confusion of truth with reality, and with existence. Once this confusion is removed, I think the difficulties are lessened.

## VII.

Finally, I began by saying that the two opposed theories as to the nature of relations, which we have been examining, afford the basis respectively of pluralism and of monism. I do not think that either of these labels is an appropriate or convenient one for the view which seems to me most likely to be correct. Not *monism*, because in the hands of Mr. Bradley and of Mr. Joachim, and, to some extent, in those of Professor Bosanquet also, this label has come to denote a distinctionless unity which, as I have pointed out, appears to be meaningless. Not *pluralism* again, for in the hands of Mr. Russell this label has come to denote a *multiverse* in which atomistic entities jostle atomistic entities—if indeed "jostle" be not too intimate a term!

Nor is the repudiation of these labels idle, for the conception of concrete unity, which seems to me fundamental, is rejected

by both these schools of thought, by the one as meaningless absurdity, by the other as a conception valid "here and now" but not "in the end." But, as I have tried to show, once the conception is seriously taken and consistently maintained throughout, then many of the difficulties of the coherence theory disappear. In particular, the difficulty of assuming that knowing confers existence upon the objects known is overcome, for it arises from the false assumption that "only like can know like." Another difficulty that may well be dispelled is that arising from the confusion of truth with existing reality, namely, that truth can never attain its ideal. Moreover, this line of reflection opens up to us the possibility of the unification of existing minds through the content of knowledge. Suppose, for example, that each of us knew reality completely, then would there not be through the identity of the content of knowledge a unity of individuals? Each individual would know a coherent system of truth, but, as a knower, each would be distinct from every other. Thus we should have unity while yet preserving that multiplicity as existents which is the most important element of pluralism. On the other hand, we should avoid that absorption of the individual which is the nemesis of any Absolute. In this way, existence and truth would form a concrete unity in which unification and diversity would remain. On the one hand, this concrete unity would transcend ultimate or radical pluralism; on the other, it would preserve that differentiation of elements which is surely necessary for a significant whole. In spite, therefore, of Mr. Russell's ridicule, the conception of concrete unity does seem to me to be one valid for thought and pregnant for philosophy, for it means the conception of the universe as a connected whole capable of being known because it is a rational system.

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## RULES OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

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### NAME.

I.—This Society shall be called “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY,” or, for a short title, “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.”

### OBJECTS.

II.—The object of this Society shall be the systematic study of Philosophy; 1st, as to its historic development; 2nd, as to its methods and problems.

### CONSTITUTION.

III.—This Society shall consist of a President, Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, a Secretary, and Members. Every Ex-President shall be a Vice-President. The business of the Society shall be managed by an Executive Committee consisting of the President, the Treasurer, the Secretary, and six members elected in accordance with Rule VIII.

### SUBSCRIPTION.

IV.—The annual subscription shall be one guinea, due at the first meeting in each session.

### ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.

V.—Any person desirous of becoming a member of the ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY shall apply to the Secretary or other officer of the Society, who shall lay the application before the Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee, if they think fit, shall admit the candidate to membership.

## CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

VI.—Foreigners may be elected as corresponding members of the Society. They shall be nominated by the Executive Committee, and notice having been given at one ordinary meeting, their nomination shall be voted upon at the next meeting, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for their election. Corresponding members shall not be liable to the annual subscription, and shall not vote.

## ELECTION OF OFFICERS.

VII.—The Committee shall nominate the President, the Treasurer, and the Secretary for the ensuing session, and shall, at the Annual Meeting, submit the nominations for the approval of the Society.

## ELECTION OF COMMITTEE.

VIII.—At the same meeting the six members to constitute with the officers the Executive Committee shall be elected by ballot. Nominations, which must be signed by two members of the Society, must reach the Secretary fourteen days before the meeting, and a balloting paper shall be sent to all members. Members may return their balloting papers by post before the meeting or hand them in at the meeting.

Should a vacancy occur at any other time, the Committee may co-opt a member to serve for the remainder of the Session.

## SESSIONS AND MEETINGS.

IX.—The ordinary meetings of the Society shall be on the first Monday in every month from November to June, unless otherwise ordered by the Committee. Such a course shall constitute a session. Special meetings may be ordered by resolution of the Society or shall be called by the President whenever requested in writing by four or more members.

## BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.

X.—At the last meeting in each session the Executive Committee shall report and the Treasurer shall make a financial statement, and present his accounts audited by two members appointed by the Society at a previous meeting.

## BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.

XI.—Except at the first meeting in each session, when the President or a Vice-President shall deliver an address, the study of Philosophy in both departments shall be pursued by means of discussion, so that every member may take an active part in the work of the Society.

## PROCEEDINGS.

XII.—The Executive Committee are entrusted with the care of publishing or providing for the publication of a selection of the papers read each session before the Society.

## BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.

XIII.—No resolution affecting the general conduct of the Society and not already provided for by Rule XV shall be put unless notice has been given and the resolution read at the previous meeting, and unless a quorum of five members be present.

## VISITORS.

XIV.—Visitors may be introduced to the meetings by members.

## AMENDMENTS.

XV.—Notices to amend these rules shall be in writing and must be signed by two members. Amendments must be announced at an ordinary meeting, and, notice having been given to all the members, they shall be voted upon at the next ordinary meeting, when they shall not be carried unless two-thirds of the votes cast are in their favour.

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LIST OF OFFICERS FOR THE  
THIRTY-NINTH SESSION, 1917-1918.

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THE COUNCIL.

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H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1894-1898).

G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1899-1904).

VERY REV. DEAN HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A. (President, 1904-1907).

RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT HALDANE OF CLOAN, O.M., K.T., LL.D., F.R.S., F.B.A. (President, 1907-1908).

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